Another milestone
266 follow by email
131 follow by Tumblr
67 follow by Twitter
And others when they feel like it.
Saturday, September 21, 2013
3 0 0, 0 0 0 P a g e v i e w s
266 follow by email
131 follow by Tumblr
67 follow by Twitter
And others when they feel like it.
Guantanamo Ethics
Religion and Ethics Newsweekly
Originally published September 6, 2013
A growing movement is renewing calls for the facility at Guantanamo Bay to be closed, citing concerns about the treatment of prisoners. Especially troubling for human rights activists is the practice of force-feeding detainees against their will. “They’re prisoners, but that doesn’t mean that they’ve given up every right that they have as a human being,” says a US Naval Academy professor who visited Gitmo in 2009.
Watch the video here.
Originally published September 6, 2013
A growing movement is renewing calls for the facility at Guantanamo Bay to be closed, citing concerns about the treatment of prisoners. Especially troubling for human rights activists is the practice of force-feeding detainees against their will. “They’re prisoners, but that doesn’t mean that they’ve given up every right that they have as a human being,” says a US Naval Academy professor who visited Gitmo in 2009.
Watch the video here.
N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web
By NICOLE PERLROTH, JEFF LARSON and SCOTT SHANE
The New York Times
Published: September 5, 2013
The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly disclosed documents.
The agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show.
The entire article is here.
With this information, how will you contemplate and explain important clinical issues such as privacy of Protected Health Information as a part of informed consent?
The New York Times
Published: September 5, 2013
The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly disclosed documents.
The agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show.
The entire article is here.
With this information, how will you contemplate and explain important clinical issues such as privacy of Protected Health Information as a part of informed consent?
Friday, September 20, 2013
Response to Critics of The Moral Landscape
By Sam Harris
His Blog
January 29, 2011
Here are two excerpts:
The problem posed by public criticism is by no means limited to the question of what to do about misrepresentations of one’s work. There is simply no good forum in which to respond to reviews of any kind, no matter how substantive. To do so in a separate essay is to risk confusing readers with a litany of disconnected points or—worse—boring them to salt. And any author who rises to the defense of his own book is always in danger of looking petulant, vain, and ineffectual. There is a galling asymmetry at work here: to say anything at all in response to criticism is to risk doing one’s reputation further harm by appearing to care too much about it.
These strictures now weigh heavily on me, because I recently published a book, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, which has provoked a backlash in intellectual (and not-so-intellectual) circles. I knew this was coming, given my thesis, but this knowledge left me no better equipped to meet the cloudbursts of vitriol and confusion once they arrived. Watching the tide of opinion turn against me, it has been difficult to know what, if anything, to do about it.
(cut)
For those unfamiliar with my book, here is my argument in brief: Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, of course, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science. On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.
The entire blog post is here.
His Blog
January 29, 2011
Here are two excerpts:
The problem posed by public criticism is by no means limited to the question of what to do about misrepresentations of one’s work. There is simply no good forum in which to respond to reviews of any kind, no matter how substantive. To do so in a separate essay is to risk confusing readers with a litany of disconnected points or—worse—boring them to salt. And any author who rises to the defense of his own book is always in danger of looking petulant, vain, and ineffectual. There is a galling asymmetry at work here: to say anything at all in response to criticism is to risk doing one’s reputation further harm by appearing to care too much about it.
These strictures now weigh heavily on me, because I recently published a book, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, which has provoked a backlash in intellectual (and not-so-intellectual) circles. I knew this was coming, given my thesis, but this knowledge left me no better equipped to meet the cloudbursts of vitriol and confusion once they arrived. Watching the tide of opinion turn against me, it has been difficult to know what, if anything, to do about it.
(cut)
For those unfamiliar with my book, here is my argument in brief: Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, of course, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science. On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.
The entire blog post is here.
The Cheater's High: The Unexpected Affective Benefits of Unethical Behavior
By Nicole Ruedy, Celia Moore, Francesca Gino, & Maurice E. Schweitzer
Abstract
Many theories of moral behavior share the assumption that unethical behavior triggers negative affect. In this paper, we challenge this assumption and demonstrate that unethical behavior can trigger positive affect, which we term a “cheater’s high.” Across six studies, we find that even though individuals predict they will feel guilty and have increased levels of negative affect after engaging in unethical behavior (Studies 1a and 1b), individuals who cheat on different problem-solving tasks consistently experience more positive affect than those who do not (Studies 2-5). We find that this heightened positive affect is not due to the accrual of undeserved financial incentives (Study 3) and does not depend on self-selection (Study 4). Cheating is associated with feelings of self-satisfaction, and the boost in positive affect from cheating persists even when cheaters acknowledge that their self-reported performance is unreliable (Study 5). Thus, even when prospects for self-deception about unethical behavior have been reduced, the high cheaters experience from “getting away with it” overwhelms the negative affective consequences that people mistakenly predict they will experience after engaging in unethical behavior. Our results have important implications for models of ethical decision making, moral behavior, and self-regulatory theory.
The entire paper is here.
Abstract
Many theories of moral behavior share the assumption that unethical behavior triggers negative affect. In this paper, we challenge this assumption and demonstrate that unethical behavior can trigger positive affect, which we term a “cheater’s high.” Across six studies, we find that even though individuals predict they will feel guilty and have increased levels of negative affect after engaging in unethical behavior (Studies 1a and 1b), individuals who cheat on different problem-solving tasks consistently experience more positive affect than those who do not (Studies 2-5). We find that this heightened positive affect is not due to the accrual of undeserved financial incentives (Study 3) and does not depend on self-selection (Study 4). Cheating is associated with feelings of self-satisfaction, and the boost in positive affect from cheating persists even when cheaters acknowledge that their self-reported performance is unreliable (Study 5). Thus, even when prospects for self-deception about unethical behavior have been reduced, the high cheaters experience from “getting away with it” overwhelms the negative affective consequences that people mistakenly predict they will experience after engaging in unethical behavior. Our results have important implications for models of ethical decision making, moral behavior, and self-regulatory theory.
The entire paper is here.
Thursday, September 19, 2013
To Bee or not To Bee: Punishment, bee keeping, and the virtue of making choices
By Katrina Siefferd
Psychiatric Ethics Blog - Kerry Gutridge
Originally posted August 28, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
Recently I’ve been thinking about the importance of rehabilitative programs and alternative sentencing from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue theory. Virtue theory supports such programs as an important way to recognize offenders’ moral agency. Moral agency involves the ability of a person to act such that their actions deserve praise or blame. Virtue theory sees choice-making as the primary means for a moral agent to develop and exercise character traits: by choosing generous actions one becomes more generous, and in turn, being generous allows one to choose generous actions more easily. The theory provides a means for critiquing punishments that unfairly impose upon this process of moral development.
The Aristotelian label for this process – where character traits like honesty, kindness and courage become stable – is “habituation.” Habituation involves practicing the trait via the use of practical reason, which allows a person to determine which actions are appropriate in any given situation. A stable disposition to act in accordance with a trait, such as honesty, is established as a result of making appropriately honest choices over time and in a variety of circumstances. However, even stable traits do not dictate automatic behavioral responses: if they were, changes in character would be impossible. Instead, traits should be seen as flexible reasons-responsive dispositions to behave that are in constant development or decline, depending on the choices that one makes (see Annas 2011; Webber 2006).
The entire blog post is here.
Psychiatric Ethics Blog - Kerry Gutridge
Originally posted August 28, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
Recently I’ve been thinking about the importance of rehabilitative programs and alternative sentencing from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue theory. Virtue theory supports such programs as an important way to recognize offenders’ moral agency. Moral agency involves the ability of a person to act such that their actions deserve praise or blame. Virtue theory sees choice-making as the primary means for a moral agent to develop and exercise character traits: by choosing generous actions one becomes more generous, and in turn, being generous allows one to choose generous actions more easily. The theory provides a means for critiquing punishments that unfairly impose upon this process of moral development.
The Aristotelian label for this process – where character traits like honesty, kindness and courage become stable – is “habituation.” Habituation involves practicing the trait via the use of practical reason, which allows a person to determine which actions are appropriate in any given situation. A stable disposition to act in accordance with a trait, such as honesty, is established as a result of making appropriately honest choices over time and in a variety of circumstances. However, even stable traits do not dictate automatic behavioral responses: if they were, changes in character would be impossible. Instead, traits should be seen as flexible reasons-responsive dispositions to behave that are in constant development or decline, depending on the choices that one makes (see Annas 2011; Webber 2006).
The entire blog post is here.
Fighting the Good Fight: The Relationship Between Belief in Evil and Support for Violent Policies
Campbell M & Vollhardt JR
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
DOI: 10.1177/0146167213500997
Abstract
The rhetoric of good and evil is prevalent in many areas of society and is often used to garner support for "redemptive violence" (i.e., using violence to rid and save the world from evil). While evil is discussed in psychological literature, beliefs about good and evil have not received adequate empirical attention as predictors of violent versus peaceful intergroup attitudes. In four survey studies, we developed and tested novel measures of belief in evil and endorsement of redemptive violence. Across four different samples, belief in evil predicted greater support for violence and lesser support for nonviolent responses. These effects were, in most cases, mediated by endorsement of redemptive violence. Structural equation modeling suggested that need for cognitive closure predicts belief in evil, and that the effect of belief in evil on support for violence is independent of right-wing authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and dangerous world beliefs.
The entire article is here.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
DOI: 10.1177/0146167213500997
Abstract
The rhetoric of good and evil is prevalent in many areas of society and is often used to garner support for "redemptive violence" (i.e., using violence to rid and save the world from evil). While evil is discussed in psychological literature, beliefs about good and evil have not received adequate empirical attention as predictors of violent versus peaceful intergroup attitudes. In four survey studies, we developed and tested novel measures of belief in evil and endorsement of redemptive violence. Across four different samples, belief in evil predicted greater support for violence and lesser support for nonviolent responses. These effects were, in most cases, mediated by endorsement of redemptive violence. Structural equation modeling suggested that need for cognitive closure predicts belief in evil, and that the effect of belief in evil on support for violence is independent of right-wing authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and dangerous world beliefs.
The entire article is here.
Wednesday, September 18, 2013
Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt - Book Review
Macalester Bell, Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt, Oxford University Press, 2013 ISBN 9780199794140.
Reviewed by Robert C. Roberts, Baylor University
Macalester Bell defends contempt as a moral emotion and recommends cultivating a disposition to feel apt contempt. She endorses a general account of emotions on which they are "cognitive" without implying belief or judgment of their content; rather, they are perception-like, "presenting" objects in one evaluative dimension or another. Contempt in particular has four salient properties. 1) It takes whole persons (rather than persons' actions or character traits) as its object; thus it is a "globalist" or "totalizing" evaluative perception of its target (usually some person or group, though institutions can also be contemned). 2) It is a "dismissive and insulting attitude that manifests disregard for its target" (8, italics original), presenting him or her as low in status by some standard of value that the subject cares about. 3) It is comparative or reflexive; "the contemnor makes a comparison between herself and the object of her contempt, and sees the contemned as inferior to her along some axis of comparison" (41). 4) Characteristically the subject shuns or withdraws from involvement with the object of contempt.
Bell clarifies the concept of contempt by comparing it with other hard feelings. Whereas contempt focuses on a person, attributes "badbeing," and motivates withdrawal, resentment focuses on an act, attributes wrongdoing, and motivates engagement with the target. Disgust is like contempt in presenting its object as "threatening" and motivating withdrawal, but it differs in often involving a somatic reaction, in not being hierarchical, comparative, and reflexive, and in construing its object as contaminated rather than low in status. Moral hatred differs from moral contempt in not being necessarily comparative and in motivating active engagement with the object rather than withdrawal. Bell also distinguishes active from passive contempt: whereas active contempt presents the target as "threatening," passive contempt hardly presents the target at all, regarding and treating the target as almost beneath notice. Most of the book is about active contempt, though it contains nice discussions of passive contempt as commended by Aristotle and Nietzsche. Bell also discusses Kant's discussion of contempt, and shows it to be surprisingly sympathetic to this emotion.
The entire review is here.
Reviewed by Robert C. Roberts, Baylor University
Macalester Bell defends contempt as a moral emotion and recommends cultivating a disposition to feel apt contempt. She endorses a general account of emotions on which they are "cognitive" without implying belief or judgment of their content; rather, they are perception-like, "presenting" objects in one evaluative dimension or another. Contempt in particular has four salient properties. 1) It takes whole persons (rather than persons' actions or character traits) as its object; thus it is a "globalist" or "totalizing" evaluative perception of its target (usually some person or group, though institutions can also be contemned). 2) It is a "dismissive and insulting attitude that manifests disregard for its target" (8, italics original), presenting him or her as low in status by some standard of value that the subject cares about. 3) It is comparative or reflexive; "the contemnor makes a comparison between herself and the object of her contempt, and sees the contemned as inferior to her along some axis of comparison" (41). 4) Characteristically the subject shuns or withdraws from involvement with the object of contempt.
Bell clarifies the concept of contempt by comparing it with other hard feelings. Whereas contempt focuses on a person, attributes "badbeing," and motivates withdrawal, resentment focuses on an act, attributes wrongdoing, and motivates engagement with the target. Disgust is like contempt in presenting its object as "threatening" and motivating withdrawal, but it differs in often involving a somatic reaction, in not being hierarchical, comparative, and reflexive, and in construing its object as contaminated rather than low in status. Moral hatred differs from moral contempt in not being necessarily comparative and in motivating active engagement with the object rather than withdrawal. Bell also distinguishes active from passive contempt: whereas active contempt presents the target as "threatening," passive contempt hardly presents the target at all, regarding and treating the target as almost beneath notice. Most of the book is about active contempt, though it contains nice discussions of passive contempt as commended by Aristotle and Nietzsche. Bell also discusses Kant's discussion of contempt, and shows it to be surprisingly sympathetic to this emotion.
The entire review is here.
The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior
Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust
Philosophical Psychology
DOI:10.1080/09515089.2012.727135
Abstract
Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, responsiveness to student emails, charitable giving, and honesty in responding to survey questionnaires. On some issues, we also had direct behavioral measures that we could compare with the self-reports. Ethicists expressed somewhat more stringent normative attitudes on some issues, such as vegetarianism and charitable donation. However, on no issue did ethicists show unequivocally better behavior than the two comparison groups. Our findings on attitude-behavior consistency were mixed: ethicists showed the strongest relationship between behavior and expressed moral attitude regarding voting but the weakest regarding charitable donation. We discuss implications for several models of the relationship between philosophical reflection and real-world moral behavior.
The article is here, hiding behind a paywall.
Philosophical Psychology
DOI:10.1080/09515089.2012.727135
Abstract
Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, responsiveness to student emails, charitable giving, and honesty in responding to survey questionnaires. On some issues, we also had direct behavioral measures that we could compare with the self-reports. Ethicists expressed somewhat more stringent normative attitudes on some issues, such as vegetarianism and charitable donation. However, on no issue did ethicists show unequivocally better behavior than the two comparison groups. Our findings on attitude-behavior consistency were mixed: ethicists showed the strongest relationship between behavior and expressed moral attitude regarding voting but the weakest regarding charitable donation. We discuss implications for several models of the relationship between philosophical reflection and real-world moral behavior.
The article is here, hiding behind a paywall.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)