Older people are perceived as more moral than younger people: data from seven culturally diverse countries

Piotr Sorokowski, et al. (2023)

Ethics & Behavior,

DOI: 10.1080/10508422.2023.2248327

Abstract

Given the adage “older and wiser,” it seems justified to assume that older people may be stereotyped as more moral than younger people. We aimed to study whether assessments of a person’s morality differ depending on their age. We asked 661 individuals from seven societies (Australians, Britons, Burusho of Pakistan, Canadians, Dani of Papua, New Zealanders, and Poles) whether younger (~20-year-old), middle-aged (~40-year-old), or older (~60-year-old) people were more likely to behave morally and have a sense of right and wrong. We observed that older people were perceived as more moral than younger people. The effect was particularly salient when comparing 20-year-olds to either 40- or 60-year-olds and was culturally universal, as we found it in both WEIRD (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) and non-WEIRD societies.

A pdf of the research is here.

Here is my summary:

The researchers found that older people were rated as more moral than younger people, and this effect was particularly strong when comparing 20-year-olds to either 40- or 60-year-olds. The effect was also consistent across cultures, suggesting that it is a universal phenomenon.

The researchers suggest that there are a few possible explanations for this finding. One possibility is that older people are simply seen as having more life experience and wisdom, which are both associated with morality. Another possibility is that older people are more likely to conform to social norms, which are often seen as being moral. Finally, it is also possible that people simply have a positive bias towards older people, which leads them to perceive them as being more moral.

Whatever the explanation, the finding that older people are perceived as more moral than younger people has a number of implications. For example, it suggests that older people may be more likely to be trusted and respected, and they may also be more likely to be seen as leaders. Additionally, the finding suggests that ageism may be a form of prejudice, as it involves making negative assumptions about people based on their age.

How important is the end of humanity? Lay people prioritize extinction prevention but not above all other societal issues

Coleman, M. B., Caviola, L., et al.

(2023, October 21). 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/qn7k5

Abstract

Human extinction would mean the deaths of eight billion people and the end of humanity’s achievements, culture, and future potential. On several ethical views, extinction would be a terrible outcome. How do people think about human extinction? And how much do they prioritize preventing extinction over other societal issues? Across six empirical studies (N = 2,541; U.S. and China) we find that people consider extinction prevention a global priority and deserving of greatly increased societal resources. However, despite estimating the likelihood of human extinction to be 5% this century (U.S. median), people believe the odds would need to be around 30% for it to be the very highest priority. Consequently, people consider extinction prevention to be only one among several important societal issues. People’s judgments about the relative importance of extinction prevention appear relatively fixed and are hard to change by reason-based interventions.

The research is here.

Here is my take:

The study found that lay people rated extinction prevention as more important than addressing climate change, poverty, and inequality. However, they rated extinction prevention as less important than promoting peace and security, and ensuring the well-being of future generations.

The study's authors suggest that these findings may be due to the fact that lay people perceive extinction prevention as a more existential threat than other societal issues. They also suggest that lay people may be more likely to prioritize extinction prevention if they believe that it is achievable.

Key findings:

• Lay people prioritize extinction prevention, but not above all other societal issues.
• Lay people rated extinction prevention as more important than addressing climate change, poverty, and inequality.
• Lay people rated extinction prevention as less important than promoting peace and security, and ensuring the well-being of future generations.
• The study's authors suggest that these findings may be due to the fact that lay people perceive extinction prevention as a more existential threat than other societal issues.

How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay

Kiatpongsan, S., & Norton, M. I. (2014).

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9(6), 587–593.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691614549773

Abstract

Do people from different countries and different backgrounds have similar preferences for how much more the rich should earn than the poor? Using survey data from 40 countries (N = 55,238), we compare respondents’ estimates of the wages of people in different occupations—chief executive officers, cabinet ministers, and unskilled workers—to their ideals for what those wages should be. We show that ideal pay gaps between skilled and unskilled workers are significantly smaller than estimated pay gaps and that there is consensus across countries, socioeconomic status, and political beliefs. Moreover, data from 16 countries reveals that people dramatically underestimate actual pay inequality. In the United States—where underestimation was particularly pronounced—the actual pay ratio of CEOs to unskilled workers (354:1) far exceeded the estimated ratio (30:1), which in turn far exceeded the ideal ratio (7:1). In sum, respondents underestimate actual pay gaps, and their ideal pay gaps are even further from reality than those underestimates.

Conclusion

These results demonstrate a strikingly consistent belief that the gaps in incomes between

skilled and unskilled workers should be smaller than people believe them to be – and much

smaller than these gaps actually are. The consensus that income gaps between skilled and

unskilled workers should be smaller holds in all subgroups of respondents regardless of their age,

education, socioeconomic status, political affiliation and opinions on inequality and pay. As a

result, they suggest that – in contrast to a belief that only the poor and members of left-wing

political parties desire greater income equality – people all over the world, and from all walks of

life, would prefer smaller pay gaps between the rich and poor.

A pdf of the research is here.

Cross-Cultural Differences and Similarities in Human Value Instantiation

Hanel PHP, Maio GR, et al. (2018).

Front. Psychol., 29 May 2018

Sec.Personality and Social Psychology

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00849

Abstract

Previous research found that the within-country variability of human values (e.g., equality and helpfulness) clearly outweighs between-country variability. Across three countries (Brazil, India, and the United Kingdom), the present research tested in student samples whether between-nation differences reside more in the behaviors used to concretely instantiate (i.e., exemplify or understand) values than in their importance as abstract ideals. In Study 1 (N = 630), we found several meaningful between-country differences in the behaviors that were used to concretely instantiate values, alongside high within-country variability. In Study 2 (N = 677), we found that participants were able to match instantiations back to the values from which they were derived, even if the behavior instantiations were spontaneously produced only by participants from another country or were created by us. Together, these results support the hypothesis that people in different nations can differ in the behaviors that are seen as typical as instantiations of values, while holding similar ideas about the abstract meaning of the values and their importance.

Conclusion

Overall, Study 1 revealed that most examples that are spontaneously attached to values vary in how much they are shaped by context. In most cases, within-country variability outweighed between-country differences. Nevertheless, many of the instances for which between-country differences were found could be linked to contextual factors. In Study 2, we found that most instantiations that had been spontaneously produced by participants in another country could reliably be matched to the values that they exemplified. Taken together, our results further challenge “the prevailing conception of culture as shared meaning system” (Schwartz, 2014, p. 5), as long as culture is equated with country or nation: the within-country variability outweighs the between-country variability, similar to values on an abstract level (Fischer and Schwartz, 2011). In other words, people endorse the same values to a similar extent across countries and also instantiate them similarly. We hope this research helps to lay a foundation for future research examining these differences and their implications for intercultural understanding and communication.

The research is here.

How development and culture shape intuitions about prosocial obligations

Marshall, J., Gollwitzer, A., et al. (2022).

Journal of experimental psychology. 

General, 10.1037/xge0001136. 

Advance online publication.

Abstract

Do children, like most adults, believe that only kin and close others are obligated to help one another? In two studies (total N = 1140), we examined whether children (∼5- to ∼10-yos) and adults across five different societies consider social relationship when ascribing prosocial obligations. Contrary to the view that such discriminations are a natural default in human reasoning, younger children in the United States (Studies 1 and 2) and across cultures (Study 2) generally judged everyone-parents, friends, and strangers-as obligated to help someone in need. Older children and adults, on the other hand, tended to exhibit more discriminant judgments. They considered parents more obligated to help than friends followed by strangers-although this effect was stronger in some cultures than others. Our findings suggest that children's initial sense of prosocial obligation in social-relational contexts starts out broad and generally becomes more selective over the course of development.

From the General Discussion

Other than urban versus rural, our cross-cultural samples varied on a variety of dimensions, including (but not limited to) Westernization, collectivism versus individualism, and SES. Again, because of our samples do not vary systematically on any of these dimensions, we cannot directly examine the role of certain cultural factors in the development of prosocial obligation judgments. But we do suspect that variation in societal values related to collectivism and individualism may shape children’s emerging sense of prosocial obligation. This proposal is motivated by the finding that participants in more collectivistic societies(Japan, India, Uganda) exhibited broader senses of obligation than  those  in  more  individualistic societies (Germany,  United  States) (see Hofstede, 2011; Rarick et al., 2013).

How would collectivism and individualism shape the development of our sense of obligation?After all, collectivism in a theoretical sense tends to emphasize obligations to the group—not  necessarily to  strangers  (e.g.,  Brewer  &  Chen,  2007). It is possible, however,  that participants across societies view strangers in our stimuli as part of the cultural in-group. After all, the  characters in the stimuli are all the  same  ethnicity and also presumably live in the  same community. The variance in responses we find, then, might be variance in the degree to which they consider individuals obligated to help in-group strangers—and this in turn, may depend on cultural values, such as collectivism. Future research is best suited to address this question by examining how  group  membership  and  social relationship  independently  impact the development of obligation judgments across societies.

Regardless of which societal values ultimately impact children’s sense of obligation, the findings raise the question of how this process occurs during childhood.Adults and trusted others may explicitly or implicitly teach children about societal values either via testimony or observation(e.g., Maccoby, 2007; Pratty & Hardy, 2014; see Dahl, 2019 for a useful review). Through this process, children may then absorb this information, which ultimately alters children’s obligation judgments. Alternatively, and in line with more of a Piagetian constructivist view(Piaget, 1932), children may update  their  beliefs  about  obligation through  exploring how  individuals  in  their community act toward one another and eliciting information about obligation from others (Dahl et al., 2018; Turiel, 2015, 1983).We hope future research will investigate these questions in greater detail. 

A pdf is here.