Blog Comment on British Psychological Society on DSM-5

Dr. Will Meek is a psychologist practicing in Vancouver, WA. He writes regularly about mental health on his blog: Vancouver Psychologist

Some of you may be following the development of the forthcoming fifth revision to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the major book used for psychiatric diagnosis. There has been a lot of criticism due to the secrecy of the process this time around, but the British Psychological Society (BPS), the major mental health organization in the UK, is taking an even more interesting and refreshing angle: criticizing the entire current framework of diagnosis.

The DSM takes a medical approach to diagnosis. In short, this means that a ‘patient’ is assumed to have an underlying ‘pathology’ that manifests as various ‘symptoms’ that are assessed to make a ‘diagnosis’ and then apply a ‘treatment’ to said diagnosis. This approach basically makes various human conditions into ‘illnesses’ that need ‘interventions’ like medication or cognitive behavioral therapy. In a recent paper, BPS has criticized this framework as harmful to individuals and the public.

“The Society is concerned that clients and the general public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation. (p.1)”

“We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the relational context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For psychologists, our well-being and mental health stem from our frameworks of understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the experiences and learning through our lives. (p.4)”

As a practicing psychologist who also teaches a class on diagnosis for master’s level therapists, I could not be more excited reading this paper. BPS essentially takes a more humanistic and social constructivist approach to the problems of living. The benefits of this include reducing stigma, a larger focus on the interpersonal dimensions of mental health, and normalizing the experience of having problems during life.

Cheers to you BPS, now if only your American counterparts would get the message…

British Psychological Society Critiques DSM-5



The British Psychological Society


The British Psychological Society responds to the new DSM-5.   A prior blog post looked at some criticism of the DSM-5.  The British Psychological Association offers a more formal, 26-page critique.  The entire document can be found here.  The first part of the critique is posted for your review.

=======================

The Society is concerned that clients and the general public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and normal responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.

We therefore do welcome the proposal to include a profile of rating the severity of different symptoms over the preceding month. This is attractive, not only because it focuses on specific problems (see below), but because it introduces the concept of variability more fully into the system. That said, we have more concerns than plaudits.

The putative diagnoses presented in DSM-V are clearly based largely on social norms, with 'symptoms' that all rely on subjective judgments, with little confirmatory physical 'signs' or evidence of biological causation. The criteria are not value-free, but rather reflect current normative social expectations. Many researchers have pointed out that psychiatric diagnoses are plagued by problems of reliability, validity, prognostic value, and co-morbidity.

Diagnostic categories do not predict response to medication or other interventions whereas more specific formulations or symptom clusters might (Moncrieff, 2007).

Finally, disorders categorised as ‘not otherwise specified’ are huge (running at 30% of all personality disorder diagnoses for example).

Personality disorder and psychoses are particularly troublesome as they are not adequately normed on the general population, where community surveys regularly report much higher prevalence and incidence than would be expected. This problem – as well as threatening the validity of the approach – has significant implications. If community samples show high levels of ‘prevalence’, social factors are minimised, and the continuum with normality is ignored. Then many of the people who describe normal forms of distress like feeling bereaved after three months, or traumatised by military conflict for more than a month, will meet diagnostic criteria.

In this context, we have significant concerns over consideration of inclusion of both “at-risk mental state” (prodrome) and “attenuated psychosis syndrome”. We recognise that the first proposal has now been dropped – and we welcome this. But the concept of “attenuated psychosis system” appears very worrying; it could be seen as an opportunity to stigmatize eccentric people, and to lower the threshold for achieving a diagnosis of psychosis

Diagnostic systems such as these therefore fall short of the criteria for legitimate medical diagnoses. They certainly identify troubling or troubled people, but do not meet the criteria for categorisation demanded for a field of science or medicine (with a very few exceptions such as dementia.) We are also concerned that systems such as this are based on identifying problems as located within individuals.  This misses the relational context of problems and the undeniable social causation of many such problems. For psychologists, our wellbeing and mental health stem from our frameworks of understanding of the world, frameworks which are themselves the product of the experiences and learning through our lives.

DSM-5 Article: The Social Construction of Diagnoses?

by John Gavazzi, PsyD, ABPP
Ethics Chair

While some may want to think that psychiatric diagnoses are objective categories that truly reflect an individual's mental, emotional, and physiological condition, there are others who view diagnoses as value-laden, socially constructed concepts that may not be the most useful tools in understanding and treating the patients with whom we work.

There is an interesting article from the Seattle Times sheds light on the social construction of DSM-V diagnoses: Key Diagnostic Deadline Draws Near for Psychiatrists and "New" DSM conditions.  Here are some highlights:

But molecular tests and brain scans based on those discoveries aren't yet ready for diagnostic use, and that leaves the authors of the upcoming book with the same problem that vexed their predecessors: how to distinguish a mental illness from the rainbow of normal human behavior.

Much of the discussion at the American Psychiatric Association meeting centered on fears that, without solid scientific evidence, additions or deletions in their new bible of mental health could do more harm than good.

"The brain is so darn complicated," said Dr. David Axelson, director of the Child and Adolescent Bipolar Services program at the Western Psychiatric Institute in Pittsburgh.

As with each edition, the controversies dogging DSM-5 center on the proposed "new" conditions. Among the questions:
Is there a distinct mood disorder that occurs in some women before their periods?
Is hoarding a brain-based illness?
Can the sorrow accompanying bereavement swell into a certifiable mental disorder?

Even when concepts are not at issue, nomenclature sometimes is. Suggestions include replacing the word "anxiety" with "worry," and scrapping the terms "addiction," "dependence" and "substance abuse" in favor of "substance-use disorder."

"We have to be very careful about our choice of language and precise criteria," said Dr. David J. Kupfer, the DSM-5 task force chairman and director of research at Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic. Slight word changes could translate into making a disorder much more prevalent — or much more rare, he said.

and

In another room, doctors debated whether a patient must have impaired function — such as problems in personal relationships — to qualify as having a mental disorder. "If your life is humming along just fine despite gambling 30 hours a week, do you really have a gambling addiction?" one psychiatrist asked with a note of exasperation in his voice.

Yes, a colleague responded: "The person just doesn't know he has a problem yet."

The reader can draw his or her own conclusions from the article.  For me, it is difficult to see how DSM-V can be taken too seriously as an empirically-based reference book.