The Law Meets Psychological Expertise: Eight Best Practices to Improve Forensic Psychological Assessment

Neal, T. M., Martire, K. A.,  et al. (2022).

Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 

18(1), 169–192.

The article is here.

Abstract

 

We review the state of forensic mental health assessment. The field is in much better shape than in the past; however, significant problems of quality remain, with much room for improvement. We provide an overview of forensic psychology's history and discuss its possible future, with multiple audiences in mind. We distill decades of scholarship from and about fundamental basic science and forensic science, clinical and forensic psychology, and the law of expert evidence into eight best practices for the validity of a forensic psychological assessment. We argue these best practices should apply when a psychological assessment relies on the norms, values, and esteem of science to inform legal processes. The eight key considerations include (a) foundational validity of the assessment; (b) validity of the assessment as applied; (c) management and mitigation of bias; (d) attention to quality assurance; (e) appropriate communication of data, results, and opinions; (f) explicit consideration of limitations and assumptions; (g) weighing of alternative views or disagreements; and (h) adherence with ethical obligations, professional guidelines, codes of conduct, and rules of evidence.

Here are some thoughts:

This article outlines eight best practices designed to enhance the quality and validity of forensic psychological assessments. It provides a historical context for forensic psychology, discussing its evolution and future directions. Drawing on extensive research from basic science, forensic science, clinical and forensic psychology, and the law of expert evidence, the authors present key considerations for psychologists conducting assessments in legal settings. These practices include ensuring foundational and applied validity, managing biases, implementing quality assurance, communicating data and opinions appropriately, explicitly considering limitations, weighing alternative perspectives, and adhering to ethical guidelines. The article underscores the importance of these best practices to improve the reliability and scientific rigor of psychological expertise within the legal system.

How do clinical psychologists make ethical decisions? A systematic review of empirical research

Grace, B., Wainwright, T., et al. (2020). 

Clinical Ethics, 15(4), 213–224.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1477750920927165

Abstract

Given the nature of the discipline, it might be assumed that clinical psychology is an ethical profession, within which effective ethical decision-making is integral. How then, does this ethical decision-making occur? This paper describes a systematic review of empirical research addressing this question. The paucity of evidence related to this question meant that the scope was broadened to include other professions who deliver talking therapies. This review could support reflective practice about what may be taken into account when making ethical decisions and highlight areas for future research. Using academic search databases, original research articles were identified from peer-reviewed journals. Articles using qualitative (n = 3), quantitative (n = 8) and mixed methods (n = 2) were included. Two theoretical models of aspects of ethical decision-making were identified. Areas of agreement and debate are described in relation to factors linked to the professional, which impacted ethical decision-making. Factors relating to ethical dilemmas, which impacted ethical decision-making, are discussed. Articles were appraised by two independent raters, using quality assessment criteria, which suggested areas of methodological strengths and weaknesses. Comparison and synthesis of results revealed that the research did not generally pertain to current clinical practice of talking therapies or the particular socio-political context of the UK healthcare system. There was limited research into ethical decision-making amongst specific professions, including clinical psychology. Generalisability was limited due to methodological issues, indicating avenues for future research.

Here are some thoughts:

This article is a systematic review of empirical research on how clinical psychologists and related professionals make ethical decisions. The review addresses the question of how professionals who deliver psychotherapy make ethical decisions related to their work. The authors searched academic databases for original research articles from peer-reviewed journals and included qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods studies. The review identified two theoretical models of ethical decision-making and discussed factors related to the professional and ethical dilemmas that impact decision-making. The authors found that the research did not generally pertain to current clinical practice or the socio-political context of the UK healthcare system and that there was limited research into ethical decision-making among specific professions, including clinical psychology. The authors suggest that there is a need for further up-to-date, profession-specific, mixed-methods research in this area.

Moral Challenges for Psychologists Working in Psychology and Law

Allan A. (2018).

Psychiatry, psychology, and law:

an interdisciplinary journal of the Australian and 

New Zealand Association of Psychiatry,

Psychology and Law, 25(3), 485–499.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2018.1473173

Abstract

States have an obligation to protect themselves and their citizens from harm, and they use the coercive powers of law to investigate threats, enforce rules and arbitrate disputes, thereby impacting on people's well-being and legal rights and privileges. Psychologists as a collective have a responsibility to use their abilities, knowledge, skill and experience to enhance law's effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability in preventing harm, but their professional behaviour in this collaboration must be moral. They could, however, find their personal values to be inappropriate or there to be insufficient moral guides and could find it difficult to obtain definitive moral guidance from law. The profession's ethical principles do, however, provide well-articulated, generally accepted and profession-appropriate guidance, but practitioners might encounter moral issues that can only be solved by the profession as a whole or society.

Here are some thoughts:

While psychologists play a crucial role in assisting the law to protect society through assessments, risk evaluations, and expert opinions, their work often intersects with coercive practices that can impact individual rights and well-being.  Psychologists must navigate the tension between societal protection and respect for human dignity, especially when involved in involuntary detention, forensic interviews, and risk assessments.  They are guided by core ethical principles such as non-maleficence, justice, fidelity, and respect, but these principles can conflict, requiring careful ethical decision-making.  Challenges are particularly pronounced in areas like risk assessment, where tools may be flawed or culturally biased, and where psychologists might face pressure to align with legal expectations, potentially compromising their objectivity and professional integrity.

The article emphasizes the need for psychologists in legal settings to maintain public trust, uphold human rights principles, and utilize structured, evidence-based, and culturally sensitive methods in their practice.  Beyond individual ethical conduct, psychologists have a responsibility to advocate for systemic improvements, including better assessment tools for diverse populations and robust ethical guidelines. Ultimately, the article underscores that psychologists in law must continually engage in moral reflection, striving for a just and effective legal system while minimizing harm and ensuring their practice remains ethically sound and socially responsible, guided by both professional ethics and universal human rights frameworks.

The Moral Psychology of Artificial Intelligence

Bonnefon, J., Rahwan, I., & Shariff, A. (2023).

Annual Review of Psychology, 75(1), 653–675.

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-030123-113559

Abstract

Moral psychology was shaped around three categories of agents and patients: humans, other animals, and supernatural beings. Rapid progress in artificial intelligence has introduced a fourth category for our moral psychology to deal with: intelligent machines. Machines can perform as moral agents, making decisions that affect the outcomes of human patients or solving moral dilemmas without human supervision. Machines can be perceived as moral patients, whose outcomes can be affected by human decisions, with important consequences for human–machine cooperation. Machines can be moral proxies that human agents and patients send as their delegates to moral interactions or use as a disguise in these interactions. Here we review the experimental literature on machines as moral agents, moral patients, and moral proxies, with a focus on recent findings and the open questions that they suggest.

Here are some thoughts:

This article delves into the evolving moral landscape shaped by artificial intelligence (AI). As AI technology progresses rapidly, it introduces a new category for moral consideration: intelligent machines.

Machines as moral agents are capable of making decisions that have significant moral implications. This includes scenarios where AI systems can inadvertently cause harm through errors, such as misdiagnosing a medical condition or misclassifying individuals in security contexts. The authors highlight that societal expectations for these machines are often unrealistically high; people tend to require AI systems to outperform human capabilities significantly while simultaneously overestimating human error rates. This disparity raises critical questions about how many mistakes are acceptable from machines in life-and-death situations and how these errors are distributed among different demographic groups.

In their role as moral patients, machines become subjects of human moral behavior. This perspective invites exploration into how humans interact with AI—whether cooperatively or competitively—and the potential biases that may arise in these interactions. For instance, there is a growing concern about algorithmic bias, where certain demographic groups may be unfairly treated by AI systems due to flawed programming or data sets.

Lastly, machines serve as moral proxies, acting as intermediaries in human interactions. This role allows individuals to delegate moral decision-making to machines or use them to mask unethical behavior. The implications of this are profound, as it raises ethical questions about accountability and the extent to which humans can offload their moral responsibilities onto AI.

Overall, the article underscores the urgent need for a deeper understanding of the psychological dimensions associated with AI's integration into society. As encounters between humans and intelligent machines become commonplace, addressing issues of trust, bias, and ethical alignment will be crucial in shaping a future where AI can be safely and effectively integrated into daily life.

Beyond rating scales: With targeted evaluation, large language models are poised for psychological assessment

Kjell, O. N., Kjell, K., & Schwartz, H. A. (2023).

Psychiatry Research, 333, 115667.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2023.115667

Abstract

In this narrative review, we survey recent empirical evaluations of AI-based language assessments and present a case for the technology of large language models to be poised for changing standardized psychological assessment. Artificial intelligence has been undergoing a purported “paradigm shift” initiated by new machine learning models, large language models (e.g., BERT, LAMMA, and that behind ChatGPT). These models have led to unprecedented accuracy over most computerized language processing tasks, from web searches to automatic machine translation and question answering, while their dialogue-based forms, like ChatGPT have captured the interest of over a million users. The success of the large language model is mostly attributed to its capability to numerically represent words in their context, long a weakness of previous attempts to automate psychological assessment from language. While potential applications for automated therapy are beginning to be studied on the heels of chatGPT's success, here we present evidence that suggests, with thorough validation of targeted deployment scenarios, that AI's newest technology can move mental health assessment away from rating scales and to instead use how people naturally communicate, in language.

Highlights

• Artificial intelligence has been undergoing a purported “paradigm shift” initiated by new machine learning models, large language models.

• We review recent empirical evaluations of AI-based language assessments and present a case for the technology of large language models, that are used for chatGPT and BERT, to be poised for changing standardized psychological assessment.

• While potential applications for automated therapy are beginning to be studied on the heels of chatGPT's success, here we present evidence that suggests, with thorough validation of targeted deployment scenarios, that AI's newest technology can move mental health assessment away from rating scales and to instead use how people naturally communicate, in language.

Here are some thoughts:

The article underscores the transformative role of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) in psychological assessment, marking a significant shift in how psychologists approach their work. By integrating these technologies, assessments can become more accurate, efficient, and scalable, enabling psychologists to analyze vast amounts of data and uncover patterns that might otherwise go unnoticed. This is particularly important in improving diagnostic accuracy, as AI can help mitigate human bias and subjectivity, providing data-driven insights that complement clinical judgment. However, the adoption of these tools also raises critical ethical and practical considerations, such as ensuring client privacy, data security, and the responsible use of AI in alignment with professional standards.

As AI becomes more prevalent, the role of psychologists is evolving, requiring them to collaborate with these technologies by focusing on interpretation, contextual understanding, and therapeutic decision-making, while maintaining their unique human expertise.

Looking ahead, the article highlights emerging trends like natural language processing (NLP) for analyzing speech and text, as well as wearable devices for real-time behavioral and physiological data collection, offering psychologists innovative methods to enhance their practice. These advancements not only improve the precision of assessments but also pave the way for more personalized and timely interventions, ultimately supporting better mental health outcomes for clients.

Large language models can outperform humans in social situational judgments

Mittelstädt, J. M.,  et al. (2024).

Scientific Reports, 14(1).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-79048-0

Abstract

Large language models (LLM) have been a catalyst for the public interest in artificial intelligence (AI). These technologies perform some knowledge-based tasks better and faster than human beings. However, whether AIs can correctly assess social situations and devise socially appropriate behavior, is still unclear. We conducted an established Situational Judgment Test (SJT) with five different chatbots and compared their results with responses of human participants (N = 276). Claude, Copilot and you.com’s smart assistant performed significantly better than humans in proposing suitable behaviors in social situations. Moreover, their effectiveness rating of different behavior options aligned well with expert ratings. These results indicate that LLMs are capable of producing adept social judgments. While this constitutes an important requirement for the use as virtual social assistants, challenges and risks are still associated with their wide-spread use in social contexts.

Here are some thoughts:

This research assesses the social judgment capabilities of large language models (LLMs) by administering a Situational Judgment Test (SJT), a standardized test for work or critical situation decisions, to five popular chatbots and comparing their performance to a human control group. The study found that several LLMs significantly outperformed humans in identifying appropriate behaviors in complex social scenarios. While LLMs demonstrated high consistency in their responses and agreement with expert ratings, the study notes limitations including potential biases and the need for further investigation into real-world application and the underlying mechanisms of their social judgment. The results suggest LLMs possess considerable potential as social assistants, but also highlight ethical considerations surrounding their use.

Being facially expressive is socially advantageous

Kavanagh, E., Whitehouse, J., & Waller, B. (2024)

Scientific Reports, 14(1). 

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-62902-6

Abstract

Individuals vary in how they move their faces in everyday social interactions. In a first large-scale study, we measured variation in dynamic facial behaviour during social interaction and examined dyadic outcomes and impression formation. In Study 1, we recorded semi-structured video calls with 52 participants interacting with a confederate across various everyday contexts. Video clips were rated by 176 independent participants. In Study 2, we examined video calls of 1315 participants engaging in unstructured video-call interactions. Facial expressivity indices were extracted using automated Facial Action Coding Scheme analysis and measures of personality and partner impressions were obtained by self-report. Facial expressivity varied considerably across participants, but little across contexts, social partners or time. In Study 1, more facially expressive participants were more well-liked, agreeable, and successful at negotiating (if also more agreeable). Participants who were more facially competent, readable, and perceived as readable were also more well-liked. In Study 2, we replicated the findings that facial expressivity was associated with agreeableness and liking by their social partner, and additionally found it to be associated with extraversion and neuroticism. Findings suggest that facial behaviour is a stable individual difference that proffers social advantages, pointing towards an affiliative, adaptive function.

Here are some thoughts:

The study on facial expressivity in social interactions offers valuable insights for psychologists engaging in psychotherapy. A key takeaway is the importance of facial expressions in building rapport with clients. Therapists can utilize their facial expressions to convey empathy, understanding, and interest, thereby fostering a positive therapeutic relationship. Conversely, being attentive to clients' facial expressivity can provide clues about their personality traits, such as extraversion and agreeableness, as well as their emotional regulation strategies.

Therapists should also develop awareness of their own facial expressions and their impact on clients. This self-awareness enables therapists to manage their emotional responses and maintain a neutral or supportive demeanor. Moreover, recognizing cultural differences in facial expressivity and display rules is crucial. Cultural norms may influence clients' facial behavior and interpretations, and therapists must be sensitive to these variations.

Facial expressivity plays a significant role in nonverbal communication, and therapists can harness this to convey emotional support, encouragement, or concern. This can enhance the therapeutic relationship and facilitate effective communication. Additionally, being aware of subtle, involuntary facial expressions (micro-expressions) can reveal underlying emotions or attitudes.

To integrate these findings into therapeutic practice, therapists should strive for authenticity and congruence in their facial expressions to build trust and rapport. Consideration should be given to incorporating facial expression training into therapist development programs. Furthermore, therapists must be mindful of power dynamics and cultural differences in facial expressivity. By leveraging facial expressivity, therapists can refine their approach, foster stronger relationships with clients, and ultimately improve treatment outcomes.

The study's findings also underscore the importance of considering individual differences in facial expressivity. Rather than assuming universality, therapists should recognize that each client's facial behavior is unique and influenced by their personality, cultural background, and emotional regulation strategies. By adopting a more nuanced understanding of facial expressivity, therapists can tailor their approach to better meet the needs of their clients and cultivate a more empathetic and supportive therapeutic environment.

Relational morality in psychology and philosophy: past, present, and future

Earp, B D., Calcott, R., et al. (in press).

In S. Laham (ed.), Handbook of

Ethics and Social Psychology. 

Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Abstract

Moral psychology research often frames participant judgments in terms of adherence to abstract principles, such as utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative, and focuses on hypothetical interactions between strangers. However, real-world moral judgments typically involve concrete evaluations of known individuals within specific social relationships. Acknowledging this, a growing number of moral psychologists are shifting their focus to the study of moral judgment in social-relational contexts. This chapter provides an overview of recent work in this area, highlighting strengths and weaknesses, and describes a new 'relational norms' model of moral judgment developed by the authors and colleagues. The

discussion is situated within influential philosophical theories of human morality that emphasize relational context, and suggests that these theories should receive more attention from moral psychologists. The chapter concludes by exploring future applications of relational-moral frameworks, such as modeling and predicting norms and judgments related to human-AI cooperation.

A pre-print is here.

It's a great chapter. Here are some thoughts:

The field of moral psychology is undergoing a significant shift, known as the "relational turn." This movement recognizes that real-world morality is deeply embedded in social relationships, rather than being based solely on impartial principles and abstract dilemmas. Researchers are now focusing on the intricate web of social roles, group memberships, and interpersonal dynamics that shape our everyday moral experiences.

Traditional Western philosophical traditions, such as utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, have emphasized impartiality as a cornerstone of moral reasoning. However, empirical evidence suggests that moral judgments are influenced by factors like group membership, relationship type, and social context. This challenges the idea that moral principles should be applied uniformly, regardless of the individuals involved.

The relational context of a situation greatly impacts our moral judgments. For example, helping a stranger move might be seen as kind, but missing work for it seems excessive. Similarly, expecting payment for helping a family member feels at odds with the implicit rules of familial relationships. Philosophical perspectives such as Confucianism, African moral traditions, and feminist care ethics support the importance of relationships in shaping moral norms and obligations.

Evolutionary theory provides a compelling explanation for why relationships matter in moral decision-making. Our moral instincts likely evolved to solve coordination problems and reduce conflict within social groups, primarily consisting of family, kin, and close allies. This "friends-and-family cooperation bias" has led to the development of specific moral norms tailored to different relationship categories.

Research in relational morality highlights the importance of understanding the structure and dynamics of interpersonal relationships. Various relational models, such as Fiske's Relationship Regulation Theory, propose that different relationships are associated with specific moral motives. However, real-life relationships are complex and multifaceted, drawing on multiple models simultaneously.

The developmental trajectory of relational morality suggests that even young children display a preference for friends and family in resource allocation tasks. However, the ability to make nuanced moral judgments based on social roles and relationship types emerges gradually with age.

Emerging research areas within relational morality include impartial beneficence, moral obligations to future generations, and the psychological underpinnings of extending moral concern to strangers and future generations. By shifting focus from abstract principles to social relationships, researchers can develop more nuanced and ecologically valid models of moral judgment and behavior.

This relational turn promises to deepen our understanding of the social and evolutionary roots of human morality, shedding light on the complex interplay between personal connections and our sense of right and wrong. By recognizing the importance of relationships in moral decision-making, researchers can develop more effective strategies for promoting moral growth, cooperation, and well-being.

National politics ignites more talk of morality and power than local politics

Dillion, D., et al. (2024).

PNAS Nexus, 3(9).

https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae345

Abstract

Politics and the media in the United States are increasingly nationalized, and this changes how we talk about politics. Instead of reading the local news and discussing local events, people are more often consuming national media and discussing national issues. Unlike local politics, which can rely on shared concrete knowledge about the region, national politics must coordinate large groups of people with little in common. To provide this coordination, we find that national-level political discussions rely upon different themes than local-level discussions, using more abstract, moralized, and power-centric language. The higher prevalence of abstract, moralized, and power-centric language in national vs. local politics was found in political speeches, politician Tweets, and Reddit discussions. These national-level linguistic features lead to broader engagement with political messages, but they also foster more anger and negativity. These findings suggest that the nationalization of politics and the media may contribute to rising partisan animosity.

Here are some thoughts:

In recent years, American politics has undergone a significant transformation, becoming increasingly divisive and focused on national issues at the expense of local concerns. Researchers have identified a key factor contributing to this shift: the reliance on moral, power-centric, and abstract language in national politics. This linguistic style serves as a unifying framework, capturing attention and coordinating opinions across broad and diverse audiences.

Studies have revealed striking differences in language styles between national and local politics. Across various mediums, including politician speeches, Twitter, and Reddit, national politics consistently employs more moral, power-centric, and abstract language. Furthermore, this language style fosters widespread engagement, but also cultivates anger and negativity. Notably, politicians and individuals adapt their language depending on the context, using more moralized language in national settings than local ones.

These findings have significant implications for our understanding of the nationalization of politics and its consequences. The shift towards national politics may contribute to increased polarization and division, highlighting the need for further research into the effectiveness of abstract, moralized, and power-centric language in different contexts. Additionally, exploring how these dynamics play out in more homogeneous societies could provide valuable insights.

Ultimately, recognizing the benefits and drawbacks of national politics' reliance on moral, power-centric language is crucial. While it unites people and encourages participation, it also diverts attention from important local issues and fosters animosity. By understanding these complexities, we can work towards more effective coordination and communication in diverse groups, minimizing conflict and promoting constructive engagement.

Jean Maria Arrigo, Who Exposed Psychologists’ Ties to Torture, Dies at 79

Trip Gabriel

The New York Times

Originally published 19 March 24

Jean Maria Arrigo, a psychologist who exposed efforts by the American Psychological Association to obscure the role of psychologists in coercive interrogations of terror suspects in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, died on Feb. 24 at her home in Alpine, Calif. She was 79.

The cause was complications of pancreatic cancer, her husband, John Crigler, said.

A headline about her as a whistle-blower in The Guardian  in 2015 put it succinctly: “‘A National Hero’: Psychologist Who Warned of Torture Collusion Gets Her Due.”

A decade earlier, Dr. Arrigo had been named to a task force by the American Psychological Association, the largest professional group of psychologists, to examine the role of trained psychologists in national security interrogations.

The 10-member panel was formed in response to news reports in 2004 about abuse at the American-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, which included details about psychologists aiding in interrogations that, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, were “tantamount to torture.”

Dr. Arrigo later asserted that the A.P.A. task force was a sham — a public relations effort “to put out the fires of controversy right away,” as she told fellow psychologists in a wave-making speech in 2007.

The info is here.

Not all heroes wear capes.

Jean Maria Arrigo, a psychologist known for exposing the American Psychological Association's involvement in obscuring psychologists' roles in coercive interrogations post-9/11, passed away at 79 due to complications from pancreatic cancer. She was a whistleblower who revealed the APA's efforts to downplay psychologists' participation in interrogations deemed as torture. Arrigo criticized the APA's task force, stating it was a sham with ties to the Pentagon and conflicts of interest. Despite facing backlash and attacks from colleagues, she persisted in her crusade against APA complicity with brutal interrogations. Arrigo's work highlighted the ethical dilemmas faced by psychologists in national security contexts and emphasized the need for clear boundaries on involvement in such practices.

Humans feel too special for machines to score their morals

Purcell, Z. A., & Jean‐François Bonnefon. (2023).

PNAS Nexus, 2(6).

https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad179

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be harnessed to create sophisticated social and moral scoring systems—enabling people and organizations to form judgments of others at scale. However, it also poses significant ethical challenges and is, subsequently, the subject of wide debate. As these technologies are developed and governing bodies face regulatory decisions, it is crucial that we understand the attraction or resistance that people have for AI moral scoring. Across four experiments, we show that the acceptability of moral scoring by AI is related to expectations about the quality of those scores, but that expectations about quality are compromised by people's tendency to see themselves as morally peculiar. We demonstrate that people overestimate the peculiarity of their moral profile, believe that AI will neglect this peculiarity, and resist for this reason the introduction of moral scoring by AI.‌

Significance Statement

The potential use of artificial intelligence (AI) to create sophisticated social and moral scoring systems poses significant ethical challenges. To inform the regulation of this technology, it is critical that we understand the attraction or resistance that people have for AI moral scoring. This project develops that understanding across four empirical studies—demonstrating that people overestimate the peculiarity of their moral profile, believe that AI will neglect this peculiarity, and resist for this reason the introduction of moral scoring by AI.

The link to the research is above.

My summary:

Here is another example of "myside bias" in which humans base decisions based on their uniqueness or better than average hypothesis.  This research study investigated whether people would accept AI moral scoring systems. The study found that people are unlikely to accept such systems, in large part because they feel too special for machines to score their personal morals.

Specifically, the results showed that people were more likely to accept AI moral scoring systems if they believed that the systems were accurate. However, even if people believed that the systems were accurate, they were still less likely to accept them if they believed that they were morally unique.

The study's authors suggest that these findings may be due to the fact that people have a strong need to feel unique and special. They also suggest that people may be hesitant to trust AI systems to accurately assess their moral character.

Key findings:

• People are unlikely to accept AI moral scoring systems, in large part because they feel too special for machines to score their personal morals.
• People's willingness to accept AI moral scoring is influenced by two factors: their perceived accuracy of the system and their belief that they are morally unique.
• People are more likely to accept AI moral scoring systems if they believe that the systems are accurate. However, even if people believe that the systems are accurate, they are still less likely to accept them if they believe that they are morally unique.

Social Media and Morality

Van Bavel, J. J., Robertson, C. et al. (2023, June 6).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ywevq

Abstract

Nearly five billion people around the world now use social media, and this number continues to grow. One of the primary goals of social media platforms is to capture and monetize human attention. One means by which individuals and groups can capture attention and drive engagement on these platforms is by sharing morally and emotionally evocative content. We review a growing body of research on the interrelationship of social media and morality–as well the consequences for individuals and society. Moral content often goes “viral” on social media, and social media makes moral behavior (such as punishment) less costly. Thus, social media often acts as an accelerant for existing moral dynamics – amplifying outrage, status seeking, and intergroup conflict, while also potentially amplifying more constructive facets of morality, such as social support, pro-sociality, and collective action. We discuss trends, heated debates, and future directions in this emerging literature.

From Discussions and Future Directions

Addressing the interplay between social media and morality 

There is a growing recognition among scholars and the public that social media has deleterious consequences for society and there is a growing appetite for greater transparency and some form of regulation of social media platforms (Rathje et al., 2023). To address the adverse consequences of social media, solutions at the system level are necessary (e.g., Chater & Loewenstein, 2022), but individual- or group-level solutions may be useful for creating behavioral change before system-level change is in place and for increasing public support for system-level solutions (Koppel et. al., 2023). In the following section, we discuss a range of solutions that address the adverse consequences of the interplay between social media and morality.

Regulation is one of the most heavily debated ways of mitigating the adverse features of social media. Regulating social media can be done both on platforms as well at the national or cross-national level, but always involves discussions about who should decide what should be allowed on which platforms (Kaye, 2019). Currently, there is relatively little editorial oversight with the content even on mainstream platforms, yet the connotations with censorship makes regulation inherently controversial. For instance, Americans believe that social media companies censor political viewpoints (Vogels et al., 2020) and believe it is hard to regulate social media because people cannot agree upon what should and should not be removed (PewResearch Center, 2019). Moreover, authoritarian states can suppress dissent through the regulation of speech on social media.

In general, people on the political left are supportive of regulating social media platforms (Kozyreva, 2023; Rasmussen, 2022), reflecting liberals’ general tendency to more supportive, and conservatives' tendency to more opposing, of regulatory policies (e.g. Grossman, 2015). In the context of content on social media, one explanation is that left-leaning people infer more harm from aggressive behaviors. In other words, they may perceive immoral behaviors on social media as more harmful for the victim, which in turn justifies regulation (Graham 2009; Crawford 2017; Walter 2019; Boch 2020). There are conflicting results, however, on whether people oppose regulating hate speech (Bilewicz et. al. 2017; Rasmussen 2023a) because they use hate to derogate minority and oppressed groups (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Federico and Sidanius, 2002) or because of principled political preferences deriving from conservatism values (Grossman 2016; Grossman 2015; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). While sensitivity to harm contributes to making people on the political left more supportive of regulating social media, it is contested whether opposition from the political right derives from group-based dominance or principled opposition.

Click the link above to get to the research.

Here is a summary from me:

• Social media can influence our moral judgments. Studies have shown that people are more likely to make moral judgments that align with the views of their social media friends and the content they consume on social media. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to pro-environmental content on social media were more likely to make moral judgments that favored environmental protection.
• Social media can lead to moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a psychological process that allows people to justify harmful or unethical behavior. Studies have shown that social media can contribute to moral disengagement by making it easier for people to distance themselves from the consequences of their actions. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to violent content on social media were more likely to engage in moral disengagement.
• Social media can promote prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is behavior that is helpful or beneficial to others. Studies have shown that social media can promote prosocial behavior by connecting people with others who share their values and by providing opportunities for people to help others. For example, one study found that people who used social media to connect with others were more likely to volunteer their time to help others.
• Social media can be used to spread misinformation and hate speech. Misinformation is false or misleading information that is spread intentionally or unintentionally. Hate speech is speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of attributes such as race, religion, or sexual orientation. Social media platforms have been used to spread misinformation and hate speech, which can have a negative impact on society.

Overall, the research on social media and morality suggests that social media can have both positive and negative effects on our moral judgments and behavior. It is important to be aware of the potential risks and benefits of social media and to use it in a way that promotes positive moral values.

On the origin of laws by natural selection

DeScioli, P.

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volume 44, Issue 3, May 2023, Pages 195-209

Abstract

Humans are lawmakers like we are toolmakers. Why do humans make so many laws? Here we examine the structure of laws to look for clues about how humans use them in evolutionary competition. We will see that laws are messages with a distinct combination of ideas. Laws are similar to threats but critical differences show that they have a different function. Instead, the structure of laws matches moral rules, revealing that laws derive from moral judgment. Moral judgment evolved as a strategy for choosing sides in conflicts by impartial rules of action—rather than by hierarchy or faction. For this purpose, humans can create endless laws to govern nearly any action. However, as prolific lawmakers, humans produce a confusion of contradictory laws, giving rise to a perpetual battle to control the laws. To illustrate, we visit some of the major conflicts over laws of violence, property, sex, faction, and power.

(cut)

Moral rules are not for cooperation

We have briefly summarized the  major divisions and operations of moral judgment. Why then did humans evolve such elaborate powers of the mind devoted to moral rules? What is all this rule making for?

One common opinion is that moral rules are for cooperation. That is, we make and enforce a moral code in order to cooperate more effectively with other people. Indeed, traditional  theories beginning with Darwin assume that morality is  the  same  as cooperation. These theories  successfully explain many forms of cooperation, such as why humans and other  animals  care  for  offspring,  trade  favors,  respect  property, communicate  honestly,  and  work  together  in  groups.  For  instance, theories of reciprocity explain why humans keep records of other people’s deeds in the form of reputation, why we seek partners who are nice, kind, and generous, why we praise these virtues, and why we aspire to attain them.

However, if we look closely, these theories explain cooperation, not moral  judgment.  Cooperation pertains  to our decisions  to  benefit  or harm someone, whereas moral judgment pertains to  our judgments of someone’s action  as right or  wrong. The difference  is crucial because these  mental  faculties  operate  independently  and  they  evolved  separately. For  instance,  people can  use moral judgment  to cooperate but also to cheat, such as a thief who hides the theft because they judge it to be  wrong, or a corrupt leader who invents a  moral rule  that forbids criticism of the leader. Likewise, people use moral judgment to benefit others  but  also  to  harm  them, such  as falsely  accusing an enemy of murder to imprison them. 

Regarding  their  evolutionary  history, moral  judgment is  a  recent adaptation while cooperation is ancient and widespread, some forms as old  as  the origins  of  life and  multicellular  organisms.  Recalling our previous examples, social animals like gorillas, baboons, lions, and hyenas cooperate in numerous ways. They care for offspring, share food, respect property, work together in teams, form reputations,  and judge others’ characters as nice or nasty. But these species do not communicate rules of action, nor do they learn, invent, and debate the rules. Like language, moral judgment  most likely evolved  recently in the  human lineage, long after complex forms of cooperation. 

From the Conclusion

Having anchored ourselves to concrete laws, we next asked, What are laws for? This is the central question for  any mental power because it persists only  by aiding an animal in evolutionary competition.  In this search,  we  should  not  be  deterred  by  the  magnificent creativity  and variety of laws. Some people suppose that natural selection could impart no more than  a  few fixed laws in  the  human mind, but there  are  no grounds for this supposition. Natural selection designed all life on Earth and its creativity exceeds our own. The mental adaptations of animals outperform our best computer programs on routine tasks such as loco-motion and vision. Why suppose that human laws must be far simpler than, for instance, the flight controllers in the brain of a hummingbird? And there are obvious counterexamples. Language is a complex  adaptation but this does not mean that humans speak just a few sentences. Tool use comes from mental adaptations including an intuitive theory of physics, and again these abilities do not limit but enable the enormous variety of tools.

A pdf is here.

The Unchecked Rise of Psychological Testing Evidence in United States Courts.

King, C., & Neal, T. M. (2022, June 7).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/4hfd6

Abstract

Psychological testing, based on psychometric science, is often used in court to aid judges and juries in making legal decisions that profoundly affect people’s lives, such as eligibility for disability benefits, psychological damages, child custody, and whether and where someone will serve a criminal sentence. We provide a novel estimate of the pattern of psychological tests introduced as legal evidence throughout the entire history of United States case law, finding a sharp increase in this type of expert evidence in recent years. Although the law requires judges to screen evidence for relevance and reliability before allowing an expert to testify about it in court, legal challenges to psychological testing evidence are rare: across 28,824 judicial opinions citing psychological tests, just 479 involved a potential admissibility challenge (1.66%). This finding informs and raises questions for the public as well as legal and mental health professionals.

Discussion

Our results indicate that psychological testing evidence in U.S. courts has been increasing steadily in civil, family, and criminal cases over the past half-century, beginning roughly around the time that psychological testing emerged as a specialty in the field of psychology. Although we used a sizable sample, psychological testing evidence has undoubtedly occurred in many more cases than we could capture—with such evidence either not specified in written opinions, or judicial decisions not incorporated, for various reasons, into the large legal database we searched.

We also found evidence that legal professionals either rarely scrutinize psychological testing evidence, or admissibility decisions about such evidence are not typically deemed significant enough to warrant written explanations. This seems to be true irrespective of shifts in the strictness of admissibility standards over time. Potential challenge rates did, however, vary across individual psychological tests, and at least a third of the examined tests were challenged at least once. The two most commonly challenged types of tests provide a clue as to the type of case most likely to involve testing-related challenges: litigation concerning the civil commitment of certain convicted sex offenders. Nevertheless, the generally unchecked rise in psychological testing evidence, as suggested by this study, raises questions about the rigor of current admissibility standards, the functioning of the enforcers of those rules, and the seemingly broad deference afforded to mental health professionals’ highly varied test selections.

The research is here.

Institutional Courage Buffers Against Institutional Betrayal, Protects Employee Health, and Fosters Organizational Commitment Following Workplace Sexual Harassment

Smidt, A. M., Adams-Clark, A. A., & Freyd, J. J. (2023).

PLOS ONE, 18(1), e0278830. 

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0278830

Abstract

Workplace sexual harassment is associated with negative psychological and physical outcomes. Recent research suggests that harmful institutional responses to reports of wrongdoing–called institutional betrayal—are associated with additional psychological and physical harm. It has been theorized that supportive responses and an institutional climate characterized by transparency and proactiveness—called institutional courage—may buffer against these negative effects. The current study examined the association of institutional betrayal and institutional courage with workplace outcomes and psychological and physical health among employees reporting exposure to workplace sexual harassment. Adults who were employed full-time for at least six months were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform and completed an online survey (N = 805). Of the full sample, 317 participants reported experiences with workplace sexual harassment, and only this subset of participants were included in analyses. We used existing survey instruments and developed the Institutional Courage Questionnaire-Specific to assess individual experiences of institutional courage within the context of workplace sexual harassment. Of participants who experienced workplace sexual harassment, nearly 55% also experienced institutional betrayal, and 76% experienced institutional courage. Results of correlational analyses indicated that institutional betrayal was associated with decreased job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and increased somatic symptoms. Institutional courage was associated with the reverse. Furthermore, results of multiple regression analyses indicated that institutional courage appeared to attenuate negative outcomes. Overall, our results suggest that institutional courage is important in the context of workplace sexual harassment. These results are in line with previous research on institutional betrayal, may inform policies and procedures related to workplace sexual harassment, and provide a starting point for research on institutional courage.

Conclusion

Underlying all research on institutional betrayal and institutional courage is the idea that how one responds to a negative event—whether sexual harassment, sexual assault, and other types of victimization—is often as important or more important for future outcomes as the original event itself. In other words, it’s not only about what happens; it’s also about what happens next. In this study, institutional betrayal and institutional courage appear to have a tangible association with employee workplace and health outcomes. Furthermore, institutional courage appears to attenuate negative outcomes in both the employee workplace and health domains.

While we once again find that institutional betrayal is harmful, this study indicates that institutional courage can buffer against those harms. The ultimate goal of this research is to eliminate institutional betrayal at all levels of institutions by replacing it with institutional courage. The current study provides a starting point to achieving that goal by introducing a new measure of institutional courage to be used in future investigations and by reporting findings that demonstrate the power of institutional courage with respect to workplace sexual harassment.

The info is here.

Rational learners and parochial norms

Partington, S. Nichols, S., & Kushnir, T.

Cognition

Volume 233, April 2023, 105366

Abstract

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope – whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) – were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

From the General discussion

The widespread prevalence of parochial norms across history and cultures have led some to suggest parochialism is itself a human universal (Clark et al., 2019; Greene, 2013) in part owing to evolved, group-based biases in social norm acquisition (Chalik & Rhodes, 2020; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Roberts et al., 2017). In this paper, we investigated whether a rational learning process can also explain this phenomenon. In Study 1, we found that adults can acquire distinctions of social scope in a statistically appropriate manner, and this finding was robust across two forms of measurement (rule judgments and open response). In Study 2, older children displayed the adult-like statistical sensitivity in their rule judgments, and even younger children did so in their open responses. Computational analyses suggests that rule judgments were inclusively biased: compared to an unbiased Bayesian learner, children tended to assume that novel rules apply to everyone in a candidate population. Adults also displayed an inclusive bias, albeit to a lesser extent than children.

Broadly, these findings suggest that rational learning processes can indeed explain the acquisition of parochial norms and highlight an important sense in which children's norm learning can be biased in the opposite direction of tribalism. At the least, the finding that children and adults are inclusively biased serves as an existence proof that deep-rooted tribal biases in social learning are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms. Rather, if children and adults are rational learners, they can acquire a parochial norm when presented with evidence that is consistent with parochialism. However, tribalism can still play a role in norm acquisition, for example, by influencing the sort of evidence that adults seek out, or the evidence to which children are exposed.

The research is here.

Drowning in Debris: A Daughter Faces Her Mother’s Hoarding

Deborah Derrickson Kossmann

Psychotherapy Networker

March/April 2023

Here is an excerpt:

My job as a psychologist is to salvage things, to use the stories people tell me in therapy and help them understand themselves and others better. I make meaning out of the joy and wreckage of my own life, too. Sure, I could’ve just hired somebody to shovel all my mother’s mess into a dumpster, but I needed to be my family’s archaeologist, excavating and preserving what was beautiful and meaningful. My mother isn’t wrong to say that holding on to some things is important. Like her, I appreciate connections to the past. During the cleaning, I found photographs, jewelry passed down over generations, and my bronzed baby shoes. I treasure these things.

“Maybe I failed by not following anything the psychology books say to do with a hoarding client,” I tell my sister over the phone. “Sometimes I still feel like I wasn’t compassionate enough.”

“You handled it as best you could as her daughter,” my sister says. “You’re not her therapist.”

After six years, my mother has finally stopped saying she’s a “prisoner” at assisted living. She tells me she’s part of a “posse” of women who eat dinner together. My sister decorated her studio apartment beautifully, but the cluttering has begun again. Piles of magazines and newspapers sit in corners of her room. Sometimes, I feel the rage and despair these behaviors trigger in me. I still have nightmares where I drive to my mother’s house, open the door, and see only darkness, black and terrifying, like I’m looking into a deep cave. Then, I’m fleeing while trying to wipe feces off my arm. I wake up feeling sadness and shame, but I know it isn’t my own.

A few weeks ago, I pulled up in front of my mother’s building after taking her to the cardiologist. We turned toward each other and hugged goodbye. She opened the car door with some effort and determinedly waved off my help before grabbing the bag of books I’d brought for her.

“I can do it, Deborah,” she snapped. But after taking a few steps toward the building entrance, she turned around to look at me and smiled. “Thank you,” she said. “I really appreciate all you do for me.” She added, softly, “I know it’s a lot.”

The article is here.

The article is an important reminder that practicing psychologists cope with their own stressors, family dynamics, and unpleasant emotional experiences.  Psychologists are humans with families, value systems, emotions, beliefs, and shortcomings.

Frequently asked questions about abortion laws and psychology practice

American Psychological Association

Updated 1 SEPT 2022

Since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, many states have proposed, enacted, or resurrected a range of laws to either prohibit, significantly restrict, or protect reproductive rights and health care. Currently, the main targets of these laws appear to be medical providers who provide abortions or individuals seeking to obtain an abortion.

APA and APA Services Inc. are striving to provide psychologists with accurate and adequate information about the potential impact on them of reproductive health care laws. Since psychologists have embraced telehealth and many use technology to provide services across state lines, it’s important to be familiar with the laws governing the jurisdiction(s) where you are licensed as well as the jurisdiction(s) where your patients live.

In addition to this FAQ and other APA resources, psychologists will want to be familiar with guidance issued by federal and state agencies, their state licensing board(s), and their liability carrier. Some frequently asked questions follow.

While the situation is dynamic, good psychological practice remains unchanged. The changing landscape in states regarding access to reproductive health care does not change the fundamental approach to psychological care. Psychologists should continue to prioritize the welfare of their patients, protect confidentiality, and ensure their patients’ safety.

Practicing in states with changing abortion laws

Am I practicing in a state where abortion is, or is soon to be, illegal under all or certain circumstances?

The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade has put the regulation of abortion in the hands of states. In anticipation of the ruling, 13 states enacted “trigger laws,” designed to ban or restrict abortion upon the Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade. Not all trigger laws immediately kicked in, and some that did were immediately challenged in court, delaying their enforcement.

Staying current on laws affecting the states where you practice is important. For a list of existing abortion bans and restrictions within each state, the Center for Reproductive Rights has provided a map that is updated in real time. The Guttmacher Institute, a well-respected research group that collects information on abortion laws across the United States, also tracks current state abortion-related laws.

The information is here.

Gina Haspel Observed Waterboarding at CIA Black Site, Psychologist Testifies

Carol Rosenberg and J. E. Barnes

The New York Times

Originally posted 4 JUN 22

During Gina Haspel’s confirmation hearing to become director of the CIA in 2018, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., asked her if she had overseen the interrogations of a Saudi prisoner, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, which included the use of a waterboard.

Haspel declined to answer, saying it was part of her classified career.

While there has been reporting about her oversight of a CIA black site in Thailand where al-Nashiri was waterboarded, and where Haspel wrote or authorized memos about his torture, the precise details of her work as the chief of base, the CIA officer who oversaw the prison, have been shrouded in official secrecy.

But testimony at a hearing last month in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, included a revelation about the former CIA director’s long and secretive career. James E. Mitchell, a psychologist who helped develop the agency’s interrogation program, testified that the chief of base at the time, whom he referred to as Z9A in accordance with court rules, watched while he and a teammate subjected al-Nashiri to “enhanced interrogation” that included waterboarding at the black site.

Z9A is the code name used in court for Haspel.

The CIA has never acknowledged Haspel’s work at the black site, and the use of the code name represented the court’s acceptance of an agency policy of not acknowledging state secrets — even those that have already been spilled. Former officials long ago revealed that she ran the black site in Thailand from October 2002 until December 2002, during the time al-Nashiri was being tortured, which Mitchell described in his testimony.

Guantánamo Bay is one of the few places where America is still wrestling with the legacy of torture in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Torture has loomed over the pretrial phase of the death penalty cases for years and is likely to continue to do so as hearings resume over the summer.

The info is here.

Could we fall in love with robots?

Rich Wordsworth

eandt.theiet.org

Originally published 6 DEC 21

Here is an excerpt:

“So what are people’s expectations? They’re being fed a very particular idea of how [robot companions] should look. But when you start saying to people, ‘They can look like anything,’ then the imagination really opens up.”

Perhaps designing companion robots that deliberately don’t emulate human beings is the answer to that common sci-fi question of whether or not a relationship with a robot can ever be reciprocal. A robot with a Kindle for a head isn’t likely to hoodwink many people at the singles bar. When science fiction shows us robotic lovers, they are overwhelmingly portrayed as human (at least outwardly). This trips something defensive in us: the sense of unease or revulsion we feel when a non-human entity tries to deceive us into thinking that it’s human is such a common phenomenon (thanks largely to CGI in films and video games) that it has its own name: ‘the Uncanny Valley’. Perhaps in the future, the engineering of humanoid robots will progress to the point where we really can’t tell (without a signed waiver and a toolbox) whether a ‘person’ is flesh and blood or wires and circuitry. But in the meantime, maybe the best answer is simply not to bother attempting to emulate humans and explore the outlandish.

“You can form a friendship; you can form a bond,” says Devlin of non-humanlike machines. “That bond is one-way, but if the machine shows you any form of response, then you can project onto that and feel social. We treat machines socially because we are social creatures and it’s almost enough to make us buy into it. Not delusionally, but to suspend our disbelief and feel a connection. People feel connections with their vacuum cleaners: mine’s called Babbage and I watch him scurrying around, I pick him up, I tell him, ‘Don’t go there!’ It’s like having a robot pet – but I’m perfectly aware he’s just a lump of plastic. People talk to their Alexas when they’re lonely and they want to chat. So, yes: you can feel a bond there.

“It’s not the same as a human friendship: it’s a new social category that’s emerging that we haven’t really seen before.”

As for the question of reciprocity, Devlin doesn’t see a barrier there with robots that doesn’t already exist in human relationships.

“You’ll get a lot of people going, ‘Oh, that’s not true friendship; that’s not real.’,” Devlin says, sneeringly. “Well, if it feels real and if you’re happy in it, is that a problem? It’s the same people who say you can’t have true love unless it’s reciprocated, which is the biggest lie I’ve ever heard because there are so many people out there who are falling in love with people they’ve never even met! Fictional people! Film stars! Everybody! Those feelings are very, very valid to someone who’s experiencing them.”

“How are you guys doing here?” The waitress asks with perfect waitress-in-a-movie timing as Twombly and Catherine sit, processing the former’s new relationship with Samantha in silence.

“Fine,” Catherine blurts. “We’re fine. We used to be married but he couldn’t handle me; he wanted to put me on Prozac and now he’s madly in love with his laptop.”

In 2013, Spike Jonze’s script for ‘Her’ won the Academy Award for Best Screenplay (it was nominated for four others including Best Picture). A year later, Alex Garland’s script for ‘Ex Machina’ would be nominated for the same award while arguably presenting the same conclusion: we are a species that loves openly and to a fault. 

The info is here.