National politics ignites more talk of morality and power than local politics

Dillion, D., et al. (2024).

PNAS Nexus, 3(9).

https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae345

Abstract

Politics and the media in the United States are increasingly nationalized, and this changes how we talk about politics. Instead of reading the local news and discussing local events, people are more often consuming national media and discussing national issues. Unlike local politics, which can rely on shared concrete knowledge about the region, national politics must coordinate large groups of people with little in common. To provide this coordination, we find that national-level political discussions rely upon different themes than local-level discussions, using more abstract, moralized, and power-centric language. The higher prevalence of abstract, moralized, and power-centric language in national vs. local politics was found in political speeches, politician Tweets, and Reddit discussions. These national-level linguistic features lead to broader engagement with political messages, but they also foster more anger and negativity. These findings suggest that the nationalization of politics and the media may contribute to rising partisan animosity.

Here are some thoughts:

In recent years, American politics has undergone a significant transformation, becoming increasingly divisive and focused on national issues at the expense of local concerns. Researchers have identified a key factor contributing to this shift: the reliance on moral, power-centric, and abstract language in national politics. This linguistic style serves as a unifying framework, capturing attention and coordinating opinions across broad and diverse audiences.

Studies have revealed striking differences in language styles between national and local politics. Across various mediums, including politician speeches, Twitter, and Reddit, national politics consistently employs more moral, power-centric, and abstract language. Furthermore, this language style fosters widespread engagement, but also cultivates anger and negativity. Notably, politicians and individuals adapt their language depending on the context, using more moralized language in national settings than local ones.

These findings have significant implications for our understanding of the nationalization of politics and its consequences. The shift towards national politics may contribute to increased polarization and division, highlighting the need for further research into the effectiveness of abstract, moralized, and power-centric language in different contexts. Additionally, exploring how these dynamics play out in more homogeneous societies could provide valuable insights.

Ultimately, recognizing the benefits and drawbacks of national politics' reliance on moral, power-centric language is crucial. While it unites people and encourages participation, it also diverts attention from important local issues and fosters animosity. By understanding these complexities, we can work towards more effective coordination and communication in diverse groups, minimizing conflict and promoting constructive engagement.

Moral Humility Reduces Political Divisions

Vallabha, S., & Brandt, M. J. (2024, April 5).

PsyArXiv

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/5r6fw

Abstract

Political and intergroup conflicts are often rooted in moral differences. People claim their side to be morally superior and derogate moral outgroups. Therefore, we propose that moral humility, a domain-specific form of humility, might serve as one antidote to such morally fueled conflicts. We test this in the context of political polarization in the USA. Across 3 studies involving diverse national and student samples (N = 2766), we found higher moral humility to be linked to reduced political animosity, increased support for political compromise and pluralistic norms, greater empathy and respect for the political outgroup, greater perceptions of the political group as moral and non-threatening, amongst others. Importantly, these effects persisted after accounting for domain-general intellectual humility, moral relativism, political identity and extremity, and other controls. This research demonstrates moral humility’s relevance for understanding political polarization, and points the way for a strength-based approach to addressing conflicts.

Here are some thoughts:

This research explores the concept of moral humility and its potential to reduce political polarization and intergroup conflicts. The study found that individuals with higher moral humility demonstrated reduced political animosity, increased support for political compromise and pluralistic norms, greater empathy and respect for political outgroups, and improved perceptions of political outgroups as moral and non-threatening. These effects persisted even after controlling for factors like intellectual humility, moral relativism, and political identity.

This research is important to mental health professionals for several reasons. Understanding moral humility can help therapists develop strategies to address the psychological impacts of political polarization on their clients and improve interpersonal relationships. The findings suggest that cultivating moral humility could help individuals navigate conflicts more effectively in both personal and professional settings. Mental health professionals can use insights from this research to help clients develop greater empathy and respect for those with differing viewpoints, as well as recognize and mitigate their own biases and moral righteousness, leading to more balanced thinking.

Understanding moral humility can help prevent individuals from engaging in harmful behaviors justified by moral superiority. Encouraging moral humility can support clients in their journey of self-improvement and moral development. Furthermore, mental health professionals can apply these findings to develop interventions that promote constructive dialogue and reduce societal tensions. By incorporating the concept of moral humility into their practice, mental health professionals can better equip their clients to navigate the complexities of modern social and political landscapes while fostering personal growth and improved interpersonal relationships.

Effects of intellectual humility in the context of affective polarization: Approaching and avoiding others in controversial political discussions

Knöchelmann, L., & Cohrs, J. C. (2024).

Journal of personality and social psychology, 

10.1037/pspi0000462.

Advance online publication.

https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000462

Abstract

Affective polarization, the extent to which political actors treat each other as disliked outgroups, is challenging political exchange and deliberation, for example, via mistrust of the "political enemy" and unwillingness to discuss political topics with them. The present experiments address this problem and study what makes people approach, and not avoid, potential discussion partners in the context of polarized political topics in Germany. We hypothesized that intellectual humility, the recognition of one's intellectual limitations, would predict both less affective polarization and higher approach and lower avoidance tendencies toward contrary-minded others. Across four preregistered online-survey experiments (N = 1,668), we manipulated how intellectually humble a target person was perceived and measured participants' self-reported (topic-specific) intellectual humility. Results revealed that participants' intellectual humility was consistently negatively correlated with affective polarization. Additionally, intellectual humility of both the target person and the participants was beneficial, and sometimes even necessary, to make participants approach, and not avoid, the target person. Intellectual humility was more important than moral conviction, opinion, and opinion strength. Furthermore, the effects on approach and avoidance were mediated by more positive expectations regarding the debate, and the effects on future willingness for contact by higher target liking. Our findings suggest that intellectual humility is an important characteristic to enable political exchange as it leads to seeing political outgroups more positively and to a higher willingness to engage in intergroup contact. Implications for intergroup contact of political groups as well as ideas for future research are discussed.

A pdf of the research is here.

Here are some thoughts as to why intellectual humility is important to practicing psychologists:

Intellectual humility involves recognizing the limits of one's knowledge and being open to opposing perspectives.  This can help therapists avoid being overly dogmatic or dismissive of their clients' beliefs, even if they disagree. Maintaining an open and non-judgmental stance is crucial for building a strong therapeutic alliance.

People higher in intellectual humility tend to be more empathetic, forgiving, and valuing of others' wellbeing.  These qualities can facilitate better rapport and understanding between therapists and clients from different backgrounds or with contrasting worldviews.

Intellectual humility is associated with reduced polarization, extremism, and susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs.  Therapists exhibiting intellectual humility can model these qualities for clients struggling with rigid ideological stances that strain their relationships.

When political or controversial topics arise in therapy, intellectual humility can allow therapists to thoughtfully consider different perspectives without getting mired in unproductive debates or power struggles with clients.  An intellectually humble stance creates space for productive dialogue.

Overall, cultivating intellectual humility may help therapists navigate affective polarization and controversial topics more constructively in the therapeutic context by increasing openness, empathy, and willingness to entertain alternative viewpoints.  This can strengthen the therapeutic relationship and facilitate progress, even when working with clients holding contrasting beliefs.

Reducing Explicit Blatant Dehumanization by Correcting Exaggerated Meta-Perceptions

Landry, A. P., Schooler, J. W., Willer, R., 

& Seli, P. (2022). 

Social Psychological and Personality Science.

https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221099146

Abstract

If explicitly, blatantly dehumanizing a group of people—overtly characterizing them as less than human—facilitates harming them, then reversing this process is paramount. Addressing dehumanization among American political partisans appears especially crucial, given that it has been linked to their anti-democratic hostility. Perhaps because of its overt nature, partisans recognize—and greatly exaggerate—the extent to which out-partisans explicitly, blatantly dehumanize them. Past research has found that when people perceive they are dehumanized by an outgroup (i.e., meta-dehumanization), they respond with reciprocal dehumanization. Therefore, we reasoned that partisans’ dehumanization could be reduced by correcting their exaggerated meta-dehumanization. Indeed, across three preregistered studies (N = 4,154), an intervention correcting American partisans’ exaggerated meta-dehumanization reduced their own dehumanization of out-partisans. This decreased dehumanization persisted at a 1-week follow-up and predicted downstream reductions in partisans’ anti-democratic hostility, suggesting that correcting exaggerated meta-dehumanization can durably mitigate the dark specter of dehumanization.

Discussion

Explicit blatant dehumanization continues to mar contemporary intergroup relations (Kteily & Landry, 2022). For instance, a troubling number of American partisans explicitly, blatantly dehumanize one another, which has been linked to their anti-democratic hostility (e.g., Moore-Berg et al., 2020). We sought to reduce partisan dehumanization by integrating research demonstrating that (a) individuals who think an outgroup dehumanizes their own group (i.e., meta-dehumanization) respond with reciprocal dehumanization (Kteily et al., 2016; Landry, Ihm & Schooler, 2022) and (b) individuals attribute overly-negative attitudes to outgroup members (Lees & Cikara, 2021). We developed an intervention informing American partisans of their tendency to overestimate how much they are dehumanized by out-partisans (Landry, Ihm, Kwit & Schooler, 2021; Moore-Berg et al., 2020). This reduced partisans’ own dehumanization of out-partisans across three studies–an effect that persisted at a 1-week follow-up.

Correcting partisans’ meta-dehumanization also produced modest—yet reliable—reductions in their anti-democratic hostility. This is notable given recent work finding that interventions reducing negative affect do not influence anti-democratic attitudes (Broockman et al., 2020; Voelkel et al., 2021). Perhaps our dehumanization-focused intervention reduced anti-democratic attitudes when affect-focused interventions did not because dehumanization is more strongly linked to anti-democratic attitudes. Indeed, we observed particularly strong indirect effects of the intervention on reduced anti-democratic spite through dehumanization (average βindirect = −.23, compared to an average βindirect = −.03 for negative affect; see also Landry, Ihm & Schooler, 2022). Although experimental tests of mediation are needed to confirm this cross-sectional indirect effect, future work attempting to bolster support for democratic norms should consider the promise of targeting dehumanization.

Political conspiracy theories as tools for mobilization and signaling

Marie, A., & Petersen, M. B. (2022).

Current Opinion in Psychology, 101440

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101440

Abstract

Political conspiracist communities emerge and bind around hard-to-falsify narratives about political opponents or elites convening to secretly exploit the public in contexts of perceived political conflict. While the narratives appear descriptive, we propose that their content as well as the cognitive systems regulating their endorsement and dissemination may have co-evolved, at least in part, to reach coalitional goals: To drive allies’ attention to the social threat to increase their commitment and coordination for collective action, and to signal devotion to gain within-group status. Those evolutionary social functions may be best fulfilled if individuals endorse the conspiratorial narrative sincerely.

Highlights

•  Political conspiracist groups unite around clear-cut and hard-to-falsify narratives about political opponents or elites secretly organizing to deceive and exploit the public.

•  Such social threat-based narratives and the cognitive systems that regulate them may have co-evolved, at least in part, to serve social rather than epistemic functions: facilitating ingroup recruitment, coordination, and signaling for cooperative benefits.

•  While social in nature, those adaptive functions may be best fulfilled if group leaders and members endorse conspiratorial narratives sincerely.

Conclusions

Political conspiracy theories are cognitively attractive, hard-to-falsify narratives about the secret misdeeds of political opponents and elites. While descriptive in appearance, endorsement and expression of those narratives may be regulated, at least partly, by cognitive systems pursuing social goals: to attract attention of allies towards a social threat to enhance commitment and coordination for joint action (in particular, in conflict), and signal devotion to gain within-group status.

Rather than constituting a special category of cultural beliefs, we see political conspiracy theories as part of a wider family of abstract ideological narratives denouncing how an evil, villains, or oppressive system—more or less real and clearly delineated—exploit a virtuous victim group. This family also comprises anti-capitalistic vs. anti-communist or religious propaganda, white supremacist vs. anti-racist discourses, etc. Future research should explore the content properties that make those threat-based narratives compelling; the balance between their hypothetical social functions of signaling, commitment, and coordination enhancers; and the factors moderating their spread (such as intellectual humility and beliefs that the outgroup does not hate the ingroup).

The moral psychology of misinformation: Why we excuse dishonesty in a post-truth world

Effron, D.A., & Helgason, B. A.

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 47, October 2022, 101375

Abstract

Commentators say we have entered a “post-truth” era. As political lies and “fake news” flourish, citizens appear not only to believe misinformation, but also to condone misinformation they do not believe. The present article reviews recent research on three psychological factors that encourage people to condone misinformation: partisanship, imagination, and repetition. Each factor relates to a hallmark of “post-truth” society: political polarization, leaders who push “alterative facts,” and technology that amplifies disinformation. By lowering moral standards, convincing people that a lie's “gist” is true, or dulling affective reactions, these factors not only reduce moral condemnation of misinformation, but can also amplify partisan disagreement. We discuss implications for reducing the spread of misinformation.

Repeated exposure to misinformation reduces moral condemnation

A third hallmark of a post-truth society is the existence of technologies, such as social media platforms, that amplify misinformation. Such technologies allow fake news – “articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and that could mislead readers” – to spread fast and far, sometimes in multiple periods of intense “contagion” across time. When fake news does “go viral,” the same person is likely to encounter the same piece of misinformation multiple times. Research suggests that these multiple encounters may make the misinformation seem less unethical to spread.

Conclusion

In a post-truth world, purveyors of misinformation need not convince the public that their lies are true. Instead, they can reduce the moral condemnation they receive by appealing to our politics (partisanship), convincing us a falsehood could have been true or might become true in the future (imagination), or simply exposing us to the same misinformation multiple times (repetition). Partisanship may lower moral standards, partisanship and imagination can both make the broader meaning of the falsehood seem true, and repetition can blunt people's negative affective reaction to falsehoods (see Figure 1). Moreover, because partisan alignment strengthens the effects of imagination and facilitates repeated contact with falsehoods, each of these processes can exacerbate partisan divisions in the moral condemnation of falsehoods. Understanding these effects and their pathways informs interventions aimed at reducing the spread of misinformation.

Ultimately, the line of research we have reviewed offers a new perspective on our post-truth world. Our society is not just post-truth in that people can lie and be believed. We are post-truth in that it is concerningly easy to get a moral pass for dishonesty – even when people know you are lying.

The research is here.