Straight Talk for White Men

By Nicholas Kristof
The New York Times
Originally published on February 21, 2015

Here is an excerpt:

The study found that a résumé with a name like Emily or Greg received 50 percent more callbacks than the same résumé with a name like Lakisha or Jamal. Having a white-sounding name was as beneficial as eight years’ work experience.

Then there was the study in which researchers asked professors to evaluate the summary of a supposed applicant for a post as laboratory manager, but, in some cases, the applicant was named John and in others Jennifer. Everything else was the same.

“John” was rated an average of 4.0 on a 7-point scale for competence, “Jennifer” a 3.3. When asked to propose an annual starting salary for the applicant, the professors suggested on average a salary for “John” almost $4,000 higher than for “Jennifer.”

It’s not that we white men are intentionally doing anything wrong, but we do have a penchant for obliviousness about the way we are beneficiaries of systematic unfairness. Maybe that’s because in a race, it’s easy not to notice a tailwind, and white men often go through life with a tailwind, while women and people of color must push against a headwind.

The entire article is here.

Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics*

By Joshua Greene
Forthcoming in Ethics

Abstract:

In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience)
matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment
and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental
research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in
which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper
understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other
classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright
future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

Here is an excerpt:

Likewise, it would be a cognitive miracle if we had reliably good moral instincts about
unfamiliar* moral problems. This suggests the following more general principle:

The No Cognitive Miracles Principle: When we are dealing with unfamiliar*
moral problems, we ought to rely less on automatic settings (automatic
emotional responses) and more on manual mode (conscious, controlled
reasoning), lest we bank on cognitive miracles.

This principle is powerful because it, when combined with empirical knowledge of
moral psychology, offers moral guidance while presupposing nothing about what is
morally good or bad. A corollary of the NCMP is that we should expect certain
pathological individuals—VMPFC patients? Psychopaths? Alexithymics? —to make 32
better decisions than healthy people in some cases. (This is why such individuals are no
embarrassment to the view I will defend in the next section.)

The author's copy is here.

On making the right choice: A meta-analysis and large-scale replication attempt of the unconscious thought advantage

M.R. Nieuwenstein, T. Wirenga, R.D. Morey, J.M. Wichers, T.N. Blom, E. Wagenmakers, and H. vanRijn
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2015, pp. 1-17

Abstract

Are difficult decisions best made after a momentary diversion of thought? Previous research addressing this important question has yielded dozens of experiments in which participants were asked to choose the best of several options (e.g., cars or apartments) either after conscious deliberation, or after a momentary diversion of thought induced by an unrelated task. The results of these studies were mixed. Some found that participants who had first performed the unrelated task were more likely to choose the best option, whereas others found no evidence for this so-called unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The current study examined two accounts of this inconsistency in previous findings. According to the reliability account, the UTA does not exist and previous reports of this effect concern nothing but spurious effects obtained with an unreliable paradigm. In contrast, the moderator account proposes that the UTA is a real effect that occurs only when certain conditions are met in the choice task. To test these accounts, we conducted a meta-analysis and a large-scale replication study (N = 399) that met the conditions deemed optimal for replicating the UTA. Consistent with the reliability account, the large-scale replication study yielded no evidence for the UTA, and the meta-analysis showed that previous reports of the UTA were confined to underpowered studies that used relatively small sample sizes. Furthermore, the results of the large-scale study also dispelled the recent suggestion that the UTA might be gender-specific. Accordingly, we conclude that there exists no reliable support for the claim that a momentary diversion of thought leads to better decision making than a period of deliberation.

The entire article is here.

How Your Brain Decides Without You

In a world full of ambiguity, we see what we want to see.

By Tom Vanderbilt

Nautilus

Originally published on November 6, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

The structure of the brain, she notes, is such that there are many more intrinsic connections between neurons than there are connections that bring sensory information from the world. From that incomplete picture, she says, the brain is “filling in the details, making sense out of ambiguous sensory input.” The brain, she says, is an “inference generating organ.” She describes an increasingly well-supported working hypothesis called predictive coding, according to which perceptions are driven by your own brain and corrected by input from the world. There would otherwise simple be too much sensory input to take in. “It’s not efficient,” she says. “The brain has to find other ways to work.” So it constantly predicts. When “the sensory information that comes in does not match your prediction,” she says, “you either change your prediction—or you change the sensory information that you receive.”

The entire, fascinating article is here.

Brain Imaging Research Shows How Unconscious Processing Improves Decision-Making

Carnegie Mellon
Press Release
Originally released on February 13, 2013

When faced with a difficult decision, it is often suggested to "sleep on it" or take a break from thinking about the decision in order to gain clarity.

But new brain imaging research from Carnegie Mellon University, published in the journal "Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience," finds that the brain regions responsible for making decisions continue to be active even when the conscious brain is distracted with a different task. The research provides some of the first evidence showing how the brain unconsciously processes decision information in ways that lead to improved decision-making.

"This research begins to chip away at the mystery of our unconscious brains and decision-making," said J. David Creswell, assistant professor of psychology in CMU's Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences and director of the Health and Human Performance Laboratory. "It shows that brain regions important for decision-making remain active even while our brains may be simultaneously engaged in unrelated tasks, such as thinking about a math problem. What’s most intriguing about this finding is that participants did not have any awareness that their brains were still working on the decision problem while they were engaged in an unrelated task."

The entire press release is here.

What Are the Implications of the Free Will Debate for Individuals and Society?

By Alfred Mele
Big Questions Online
Originally posted May 6, 2014

Does free will exist? Current interest in that question is fueled by news reports suggesting that neuroscientists have proved it doesn’t. In the last few years, I’ve been on a mission to explain why scientific discoveries haven’t closed the door on free will. To readers interested in a rigorous explanation, I recommend my 2009 book, Effective Intentions. For a quicker read, you might wait for my Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will, to be published this fall.

One major plank in a well-known neuroscientific argument for the nonexistence of free will is the claim that participants in various experiments make their decisions unconsciously. In some studies, this claim is based partly on EEG readings (electrical readings taken from the scalp). In others, fMRI data (about changes in blood oxygen levels in the brain) are used instead. In yet others, with people whose skulls are open for medical purposes, readings are taken directly from the brain. The other part of the evidence comes from participants’ reports on when they first became aware of their decisions. If the reports are accurate (which is disputed), the typical sequence of events is as follows: first, there is the brain activity the scientists focus on, then the participants become aware of decisions (or intentions or urges) to act, and then they act, flexing a wrist or pushing a button, for example.

The entire article is here.

Jennifer Saul on Implicit Bias

Philosophybites.com
Originally published December 7, 2013

Are we more biased than we imagine? In this episode of the Philosophy Bites podcast Jennifer Saul investigates a range of ways in which we are prone to implicit bias and the philosophical implications of these biases.

The podcast is here.