The Nature of Moral Progress: Definitions, Types and Measures

John Danaher

Philosophical Disquisitions

Originally posted 24 AUG 22

Moral progress is something to be celebrated. But what is it, exactly? In answer to that question, many people point to paradigmatic cases of moral progress: the abolition of slavery, the extension of legal rights to women and racial minorities, the decriminalisation of homosexuality, and so on. But what is it that unites these cases? What makes them all instances of moral progress? Can we identify progress as it happens or does it only become obvious in retrospect?  These are important questions. They are important from a social perspective since past episodes of moral progress have improved the state of the world for many people. We might like to accelerate such progress in the future. They are also important from an individual perspective since we want to be on the right side of history. We don’t want to be reactionary, conservative, relics of the past. At least, most of us don’t.

But it is not always easy to say what moral progress is or to understand how it comes about. Philosophers and social scientists have been studying this topic for some time and there is considerable disagreement about what it is and whether it exists. Indeed, as some academic commentators have noted “for much of the 20th century, it was taken as a sign of moral progress that we had stopped believing in it” (Sauer et al 2021).

Still, we can say some things about the nature of moral progress. In particular, following a recent review by Hanno Sauer, Charlie Blunden, Cecilie Eriksen and Paul Rehren, we can say something about: (i) the definition of moral progress; (ii) the different forms of moral progress; and (iii) the epistemic challenge of identifying episodes of moral progress. In what follows, I will consider each of these in more detail. In doing so, I am inspired, but not constrained, by what Sauer and his colleagues have to say. Much of what I write will summarise their insights; but some of what I write will expand upon or criticise what they have to say. It should be obvious when the latter is happening.

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From Measuring Moral Progress section

And therein lies the rub. The measurement problem arises from the fact that there may be too many measuring sticks and they might not all reach the same verdict about a particular instance of moral change. What’s more, these measuring sticks might be contested, with some groups preferring one over another. The demoralisation of homosexuality might be progressive when measured against the values of autonomy and individual well-being but, according to conservative critics, would be regressive (or transgressive) when measured against the values of purity, naturalness, and social cohesion.

And the problem may go even deeper than this. If moral measuring sticks are themselves subject to progressive moral change, then it might be even more difficult to classify instances of change as progressive. You have to have some fixed set of values against which to measure change as progressive. If nothing is fixed, then all progress seems illusory (or at least highly contingent and relativistic).

These are not new problems. They have been part and parcel of moral philosophy for a long time, but they do affect the study of moral progress. I tend to think there is no entirely satisfactory resolution to them. The best we can do is to be clear about the measuring sticks we are using.

The blog post is here.

A psychologically rich life: Beyond happiness and meaning

Oishi, S., & Westgate, E. C. (2022).

Psychological Review, 129(4), 790–811.

https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000317

Abstract

Psychological science has typically conceptualized a good life in terms of either hedonic or eudaimonic well-being. We propose that psychological richness is another, neglected aspect of what people consider a good life. Unlike happy or meaningful lives, psychologically rich lives are best characterized by a variety of interesting and perspective-changing experiences. We present empirical evidence that happiness, meaning, and psychological richness are related but distinct and desirable aspects of a good life, with unique causes and correlates. In doing so, we show that a nontrivial number of people around the world report they would choose a psychologically rich life at the expense of a happy or meaningful life, and that approximately a third say that undoing their life’s biggest regret would have made their lives psychologically richer. Furthermore, we propose that the predictors of a psychologically rich life are different from those of a happy life or a meaningful life, and report evidence suggesting that people leading psychologically rich lives tend to be more curious, think more holistically, and lean more politically liberal. Together, this work moves us beyond the dichotomy of hedonic versus eudaimonic well-being, and lays the foundation for the study of psychological richness as another dimension of a good life.

Summary of Empirical Evidence

A psychologically rich life, filled with a wide variety of interesting and perspective-changing experiences, is distinct from a happy life and a meaningful life. Psychometrically, a 3-factor model, in which happiness, meaning, and psychological richness each constitute discrete constructs, fits the data significantly better than 1- or 2-factor models which conflate richness with happiness or meaning.  Likewise, people with psychologically rich lives differ in personality from people leading happy or meaningful lives. Openness to experience, in particular, as well as extraversion strongly predicts psychological richness. Finally, leading a psychologically rich life predicts important outcomes above and beyond a happy and/or meaningful life, including system justification, political orientation, attributional complexity, and challenge-seeking.

In sum, the building blocks of a psychologically rich life are different. Particular life experiences and situational factors uniquely contribute to psychological richness, without increasing happiness or meaning. For instance, students’ lives were psychologically richer after a semester studying abroad, but not happier or more meaningful. In experimental work, we likewise find that perspective change uniquely predicts psychological richness. Figure-ground illusions consistently evoke more psychological richness than comparable drawings (but do not increase positive moods). Shifts in perspective increase how psychologically rich (but not how personally meaningful) people find cognitive activities, and perspective-changing information (e.g., learning that a pianist is blind) enriches a musical performance. Finally, perceived difficulty is uniquely associated with psychological richness and (independent of outcomes) predicts how rich, but not how happy or meaningful, people find escape rooms. This is clearly illustrated in the obituary studies: Dramatic (and mostly unpleasant) life events such as unemployment and bereavement are positively associated with richness but negatively associated with happiness.

A pdf of the research is here.

Attributions of emotion and reduced attitude openness prevent people from engaging others with opposing views

Teeny, J. D., & Petty, R. E. (2022).

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 

102, 104373.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104373

Abstract

People exhibit a general unwillingness to engage others on social issues for which they disagree (e.g., political elections, police funding, vaccine mandates, etc.), a phenomenon that contributes to the political polarization vexing societies today. Previous research has largely attributed this unwillingness to the perception that such counterattitudinal targets are extreme, certain, and/or difficult to change on these topics. However, the present research offers an additional theoretical explanation. First, we introduce a less studied perception of targets, their affective-cognitive attitude basis (i.e., the degree to which an attitude is seemingly based on emotions versus reasons) that is critical in determining engagement willingness. Specifically, perceivers are less willing to engage with targets who are perceived to hold an affective (vs. cognitive) attitude basis on a topic, because these targets are inferred to have low attitudinal openness on it (i.e., expected to be unlikely to genuinely “hear out” the perceiver). Second, we use a series of multimethod studies with varied U.S. samples to show why this person perception process is central to understanding counterattitudinal engagement. Compared to proattitudinal targets, perceivers on both sides of an issue ascribe more affective (vs. cognitive) attitude bases to rival (counterattitudinal) targets, which cues inferences of reduced attitudinal openness, thereby diminishing people's willingness to engage with these individuals.

From the General Discussion

One of the foremost paths to combatting political polarization is to have people of opposing views engage with counterattitudinal others (e.g., Broockman & Kalla, 2016). Unfortunately, people tend to be unwilling to do this, which previous research has largely attributed to perceptions about the target’s attitudinal extremity, certainty, and the perceived difficulty required to change the target’s mind. However, in the current research, effects on these measures were not only inconsistent (see Footnotes 2 and 4 as well as the web appendix), but they also had reduced explanatory power relative to the focal perceptions outlined here. That is, regardless of how certain, extreme, or difficult to change a counterattitudinal target was perceived to be, it was the affect (relative to cognition) ascribed to their attitude that predicted inferences of reduced attitudinal openness, which in turn determined bipartisan engagement.

These findings emerged across multiple topics, varied study designs, and in light of targets presenting actual rationale for their opinions.  Moreover, post-hoc analyses reveal that these effects were neither moderated by which side of the issue the participants took, nor the participant’s ideological stance (i.e., both liberals and conservatives demonstrated these effects), nor the participants’ own perceived attitude basis.

A pdf is here.

Beyond individualism: Is there a place for relational autonomy in clinical practice and research?

Dove, E. S., Kelly, S. E., et al. (2017).

Clinical Ethics, 12(3), 150–165.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1477750917704156

Abstract

The dominant, individualistic understanding of autonomy that features in clinical practice and research is underpinned by the idea that people are, in their ideal form, independent, self-interested and rational gain-maximising decision-makers. In recent decades, this paradigm has been challenged from various disciplinary and intellectual directions. Proponents of ‘relational autonomy’ in particular have argued that people’s identities, needs, interests – and indeed autonomy – are always also shaped by their relations to others. Yet, despite the pronounced and nuanced critique directed at an individualistic understanding of autonomy, this critique has had very little effect on ethical and legal instruments in clinical practice and research so far. In this article, we use four case studies to explore to what extent, if at all, relational autonomy can provide solutions to ethical and practical problems in clinical practice and research. We conclude that certain forms of relational autonomy can have a tangible and positive impact on clinical practice and research. These solutions leave the ultimate decision to the person most affected, but encourage and facilitate the consideration of this person’s care and responsibility for connected others.

From the Discussion section

Together, these cases show that in our quest to enhance the practical value of the concept of relational autonomy in healthcare and research, we must be careful not to remove the patient or participant from the centre of decision-making. At the same time, we should acknowledge that the patient’s decision to consent (or refuse) to treatment or research can be augmented by facilitating and encouraging that her relations to, and responsibility for, others are considered in decision-making processes. Our case studies do not suggest that we should expand consent requirements to others per se, such as family members or community elders – that is, to add the requirement of seeking consent from further individuals who may also be seen as having a stake in the decision. Such a position would undermine the idea that the person who is centrally affected by a decision should typically have the final say in what happens with and to her, or her body, or even her data. As long as this general principle respects all legal exceptions (see below), we believe that it is a critical underpinning of fundamental respect for persons that should not done away with. Moreover, expanding consent or requiring consent to include others (however so defined) undermines the main objective of relational autonomy, which is to foreground the relational aspect of human identities and interests, and not merely to expand the range of individuals who need to give consent to a procedure. An approach that merely extends consent requirements to other people does not foreground relations but rather presumptions about who the relevant others of a person are.

The article is here.

Why do narcissists find conspiracy theories so appealing?

A. Cichocka, M. Marchlewska, & M. Biddlestone

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 47, October 2022, 101386

Abstract

Narcissism—a conviction about one's superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one's social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation.

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Gullibility

Although narcissists are typically overconfident in their abilities, judgments, and intelligence, they tend to be naive and less likely to engage in cognitive reflection. For example, Hart and colleagues found that those scoring high in narcissistic rivalry/antagonism (but not admiration/agentic extraversion) were more gullible, that is insensitive to cues of untrustworthiness and vulnerable to being manipulated. Furthermore, studies consistently show that both grandiose (especially its antagonistic, but less consistently agentic extroversive, component) and vulnerable (its antagonistic and neurotic components) narcissism are associated with a predisposition towards odd and unusual beliefs. Conspiracy theories can be one example of such beliefs. There is also evidence that gullibility strengthens the association between narcissism and conspiracy beliefs. In a study by Ahadzadeh and colleagues, the link between narcissism and endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories was especially pronounced among those who were not skeptical towards social media posts in the first place. Taken together, this research suggests that narcissistic antagonism and neuroticism might predict higher gullibility, further related to conspiracy beliefs.

Parallel effects of collective narcissism

Multiple studies indicate that conspiracy theories might not only be appealing to those high in individual narcissism, but also in collective narcissism—a belief that one's group is exceptional and deserves special treatment. Collective narcissism predicts beliefs in conspiracy theories about outgroups, for instance accusing them of involvement in high-profile events (such as the 2019 Smolensk air disaster). Collective narcissism has also been linked to beliefs in anti-science conspiracy theories (e.g., about vaccines, COVID-19, or climate change). These associations are typically explained by the exaggerated intergroup threat sensitivity of collective narcissists, analogous to the paranoia and threat sensitivity of individual narcissists. A conviction that one's group is unique and entitled to special treatment might also increase the need to deny or deflect from national failings by pointing a finger towards malevolent forces undermining the ingroup. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that a motivation to restore personal control strengthens the association between collective narcissism and outgroup conspiracy beliefs, echoing the role of control and dominance motives in individual narcissism. Finally, given studies linking collective narcissism to bullshit receptivity and low cognitive reflection, it is at least plausible that gullibility also plays a role. Thus, collective and individual narcissism could be linked to conspiracy beliefs via similar psychological processes. At the same time, while the effects of individual narcissism might be relatively stable across contexts, any effects of collective narcissism might depend on whether certain identities are important or salient to participants. More work is needed to examine these possibilities.

The info is here.

Some important information for mental health clinicians.

Understanding "longtermism": Why this suddenly influential philosophy is so toxic

Émile P. Torres

Salon.com

Originally posted 20 AUG 22

Here is an excerpt:

But what is longtermism? I have tried to answer that in other articles, and will continue to do so in future ones. A brief description here will have to suffice: Longtermism is a quasi-religious worldview, influenced by transhumanism and utilitarian ethics, which asserts that there could be so many digital people living in vast computer simulations millions or billions of years in the future that one of our most important moral obligations today is to take actions that ensure as many of these digital people come into existence as possible.

In practical terms, that means we must do whatever it takes to survive long enough to colonize space, convert planets into giant computer simulations and create unfathomable numbers of simulated beings. How many simulated beings could there be? According to Nick Bostrom —the Father of longtermism and director of the Future of Humanity Institute — there could be at least 1058 digital people in the future, or a 1 followed by 58 zeros. Others have put forward similar estimates, although as Bostrom wrote in 2003, "what matters … is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge."

In this article, however, I don't want to focus on how bizarre and dangerous this ideology is and could be. Instead, I think it would be useful to take a look at the community out of which longtermism emerged, focusing on the ideas of several individuals who helped shape the worldview that MacAskill and others are now vigorously promoting. The most obvious place to start is with Bostrom, whose publications in the early 2000s — such as his paper "Astronomical Waste," which was recently retweeted by Musk — planted the seeds that have grown into the kudzu vine crawling over the tech sector, world governments and major media outlets like the New York Times and TIME.

Nick Bostrom is, first of all, one of the most prominent transhumanists of the 21st century so far. Transhumanism is an ideology that sees humanity as a work in progress, as something that we can and should actively reengineer, using advanced technologies like brain implants, which could connect our brains to the Internet, and genetic engineering, which could enable us to create super-smart designer babies. We might also gain immortality through life-extension technologies, and indeed many transhumanists have signed up with Alcor to have their bodies (or just their heads and necks, which is cheaper) frozen after they die so that they can be revived later on, in a hypothetical future where that's possible. Bostrom himself wears a metal buckle around his ankle with instructions for Alcor to "take custody of his body and maintain it in a giant steel bottle flooded with liquid nitrogen" after he dies.

The article is here.

A community response approach to mental health and substance abuse crises reduced crime

T. S. Dee and J. Pyne

Science Advances, 8 Jun 2022

Vol 8, Issue 23

Abstract

Police officers often serve as first responders to mental health and substance abuse crises. Concerns over the unintended consequences and high costs associated with this approach have motivated emergency response models that augment or completely remove police involvement. However, there is little causal evidence evaluating these programs. This preregistered study presents quasi-experimental evidence on the impact of an innovative “community response” pilot in Denver that directed targeted emergency calls to health care responders instead of the police. We find robust evidence that the program reduced reports of targeted, less serious crimes (e.g., trespassing, public disorder, and resisting arrest) by 34% and had no detectable effect on more serious crimes. The sharp reduction in targeted crimes reflects the fact that health-focused first responders are less likely to report individuals they serve as criminal offenders and the spillover benefits of the program (e.g., reducing crime during hours when the program was not in operation).

From the Discussion Section

The evidence in this study indicates that the STAR community response program was effective in reducing police-reported criminal offenses (i.e., both reducing the designation of individuals in crisis as criminal offenders and reducing the actual level of crime). These results provide a compelling motivation for the continued implementation and assessment of this approach. However, successfully replicating the STAR program is likely to rely on key implementation details such as the recruitment and training of dispatchers and mental health field staff as well as the successful coordination of their activities with the police. Furthermore, the generalizability of the community response approach to a broader set of potentially preventable charges is uncertain and a design feature worthy of further study. There are also additional details about programs such as STAR that merit further investigation and clarification. For example, we are unsure of whether the existence of STAR may have increased the trust and the willingness of community members to call 911. However, we note that such an effect is likely to imply that our estimates underestimate the true effect of the STAR program. That is because increase in trust and willingness to call 911 is likely to increase measured crime in the short run as some of these calls would result in police engagement regardless of arrest status. Future studies may also consider the effects of programs like STAR on health-related outcomes, such as access to health services (e.g., counseling and therapy) and related measures of well-being.

The research is here.

Facial attractiveness is more associated with individual warmth than with competence: Behavioral and neural evidence

Mengxue Lan, et al. (2022) 

Social Neuroscience, 17:3, 225-235

DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2022.2069152

Abstract

Individuals appear to infer others’ psychological characteristics according to facial attractiveness and these psychological characteristics can be classified into two categories in social cognition, that is, warmth and competence. However, which category of psychological characteristic is more associated with face attractiveness and its neural mechanisms have not been explored. To address this, participants were asked to judge others’ warmth and competence traits based on face attractiveness, while their brains were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). They also assessed the attractiveness of faces after scanning. Behavioral results showed that the correlation between face attractiveness and warmth ratings was significantly higher than that with competence ratings. fMRI results demonstrated that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), lateral prefrontal cortex, and lateral temporal lobe were more involved in the warmth task. Moreover, attractiveness ratings were negatively correlated with activation of the dmPFC and TPJ only in the warmth task. Furthermore, the attractiveness ratings were negatively correlated with the defined dmPFC, region related to attractiveness judgment, only in the warmth task. In conclusion, people are more inclined to infer others’ warmth than competence characteristics from face attractiveness, that is, face attractiveness is more associated with warmth than with competence.

The research is here.

Freezing revisited: coordinated autonomic and central optimization of threat coping

Roelofs, K., Dayan, P. 

Nat Rev Neurosci 23, 568–580 (2022).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00608-2

Abstract

Animals have sophisticated mechanisms for coping with danger. Freezing is a unique state that, upon threat detection, allows evidence to be gathered, response possibilities to be previsioned and preparations to be made for worst-case fight or flight. We propose that — rather than reflecting a passive fear state — the particular somatic and cognitive characteristics of freezing help to conceal overt responses, while optimizing sensory processing and action preparation. Critical for these functions are the neurotransmitters noradrenaline and acetylcholine, which modulate neural information processing and also control the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system. However, the interactions between autonomic systems and the brain during freezing, and the way in which they jointly coordinate responses, remain incompletely explored. We review the joint actions of these systems and offer a novel computational framework to describe their temporally harmonized integration. This reconceptualization of freezing has implications for its role in decision-making under threat and for psychopathology.

Conclusions and future directions

Considering the post encounter threat state from neural, psychological and computational perspectives has shown how the most obvious external characteristic of this state — a particular form of active freezing arising from co-activation of the normally opposed sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the ANS — could have various advantages from the viewpoints of both information processing and fast Pavlovian or instrumental action. Descending control of this state is quite well understood, and the potential benefits of expending effort on enhancing unbiased, bottom-up, sensory processing and engaging in planning are easy to observe. However, the roles of ascending neuromodulators in engaging these forms of appropriate information processing are less clear.  Certainly, various of the modes of action of ACh and NA in the CNS are in a position to achieve some of this; but much remains to be discovered by precisely recording and manipulating the candidate circuits within the timeframes of the detection, evaluation and action stages.

One important source of ideas is evolutionary theory. For instance, the polyvagal theory of the phylogeny of the ANS suggests that it progressed in three stages. The first, associated with an unmyelinated vagus nerve, allowed metabolic activity to be depressed in response to threat and also controlled aspects of digestion. The second stage was associated with the sympathetic nervous system, which organized energized behaviour for fight or flight. The third stage was associated with a myelinated vagus nerve and allowed for more flexible and sophisticated responding. It has been suggested that the last stage is particularly involved in the evolution of somatic regulation in a social context; but the evolutionary layering of the competition and cooperation between the inhibitory and activating aspects of the different branches of the ANS is notable. It would be interesting to understand the parallel evolution of cholinergic and noradrenergic neuromodulation in the CNS. 

A pdf is here.

Note: We are primates subject to the principles of biology and evolution.