Google is Free: Moral Evaluations of Intergroup Curiosity

Mosley, A. J., & Solomon, L. H. (2023).

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0(0).

https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231180149

Abstract

Two experiments investigated how evaluations of intergroup curiosity differed depending on whether people placed responsibility for their learning on themselves or on outgroup members. In Study 1, participants (n = 340; 51% White-American, 49% Black-American) evaluated White actors who were curious about Black culture and placed responsibility on outgroup members to teach versus on themselves to learn. Both Black and White participants rated the latter actors as more moral, and perceptions of effort mediated this effect. A follow-up preregistered study (n = 513; 75% White-American) asked whether perceptions of greater effort cause greater perceptions of moral goodness. Replicating Study 1, participants rated actors as more moral when they placed responsibility on themselves versus others. Participants also rated actors as more moral when they exerted high versus low effort. These results clarify when and why participants view curiosity as morally good and help to strengthen bridges between work on curiosity, moral cognition, and intergroup relations.

A pdf is here.

Here is my summary:

The researchers found that people evaluate intergroup curiosity more favorably when they perceive that the curious individual is placing responsibility on themselves to learn rather than on the outgroup to teach. The researchers also found that perceptions of effort mediate this effect, such that people view curious individuals who exert greater effort as more moral. These findings suggest that people view intergroup curiosity as more morally good when they perceive that the curious individual is taking responsibility for their own learning and is putting in the effort to understand the outgroup.

Consciousness does not require a self

James Coook

iai.tv

Originally published 14 DEC 23

Here is an excerpt:

Beyond the neuroscientific study of consciousness, phenomenological analysis also reveals the self to not be the possessor of experience. In mystical experiences induced by meditation or psychedelics, individuals typically enter a mode of experience in which the psychological self is absent, yet consciousness remains. While this is not the default state of the mind, the presence of consciousness in the absence of a self shows that consciousness is not dependent on an experiencing subject. What is consciousness if not a capacity of an experiencing subject? Such an experience reveals consciousness to consist of a formless awareness at its core, an empty space in which experience arises, including the experience of being a self. The self does not possess consciousness, consciousness is the experiential space in which the image of a psychological self can appear. This mode of experience can be challenging to conceptualise but is very simple when experienced – it is a state of simple appearances arising without the extra add-on of a psychological self inspecting them.

We can think of a conscious system as a system that is capable of holding beliefs about the qualitative character of the world. We should not think of belief here as referring to complex conceptual beliefs, such as believing that Paris is the capital of France, but as the simple ability to hold that the world is a certain way. You do this when you visually perceive a red apple in front of you, the experience is one of believing the apple to exist with all of its qualities such as roundness and redness. This way of thinking is in line with the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that we never come to know reality as it is but instead only experience phenomenal representations of reality [9]. We are not conscious of the world as it is, but as we believe it to be.

The info is here.

Here is my take:

For centuries, we've assumed consciousness and the sense of self are one and the same. This article throws a wrench in that assumption, proposing that consciousness can exist without a self. Imagine experiencing sights, sounds, and sensations without the constant "me" narrating it all. That's what "selfless consciousness" means – raw awareness untouched by self-reflection.

The article then posits that our familiar sense of self, complete with its stories and memories, isn't some fundamental truth but rather a clever prediction concocted by our brains. This "predicted self" helps us navigate the world and interact with others, but it's not necessarily who we truly are.

Decoupling consciousness from the self opens a Pandora's box of possibilities. We might find consciousness in unexpected places, like animals or even artificial intelligence. Understanding brain function could shift dramatically, and our very notions of identity, free will, and reality might need a serious rethink. This is a bold new perspective on what it means to be conscious, and its implications are quite dramatic.

Out, damned spot: Can the “Macbeth Effect” be replicated?

Earp, B. D., Everett, J. A. C., et al. (2014).

Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 36(1), 91–98.

https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2013.856792

Abstract

Comments on an article by Zhong, and Liljenquist (see record 2004-22267-003). Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) reported evidence of a “Macbeth Effect” in social psychology: a threat to people's moral purity leads them to seek, literally, to cleanse themselves. In an attempt to build upon these findings, we conducted a series of direct replications of Study 2 from Z&L's seminal report. We used Z&L's original materials and methods, investigated samples that were more representative of the general population, investigated samples from different countries and cultures, and substantially increased the power of our statistical tests. Despite multiple good-faith efforts, however, we were unable to detect a “Macbeth Effect” in any of our experiments. We discuss these findings in the context of recent concerns about replicability in the field of experimental social psychology.

A pdf is here.

Here is my summary:

In a seminal study published in 2006, Zhong and Liljenquist introduced the concept of the "Macbeth Effect," which suggests that moral transgressions lead to a desire for physical cleansing. This phenomenon was inspired by Shakespeare's play "Macbeth," in which Lady Macbeth's obsession with washing her hands reflects her guilt over her murderous actions.

Building on Zhong and Liljenquist's work, Earp et al. (2014) conducted a series of experiments to replicate the Macbeth Effect. They used various methods, including manipulating participants' moral states through writing tasks and exposing them to reminders of moral cleanliness. However, despite their efforts, they were unable to consistently find evidence for the Macbeth Effect.

The authors' inability to replicate the original findings raises questions about the robustness of the Macbeth Effect. They suggest that more research is needed to understand the conditions under which moral transgressions lead to a desire for physical cleansing. Additionally, they emphasize the importance of conducting replications in psychological research to ensure the reliability of findings.

The paucity of morality in everyday talk

Atari, M., Mehl, M.R., Graham, J. et al. 

Sci Rep 13, 5967 (2023).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-32711-4

Abstract

Given its centrality in scholarly and popular discourse, morality should be expected to figure prominently in everyday talk. We test this expectation by examining the frequency of moral content in three contexts, using three methods: (a) Participants’ subjective frequency estimates (N = 581); (b) Human content analysis of unobtrusively recorded in-person interactions (N = 542 participants; n = 50,961 observations); and (c) Computational content analysis of Facebook posts (N = 3822 participants; n = 111,886 observations). In their self-reports, participants estimated that 21.5% of their interactions touched on morality (Study 1), but objectively, only 4.7% of recorded conversational samples (Study 2) and 2.2% of Facebook posts (Study 3) contained moral content. Collectively, these findings suggest that morality may be far less prominent in everyday life than scholarly and popular discourse, and laypeople, presume.

Summary

Overall, the findings of this research suggest that morality is far less prevalent in everyday talk than previously assumed. While participants overestimated the frequency of moral content in their self-reports, objective measures revealed that moral topics are relatively rare in everyday conversations and online interactions.

The study's authors propose several explanations for this discrepancy between subjective and objective findings. One possibility is that people tend to remember instances of moral talk more vividly than other types of conversation. Additionally, people may be more likely to report that they engage in moral talk when they are explicitly asked about it, as this may make them more aware of their own moral values.

Regardless of the underlying reasons, the findings of this research suggest that morality is not as prominent in everyday life as is often assumed. This may have implications for how we understand and promote moral behavior in society.

Indigenous data sovereignty—A new take on an old theme

Tahu Kukutai (2023).

Science, 382.

DOI:10.1126/science.adl4664

A new kind of data revolution is unfolding around the world, one that is unlikely to be on the radar of tech giants and the power brokers of Silicon Valley. Indigenous Data Sovereignty (IDSov) is a rallying cry for Indigenous communities seeking to regain control over their information while pushing back against data colonialism and its myriad harms. Led by Indigenous academics, innovators, and knowledge-holders, IDSov networks now exist in the United States, Canada, Aotearoa (New Zealand), Australia, the Pacific, and Scandinavia, along with an international umbrella group, the Global Indigenous Data Alliance (GIDA). Together, these networks advocate for the rights of Indigenous Peoples over data that derive from them and that pertain to Nation membership, knowledge systems, customs, or territories. This lens on data sovereignty not only exceeds narrow notions of sovereignty as data localization and jurisdictional rights but also upends the assumption that the nation state is the legitimate locus of power. IDSov has thus become an important catalyst for broader conversations about what Indigenous sovereignty means in a digital world and how some measure of self-determination can be achieved under the weight of Big Tech dominance.

Indigenous Peoples are, of course, no strangers to struggles for sovereignty. There are an estimated 476 million Indigenous Peoples worldwide; the actual number is unknown because many governments do not separately identify Indigenous Peoples in their national data collections such as the population census. Colonial legacies of racism; land dispossession; and the suppression of Indigenous cultures, languages, and knowledges have had profound impacts. For example, although Indigenous Peoples make up just 6% of the global population, they account for about 20% of the world’s extreme poor. Despite this, Indigenous Peoples continue to assert their sovereignty and to uphold their responsibilities as protectors and stewards of their lands, waters, and knowledges.

The rest of the article is here.

Here is a brief summary:

This is an article about Indigenous data sovereignty. It discusses the importance of Indigenous communities having control over their own data. This is because data can be used to exploit and harm Indigenous communities. Indigenous data sovereignty is a way for Indigenous communities to protect themselves from this harm. There are a number of principles that guide Indigenous data sovereignty, including collective consent and the importance of upholding cultural protocols. Indigenous data sovereignty is still in its early stages, but it has the potential to be a powerful tool for Indigenous communities.

Betrayal-Based Moral Injury and Mental Health Problems Among Healthcare and Hospital Workers Serving COVID-19 Patients

Soim Park, Johannes Thrul, et al. (2023)

Journal of Trauma & Dissociation

DOI: 10.1080/15299732.2023.2289195

Abstract

One factor potentially driving healthcare and hospital worker (HHW)’s declining mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic is feeling betrayed by institutional leaders, coworkers, and/or others’ pandemic-related responses and behaviors. We investigated whether HHWs’ betrayal-based moral injury was associated with greater mental distress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms related to COVID-19. We also examined if these associations varied between clinical and non-clinical staff. From July 2020 to January 2021, cross-sectional online survey data were collected from 1,066 HHWs serving COVID-19 patients in a large urban US healthcare system. We measured betrayal-based moral injury in three groups: institutional leaders, coworkers/colleagues, and people outside of healthcare. Multivariate logistic regression analyses were performed to investigate whether betrayal-based moral injury was associated with mental distress and PTSD symptoms. Approximately one-third of HHWs reported feeling betrayed by institutional leaders, and/or people outside healthcare. Clinical staff were more likely to report feelings of betrayal than non-clinical staff. For all respondents, 49.5% reported mental distress and 38.2% reported PTSD symptoms. Having any feelings of betrayal increased the odds of mental distress and PTSD symptoms by 2.9 and 3.3 times, respectively. These associations were not significantly different between clinical and non-clinical staff. As health systems seek to enhance support of HHWs, they need to carefully examine institutional structures, accountability, communication, and decision-making patterns that can result in staff feelings of betrayal. Building trust and repairing ruptures with HHWs could prevent potential mental health problems, increase retention, and reduce burnout, while likely improving patient care.

Here is my take for psychologists:

The article identifies betrayal-based moral injury as a significant factor contributing to mental health problems among healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The research demonstrates a strong association between feelings of betrayal and both mental distress and PTSD symptoms. This suggests that interventions aimed at addressing betrayal-based moral injury could play a crucial role in improving the mental well-being of healthcare workers.

The article provides valuable insights into specific sources of betrayal experienced by healthcare workers. The study highlights that betrayal can stem from institutional leaders, coworkers, and even individuals outside of the healthcare system. This understanding can inform targeted interventions aimed at rebuilding trust and repairing ruptures within healthcare institutions and the broader community.

By understanding the impact of betrayal-based moral injury and its sources, clinical psychologists can develop more effective interventions to support healthcare workers' mental health. These efforts can improve the well-being of individuals working on the frontlines, potentially leading to better patient care and a more sustainable healthcare system.

Human-Algorithm Interactions Help Explain the Spread of Misinformation

McLoughlin, K. L., & Brady, W. J. (2023).

Current Opinion in Psychology, 101770.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101770

Abstract

Human attention biases toward moral and emotional information are as prevalent online as they are offline. When these biases interact with content algorithms that curate social media users’ news feeds to maximize attentional capture, moral and emotional information are privileged in the online information ecosystem. We review evidence for these human-algorithm interactions and argue that misinformation exploits this process to spread online. This framework suggests that interventions aimed at combating misinformation require a dual-pronged approach that combines person-centered and design-centered interventions to be most effective. We suggest several avenues for research in the psychological study of misinformation sharing under a framework of human-algorithm interaction.

Here is my summary:

This research highlights the crucial role of human-algorithm interactions in driving the spread of misinformation online. It argues that both human attentional biases and algorithmic amplification mechanisms contribute to this phenomenon.

Firstly, humans naturally gravitate towards information that evokes moral and emotional responses. This inherent bias makes us more susceptible to engaging with and sharing misinformation that leverages these emotions, such as outrage, fear, or anger.

Secondly, social media algorithms are designed to maximize user engagement, which often translates to prioritizing content that triggers strong emotions. This creates a feedback loop where emotionally charged misinformation is amplified, further attracting human attention and fueling its spread.

The research concludes that effectively combating misinformation requires a multifaceted approach. It emphasizes the need for interventions that address both human psychology and algorithmic design. This includes promoting media literacy, encouraging critical thinking skills, and designing algorithms that prioritize factual accuracy and diverse perspectives over emotional engagement.

The power of social influence: A replication and extension of the Asch experiment

Franzen A, Mader S (2023)

PLoS ONE 18(11): e0294325.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294325

Abstract

In this paper, we pursue four goals: First, we replicate the original Asch experiment with five confederates and one naïve subject in each group (N = 210). Second, in a randomized trial we incentivize the decisions in the line experiment and demonstrate that monetary incentives lower the error rate, but that social influence is still at work. Third, we confront subjects with different political statements and show that the power of social influence can be generalized to matters of political opinion. Finally, we investigate whether intelligence, self-esteem, the need for social approval, and the Big Five are related to the susceptibility to provide conforming answers. We find an error rate of 33% for the standard length-of-line experiment which replicates the original findings by Asch (1951, 1955, 1956). Furthermore, in the incentivized condition the error rate decreases to 25%. For political opinions we find a conformity rate of 38%. However, besides openness, none of the investigated personality traits are convincingly related to the susceptibility of group pressure.

My summary:

This research aimed to replicate and extend the classic Asch conformity experiment, investigating the extent to which individuals conform to group pressure in a line-judging task. The study involved 210 participants divided into groups, with one naive participant and five confederates who provided deliberately incorrect answers. Replicating the original findings, the researchers observed an average error rate of 33%, demonstrating the enduring power of social influence in shaping individual judgments.

Furthering the investigation, the study explored the impact of monetary incentives on conformity. The researchers found that offering rewards for independent judgments reduced the error rate, suggesting that individuals are more likely to resist social pressure when motivated by personal gain. However, the study still observed a significant level of conformity even with incentives, indicating that social influence remains a powerful force even when competing with personal interests.

Worth the Risk? Greater Acceptance of Instrumental Harm Befalling Men than Women

Graso, M., Reynolds, T. & Aquino, K.

Arch Sex Behav 52, 2433–2445 (2023).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-023-02571-0

Abstract

Scientific and organizational interventions often involve trade-offs whereby they benefit some but entail costs to others (i.e., instrumental harm; IH). We hypothesized that the gender of the persons incurring those costs would influence intervention endorsement, such that people would more readily support interventions inflicting IH onto men than onto women. We also hypothesized that women would exhibit greater asymmetries in their acceptance of IH to men versus women. Three experimental studies (two pre-registered) tested these hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 granted support for these predictions using a variety of interventions and contexts. Study 3 tested a possible boundary condition of these asymmetries using contexts in which women have traditionally been expected to sacrifice more than men: caring for infants, children, the elderly, and the ill. Even in these traditionally female contexts, participants still more readily accepted IH to men than women. Findings indicate people (especially women) are less willing to accept instrumental harm befalling women (vs. men). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications and limitations of our findings.

Here is my summary:

This research investigated the societal acceptance of "instrumental harm" (IH) based on the gender of the person experiencing it. Three studies found that people are more likely to tolerate IH when it happens to men than when it happens to women. This bias is especially pronounced among women and those holding egalitarian or feminist beliefs. Even in contexts traditionally associated with women's vulnerability, IH inflicted on men is seen as more acceptable.

These findings highlight a potential blind spot in our perception of harm and raise concerns about how policies might be influenced by this bias. Further research is needed to understand the underlying reasons for this bias and develop strategies to address it.