By Masimo Pigliucci
Scientia Salon
Originally published March 30, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
Moreover, as a fellow Bayesian, Silver ought to know that his own analogy is ironically flawed: in Bayesian analysis you always begin with priors, and the whole point is to revise those priors as new data comes in. That is, embedded in the very fabric of the Bayesian approach [4] is that you start with beliefs, you add data (collected on the basis of your beliefs!), and end up with (likely modified) beliefs. You just can’t take the belief components out of the analysis, it’s integral to it, and it’s both affected by the data one gathers and determines which bits of information “out there” actually get to count as data.
As Wieseltier astutely observes, “Silver wishes to impugn not only the quality of opinion journalism, he wishes to impugn also its legitimacy. The new technology, which produces numbers the way plants produce oxygen, has inspired a new positivism, and he is one of its princes. He dignifies only facts … He does not recognize the calling of, or grasp the need for, public reason.”
The entire story is here.
Wednesday, April 16, 2014
Tuesday, April 15, 2014
Automated ethics
When is it ethical to hand our decisions over to machines? And when is external automation a step too far?
by Tom Chatfield
Aeon Magazine
Originally published March 31, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
Automation, in this context, is a force pushing old principles towards breaking point. If I can build a car that will automatically avoid killing a bus full of children, albeit at great risk to its driver’s life, should any driver be given the option of disabling this setting? And why stop there: in a world that we can increasingly automate beyond our reaction times and instinctual reasoning, should we trust ourselves even to conduct an assessment in the first place?
Beyond the philosophical friction, this last question suggests another reason why many people find the trolley disturbing: because its consequentialist resolution presents not only the possibility that an ethically superior action might be calculable via algorithm (not in itself a controversial claim) but also that the right algorithm can itself be an ethically superior entity to us.
The entire article is here.
by Tom Chatfield
Aeon Magazine
Originally published March 31, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
Automation, in this context, is a force pushing old principles towards breaking point. If I can build a car that will automatically avoid killing a bus full of children, albeit at great risk to its driver’s life, should any driver be given the option of disabling this setting? And why stop there: in a world that we can increasingly automate beyond our reaction times and instinctual reasoning, should we trust ourselves even to conduct an assessment in the first place?
Beyond the philosophical friction, this last question suggests another reason why many people find the trolley disturbing: because its consequentialist resolution presents not only the possibility that an ethically superior action might be calculable via algorithm (not in itself a controversial claim) but also that the right algorithm can itself be an ethically superior entity to us.
The entire article is here.
Moral Responsibility
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
First published Sat Jan 6, 2001; substantive revision Wed Mar 26, 2014
When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for help. To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to regard them as responsible for what they have done or left undone. (These are examples of other-directed ascriptions of responsibility. The reaction might also be self-directed, e.g., one can recognize oneself to be blameworthy). Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it.
The entire article is here.
First published Sat Jan 6, 2001; substantive revision Wed Mar 26, 2014
When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for help. To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to regard them as responsible for what they have done or left undone. (These are examples of other-directed ascriptions of responsibility. The reaction might also be self-directed, e.g., one can recognize oneself to be blameworthy). Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it.
The entire article is here.
Monday, April 14, 2014
Episode 6: Ethical Analysis of Vignettes (Number 1)
Dr. Richard F. Small joins John to discuss ethical decision-making, ethics education, and vignette analysis. Rick and John will use information from Episodes 4 and 5 to demonstrate the differences among ethical issues, clinical concerns, legal matters, and risk management. They will utilize the SHAPE decision-making model in conjunction with the acculturation model to demonstrate ways to consider ethical and clinical decision-making. There will be some discussion on risk management and legal issues. They will also discuss possible emotional issues that complicate decision-making skills.
At the end of this podcast, the listener will be able to:
1. Outline the relevant factors if the SHAPE decision-making model,
2. Identify the competing ethical principles in the vignettes, and,
3. Practice integrating personal values with professional ethics.
Find this podcast in iTunes
Click here to purchase 1 APA-approved Continuing Education credit
Listen directly from here
Resources
Episode 4: Ethical Decision-making (Part 1)
Episode 5: Ethical Decision-making (Part 2)
American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct
Handelsman, M. M., Gottlieb, M. C., & Knapp, S. (2005). Training ethical psychologists: An acculturation model. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 36, 59-65.
Motivated Moral Reasoning in Psychotherapy
John Gavazzi and Sam Knapp
Nonrational Processes in Ethical Decision-making
Mark Rogerson, Michael C. Gottlieb Mitchell M. Handelsman Samuel Knapp & Jeffrey Younggren
Link to Dr. Small's Practice
At the end of this podcast, the listener will be able to:
1. Outline the relevant factors if the SHAPE decision-making model,
2. Identify the competing ethical principles in the vignettes, and,
3. Practice integrating personal values with professional ethics.
Find this podcast in iTunes
Click here to purchase 1 APA-approved Continuing Education credit
Listen directly from here
Resources
Episode 4: Ethical Decision-making (Part 1)
Episode 5: Ethical Decision-making (Part 2)
American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct
Handelsman, M. M., Gottlieb, M. C., & Knapp, S. (2005). Training ethical psychologists: An acculturation model. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 36, 59-65.
Motivated Moral Reasoning in Psychotherapy
John Gavazzi and Sam Knapp
Nonrational Processes in Ethical Decision-making
Mark Rogerson, Michael C. Gottlieb Mitchell M. Handelsman Samuel Knapp & Jeffrey Younggren
Link to Dr. Small's Practice
Sunday, April 13, 2014
Arrested development: early prefrontal lesions impair the maturation of moral judgement
By Bradley Taber-Thomas, Erik Asp, Michael Koenings, Matthew Sutterer, Steven Anderson, and Daniel Tranel
Brain (2014) 137 (4): 1254-1261 first published online February 11, 2014
doi: 10.1093/brain/awt377
Summary
Learning to make moral judgements based on considerations beyond self-interest is a fundamental aspect of moral development. A deficit in such learning is associated with poor socialization and criminal behaviour. The neural systems required for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency are not well understood. Here we show in a unique sample of neurological patients that focal lesions involving ventromedial prefrontal cortex, acquired during development, result in an abnormally egocentric pattern of moral judgement. In response to simple hypothetical moral scenarios, the patients were more likely than comparison participants to endorse self-interested actions that involved breaking moral rules or physically harming others in order to benefit themselves. This pattern (which we also found in subjects with psychopathy) differs from that of patients with adult-onset ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions—the latter group showed normal rejection of egocentric rule violations. This novel contrast of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions acquired during development versus during adulthood yields new evidence suggesting that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is a critical neural substrate for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency that goes beyond self-interest to consider the welfare of others. Disruption to this affective neural system early in life interrupts moral development.
The article can be found here, behind a paywall.
Email Contact of Daniel Tranel
Brain (2014) 137 (4): 1254-1261 first published online February 11, 2014
doi: 10.1093/brain/awt377
Summary
Learning to make moral judgements based on considerations beyond self-interest is a fundamental aspect of moral development. A deficit in such learning is associated with poor socialization and criminal behaviour. The neural systems required for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency are not well understood. Here we show in a unique sample of neurological patients that focal lesions involving ventromedial prefrontal cortex, acquired during development, result in an abnormally egocentric pattern of moral judgement. In response to simple hypothetical moral scenarios, the patients were more likely than comparison participants to endorse self-interested actions that involved breaking moral rules or physically harming others in order to benefit themselves. This pattern (which we also found in subjects with psychopathy) differs from that of patients with adult-onset ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions—the latter group showed normal rejection of egocentric rule violations. This novel contrast of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions acquired during development versus during adulthood yields new evidence suggesting that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is a critical neural substrate for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency that goes beyond self-interest to consider the welfare of others. Disruption to this affective neural system early in life interrupts moral development.
The article can be found here, behind a paywall.
Email Contact of Daniel Tranel
Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck
By Heather C. Lench, Darren Domsky, Rachel Smallman and Kathleen E. Darbor
The British Journal of Psychology
DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12072
Abstract
Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.
The entire story is here, behind a paywall.
The British Journal of Psychology
DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12072
Abstract
Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.
The entire story is here, behind a paywall.
Saturday, April 12, 2014
In Genes We Trust: How Our Essentialist Biases Distort How We Think About Genes
Posted by Peter B. Reiner
Neuroethics at the Core
Posted March 7, 2014
This video was recorded on October 23-25, 2013 during a Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies International Roundtable, "We Are Our Brains", led by Principal Investigator Dr. Peter B. Reiner (Department of Psychiatry, UBC and the National Core for Neuroethics).
To learn more about We Are Our Brains.
Neuroethics at the Core
Posted March 7, 2014
This video was recorded on October 23-25, 2013 during a Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies International Roundtable, "We Are Our Brains", led by Principal Investigator Dr. Peter B. Reiner (Department of Psychiatry, UBC and the National Core for Neuroethics).
To learn more about We Are Our Brains.
Friday, April 11, 2014
Undercover Doctor: Cure Me, I'm Gay
By Christian Jessen
Channel 4
Originally published March 20, 2013
In this one-off documentary Dr Christian Jessen goes undercover to both investigate and undertake controversial gay 'cures' in the UK and the USA.
Christian is shocked to find that not only are there people who believe that homosexuality is a disorder which should be cured, but that there is a growing number of therapists and self-styled healers who believe that they have the 'cure' for the 'illness'.
He sets out to prove or disprove their claims by offering himself up as a suitable case for treatment.
Channel 4
Originally published March 20, 2013
In this one-off documentary Dr Christian Jessen goes undercover to both investigate and undertake controversial gay 'cures' in the UK and the USA.
Christian is shocked to find that not only are there people who believe that homosexuality is a disorder which should be cured, but that there is a growing number of therapists and self-styled healers who believe that they have the 'cure' for the 'illness'.
He sets out to prove or disprove their claims by offering himself up as a suitable case for treatment.
How your brain makes moral judgments
By Elizabeth Landau
CNN
Originally posted March 26, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
A moral network?
Scientists have shown that there is a specific network of brain regions involved in mediating moral judgment. An influential study on this topic was published in 2001 and led by Joshua D. Greene, associate professor at Harvard University, author of "Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them."
Adrian Raine and Yaling Yang, in a 2006 review article, described this study as a breakthrough. It focused "on the specific difference between making judgments (i.e. 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate') on 'moral personal' dilemmas (e.g. throwing a person out of a sinking life-boat to save others), and 'moral impersonal' dilemmas (e.g. keeping money found in a lost wallet)," they wrote.
The entire article is here.
CNN
Originally posted March 26, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
A moral network?
Scientists have shown that there is a specific network of brain regions involved in mediating moral judgment. An influential study on this topic was published in 2001 and led by Joshua D. Greene, associate professor at Harvard University, author of "Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them."
Adrian Raine and Yaling Yang, in a 2006 review article, described this study as a breakthrough. It focused "on the specific difference between making judgments (i.e. 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate') on 'moral personal' dilemmas (e.g. throwing a person out of a sinking life-boat to save others), and 'moral impersonal' dilemmas (e.g. keeping money found in a lost wallet)," they wrote.
The entire article is here.
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