Binocularity in bioethics—and beyond

Earp, B. D., & Hauskeller, M. (in press). Binocularity in bioethics—and
beyond. American Journal of Bioethics, in press.

Abstract

Parens (2015) defends a habit of thinking he calls “binocularity,” which involves switching between analytical lenses (much as one must switch between seeing the duck vs. the rabbit in Wittgenstein’s famous example). Applying this habit of thought to a range of debates in contemporary bioethics, Parens urges us to acknowledge the ways in which our personal intuitions and biases shape our thinking about contentious moral issues. In this review of Parens’s latest book, we reflect on our own position as participants in the so-called “enhancement” debates, where a binocular approach could be especially useful. In particular, we consider the case of “love drugs,” a subject on which we have sometimes reached very different conclusions. We finish with an analogy to William James’s (1907) distinction between “tenderminded” rationalists and “tough-minded” empiricists, and draw some general lessons for improving academic discourse.

The paper is here.

Should we Prohibit Breast Implants?

Collective Moral Obligations in the Context of Harmful and Discriminatory Social Norms

By Jessica Laimann
Journal of Practical Ethics
Volume 3 Issue 2. December 2015

ABSTRACT

In liberal moral theory, interfering with someone’s deliberate engagement in a self-harming practice in order to promote their own good is often considered wrongfully paternalistic. But what if self-harming decisions are the product of an oppressive social context that imposes harmful norms on certain individuals, such as, arguably, in the case of cosmetic breast surgery? Clare Chambers suggests that such scenarios can mandate state interference in the form of prohibition. I argue that, unlike conventional measures, Chambers’ proposal recognises that harmful, discriminatory norms entail a twofold collective moral obligation: to eliminate the harmful norm in the long run, but also to address unjust harm that is inflicted in the meantime. I show that these two obligations tend to pull in opposite directions, thus generating a serious tension in Chambers’ proposal which eventually leads to an undue compromising of the second obligation in favour of the first. Based on this discussion, I develop an alternative proposal which, instead of prohibiting breast implant surgery, offers compensation for the disadvantages suffered by individuals who decide not to have surgery.

The paper is here.

Tinkering with consciousness: Morality & Enhancement

Daniel Faggella
TedX
Published on Dec 8, 2014

This talk was given at a local TEDx event, produced independently of the TED Conferences. We live in a world where paralyzed people can answer emails with a chip in their brain, where people with severe depression can get electrodes implanted into their brain to increase their sense of well-being and joy, and where we're successfully experimenting with replacing portions of mammalian brains with digital devices. Humanity is on the verge of a "leap" into a future where consciousness is malleable, accessible, expandable. If nothing "matters" outside of conscious awareness, isn't tinkering with consciousness itself (the bedrock or moral relevance) worth an open-minded, well-intended, and interdisciplinary global conversation ... as we take steps forward beyond what is now "human?"

When is diminishment a form of enhancement?

Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics

By Brian Earp, Anders Sandberg, Guy Kahane, & Julian Savulescu
Front. Syst. Neurosci., 04 February 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00012

The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements should be considered permissible for individuals with no particular “medical” disadvantage along any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual's overall well-being: more is not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of “diminishment as enhancement” and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing.

The entire article is here.

Could Deep-Brain Stimulation Fortify Soldiers’ Minds?

By S. Matthew Liao
Scientific American Blog
Originally posted September 4, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

Brain implants that reduce or eliminate our sense of morality are morally undesirable and are not really enhancements as such. Efforts should therefore be made to ensure that the kind of brain implants we develop do not have these unwanted side effects. In the short term, the brain implants we develop may well be imperfect in just such a way. If so, this would be a good reason to ban such devices in the short term. The interesting theoretical issue is what happens when we have perfected the technology and have brain implants that would enable a soldier to kill at the right time, for the right reasons, and in a proportionate manner? Would we still have ethical problems with soldiers using such a technology

The entire blog post is here.