A. Peterson, J. Karlawish & E. Largent (2020)
The American Journal of Bioethics
DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2020.1863507
Abstract
This article argues that supported decision making is ideal for people with dynamic cognitive and functional impairments that place them at the margins of autonomy. First, we argue that guardianship and similar surrogate decision-making frameworks may be inappropriate for people with dynamic impairments. Second, we provide a conceptual foundation for supported decision making for individuals with dynamic impairments, which integrates the social model of disability with relational accounts of autonomy. Third, we propose a three-step model that specifies the necessary conditions of supported decision making: identifying domains for support; identifying kinds of supports; and reaching a mutually acceptable and formal agreement. Finally, we identify a series of challenges for supported decision making, provide preliminary responses, and highlight avenues for future bioethics research.
Here is an excerpt:
Are Beneficiaries Authorized to Enter into a Supported Decision-Making Agreement?
The need for supported decision making implies that a beneficiary has diminished decision-making capacity. But there is a presumption that she is still capable to enter into a supported decision-making agreement. What justifies this presumption?
One way to address this challenge is to distinguish the capacity to enter into a supported decision-making agreement from the capacity to make the kinds of decisions enumerated in the agreement. For example, it is recognized in U.S. law that people who lack capacity to make medical decisions at the end of life may still have capacity to assign a surrogate decision maker (Kim and Appelbaum 2006). This practice is justified because the threshold of capacity required to appoint a surrogate is lower than that to consent to more complex decisions. Similarly, the kinds of decisions enumerated in supported decision-making agreements will often be complex and could result in unfortunate consequences if poor decisions are made. But the decision to enter into a supported decision-making agreement is relatively less complex. Moreover, these agreements are often formalizations of ongoing, trusting relationships with friends and family intended to enhance a beneficiary’s wellbeing. Thus, the threshold of capacity to enter into a supported decision-making agreement is justifiably low. People with marginal capacity would reasonably satisfy this threshold.
This response, however, raises questions about the minimum level of decision-making capacity required to enter into a supported decision-making agreement. The project of supported decision making would benefit from future scholarship that describes the specific decisional abilities that show a person with dynamic impairments can (or cannot) enter into a valid supported decision-making agreement.
