Murder case marks the first legal test in Ky. over whether same-sex partners can be forced to testify against each other.
Jason Riley
The (Louisville, Ky.) Courier-Journal
Originally published on June 16, 2013
Prosecutors say Geneva Case heard her spouse admit to killing a man two years ago and saw her clean blood out of the man's van and abandon it in Southern Indiana.
Now, they argue, Case must testify about those facts, even though Kentucky law exempts spouses from being compelled to testify against each other.
The reason, they say, is that Case and the defendant, Bobbie Joe Clary, entered into a same-sex civil union in Vermont in 2004 — and Kentucky does not t recognize same-sex civil unions or marriages.
"That ceremony is not a 'marriage' that is valid and recognized under Kentucky law," prosecutors said in a court motion, noting that marriage between members of the same sex is prohibited in Kentucky. "Geneva Case and the defendant cannot prove the existence of a marriage under Kentucky law."
But attorneys for Clary say they are legally married and denying them the same marital rights others have would be a violation of the Constitution.
The case has become the first legal test in the state over forcing same-sex partners to testify against each other — raising the broader issue of whether the state recognizes marriages or civil unions that are legal elsewhere. The case could have ramifications for issues such as divorces and division of property after death.
The entire story is here.
Friday, June 28, 2013
Supreme Court strikes down Defense of Marriage Act, paves way for gay marriage to resume in California
By Pete Williams and Erin McClam
NBC News
Originally posted June 26, 2013
In a pair of landmark decisions, the Supreme Court on Wednesday struck down the 1996 law blocking federal recognition of gay marriage, and it allowed gay marriage to resume in California by declining to decide a separate case.
The court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal benefits to gay couples who are legally married in their states, including Social Security survivor benefits, immigration rights and family leave.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, said that the act wrote inequality into federal law and violated the Fifth Amendment’s protection of equal liberty.
“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,” he wrote.
Edith Windsor, the 84-year-old woman who brought the case against DOMA, said that the ruling ensured that the federal government could no longer discriminate against the marriages of gays and lesbians.
“Children born today will grow up in a world without DOMA, and those same children who happen to be gay will be free to love and get married,” she said.
In the second case, the court said that it could not rule on a challenge to Proposition 8, a ban on gay marriage in California passed by voters there in 2008, because supporters of the ban lacked the legal standing to appeal a lower court’s decision against it.
The court did not rule on the constitutionality of gay marriage, but the effect of the decision will be to allow same-sex marriage to resume in California. That decision was also 5-4, written by Chief Justice John Roberts.
Lt. Gavin Newsom told NBC News that gay marriage would resume in California within 30 days. Gov. Jerry Brown said counties could begin issuing marriage licenses to gay couples as soon as one formality was taken care of: A federal appeals court had to lift a stay issued by a lower judge.
The entire story is here.
NBC News
Originally posted June 26, 2013
In a pair of landmark decisions, the Supreme Court on Wednesday struck down the 1996 law blocking federal recognition of gay marriage, and it allowed gay marriage to resume in California by declining to decide a separate case.
The court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal benefits to gay couples who are legally married in their states, including Social Security survivor benefits, immigration rights and family leave.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, said that the act wrote inequality into federal law and violated the Fifth Amendment’s protection of equal liberty.
“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,” he wrote.
Edith Windsor, the 84-year-old woman who brought the case against DOMA, said that the ruling ensured that the federal government could no longer discriminate against the marriages of gays and lesbians.
“Children born today will grow up in a world without DOMA, and those same children who happen to be gay will be free to love and get married,” she said.
In the second case, the court said that it could not rule on a challenge to Proposition 8, a ban on gay marriage in California passed by voters there in 2008, because supporters of the ban lacked the legal standing to appeal a lower court’s decision against it.
The court did not rule on the constitutionality of gay marriage, but the effect of the decision will be to allow same-sex marriage to resume in California. That decision was also 5-4, written by Chief Justice John Roberts.
Lt. Gavin Newsom told NBC News that gay marriage would resume in California within 30 days. Gov. Jerry Brown said counties could begin issuing marriage licenses to gay couples as soon as one formality was taken care of: A federal appeals court had to lift a stay issued by a lower judge.
The entire story is here.
Exodus International Shuts Down: Apologizes to LGBT Community
By Jade Walker
The Huffington Post
Originally posted June 20, 2013
Exodus International, a large Christian ministry that claimed to offer a "cure" for homosexuality, plans to shut down.
In a press release posted on the ministry's website Wednesday night, the board of directors announced the decision to close after nearly four decades.
“We’re not negating the ways God used Exodus to positively affect thousands of people, but a new generation of Christians is looking for change -- and they want to be heard,” Exodus board member Tony Moore said.
The closure comes less than a day after Exodus released a statement apologizing to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community for years of undue judgment, by the organization and from the Christian Church as a whole.
“Exodus is an institution in the conservative Christian world, but we’ve ceased to be a living, breathing organism. For quite some time we’ve been imprisoned in a worldview that’s neither honoring toward our fellow human beings, nor biblical," said Alan Chambers, president of Exodus.
The entire story is here.
The Huffington Post
Originally posted June 20, 2013
Exodus International, a large Christian ministry that claimed to offer a "cure" for homosexuality, plans to shut down.
In a press release posted on the ministry's website Wednesday night, the board of directors announced the decision to close after nearly four decades.
“We’re not negating the ways God used Exodus to positively affect thousands of people, but a new generation of Christians is looking for change -- and they want to be heard,” Exodus board member Tony Moore said.
The closure comes less than a day after Exodus released a statement apologizing to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community for years of undue judgment, by the organization and from the Christian Church as a whole.
“Exodus is an institution in the conservative Christian world, but we’ve ceased to be a living, breathing organism. For quite some time we’ve been imprisoned in a worldview that’s neither honoring toward our fellow human beings, nor biblical," said Alan Chambers, president of Exodus.
The entire story is here.
Thursday, June 27, 2013
Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?
By Jesse
J.
Prinz
Forthcoming in P. Goldie and A. Coplan (Eds.). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological
Perspectives. Oxford University Press.)
1. Introduction
It is widely believed that empathy is a good thing, from a moral point of view. It is something we should cultivate because it makes us better people. Perhaps that’s true. But it is also sometimes suggested that empathy is somehow necessary for morality. That is the hypothesis I want to interrogate and challenge. Not only is there little evidence for the claim that empathy is necessary, there is also reason to think empathy can interfere with the ends of morality. A capacity for empathy might make us better people, but placing empathy at the center of our moral lives may be ill‐advised. That is not to say that morality shouldn’t centrally involve emotions. I think emotions are essential for moral judgment and moral motivation (Prinz, 2007). It’s just that empathetic emotions are not ideally suited for these jobs.
Before embarking on this campaign against empathy, I want to say a little more about the target of the attack. What is empathy? And what would it mean to say empathy is necessary for morality? With respect to the first question, much has been written. Theories of empathy abound. Batson et al. (1995: 1042) define empathy as, “as an other‐oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person.” This is not the definition I will be using. Batson’s construct might be better characterized as “concern,” because of its focus on another person’s welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about “empathetic concern.” Notice that this construct seems to be a combination of two separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artifact, like a beautiful building that has into disrepair. Empathy, seems to connote a kind of feeling that has to be at last possible for the object of empathy. If so, “empathetic concern” combines two different things—a find of feeling‐for an object and a feeling‐on‐behalf‐of an object. Much of the empirical literature, including the superb research that Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result, some of the existing studies are confounded. They purport to show the value of empathy, but may really show the value of concern. My focus below will be on empathy, and I leave it as an open possibility that concern is highly important, if not necessary, for morality. Indeed, concern often seems to involve an element kind of
moral anger, which I will argue is very important to morality.
The entire article is here.
Forthcoming in P. Goldie and A. Coplan (Eds.). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological
Perspectives. Oxford University Press.)
1. Introduction
It is widely believed that empathy is a good thing, from a moral point of view. It is something we should cultivate because it makes us better people. Perhaps that’s true. But it is also sometimes suggested that empathy is somehow necessary for morality. That is the hypothesis I want to interrogate and challenge. Not only is there little evidence for the claim that empathy is necessary, there is also reason to think empathy can interfere with the ends of morality. A capacity for empathy might make us better people, but placing empathy at the center of our moral lives may be ill‐advised. That is not to say that morality shouldn’t centrally involve emotions. I think emotions are essential for moral judgment and moral motivation (Prinz, 2007). It’s just that empathetic emotions are not ideally suited for these jobs.
Before embarking on this campaign against empathy, I want to say a little more about the target of the attack. What is empathy? And what would it mean to say empathy is necessary for morality? With respect to the first question, much has been written. Theories of empathy abound. Batson et al. (1995: 1042) define empathy as, “as an other‐oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person.” This is not the definition I will be using. Batson’s construct might be better characterized as “concern,” because of its focus on another person’s welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about “empathetic concern.” Notice that this construct seems to be a combination of two separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artifact, like a beautiful building that has into disrepair. Empathy, seems to connote a kind of feeling that has to be at last possible for the object of empathy. If so, “empathetic concern” combines two different things—a find of feeling‐for an object and a feeling‐on‐behalf‐of an object. Much of the empirical literature, including the superb research that Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result, some of the existing studies are confounded. They purport to show the value of empathy, but may really show the value of concern. My focus below will be on empathy, and I leave it as an open possibility that concern is highly important, if not necessary, for morality. Indeed, concern often seems to involve an element kind of
moral anger, which I will argue is very important to morality.
The entire article is here.
Forget ethics training: Focus on empathy
Craig Dowden
Special to Financial Post
Originally published June 13, 2013
The sheer volume and diversity of recent scandals in the corporate world, various levels of government, and even the media, has been astounding. Even though initiatives to get tough on corporate malfeasance were introduced and promoted in the early 2000s, it seems the only lesson learned is how to shield bad deeds more effectively while keeping up the appearance of compliance.
The most recent National Business Ethics survey reinforces this notion. Using data from the 2011 report, 42% of respondents state their organizations have weak ethical cultures — a result comparable the highest level in the history of the survey.
Given the importance of ethics in underpinning effective organizational leadership, the question remains: how do we demonstrate and promote ethical behaviour?
Empathy and the moral compass
The Management Research Group (MRG) has been administering the “360 review” process to executives for almost 30 years, allowing it to build a database of 100,000 leaders’ assessments.
One of the great value-added features of the MRG 360 process is that it includes various outcome measures of leadership effectiveness. One of the performance indicators asks respondents to rate a leader on whether he or she “demonstrates ethical leadership.”
When MRG examined what was the strongest predictor of ethical leadership behaviour out of the 22 competencies in their model, the resounding answer was empathy. In other words, leaders who scored highest on empathy also exhibited the highest levels of ethical leadership.
The entire article is here.
Special to Financial Post
Originally published June 13, 2013
The sheer volume and diversity of recent scandals in the corporate world, various levels of government, and even the media, has been astounding. Even though initiatives to get tough on corporate malfeasance were introduced and promoted in the early 2000s, it seems the only lesson learned is how to shield bad deeds more effectively while keeping up the appearance of compliance.
The most recent National Business Ethics survey reinforces this notion. Using data from the 2011 report, 42% of respondents state their organizations have weak ethical cultures — a result comparable the highest level in the history of the survey.
Given the importance of ethics in underpinning effective organizational leadership, the question remains: how do we demonstrate and promote ethical behaviour?
Empathy and the moral compass
The Management Research Group (MRG) has been administering the “360 review” process to executives for almost 30 years, allowing it to build a database of 100,000 leaders’ assessments.
One of the great value-added features of the MRG 360 process is that it includes various outcome measures of leadership effectiveness. One of the performance indicators asks respondents to rate a leader on whether he or she “demonstrates ethical leadership.”
When MRG examined what was the strongest predictor of ethical leadership behaviour out of the 22 competencies in their model, the resounding answer was empathy. In other words, leaders who scored highest on empathy also exhibited the highest levels of ethical leadership.
The entire article is here.
The Baby in the Well: The Case Against Empathy
By Paul Bloom
The New Yorker
Originally published May 20, 2013
Here are some excerpts:
The word “empathy”—a rendering of the German Einfühlung, “feeling into”—is only a century old, but people have been interested for a long time in the moral implications of feeling our way into the lives of others. In “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759), Adam Smith observed that sensory experience alone could not spur us toward sympathetic engagement with others: “Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers.” For Smith, what made us moral beings was the imaginative capacity to “place ourselves in his situation . . . and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.”
(cut)
Empathy research is thriving these days, as cognitive neuroscience undergoes what some call an “affective revolution.” There is increasing focus on the emotions, especially those involved in moral thought and action. We’ve learned, for instance, that some of the same neural systems that are active when we are in pain become engaged when we observe the suffering of others. Other researchers are exploring how empathy emerges in chimpanzee and other primates, how it flowers in young children, and the sort of circumstances that trigger it.
This interest isn’t just theoretical. If we can figure out how empathy works, we might be able to produce more of it. Some individuals staunch their empathy through the deliberate endorsement of political or religious ideologies that promote cruelty toward their adversaries, while others are deficient because of bad genes, abusive parenting, brutal experience, or the usual unhappy goulash of all of the above. At an extreme lie the one per cent or so of people who are clinically described as psychopaths. A standard checklist for the condition includes “callousness; lack of empathy”; many other distinguishing psychopathic traits, like lack of guilt and pathological lying, surely stem from this fundamental deficit. Some blame the empathy-deficient for much of the suffering in the world. In “The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty” (Basic), Simon Baron-Cohen goes so far as to equate evil with “empathy erosion.”
(cut)
The key to engaging empathy is what has been called “the identifiable victim effect.” As the economist Thomas Schelling, writing forty-five years ago, mordantly observed, “Let a six-year-old girl with brown hair need thousands of dollars for an operation that will prolong her life until Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in preventable deaths—not many will drop a tear or reach for their checkbooks.”
(cut)
On many issues, empathy can pull us in the wrong direction. The outrage that comes from adopting the perspective of a victim can drive an appetite for retribution. (Think of those statutes named for dead children: Megan’s Law, Jessica’s Law, Caylee’s Law.) But the appetite for retribution is typically indifferent to long-term consequences. In one study, conducted by Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov, people were asked how best to punish a company for producing a vaccine that caused the death of a child. Some were told that a higher fine would make the company work harder to manufacture a safer product; others were told that a higher fine would discourage the company from making the vaccine, and since there were no acceptable alternatives on the market the punishment would lead to more deaths. Most people didn’t care; they wanted the company fined heavily, whatever the consequence.
The entire article is here.
The New Yorker
Originally published May 20, 2013
Here are some excerpts:
The word “empathy”—a rendering of the German Einfühlung, “feeling into”—is only a century old, but people have been interested for a long time in the moral implications of feeling our way into the lives of others. In “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759), Adam Smith observed that sensory experience alone could not spur us toward sympathetic engagement with others: “Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers.” For Smith, what made us moral beings was the imaginative capacity to “place ourselves in his situation . . . and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.”
(cut)
Empathy research is thriving these days, as cognitive neuroscience undergoes what some call an “affective revolution.” There is increasing focus on the emotions, especially those involved in moral thought and action. We’ve learned, for instance, that some of the same neural systems that are active when we are in pain become engaged when we observe the suffering of others. Other researchers are exploring how empathy emerges in chimpanzee and other primates, how it flowers in young children, and the sort of circumstances that trigger it.
This interest isn’t just theoretical. If we can figure out how empathy works, we might be able to produce more of it. Some individuals staunch their empathy through the deliberate endorsement of political or religious ideologies that promote cruelty toward their adversaries, while others are deficient because of bad genes, abusive parenting, brutal experience, or the usual unhappy goulash of all of the above. At an extreme lie the one per cent or so of people who are clinically described as psychopaths. A standard checklist for the condition includes “callousness; lack of empathy”; many other distinguishing psychopathic traits, like lack of guilt and pathological lying, surely stem from this fundamental deficit. Some blame the empathy-deficient for much of the suffering in the world. In “The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty” (Basic), Simon Baron-Cohen goes so far as to equate evil with “empathy erosion.”
(cut)
The key to engaging empathy is what has been called “the identifiable victim effect.” As the economist Thomas Schelling, writing forty-five years ago, mordantly observed, “Let a six-year-old girl with brown hair need thousands of dollars for an operation that will prolong her life until Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in preventable deaths—not many will drop a tear or reach for their checkbooks.”
(cut)
On many issues, empathy can pull us in the wrong direction. The outrage that comes from adopting the perspective of a victim can drive an appetite for retribution. (Think of those statutes named for dead children: Megan’s Law, Jessica’s Law, Caylee’s Law.) But the appetite for retribution is typically indifferent to long-term consequences. In one study, conducted by Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov, people were asked how best to punish a company for producing a vaccine that caused the death of a child. Some were told that a higher fine would make the company work harder to manufacture a safer product; others were told that a higher fine would discourage the company from making the vaccine, and since there were no acceptable alternatives on the market the punishment would lead to more deaths. Most people didn’t care; they wanted the company fined heavily, whatever the consequence.
The entire article is here.
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
Committee supervises ethics of human testing
By Madison Pauly
The Dartmouth
Published on Monday, February 25, 2013
From new cardiology studies to students that go overseas and want to interview people, the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects answers ethical questions about human research at Dartmouth. The committee is an interdisciplinary group of experts and community members who analyze the risk posed to participants by Dartmouth-affiliated researchers’ studies.
As Dartmouth’s incarnation of a federally-mandated institutional review board, the committee analyzes proposals for research on human subjects from Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center and the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in White River Junction, as well as the College’s graduate and undergraduate departments.
While all studies involving human participants are subject to review by the committee, those that receive funding from sources other than the government must pay a review fee to the committee office.
A division of the Provost’s Office, the committee is financed in part by federal funds allocated to Dartmouth for research. Accordingly, its review process follows federal policies to ensure “respect for persons, beneficence and justice,” according to a Department of Health and Human Services report.
Major areas of ethical concern include the research’s medical relevance, involvement of vulnerable populations, its informed consent process and use of deception, said assistant provost for research Liz Bankert, a member of the committee.
The current federal regulations were last revised in 1991 and often fail to give adequate ethical guidance on modern research questions, said Bankert, who also serves on a national research ethics advisory committee.
The entire story is here.
The Dartmouth
Published on Monday, February 25, 2013
From new cardiology studies to students that go overseas and want to interview people, the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects answers ethical questions about human research at Dartmouth. The committee is an interdisciplinary group of experts and community members who analyze the risk posed to participants by Dartmouth-affiliated researchers’ studies.
As Dartmouth’s incarnation of a federally-mandated institutional review board, the committee analyzes proposals for research on human subjects from Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center and the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in White River Junction, as well as the College’s graduate and undergraduate departments.
While all studies involving human participants are subject to review by the committee, those that receive funding from sources other than the government must pay a review fee to the committee office.
A division of the Provost’s Office, the committee is financed in part by federal funds allocated to Dartmouth for research. Accordingly, its review process follows federal policies to ensure “respect for persons, beneficence and justice,” according to a Department of Health and Human Services report.
Major areas of ethical concern include the research’s medical relevance, involvement of vulnerable populations, its informed consent process and use of deception, said assistant provost for research Liz Bankert, a member of the committee.
The current federal regulations were last revised in 1991 and often fail to give adequate ethical guidance on modern research questions, said Bankert, who also serves on a national research ethics advisory committee.
The entire story is here.
End-of-Life Care Improves But Costs Increase, Study Finds
by E.J. Mitchell
The Medicare News Group
Originally published July 12, 2013
Improvements in end-of-life care have occurred rapidly for Medicare patients but costs have increased, according to a new Dartmouth Institute brief that was released today. The study revealed that beneficiaries in their last six months of life spent fewer days in the hospital and that more patients received hospice services in 2010 compared to 2007.
However, Medicare spending for chronically ill patients at the end of life increased more than 15 percent during that time period, while the consumer price index rose only 5.3 percent.
The data from the brief, which is through the Dartmouth Atlas Project, also found that in 2010 compared to 2007:
The Medicare News Group
Originally published July 12, 2013
Improvements in end-of-life care have occurred rapidly for Medicare patients but costs have increased, according to a new Dartmouth Institute brief that was released today. The study revealed that beneficiaries in their last six months of life spent fewer days in the hospital and that more patients received hospice services in 2010 compared to 2007.
However, Medicare spending for chronically ill patients at the end of life increased more than 15 percent during that time period, while the consumer price index rose only 5.3 percent.
The data from the brief, which is through the Dartmouth Atlas Project, also found that in 2010 compared to 2007:
- patients were less likely to die in the hospital;
- patients were as likely to spend time in intensive care units (ICUs) during the last six months of life;
- the variations in end-of-life care at some academic medical centers quickly changed;
- patients spent more days in hospice care; and
- patients were more likely to see more than 10 physicians during the last 6 months of life.
- The Dartmouth Atlas brief found that across hospitals improvement was variable, with some experiencing rapid change while others showed little improvement.
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
What happens to whistleblowers?
By David Nather
Politico
Originally published June 13, 2013
Edward Snowden might want to talk to a slew of recent national security leakers who learned a lesson the hard way: whistleblowing comes at a price.
Thomas Tamm, the DOJ attorney who told the New York Times about the National Security Agency’s surveillance program in 2004, struggled to stay employed for the five years he was under federal investigation.
And he was one of the lucky ones. Thomas Drake, a former National Security Agency official who helped expose a wasteful NSA surveillance program without privacy protections, is working in an Apple store.
And Matt Diaz, the Navy lawyer who secretly sent a list of Guantanamo Bay prisoners to a New York civil rights firm, was disbarred and now does non-legal work for the Bronx public defender’s office.
Snowden is still on the run, but he is expected to be extradited to the United States, eventually, and most likely charged with a crime.
If Snowden’s life turns out like other national security whistleblowers, his life will never be the same — leaving him to grapple with huge legal bills, poor job prospects, and a notoriety that will never really go away.
The entire story is here.
Politico
Originally published June 13, 2013
Edward Snowden might want to talk to a slew of recent national security leakers who learned a lesson the hard way: whistleblowing comes at a price.
Thomas Tamm, the DOJ attorney who told the New York Times about the National Security Agency’s surveillance program in 2004, struggled to stay employed for the five years he was under federal investigation.
And he was one of the lucky ones. Thomas Drake, a former National Security Agency official who helped expose a wasteful NSA surveillance program without privacy protections, is working in an Apple store.
And Matt Diaz, the Navy lawyer who secretly sent a list of Guantanamo Bay prisoners to a New York civil rights firm, was disbarred and now does non-legal work for the Bronx public defender’s office.
Snowden is still on the run, but he is expected to be extradited to the United States, eventually, and most likely charged with a crime.
If Snowden’s life turns out like other national security whistleblowers, his life will never be the same — leaving him to grapple with huge legal bills, poor job prospects, and a notoriety that will never really go away.
The entire story is here.
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