San Francisco State University
Press Release
Originally released June 23, 2015
Consciousness -- the internal dialogue that seems to govern one's thoughts and actions -- is far less powerful than people believe, serving as a passive conduit rather than an active force that exerts control, according to a new theory proposed by an SF State researcher.
Associate Professor of Psychology Ezequiel Morsella's "Passive Frame Theory" suggests that the conscious mind is like an interpreter helping speakers of different languages communicate.
"The interpreter presents the information but is not the one making any arguments or acting upon the knowledge that is shared," Morsella said. "Similarly, the information we perceive in our consciousness is not created by conscious processes, nor is it reacted to by conscious processes. Consciousness is the middle-man, and it doesn't do as much work as you think."
Morsella and his coauthors' groundbreaking theory, published online on June 22 by the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences, contradicts intuitive beliefs about human consciousness and the notion of self.
The entire pressor is here.
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
‘Ethical responsibility’ or ‘a whole can of worms’
Differences in opinion on incidental finding review and disclosure in neuroimaging research from focus group discussions with participants, parents, IRB members, investigators, physicians and community members
Caitlin Cole, Linda E Petree, John P Phillips, Jody M Shoemaker, Mark Holdsworth, Deborah L Helitzer
J Med Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102552
Abstract
Purpose
To identify the specific needs, preferences and expectations of the stakeholders impacted by returning neuroimaging incidental findings to research participants.
Methods
Six key stakeholder groups were identified to participate in focus group discussions at our active neuroimaging research facility: Participants, Parents of child participants, Investigators, Institutional Review Board (IRB) Members, Physicians and Community Members. A total of 151 subjects attended these discussions. Transcripts were analysed using principles of Grounded Theory and group consensus coding.
Results
A series of similar and divergent themes were identified across our subject groups. Similarities included beliefs that it is ethical for researchers to disclose incidental findings as it grants certain health and emotional benefits to participants. All stakeholders also recognised the potential psychological and financial risks to disclosure. Divergent perspectives elucidated consistent differences between our ‘Participant’ subjects (Participants, Parents, Community Members) and our ‘Professional’ subjects (IRB Members, Investigators and Physicians). Key differences included (1) what results should be reported, (2) participants’ autonomous right to research information and (3) the perception of the risk–benefit ratio in managing results.
Conclusions
Understanding the perceived impact on all stakeholders involved in the process of disclosing incidental findings is necessary to determine appropriate research management policy. Our data further demonstrate the challenge of this task as different stakeholders evaluate the balance between risk and benefit related to their unique positions in this process. These findings offer some of the first qualitative insight into the expectations of the diverse stakeholders affected by incidental finding disclosure.
The entire article is here.
Caitlin Cole, Linda E Petree, John P Phillips, Jody M Shoemaker, Mark Holdsworth, Deborah L Helitzer
J Med Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102552
Abstract
Purpose
To identify the specific needs, preferences and expectations of the stakeholders impacted by returning neuroimaging incidental findings to research participants.
Methods
Six key stakeholder groups were identified to participate in focus group discussions at our active neuroimaging research facility: Participants, Parents of child participants, Investigators, Institutional Review Board (IRB) Members, Physicians and Community Members. A total of 151 subjects attended these discussions. Transcripts were analysed using principles of Grounded Theory and group consensus coding.
Results
A series of similar and divergent themes were identified across our subject groups. Similarities included beliefs that it is ethical for researchers to disclose incidental findings as it grants certain health and emotional benefits to participants. All stakeholders also recognised the potential psychological and financial risks to disclosure. Divergent perspectives elucidated consistent differences between our ‘Participant’ subjects (Participants, Parents, Community Members) and our ‘Professional’ subjects (IRB Members, Investigators and Physicians). Key differences included (1) what results should be reported, (2) participants’ autonomous right to research information and (3) the perception of the risk–benefit ratio in managing results.
Conclusions
Understanding the perceived impact on all stakeholders involved in the process of disclosing incidental findings is necessary to determine appropriate research management policy. Our data further demonstrate the challenge of this task as different stakeholders evaluate the balance between risk and benefit related to their unique positions in this process. These findings offer some of the first qualitative insight into the expectations of the diverse stakeholders affected by incidental finding disclosure.
The entire article is here.
Monday, July 13, 2015
Chimpanzees can tell right from wrong
By Richard Gray
Daily Mail Online
Originally published June 26, 2015
They are our closest relatives in the animal kingdom, capable of using tools and solving problems much like their human cousins, but it appears chimpanzees also share our sense of morality too.
A new study of the apes reacting to an infant chimp being killed by another group has shown the animals have a strong sense of right and wrong.
The researchers found chimpanzees reacted to videos showing the violent scenes in a similar way to humans.
The entire article is here.
Daily Mail Online
Originally published June 26, 2015
They are our closest relatives in the animal kingdom, capable of using tools and solving problems much like their human cousins, but it appears chimpanzees also share our sense of morality too.
A new study of the apes reacting to an infant chimp being killed by another group has shown the animals have a strong sense of right and wrong.
The researchers found chimpanzees reacted to videos showing the violent scenes in a similar way to humans.
The entire article is here.
How national security gave birth to bioethics
By Jonathan D. Moreno
The Conversation
Originally posted June 8, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Ironically, while the experiments in Guatemala were going on in the late 1940s, three American judges were hearing the arguments in a war crimes trial in Germany. Twenty-three Nazi doctors and bureaucrats were accused of horrific experiments on people in concentration camps.
The judges decided they needed to make the rules around human experiments clear, so as part of their decision they wrote what has come to be known as the Nuremberg Code. The code states that “the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”
The Guatemala experiments clearly violated that code. President Obama’s commission found that the US public health officials knew what they were doing was unethical, so they kept it quiet. Years later, one of those doctors had a key role in the infamous syphilis experiments in Tuskegee, Alabama that studied the progression of untreated syphilis. None of the 600 men enrolled in the experiments was told if he had syphilis or not. No one with the disease was offered penicillin, the treatment of choice for syphilis. The 40-year experiment finally ended in 1972.
The entire article is here.
The Conversation
Originally posted June 8, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Ironically, while the experiments in Guatemala were going on in the late 1940s, three American judges were hearing the arguments in a war crimes trial in Germany. Twenty-three Nazi doctors and bureaucrats were accused of horrific experiments on people in concentration camps.
The judges decided they needed to make the rules around human experiments clear, so as part of their decision they wrote what has come to be known as the Nuremberg Code. The code states that “the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”
The Guatemala experiments clearly violated that code. President Obama’s commission found that the US public health officials knew what they were doing was unethical, so they kept it quiet. Years later, one of those doctors had a key role in the infamous syphilis experiments in Tuskegee, Alabama that studied the progression of untreated syphilis. None of the 600 men enrolled in the experiments was told if he had syphilis or not. No one with the disease was offered penicillin, the treatment of choice for syphilis. The 40-year experiment finally ended in 1972.
The entire article is here.
Sunday, July 12, 2015
Please, Corporations, Experiment on Us
By Michelle N. Meyer and Christopher Chabris
The New York Times - Sunday Review
Originally posted June 19, 2015
Can it ever be ethical for companies or governments to experiment on their employees, customers or citizens without their consent?
The conventional answer — of course not! — animated public outrage last year after Facebook published a study in which it manipulated how much emotional content more than half a million of its users saw. Similar indignation followed the revelation by the dating site OkCupid that, as an experiment, it briefly told some pairs of users that they were good matches when its algorithm had predicted otherwise.
But this outrage is misguided. Indeed, we believe that it is based on a kind of moral illusion.
The entire article is here.
The New York Times - Sunday Review
Originally posted June 19, 2015
Can it ever be ethical for companies or governments to experiment on their employees, customers or citizens without their consent?
The conventional answer — of course not! — animated public outrage last year after Facebook published a study in which it manipulated how much emotional content more than half a million of its users saw. Similar indignation followed the revelation by the dating site OkCupid that, as an experiment, it briefly told some pairs of users that they were good matches when its algorithm had predicted otherwise.
But this outrage is misguided. Indeed, we believe that it is based on a kind of moral illusion.
The entire article is here.
Saturday, July 11, 2015
Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of the American Psychlogical Association
David H. Hoffman, Esq.
Danielle J. Carter, Esq.
Cara R. Viglucci Lopez, Esq.
Heather L. Benzmiller, Esq.
Ava X. Guo, Esq.
S. Yasir Latifi, Esq.
Daniel C. Craig, Esq.
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
July 2, 2015
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2014, the Board of Directors of the American Psychological Association engaged our Firm to conduct an independent review of allegations that had been made regarding APA’s issuance of ethical guidelines in 2002 and 2005, and related actions. These ethical guidelines determined whether and under what circumstances psychologists who were APA members could ethically participate in national security interrogations.
The gist of the allegations was that APA made these ethics policy decisions as a substantial result of influence from and close relationships with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other government entities, which purportedly wanted permissive ethical guidelines so that their psychologists could continue to participate in harsh and abusive interrogation techniques being used by these agencies after the September 11 attacks on the United States. Critics pointed to alleged procedural irregularities and suspicious outcomes regarding APA’s ethics policy decisions and said they resulted from this improper coordination, collaboration, or collusion. Some said APA’s decisions were intentionally made to assist the government in engaging in these “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Some said they were intentionally made to help the government commit torture.
The entire report is here.
Danielle J. Carter, Esq.
Cara R. Viglucci Lopez, Esq.
Heather L. Benzmiller, Esq.
Ava X. Guo, Esq.
S. Yasir Latifi, Esq.
Daniel C. Craig, Esq.
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
July 2, 2015
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2014, the Board of Directors of the American Psychological Association engaged our Firm to conduct an independent review of allegations that had been made regarding APA’s issuance of ethical guidelines in 2002 and 2005, and related actions. These ethical guidelines determined whether and under what circumstances psychologists who were APA members could ethically participate in national security interrogations.
The gist of the allegations was that APA made these ethics policy decisions as a substantial result of influence from and close relationships with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other government entities, which purportedly wanted permissive ethical guidelines so that their psychologists could continue to participate in harsh and abusive interrogation techniques being used by these agencies after the September 11 attacks on the United States. Critics pointed to alleged procedural irregularities and suspicious outcomes regarding APA’s ethics policy decisions and said they resulted from this improper coordination, collaboration, or collusion. Some said APA’s decisions were intentionally made to assist the government in engaging in these “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Some said they were intentionally made to help the government commit torture.
The entire report is here.
Does Brain Difference Affect Legal and Moral Responsibility?
HMS Center for Bioethics
Published on May 12, 2015
Brains create behavior. Yet we hold people, not brains, morally and legally responsible for their actions. Under what conditions could -- or should -- brain disorder affect the ways in which we assign moral and legal responsibility to a person?
In this conversation among a neuroscientist who studies moral judgement, a forensic psychiatrist, and a law professor, we explore three cases that highlight the relationship between brain disorder, law-breaking, and norms relating to responsibility.
Each case raises challenging questions: Can we establish whether the brain disorder caused the law-breaking behavior? Even if we can, is the presence of brain disorder morally or legally excusing? All behavior is caused: Why should some causes be excusing, but not others? If brain disorder can cause unlawful behavior, can we infer the reverse -- that people who behave unlawfully have disordered brains? Check out this provocative discussion on the state of the art at the intersection of neuroethics, brain science, philosophy, and the law.
Panel:
Dr. Fiery Cushman, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University. From 2011-2014 he served as a post-doctoral fellow in moral psychology, funded by the Mind, Brain and Behavior Initiative at Harvard University.
Dr. Judith Edersheim, MD, JD, is the Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Center for Law, Brain and Behavior, an Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, and an attending Psychiatrist in the Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital.
Amanda Pustilnik, JD, is the Senior Fellow in Law & Applied Neuroscience at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, a faculty member of the Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital, and an assistant professor of law at the University of Maryland School of Law.
Published on May 12, 2015
Brains create behavior. Yet we hold people, not brains, morally and legally responsible for their actions. Under what conditions could -- or should -- brain disorder affect the ways in which we assign moral and legal responsibility to a person?
In this conversation among a neuroscientist who studies moral judgement, a forensic psychiatrist, and a law professor, we explore three cases that highlight the relationship between brain disorder, law-breaking, and norms relating to responsibility.
Each case raises challenging questions: Can we establish whether the brain disorder caused the law-breaking behavior? Even if we can, is the presence of brain disorder morally or legally excusing? All behavior is caused: Why should some causes be excusing, but not others? If brain disorder can cause unlawful behavior, can we infer the reverse -- that people who behave unlawfully have disordered brains? Check out this provocative discussion on the state of the art at the intersection of neuroethics, brain science, philosophy, and the law.
Panel:
Dr. Fiery Cushman, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University. From 2011-2014 he served as a post-doctoral fellow in moral psychology, funded by the Mind, Brain and Behavior Initiative at Harvard University.
Dr. Judith Edersheim, MD, JD, is the Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Center for Law, Brain and Behavior, an Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, and an attending Psychiatrist in the Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital.
Amanda Pustilnik, JD, is the Senior Fellow in Law & Applied Neuroscience at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, a faculty member of the Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital, and an assistant professor of law at the University of Maryland School of Law.
Friday, July 10, 2015
White Coat
By Nancy Etcoff
Harvard Design Magazine
No. 40
Here is an excerpt:
Others wonder if the white coat is out of step in a culture of informality, and should be abandoned like the wigs of court dress in the United Kingdom—a topic of ongoing contention. Symbols of power and authority make people nervous, causing their blood pressure to rise (“white coat syndrome”) and their thoughts to shut down. Doctors seek compliance and trust. Today, they are taught to read emotional signals and are given empathy training. They no longer want to be intimidating authorities issuing orders, but providers offering services to clients. Fittingly, some are now wearing business attire.
But if some doctors are shedding the white coat, people in other professions are eager to put them on. They are showing up on different sorts of body experts, those found at cosmetic counters, spas, and salons, who are eager to align themselves with symbols of power and authority, and with the aura of objectivity, truth, and service.
The entire article is here.
Harvard Design Magazine
No. 40
Here is an excerpt:
Others wonder if the white coat is out of step in a culture of informality, and should be abandoned like the wigs of court dress in the United Kingdom—a topic of ongoing contention. Symbols of power and authority make people nervous, causing their blood pressure to rise (“white coat syndrome”) and their thoughts to shut down. Doctors seek compliance and trust. Today, they are taught to read emotional signals and are given empathy training. They no longer want to be intimidating authorities issuing orders, but providers offering services to clients. Fittingly, some are now wearing business attire.
But if some doctors are shedding the white coat, people in other professions are eager to put them on. They are showing up on different sorts of body experts, those found at cosmetic counters, spas, and salons, who are eager to align themselves with symbols of power and authority, and with the aura of objectivity, truth, and service.
The entire article is here.
Against a singular understanding of legal capacity: Criminal responsibility and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
By Jullian Craigie
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry
Volume 40, May–June 2015, Pages 6–14
Abstract
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is being used to argue for wider recognition of the legal capacity of people with mental disabilities. This raises a question about the implications of the Convention for attributions of criminal responsibility. The present paper works towards an answer by analysing the relationship between legal capacity in relation to personal decisions and criminal acts. Its central argument is that because moral and political considerations play an essential role in setting the relevant standards, legal capacity in the context of personal decisions and criminal acts should not be thought of as two sides of the same coin. The implications of particular moral or political norms are likely to be different in these two legal contexts, and this may justify asymmetries in the relevant standards for legal capacity. However, the analysis highlights a fundamental question about how much weight moral or political considerations should be given in setting these standards, and this is used to frame a challenge to those calling for significantly wider recognition of the legal capacity of people with mental disabilities on the basis of the Convention.
The entire article is here.
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry
Volume 40, May–June 2015, Pages 6–14
Abstract
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is being used to argue for wider recognition of the legal capacity of people with mental disabilities. This raises a question about the implications of the Convention for attributions of criminal responsibility. The present paper works towards an answer by analysing the relationship between legal capacity in relation to personal decisions and criminal acts. Its central argument is that because moral and political considerations play an essential role in setting the relevant standards, legal capacity in the context of personal decisions and criminal acts should not be thought of as two sides of the same coin. The implications of particular moral or political norms are likely to be different in these two legal contexts, and this may justify asymmetries in the relevant standards for legal capacity. However, the analysis highlights a fundamental question about how much weight moral or political considerations should be given in setting these standards, and this is used to frame a challenge to those calling for significantly wider recognition of the legal capacity of people with mental disabilities on the basis of the Convention.
The entire article is here.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)