By E. O. Wilson
The Atlantic
April, 1998
Centuries of debate on the origin of ethics come down to this: Either ethical principles, such as justice and human rights, are independent of human experience, or they are human inventions. The distinction is more than an exercise for academic philosophers. The choice between these two understandings makes all the difference in the way we view ourselves as a species. It measures the authority of religion, and it determines the conduct of moral reasoning.
The two assumptions in competition are like islands in a sea of chaos, as different as life and death, matter and the void. One cannot learn which is correct by pure logic; the answer will eventually be reached through an accumulation of objective evidence. Moral reasoning, I believe, is at every level intrinsically consilient with -- compatible with, intertwined with -- the natural sciences. (I use a form of the word "consilience" -- literally a "jumping together" of knowledge as a result of the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation -- because its rarity has preserved its precision.)
Every thoughtful person has an opinion on which premise is correct. But the split is not, as popularly supposed, between religious believers and secularists. It is between transcendentalists, who think that moral guidelines exist outside the human mind, and empiricists, who think them contrivances of the mind. In simplest terms, the options are as follows: I believe in the independence of moral values, whether from God or not, and I believe that moral values come from human beings alone, whether or not God exists.
Part 1 of the article is here.
Wednesday, September 16, 2015
Tuesday, September 15, 2015
Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free Science
By Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher, & Yoel Inbar
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
August 2015
Abstract
A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment along several dimensions, even when prior credence in the hypothesis is controlled for. Furthermore, it is shown that this bias is insensitive to an economic incentive to be accurate in the evaluation of the evidence. These results contribute to call into question the attainability of the ideal of a value-free science.
The entire article is here.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
August 2015
Abstract
A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment along several dimensions, even when prior credence in the hypothesis is controlled for. Furthermore, it is shown that this bias is insensitive to an economic incentive to be accurate in the evaluation of the evidence. These results contribute to call into question the attainability of the ideal of a value-free science.
The entire article is here.
Monday, September 14, 2015
Record-keeping controversies: Ethical, legal, and clinical challenges
By Ken Pope
Canadian Psychology
Vol. 56(3), August 2015, 348-356
Abstract
The growing array of record-keeping laws, ethical standards, and professional guidelines has created controversy and confusion. Clinicians struggle with what to leave in, what to leave out, how to handle records securely, when to respond to requests for records versus when to refuse, and so on. This article focuses on 5 challenging areas: confidentiality; informed consent; the state, the law, and legal requirements; third-parties; and the implications of research findings for record keeping. It discusses published claims, critiques, proposals for change, and research reports, particularly those of Bemister and Dobson (2011, 2012); Castonguay (2013); Christie, Bemister, and Dobson (2014); Furlong (2013); and Mills (2012). It emphasizes the potential problems with any “1 size fits all” approach and the difficulties in creating sensible regulations that do justice to the diversity of values, contexts, cultures, and theoretical orientations.
The entire article is here.
Canadian Psychology
Vol. 56(3), August 2015, 348-356
Abstract
The growing array of record-keeping laws, ethical standards, and professional guidelines has created controversy and confusion. Clinicians struggle with what to leave in, what to leave out, how to handle records securely, when to respond to requests for records versus when to refuse, and so on. This article focuses on 5 challenging areas: confidentiality; informed consent; the state, the law, and legal requirements; third-parties; and the implications of research findings for record keeping. It discusses published claims, critiques, proposals for change, and research reports, particularly those of Bemister and Dobson (2011, 2012); Castonguay (2013); Christie, Bemister, and Dobson (2014); Furlong (2013); and Mills (2012). It emphasizes the potential problems with any “1 size fits all” approach and the difficulties in creating sensible regulations that do justice to the diversity of values, contexts, cultures, and theoretical orientations.
The entire article is here.
Zygmunt Bauman accused of serial ‘self-plagiarism’
By Paul Jump
Times Higher Education
Originally published August 20, 2015
Here are two excerpts:
Last year, Times Higher Education reported allegations that Zygmunt Bauman, emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Leeds and often hailed as the world’s greatest living sociologist, had included several unacknowledged passages in his 2013 book Does the Richness of the Few Benefit Us All? that were near-exact quotations from Wikipedia and other web resources. The book also allegedly included numerous passages from previous works written by Professor Bauman “without appropriate attribution”.
(cut)
They acknowledge that some academics do not regard self-plagiarism as a serious issue. But “by failing to indicate that substantial parts of his newly authored works are not in fact new, in any conventional sense of the term, but are instead copied from his earlier works, Bauman deceives his readers”, they say.
Both Professor Bauman and Polity, the publisher of many of his most recent books, declined to comment.
Irene Hames, an editorial and publishing consultant and a former journal editor and council member of the Committee on Publication Ethics, said that self-plagiarism – she preferred to call it “recycling” – was “a topic of considerable current discussion, confusion and varying viewpoints”.
The entire article is here.
Times Higher Education
Originally published August 20, 2015
Here are two excerpts:
Last year, Times Higher Education reported allegations that Zygmunt Bauman, emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Leeds and often hailed as the world’s greatest living sociologist, had included several unacknowledged passages in his 2013 book Does the Richness of the Few Benefit Us All? that were near-exact quotations from Wikipedia and other web resources. The book also allegedly included numerous passages from previous works written by Professor Bauman “without appropriate attribution”.
(cut)
They acknowledge that some academics do not regard self-plagiarism as a serious issue. But “by failing to indicate that substantial parts of his newly authored works are not in fact new, in any conventional sense of the term, but are instead copied from his earlier works, Bauman deceives his readers”, they say.
Both Professor Bauman and Polity, the publisher of many of his most recent books, declined to comment.
Irene Hames, an editorial and publishing consultant and a former journal editor and council member of the Committee on Publication Ethics, said that self-plagiarism – she preferred to call it “recycling” – was “a topic of considerable current discussion, confusion and varying viewpoints”.
The entire article is here.
Sunday, September 13, 2015
Beyond the APA: The Role of Psychology Boards and State Courts in Propping up Torture
By Deborah Popowski
Just Security
Originally posted August 24, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Licensing boards are legally mandated to protect people from the unsafe practice of psychology. This includes patients, all people with whom psychologists work, and the broader public. Yet, presented with evidence that their licensees had participated in or enabled torture, these state boards seemed to turn a blind eye. To truly understand how a profession dedicated to healing came to sanction brutality, we need a full investigation into how and why these boards dismissed misconduct complaints against psychologists James Mitchell, John Leso, Larry James, and Diane Zierhoffer. Did the state boards handle these complaints properly and in good faith, or did they, like the APA, strain their reading of the law to reach conclusions that would not restrict the government’s interrogation program — even if it included torture and cruelty? To what extent did they rely on compromised APA ethics policies and the now-discredited officials responsible for them?
The entire article is here.
Just Security
Originally posted August 24, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Licensing boards are legally mandated to protect people from the unsafe practice of psychology. This includes patients, all people with whom psychologists work, and the broader public. Yet, presented with evidence that their licensees had participated in or enabled torture, these state boards seemed to turn a blind eye. To truly understand how a profession dedicated to healing came to sanction brutality, we need a full investigation into how and why these boards dismissed misconduct complaints against psychologists James Mitchell, John Leso, Larry James, and Diane Zierhoffer. Did the state boards handle these complaints properly and in good faith, or did they, like the APA, strain their reading of the law to reach conclusions that would not restrict the government’s interrogation program — even if it included torture and cruelty? To what extent did they rely on compromised APA ethics policies and the now-discredited officials responsible for them?
The entire article is here.
Saturday, September 12, 2015
The Ethics of Creating Artificial Consciousness
By John Basl
Northeastern University
Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to raise the prospect that engaging in artificial consciousness research, research that aims to create artifactual entities with conscious states of certain kinds, might be unethical on grounds that it wrongs or will very likely wrong the subjects of such research. I say might be unethical because, in the end, it will depend on how those entities are created and how they are likely to be treated. This essay is meant to be a starting point in thinking about the ethics of artificial consciousness research ethics, not, by any means, the final word on such matters. While the ethics of the creation and proliferation of artificial intelligences and artificial consciousnesses (see, for example, (Chalmers 2010) has often been explored both in academic settings and in popular media and literature, those discussions tend to focus on the consequences for humans or, at most, the potential rights of machines that are very much like us. However, the subjects of artificial consciousness research, at least those subjects that end up being conscious in particular ways, are research subjects in the way that sentient non-human animals or human subjects are research subjects and so should be afforded appropriate protections. Therefore, it is important to ask not only whether artificial consciousnesses that are integrated into our society should be afforded moral and legal protections and whether they are a risk to our safety or existence, but whether the predecessors to such consciousnesses are wronged in their creation or in the research involving them.
The entire article is here.
Northeastern University
Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to raise the prospect that engaging in artificial consciousness research, research that aims to create artifactual entities with conscious states of certain kinds, might be unethical on grounds that it wrongs or will very likely wrong the subjects of such research. I say might be unethical because, in the end, it will depend on how those entities are created and how they are likely to be treated. This essay is meant to be a starting point in thinking about the ethics of artificial consciousness research ethics, not, by any means, the final word on such matters. While the ethics of the creation and proliferation of artificial intelligences and artificial consciousnesses (see, for example, (Chalmers 2010) has often been explored both in academic settings and in popular media and literature, those discussions tend to focus on the consequences for humans or, at most, the potential rights of machines that are very much like us. However, the subjects of artificial consciousness research, at least those subjects that end up being conscious in particular ways, are research subjects in the way that sentient non-human animals or human subjects are research subjects and so should be afforded appropriate protections. Therefore, it is important to ask not only whether artificial consciousnesses that are integrated into our society should be afforded moral and legal protections and whether they are a risk to our safety or existence, but whether the predecessors to such consciousnesses are wronged in their creation or in the research involving them.
The entire article is here.
Friday, September 11, 2015
Safeguarding choice at the end of life
By Dominic Wilkinson
J Med Ethics 2015;41:575-576
doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-102990
Across the world, in countries with permissive or restrictive existing legislation, debates about Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (EAS) continue to grip politicians, ethicists, physicians and the wider public.
Early debates about EAS focused on whether it could ever be ethical for a physician to actively cause the death of a patient. However, most contemporary writers, including most of the contributors to this special double issue of the JME appear to accept that such actions could, in some circumstances, be ethical. Current debate is mostly focused instead on which actions are permissible, when they are permissible, and what safeguards are necessary to protect the vulnerable.
There are two separate justifications for EAS. The first of these is based on the autonomy of competent patients, on their right to make important decisions about their own lives. Arguably, a decision about continuing or not continuing your life in the face of severe suffering is the most important decision that you could make. Correspondingly, we have strong autonomy based reasons for permitting that choice. (While some Kantians might claim that a decision to die, and thereby to end one's autonomous agency could not be compatible with autonomy and dignity, Michael Cholbi points out (see page 607) that a sophisticated Kantian position on EAS is neither completely restrictive nor permissive). The second justification for EAS is based on the interests of a patient, and a concern that continued life for some individuals may be so extraordinarily and intensely unpleasant that it would be better for them to die.
The entire article is here.
J Med Ethics 2015;41:575-576
doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-102990
Across the world, in countries with permissive or restrictive existing legislation, debates about Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (EAS) continue to grip politicians, ethicists, physicians and the wider public.
Early debates about EAS focused on whether it could ever be ethical for a physician to actively cause the death of a patient. However, most contemporary writers, including most of the contributors to this special double issue of the JME appear to accept that such actions could, in some circumstances, be ethical. Current debate is mostly focused instead on which actions are permissible, when they are permissible, and what safeguards are necessary to protect the vulnerable.
There are two separate justifications for EAS. The first of these is based on the autonomy of competent patients, on their right to make important decisions about their own lives. Arguably, a decision about continuing or not continuing your life in the face of severe suffering is the most important decision that you could make. Correspondingly, we have strong autonomy based reasons for permitting that choice. (While some Kantians might claim that a decision to die, and thereby to end one's autonomous agency could not be compatible with autonomy and dignity, Michael Cholbi points out (see page 607) that a sophisticated Kantian position on EAS is neither completely restrictive nor permissive). The second justification for EAS is based on the interests of a patient, and a concern that continued life for some individuals may be so extraordinarily and intensely unpleasant that it would be better for them to die.
The entire article is here.
Moral Panic: Who Benefits From Public Fear?
By Scott Bohn
Psychology Today Blog
Originally published July 20, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Moral panics arise when distorted mass media campaigns are used to create fear, reinforce stereotypes and exacerbate pre-existing divisions in the world, often based on race, ethnicity and social class.
Additionally, moral panics have three distinguishing characteristics. First, there is a focused attention on the behavior, whether real or imagined, of certain individuals or groups that are transformed into what Cohen referred to as “folk devils” by the mass media. This is accomplished when the media strip these folk devils of all favorable characteristics and apply exclusively negative ones.
Second, there is a gap between the concern over a condition and the objective threat it poses. Typically, the objective threat is far less than popularly perceived due to how it is presented by authorities.
Third, there is a great deal of fluctuation over time in the level of concern over a condition. The typical pattern begins with the discovery of the threat, followed by a rapid rise and then peak in public concern, which then subsequently, and often abruptly, subsides.
Finally, public hysteria over a perceived problem often results in the passing of legislation that is highly punitive, unnecessary, and serves to justify the agendas of those in positions of power and authority.
The entire article is here.
Psychology Today Blog
Originally published July 20, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Moral panics arise when distorted mass media campaigns are used to create fear, reinforce stereotypes and exacerbate pre-existing divisions in the world, often based on race, ethnicity and social class.
Additionally, moral panics have three distinguishing characteristics. First, there is a focused attention on the behavior, whether real or imagined, of certain individuals or groups that are transformed into what Cohen referred to as “folk devils” by the mass media. This is accomplished when the media strip these folk devils of all favorable characteristics and apply exclusively negative ones.
Second, there is a gap between the concern over a condition and the objective threat it poses. Typically, the objective threat is far less than popularly perceived due to how it is presented by authorities.
Third, there is a great deal of fluctuation over time in the level of concern over a condition. The typical pattern begins with the discovery of the threat, followed by a rapid rise and then peak in public concern, which then subsequently, and often abruptly, subsides.
Finally, public hysteria over a perceived problem often results in the passing of legislation that is highly punitive, unnecessary, and serves to justify the agendas of those in positions of power and authority.
The entire article is here.
Thursday, September 10, 2015
Law and Ethics
Richard Marshall interviews Matthew Kramer
3:AM Magazine
Originally published on August 22, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
3:AM: If capital punishment is a central contemporary issue so is the use of torture. Why do you argue that torture is always wrong?
MK: There is no single answer to that question, because there are many different types of torture, and the explanation of the wrongness of torture is not uniform across those types. (When I refer to the sundry types of torture, I am not differentiating among them on the basis of the techniques employed; rather, I am differentiating among them with regard to the chief purposes for which torture is undertaken.) Let me say a bit here about the most frequently discussed type, interrogational torture. My 2014 book Torture and Moral Integrity maintains that such torture is always and everywhere morally wrong. The gravity of the wrong varies, but the wrongness itself does not. Hence, it should be apparent that that book is as robustly deontological as any of my previous volumes. (“Robustly deontological” is definitely not equivalent to “robustly Kantian.” My book on torture contains numerous objections to Kantianism as well as to consequentialism.)
Interrogational torture involves the deliberate infliction of severe pain for the purpose of extracting information from someone (either from the person on whom the pain is directly inflicted or from someone who is likely to care deeply about that person). The deliberate infliction of severe pain for that purpose is always morally wrong because of the overweeningness of the control exerted both through the infliction itself and through the aim which it is undertaken to achieve. The overweeningness of the control exerted by the infliction itself has been brought out especially incisively in recent years by David Sussman, and the overweeningness of the aim pursued has been brought out especially incisively in recent years by David Luban. Hence, I draw upon their writings as well as those of many other philosophers in my ruminations on torture.
The entire interview is here.
3:AM Magazine
Originally published on August 22, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
3:AM: If capital punishment is a central contemporary issue so is the use of torture. Why do you argue that torture is always wrong?
MK: There is no single answer to that question, because there are many different types of torture, and the explanation of the wrongness of torture is not uniform across those types. (When I refer to the sundry types of torture, I am not differentiating among them on the basis of the techniques employed; rather, I am differentiating among them with regard to the chief purposes for which torture is undertaken.) Let me say a bit here about the most frequently discussed type, interrogational torture. My 2014 book Torture and Moral Integrity maintains that such torture is always and everywhere morally wrong. The gravity of the wrong varies, but the wrongness itself does not. Hence, it should be apparent that that book is as robustly deontological as any of my previous volumes. (“Robustly deontological” is definitely not equivalent to “robustly Kantian.” My book on torture contains numerous objections to Kantianism as well as to consequentialism.)
Interrogational torture involves the deliberate infliction of severe pain for the purpose of extracting information from someone (either from the person on whom the pain is directly inflicted or from someone who is likely to care deeply about that person). The deliberate infliction of severe pain for that purpose is always morally wrong because of the overweeningness of the control exerted both through the infliction itself and through the aim which it is undertaken to achieve. The overweeningness of the control exerted by the infliction itself has been brought out especially incisively in recent years by David Sussman, and the overweeningness of the aim pursued has been brought out especially incisively in recent years by David Luban. Hence, I draw upon their writings as well as those of many other philosophers in my ruminations on torture.
The entire interview is here.
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