By Tania Lombrozo
NPR.org
Originally published on March 4, 2014
Here are some excerpts:
The startling result was that memory wasn't a frontrunner when it came to what sustains someone's "true self." Instead, the winner was morality. A person who had trouble learning new information or forgot childhood memories, for example, was regarded as less fundamentally altered than one who became cruel or selfish, or even one who acquired positive moral traits, such as honesty or forgiveness.
(cut)
The lesson from Zaitchik's research is that while Alzheimer's patients suffer from serious conceptual impairments relative to their healthy counterparts, these impairments aren't uniform across domains. An Alzheimer's patient can be wrong about whether zebras have stripes or a car is alive, but have social and moral reasoning abilities that are relatively intact.
The entire article is here.
Thursday, March 20, 2014
Wednesday, March 19, 2014
HIPAA's Patient Access Rights
By Bruce Borkosky
Published by The Malvern Group
February 2014
This whitepaper is intended as a reference for patients, healthcare providers, and Privacy Officers. It is not legal advice and expresses the opinions of the author.
The goal of the paper is to provide a comprehensive yet understandable review of the many issues involving a patient's access to their PHI in the context of the patient’s rights, treatment considerations and interactions with other providers and the legal system.
It can be read in its entirety, or the reader may wish to use it as reference material, referring to individual sections as the need arises. Patients will be able to use this information to learn about their rights and become more assertive when providers refuse to release records.
Providers can use this information to release (or deny release of) records, thereby potentially avoiding malpractice lawsuits, disciplinary sanctions, or HIPAA complaints.
Administrators and Privacy Officers will be able to use this information to help maintain HIPAA compliance and to help resolve disputes among providers or between providers and patients.
Readers will also discover options for dealing with providers who are reluctant to release records.
The entire paper is here.
Published by The Malvern Group
February 2014
This whitepaper is intended as a reference for patients, healthcare providers, and Privacy Officers. It is not legal advice and expresses the opinions of the author.
The goal of the paper is to provide a comprehensive yet understandable review of the many issues involving a patient's access to their PHI in the context of the patient’s rights, treatment considerations and interactions with other providers and the legal system.
It can be read in its entirety, or the reader may wish to use it as reference material, referring to individual sections as the need arises. Patients will be able to use this information to learn about their rights and become more assertive when providers refuse to release records.
Providers can use this information to release (or deny release of) records, thereby potentially avoiding malpractice lawsuits, disciplinary sanctions, or HIPAA complaints.
Administrators and Privacy Officers will be able to use this information to help maintain HIPAA compliance and to help resolve disputes among providers or between providers and patients.
Readers will also discover options for dealing with providers who are reluctant to release records.
The entire paper is here.
Book Review: Does rationality + consciousness = free will?
Review of Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will
by David Hodgson. New York: Oxford University Press
Review by Brian Earp
Do we have free will or don’t we? Or do we have it in degrees? Is free will compatible with determinism or is it not? What about indeterminism? David Hodgson is not the first to explore this thicket. Following the advice of Hobbes, the first step in any effort to answer such questions should be to pose another set of questions: What do you mean by “free”? By “we”? By “have”and “will”? What is your notion of “compatible” and “incompatible”? How do you define“determinism”? And so on through the list of very pregnant turns-of-phrase.
In his latest book, Hodgson does somewhat less to “examine the Definitions of former Authors”than to “make them himself.” Though he does give some broad gestures at foundational texts in the opening chapters of his work, and while he sprinkles some references to his contemporaries throughout, Hodgson spends the bulk of his time developing his own distinctive account. Let us try to make some sense, then, of what that account is saying.
The author's personal copy of the book review is here.
by David Hodgson. New York: Oxford University Press
Review by Brian Earp
Do we have free will or don’t we? Or do we have it in degrees? Is free will compatible with determinism or is it not? What about indeterminism? David Hodgson is not the first to explore this thicket. Following the advice of Hobbes, the first step in any effort to answer such questions should be to pose another set of questions: What do you mean by “free”? By “we”? By “have”and “will”? What is your notion of “compatible” and “incompatible”? How do you define“determinism”? And so on through the list of very pregnant turns-of-phrase.
In his latest book, Hodgson does somewhat less to “examine the Definitions of former Authors”than to “make them himself.” Though he does give some broad gestures at foundational texts in the opening chapters of his work, and while he sprinkles some references to his contemporaries throughout, Hodgson spends the bulk of his time developing his own distinctive account. Let us try to make some sense, then, of what that account is saying.
The author's personal copy of the book review is here.
Tuesday, March 18, 2014
Physicians Lead the Way to Interstate Practice
By Ross Friedberg, Brandon Ge, Rene Quashie, and Bonnie Scott
Epstein, Becker, and Green
Originally posted February 21, 2014
A significant barrier to the interstate practice of telehealth is closer to being broken down. The Federation of State Medical Boards ("FSMB") recently completed and distributed a draft Interstate Medical Licensure Compact ("Compact"), which is designed to facilitate physician licensure portability and the practice of interstate telehealth. The Compact would create an additional licensure pathway through which physicians would be able to obtain expedited licensure in participating states. As the FSMB notes in the draft, the Compact "complements the existing licensing and regulatory authority of state medical boards, ensures the safety of patients, and provides physicians with enhanced portability of their license to practice medicine outside their state of primary licensure."
The entire article is here.
Epstein, Becker, and Green
Originally posted February 21, 2014
A significant barrier to the interstate practice of telehealth is closer to being broken down. The Federation of State Medical Boards ("FSMB") recently completed and distributed a draft Interstate Medical Licensure Compact ("Compact"), which is designed to facilitate physician licensure portability and the practice of interstate telehealth. The Compact would create an additional licensure pathway through which physicians would be able to obtain expedited licensure in participating states. As the FSMB notes in the draft, the Compact "complements the existing licensing and regulatory authority of state medical boards, ensures the safety of patients, and provides physicians with enhanced portability of their license to practice medicine outside their state of primary licensure."
The entire article is here.
Should teachers of controversial issues disclose their opinions?
By Harry
Crookedtimber.org
Originally posted March 3, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
For some of the issues I teach, it is not that hard to find out my views, if you really want to, and are a minimally competent googler. But I take a pretty hard line on the disclosure question. I don’t disclose my views about the issues I teach. Here’s why.
First, all of the issues I teach are issues on which there are powerful arguments on more than one side. I do not see my job as presenting technical scholarly applied ethics so that they will become interested in the major, but in introducing them to a particular practice that requires certain intellectual resources that my discipline has developed: the practice of moral reason giving and taking. So it makes no sense to teach issues about which, though there is a public debate, the reasons are one-sided. This is why, for example, I do not teach same-sex marriage (I tried, it didn’t work) or gun rights and why, if I lived in the UK, I would not teach about the legitimacy of the monarchy. I want students really to understand that there are reasons on both sides, and worry that disclosing would give them the impression that, contrary to fact, I regard the issues as settled. (I should add: it might make complete sense to teach such issues in a social studies high school class, especially if the focus is on getting the students to articulate and defend their own positions; the aims of such a class might be different from mine).
The entire blog post is here.
Crookedtimber.org
Originally posted March 3, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
For some of the issues I teach, it is not that hard to find out my views, if you really want to, and are a minimally competent googler. But I take a pretty hard line on the disclosure question. I don’t disclose my views about the issues I teach. Here’s why.
First, all of the issues I teach are issues on which there are powerful arguments on more than one side. I do not see my job as presenting technical scholarly applied ethics so that they will become interested in the major, but in introducing them to a particular practice that requires certain intellectual resources that my discipline has developed: the practice of moral reason giving and taking. So it makes no sense to teach issues about which, though there is a public debate, the reasons are one-sided. This is why, for example, I do not teach same-sex marriage (I tried, it didn’t work) or gun rights and why, if I lived in the UK, I would not teach about the legitimacy of the monarchy. I want students really to understand that there are reasons on both sides, and worry that disclosing would give them the impression that, contrary to fact, I regard the issues as settled. (I should add: it might make complete sense to teach such issues in a social studies high school class, especially if the focus is on getting the students to articulate and defend their own positions; the aims of such a class might be different from mine).
The entire blog post is here.
Monday, March 17, 2014
Episode 4: Ethical Decision-making (Part 1)
While John's introduction indicates the podcasts will be conversations, Episode 4 is a monologue. This episode provides didactic material about ethical decision-making, which does not lend itself to a conversation. The importance of this podcast and Episode 5 is to set up vignette analysis in future podcasts. Everyone needs to be on the same page in order to apply ethical decision-making in instructional or real life situations.
At the end of this podcast, the listener will be able to:
1. Describe the differences between ethical and clinical decision-making,
2. Outline the Acculturation Model, and,
3. List the five foundational principles for ethical decision-making.
Click here to purchase 1 APA-approved Continuing Education credit
Find this podcast in iTunes
Listen directly on this page
Link to video presentation on YouTube
Here is a link to the PowerPoint presentation only.
Resources
American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct
American Psychological Association's Guidelines for Practitioners
Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J.F. (1994). Principles of biomedical ethics ( 4th ed). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kitchener, K. S. (1984). Intuition, critical evaluation and ethical principles: The foundation for ethical decisions in counseling psychology. Counseling Psychologist, 12(3), 43-55.
Handelsman, M. M., Gottlieb, M. C., & Knapp, S. (2005). Training ethical psychologists: An acculturation model. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 36, 59-65.
At the end of this podcast, the listener will be able to:
1. Describe the differences between ethical and clinical decision-making,
2. Outline the Acculturation Model, and,
3. List the five foundational principles for ethical decision-making.
Click here to purchase 1 APA-approved Continuing Education credit
Find this podcast in iTunes
Listen directly on this page
Link to video presentation on YouTube
Here is a link to the PowerPoint presentation only.
Resources
American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct
American Psychological Association's Guidelines for Practitioners
Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J.F. (1994). Principles of biomedical ethics ( 4th ed). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kitchener, K. S. (1984). Intuition, critical evaluation and ethical principles: The foundation for ethical decisions in counseling psychology. Counseling Psychologist, 12(3), 43-55.
Handelsman, M. M., Gottlieb, M. C., & Knapp, S. (2005). Training ethical psychologists: An acculturation model. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 36, 59-65.
Sunday, March 16, 2014
The Failure of Social and Moral Intuitions
Edge Videos
HeadCon '13: Part IX
David Pizarro
Today I want to talk a little about our social and moral intuitions and I want to present a case that they're rapidly failing, more so than ever. Let me start with an example. Recently, I collaborated with economist Rob Frank, roboticist Cynthia Breazeal, and social psychologist David DeSteno. The experiment that we did was interested in looking at how we detect trustworthiness in others.
We had people interact—strangers interact in the lab—and we filmed them, and we got the cues that seemed to indicate that somebody's going to be either more cooperative or less cooperative. But the fun part of this study was that for the second part we got those cues and we programmed a robot—Nexi the robot, from the lab of Cynthia Breazeal at MIT—to emulate, in one condition, those non-verbal gestures. So what I'm talking about today is not about the results of that study, but rather what was interesting about looking at people interacting with the robot.
The entire page is here.
HeadCon '13: Part IX
David Pizarro
Today I want to talk a little about our social and moral intuitions and I want to present a case that they're rapidly failing, more so than ever. Let me start with an example. Recently, I collaborated with economist Rob Frank, roboticist Cynthia Breazeal, and social psychologist David DeSteno. The experiment that we did was interested in looking at how we detect trustworthiness in others.
We had people interact—strangers interact in the lab—and we filmed them, and we got the cues that seemed to indicate that somebody's going to be either more cooperative or less cooperative. But the fun part of this study was that for the second part we got those cues and we programmed a robot—Nexi the robot, from the lab of Cynthia Breazeal at MIT—to emulate, in one condition, those non-verbal gestures. So what I'm talking about today is not about the results of that study, but rather what was interesting about looking at people interacting with the robot.
The entire page is here.
Why Study Philosophy? 'To Challenge Your Own Point of View'
An interview with Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, author of Plato at the Googleplex
By Hope Reese
The Atlantic
Originally posted on February 27, 2014
At a time when advances in science and technology have changed our understanding of our mental and physical selves, it is easy for some to dismiss the discipline of philosophy as obsolete. Stephen Hawking, boldly, argues that philosophy is dead.
Not according to Rebecca Newberger Goldstein. Goldstein, a philosopher and novelist, studied philosophy at Barnard and then earned her Ph.D. in philosophy at Princeton University. She has written several books, won a MacArthur “Genius Award” in 1996, and taught at several universities, including Barnard, Columbia, Rutgers, and Brandeis.
The entire article is here.
By Hope Reese
The Atlantic
Originally posted on February 27, 2014
At a time when advances in science and technology have changed our understanding of our mental and physical selves, it is easy for some to dismiss the discipline of philosophy as obsolete. Stephen Hawking, boldly, argues that philosophy is dead.
Not according to Rebecca Newberger Goldstein. Goldstein, a philosopher and novelist, studied philosophy at Barnard and then earned her Ph.D. in philosophy at Princeton University. She has written several books, won a MacArthur “Genius Award” in 1996, and taught at several universities, including Barnard, Columbia, Rutgers, and Brandeis.
The entire article is here.
Saturday, March 15, 2014
The moral pop-out effect: Enhanced perceptual awareness of morally relevant stimuli
Gantman, A. P. & Van Bavel, J. J. (in press). The moral pop-out effect: Enhanced perceptual
awareness of morally relevant stimuli. Cognition.
Abstract
Every day people perceive religious and moral iconography in ambiguous objects, ranging from grilled cheese to bird feces. In the current research, we examined whether moral concerns can shape awareness of perceptually ambiguous stimuli. In three experiments, we presented masked moral and non-moral words around the threshold for conscious awareness as part of a lexical decision task. Participants correctly identified moral words more frequently than non-moral words—a phenomenon we term the moral pop-out effect. The moral pop-out effect was only evident when stimuli were presented at durations that made them perceptually ambiguous, but not when the stimuli were presented too quickly to perceive or slowly enough to easily perceive. The moral pop-out effect was not moderated by exposure to harm and cannot be explained by differences in arousal, valence, or extremity. Although most models of moral psychology assume the initial perception of moral stimuli, our research suggests that moral beliefs and values may shape perceptual awareness.
The entire article is here.
awareness of morally relevant stimuli. Cognition.
Every day people perceive religious and moral iconography in ambiguous objects, ranging from grilled cheese to bird feces. In the current research, we examined whether moral concerns can shape awareness of perceptually ambiguous stimuli. In three experiments, we presented masked moral and non-moral words around the threshold for conscious awareness as part of a lexical decision task. Participants correctly identified moral words more frequently than non-moral words—a phenomenon we term the moral pop-out effect. The moral pop-out effect was only evident when stimuli were presented at durations that made them perceptually ambiguous, but not when the stimuli were presented too quickly to perceive or slowly enough to easily perceive. The moral pop-out effect was not moderated by exposure to harm and cannot be explained by differences in arousal, valence, or extremity. Although most models of moral psychology assume the initial perception of moral stimuli, our research suggests that moral beliefs and values may shape perceptual awareness.
The entire article is here.
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