Morality in Our Mind and Across Cultures and Politics

Gray, K., & Pratt, S. (2024).

Annual Review of Psychology.

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020924-124236

Abstract

Moral judgments differ across cultures and politics, but they share a common theme in our minds: perceptions of harm. Both cultural ethnographies on moral values and psychological research on moral cognition highlight this shared focus on harm. Perceptions of harm are constructed from universal cognitive elements—including intention, causation, and suffering—but depend on the cultural context, allowing many values to arise from a common moral mind. This review traces the concept of harm across philosophy, cultural anthropology, and psychology, then discusses how different values (e.g., purity) across various taxonomies are grounded in perceived harm. We then explore two theories connecting culture to cognition—modularity and constructionism—before outlining how pluralism across human moral judgment is explained by the constructed nature of perceived harm. We conclude by showing how different perceptions of harm help drive political disagreements and reveal how sharing stories of harm can help bridge moral divides.

Here are some thoughts:

This article explores morality in our minds, across cultures, and within political ideologies. It shows how moral judgments differ across cultures and political ideologies, but share a common theme: perceptions of harm. The research highlights that perceptions of harm are constructed from universal cognitive elements, such as intention, causation, and suffering, but are shaped by cultural context.

The article discusses how different values are grounded in perceived harm. It also explores theories connecting culture to cognition and explains how pluralism in human moral judgment arises from the constructed nature of perceived harm. The article concludes by demonstrating how differing perceptions of harm contribute to political disagreements and how sharing stories of harm can help bridge moral divides.

This research is important for psychologists because it provides a deeper understanding of the cognitive and cultural underpinnings of morality. By understanding how perceptions of harm are constructed and how they vary across cultures and political ideologies, psychologists can gain insights into the roots of moral disagreements. This knowledge is crucial for addressing social issues, resolving conflicts, and fostering a more inclusive and harmonious society.

Advancing Transgender Health amid Rising Policy Threats

Coelho, D. R., Chen, A. L., &

Keuroghlian, A. S. (2025).

New England Journal of Medicine.

https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmp2416382

Abstract

The current U.S. political landscape poses escalating challenges for transgender health. Clinicians, researchers, policymakers, and advocates can act to counteract regressive policies.

Here is my summary:

The evolving political landscape under the Trump-Vance administration presents significant challenges to transgender health in the United States. Executive orders redefining sex and restricting gender-affirming care, coupled with state-level legislative efforts, are systematically dismantling protections for transgender and nonbinary individuals. These policies, often based on misinformation and discriminatory intent, are resulting in clinic closures, increased geographic barriers to care, and the denial of essential, evidence-based medical interventions. The denial of gender-affirming care, widely recognized as lifesaving and crucial for mental health, is having devastating consequences, including heightened risks of depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation. Legal challenges, such as the United States v. Skrmetti case, highlight the constitutional implications of these restrictions, potentially setting precedents that could further limit access to care across numerous states. Moreover, broader policy initiatives, like Project 2025, aim to redefine sex at the federal level, threatening to institutionalize discrimination in healthcare, education, and employment. To counteract these regressive measures, a multi-faceted approach is necessary, encompassing strengthened federal nondiscrimination protections, robust legal advocacy, and the reinforcement of community-based healthcare networks. Professional medical associations need to reaffirm their commitment to transgender health, while integrating legal and medical expertise to combat disinformation. Ultimately, prioritizing the lived experiences of transgender and nonbinary individuals and advocating for equitable policies are critical to safeguarding their health and well-being.

National politics ignites more talk of morality and power than local politics

Dillion, D., et al. (2024).

PNAS Nexus, 3(9).

https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae345

Abstract

Politics and the media in the United States are increasingly nationalized, and this changes how we talk about politics. Instead of reading the local news and discussing local events, people are more often consuming national media and discussing national issues. Unlike local politics, which can rely on shared concrete knowledge about the region, national politics must coordinate large groups of people with little in common. To provide this coordination, we find that national-level political discussions rely upon different themes than local-level discussions, using more abstract, moralized, and power-centric language. The higher prevalence of abstract, moralized, and power-centric language in national vs. local politics was found in political speeches, politician Tweets, and Reddit discussions. These national-level linguistic features lead to broader engagement with political messages, but they also foster more anger and negativity. These findings suggest that the nationalization of politics and the media may contribute to rising partisan animosity.

Here are some thoughts:

In recent years, American politics has undergone a significant transformation, becoming increasingly divisive and focused on national issues at the expense of local concerns. Researchers have identified a key factor contributing to this shift: the reliance on moral, power-centric, and abstract language in national politics. This linguistic style serves as a unifying framework, capturing attention and coordinating opinions across broad and diverse audiences.

Studies have revealed striking differences in language styles between national and local politics. Across various mediums, including politician speeches, Twitter, and Reddit, national politics consistently employs more moral, power-centric, and abstract language. Furthermore, this language style fosters widespread engagement, but also cultivates anger and negativity. Notably, politicians and individuals adapt their language depending on the context, using more moralized language in national settings than local ones.

These findings have significant implications for our understanding of the nationalization of politics and its consequences. The shift towards national politics may contribute to increased polarization and division, highlighting the need for further research into the effectiveness of abstract, moralized, and power-centric language in different contexts. Additionally, exploring how these dynamics play out in more homogeneous societies could provide valuable insights.

Ultimately, recognizing the benefits and drawbacks of national politics' reliance on moral, power-centric language is crucial. While it unites people and encourages participation, it also diverts attention from important local issues and fosters animosity. By understanding these complexities, we can work towards more effective coordination and communication in diverse groups, minimizing conflict and promoting constructive engagement.

Moral Disagreement across Politics is Explained by Different Assumptions about who is Most Vulnerable to Harm

Womick, J., et al. (2024). 

PsyArXiv Preprints

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/qsg7j

Abstract

Liberals and conservatives disagree about morality, but explaining this disagreement does not require different moral foundations. All people share a common harm-based mind, making moral judgments based on what seems to cause harm—but people make different assumptions of who or what is especially vulnerable to harm. Liberals and conservatives emphasize different victims. Across eight studies, we validate a brief face-valid assessment of assumptions of vulnerability (AoVs) across methodologies and samples, linking AoVs to scenario judgments, implicit attitudes, and charity behaviors. AoVs, especially about the Environment, the Othered, the Powerful, the Divine, help explain political disagreement about hot-button issues surrounding abortion, immigration, sacrilege, gay rights, polluting, race, and policing. Liberals seem to amplify differences in vulnerability, splitting the world into the very vulnerable versus the very invulnerable, while conservatives dampen differences, seeing all people as similarly vulnerable to harm. AoVs reveal common cognition—and potential common ground—among moral disagreement.

The pdf is here.

Here are some thoughts: 

The study explores the origins of moral disagreement between liberals and conservatives. It argues that both groups share a common harm-based moral framework, but differ in their assumptions about who or what is particularly vulnerable to harm. Liberals emphasize the vulnerability of the marginalized, while conservatives focus on the vulnerability of traditional power structures. These differing perspectives shape their moral judgments and political disagreements on various issues. The study concludes that by understanding these differing assumptions of vulnerability, we can gain a better understanding of moral disagreement and potentially find common ground.

Are people too flawed, ignorant, and tribal for open societies?

Dan Williams

Conspicuous Cognition

Originally posted 13 July 24

This week and the next, I am on the faculty for a two-week summer school in Budapest on “The Human Mind and the Open Society”. Organised by Thom Scott-Phillips and Christophe Heintz, the summer school focuses “on how understanding the human mind as a tool for navigating a richly social existence can inform our understanding and advocacy of open society, and the ideals it represents”:

“The notion of open society is an attempt to answer the question of how we can effectively live together in large and modern environments. Its ideals include commitments to the rule of law, freedom of association, democratic institutions, and the free use of reason and critical analysis. Arguments in favour of these ideals necessarily depend on assumptions—sometimes hidden and unexamined—about the human mind.”

I agreed to take part in the summer school because it would allow me to interact with a group of fantastic researchers and because it brings together two of my favourite things: (1) evolutionary social science and (2) the ideals of open, liberal societies—ideals that I regard as some of humanity’s most important and most fragile achievements.

In my role, I am giving two lectures on “The epistemic challenges of open societies”. The first lecture explores four factors that distort the capacity of citizens within open societies to acquire accurate beliefs about the world: complexity, invisibility, ignorance, and tribalism.

The info is here.

Here are some thoughts:

The article/blog post discusses the concept of open societies, emphasizing two key ideals: democracy and the free exchange of ideas. Open societies are characterized by political equality, typically expressed through the principle of "one person, one vote," and they promote radical freedom of thought and expression, as advocated by J.S. Mill. The text argues that these features are believed to enhance the social production of knowledge and understanding, although this optimism may be challenged by the complexities of modern societies.

Complexity and Public Opinion

Modern societies face intricate issues like climate change and economic policies, which ordinary citizens are expected to address. However, it is questioned whether they are equipped to do so, as highlighted by Walter Lippmann's critique of democracy, which points out that even experts struggle to grasp these complexities. Furthermore, the phenomenon of "rational ignorance" is introduced, explaining that individuals may choose not to become politically informed due to the minimal impact their vote has on outcomes, leading to widespread political ignorance.

Motivated Cognition and Coalitional Psychology

Despite a minority of highly engaged citizens, the text notes that those involved in politics often exhibit biases due to motivated cognition, where beliefs are shaped by personal interests rather than objective truth. This is linked to coalitional psychology, where individuals advocate for their political groups, distorting their understanding of reality to align with group interests. The article concludes that while open societies rely on informed electorates, the dynamics of motivated cognition and coalitional allegiances complicate the pursuit of truth and informed decision-making in democratic contexts.

Political censorship feels acceptable when ideas seem harmful and false

Kubin, E., Von Sikorski, C., & Gray, K. (2024).

Political Psychology.

https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.13011

Abstract

People seem willing to censor disagreeable political and moral ideas. Five studies explore why people engage in political censorship and test a potential route to decreasing censorship. While Americans report being generally supportive of free speech and against censorship (Study 1), we find that people censor material that seems harmful and false (Study 2), which are often ideas from political opponents (Study 3). Building on work demonstrating the perceived truth of harmful experiences (i.e., experiences of victimization), we test an experience-sharing intervention to reduce censorship. Among college students, the intervention indirectly decreased students' willingness to censor controversial campus speakers' ideas, through reducing beliefs that these speakers were sharing harmful and false ideas related to gun policy (Study 4). We also find benefits of sharing harmful experiences related to the abortion debate. Americans were less willing to censor and report the social media posts of opponents who base their views on experiences of victimization rather than scientific findings (Study 5).

Here are some thoughts:

This research explores the psychological underpinnings of political censorship and offers insights into when and why people engage in it.

Americans generally oppose censorship, but there are situations where they find it more acceptable. The key factors driving censorship are perceptions of ideas being harmful and false. People are more likely to endorse censoring their political opponents because they believe these individuals are likely to share harmful and untrue information.

While censorship is often associated with extreme content like hate speech, this research reveals that people are also willing to censor ideas they perceive as harmful and untrue, even if they may not actually be (e.g., opposing views on gun policy).

The study tested a "harmful experience intervention" to reduce political censorship. This intervention shifts perceptions of harm and falsity, making opponents' ideas seem less false and harmful, thereby reducing the inclination to censor. The effects were observed in both college campus settings and social media contexts.

People believe political opponents accept blatant moral wrongs, fueling partisan divides

Puryear, C., et al. (2024).

PNAS Nexus, 3(7).

https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae244

Abstract

Efforts to bridge political divides often focus on navigating complex and divisive issues, but eight studies reveal that we should also focus on a more basic misperception: that political opponents are willing to accept basic moral wrongs. In the United States, Democrats, and Republicans overestimate the number of political outgroup members who approve of blatant immorality (e.g. child pornography, embezzlement). This “basic morality bias” is tied to political dehumanization and is revealed by multiple methods, including natural language analyses from a large social media corpus and a survey with a representative sample of Americans. Importantly, the basic morality bias can be corrected with a brief, scalable intervention. Providing information that just one political opponent condemns blatant wrongs increases willingness to work with political opponents and substantially decreases political dehumanization.

Significance Statement

The United States is witnessing historic levels of political hostility and gridlock. This animosity is partly grounded in misperceptions of opponents’ political beliefs, but we find many Americans overestimate political opponents’ willingness to accept even the most basic moral wrongs. These findings suggest individuals and practitioners working to foster cross-partisan interaction might first correct this basic morality bias. Specifically, we show that learning a single opponent condemns basic moral wrongs increases behavioral engagement with political opponents and decreases dehumanization of the entire political outgroup.

The research is here.

Here are some thoughts:

Political divides in the US are fueled by a surprising misunderstanding: people believe their opponents are okay with terrible things like child pornography or embezzlement. This isn't true, but many people think it is, and this perception makes them dislike and dehumanize the other side. There's good news though - we can fix this misunderstanding. Studies show that simply reminding people that their opponents share basic moral values, like opposing these awful acts, can lead them to be more willing to work together and see each other as human. This approach seems even more effective than just giving people facts about the other side's beliefs. There are still questions about how long this positive effect lasts and if it works outside the US, but correcting this basic morality bias holds promise for bridging the political divide and fostering more productive conversations.

Spain passes law allowing anyone over 16 to change registered gender

Sam Jones

The Irish Times

Originally posted 16 Feb 23

Spain’s parliament has approved new legislation that will allow anyone over 16 to change their legally registered gender, ease abortion limits for those aged 16 and 17 and make the country the first in Europe to introduce paid menstrual leave.

The new transgender law – which was passed despite protests from feminist groups, warnings from opposition parties, and amid tensions between different wings of the Socialist-led coalition government – means that anyone aged over 16 will be able to change their gender on official documents without medical supervision.

However, a judge will need to authorise the change for minors aged 12-14, while those aged 14-16 will need the consent of their parents or guardians. No such changes will be available to those under the age of 12.

The law will also see a ban on conversion therapy – punishable by hefty fines – and an end to public subsidies for groups that “incite or promote LGBTIphobia”.

The information is here.

Some thoughts:

Spain's transgender laws are important to know from a multicultural competence perspective.

Familiarity with such laws enhances our cultural competence, allowing us to better serve diverse populations, including transgender individuals from various backgrounds. Moreover, knowledge of pioneering laws like Spain's enables us to advocate for similar reforms in our own country, promoting inclusivity and human rights. Furthermore, understanding the legal recognition of transgender rights in countries like Spain encourages us to reflect on our own ethical practices, ensuring respect, empathy, and non-discrimination in our work.

Moral Humility Reduces Political Divisions

Vallabha, S., & Brandt, M. J. (2024, April 5).

PsyArXiv

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/5r6fw

Abstract

Political and intergroup conflicts are often rooted in moral differences. People claim their side to be morally superior and derogate moral outgroups. Therefore, we propose that moral humility, a domain-specific form of humility, might serve as one antidote to such morally fueled conflicts. We test this in the context of political polarization in the USA. Across 3 studies involving diverse national and student samples (N = 2766), we found higher moral humility to be linked to reduced political animosity, increased support for political compromise and pluralistic norms, greater empathy and respect for the political outgroup, greater perceptions of the political group as moral and non-threatening, amongst others. Importantly, these effects persisted after accounting for domain-general intellectual humility, moral relativism, political identity and extremity, and other controls. This research demonstrates moral humility’s relevance for understanding political polarization, and points the way for a strength-based approach to addressing conflicts.

Here are some thoughts:

This research explores the concept of moral humility and its potential to reduce political polarization and intergroup conflicts. The study found that individuals with higher moral humility demonstrated reduced political animosity, increased support for political compromise and pluralistic norms, greater empathy and respect for political outgroups, and improved perceptions of political outgroups as moral and non-threatening. These effects persisted even after controlling for factors like intellectual humility, moral relativism, and political identity.

This research is important to mental health professionals for several reasons. Understanding moral humility can help therapists develop strategies to address the psychological impacts of political polarization on their clients and improve interpersonal relationships. The findings suggest that cultivating moral humility could help individuals navigate conflicts more effectively in both personal and professional settings. Mental health professionals can use insights from this research to help clients develop greater empathy and respect for those with differing viewpoints, as well as recognize and mitigate their own biases and moral righteousness, leading to more balanced thinking.

Understanding moral humility can help prevent individuals from engaging in harmful behaviors justified by moral superiority. Encouraging moral humility can support clients in their journey of self-improvement and moral development. Furthermore, mental health professionals can apply these findings to develop interventions that promote constructive dialogue and reduce societal tensions. By incorporating the concept of moral humility into their practice, mental health professionals can better equip their clients to navigate the complexities of modern social and political landscapes while fostering personal growth and improved interpersonal relationships.

Ethics Ratings of Nearly All Professions Down in U.S.

M. Brenan and J. M. Jones

gallup.com

Originally posted 22 Jan 24

Here is an excerpt:

New Lows for Five Professions; Three Others Tie Their Lows

Ethics ratings for five professions hit new lows this year, including members of Congress (6%), senators (8%), journalists (19%), clergy (32%) and pharmacists (55%).

Meanwhile, the ratings of bankers (19%), business executives (12%) and college teachers (42%) tie their previous low points. Bankers’ and business executives’ ratings were last this low in 2009, just after the Great Recession. College teachers have not been viewed this poorly since 1977.

College Graduates Tend to View Professions More Positively

About half of the 23 professions included in the 2023 survey show meaningful differences by education level, with college graduates giving a more positive honesty and ethics rating than non-college graduates in each case. Almost all of the 11 professions showing education differences are performed by people with a bachelor’s degree, if not a postgraduate education.

The largest education differences are seen in ratings of dentists and engineers, with roughly seven in 10 college graduates rating those professions’ honesty and ethical standards highly, compared with slightly more than half of non-graduates.

Ratings of psychiatrists, college teachers and pharmacists show nearly as large educational differences, ranging from 14 to 16 points, while doctors, nurses and veterinarians also show double-digit education gaps.

These educational differences have been consistent in prior years’ surveys.

Adults without a college degree rate lawyers’ honesty and ethics slightly better than college graduates in the latest survey, 18% to 13%, respectively. While this difference is not statistically significant, in prior years non-college graduates have rated lawyers more highly by significant margins.

Partisans’ Ratings of College Teachers Differ Most    

                

Republicans and Democrats have different views of professions, with Democrats tending to be more complimentary of workers’ honesty and ethical standards than Republicans are. In fact, police officers are the only profession with higher honesty and ethics ratings among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (55%) than among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (37%).

The largest party differences are seen in evaluations of college teachers, with a 40-point gap (62% among Democrats/Democratic leaners and 22% among Republicans/Republican leaners). Partisans’ honesty and ethics ratings of psychiatrists, journalists and labor union leaders differ by 20 points or more, while there is a 19-point difference for medical doctors.

The info is here.

Trump Is Coming for Obamacare Again

Ronald Brownstein

The Atlantic

Originally posted 10 Jan 24

Donald Trump’s renewed pledge on social media and in campaign rallies to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act has put him on a collision course with a widening circle of Republican constituencies directly benefiting from the law.

In 2017, when Trump and congressional Republicans tried and failed to repeal the ACA, also known as Obamacare, they faced the core contradiction that many of the law’s principal beneficiaries were people and institutions that favored the GOP. That list included lower-middle-income workers without college degrees, older adults in the final years before retirement, and rural communities.

The info is paywalled here.

Here's the gist:

• Trump's stance: He believes Obamacare is a "catastrophe" and wants to replace it with "MUCH BETTER HEALTHCARE."
• Challenges: Repealing Obamacare is likely an uphill battle. Its popularity has increased, and even some Republicans benefit from the law.
• Potential consequences: If Trump succeeds, millions of Americans could lose their health insurance, while others face higher premiums.
• Political implications: Trump's renewed focus on Obamacare could energize his base but alienate moderate voters.

Criminal Justice Reform Is Health Care Reform

Haber LA, Boudin C, Williams BA.

JAMA.

Published online December 14, 2023.

doi:10.1001/jama.2023.25005

Here is an excerpt:

Health Care While Incarcerated

Federal law mandates provision of health care for incarcerated persons. In 1976, the US Supreme Court ruled in Estelle v Gamble that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” prohibited under the Eighth Amendment. Subsequent cases established that incarcerated individuals must receive access to medical care, enactment of ordered care, and treatment without bias to their incarcerated status.

Such court decisions establish rights and responsibilities, but do not fund or oversee health care delivery. Community health care oversight, such as the Joint Commission, does not apply to prison health care. When access to quality care is inadequate, incarcerated patients must resort to lawsuits to advocate for change—a right curtailed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, which limited prisoners’ ability to file suit in federal court.

Despite Eighth Amendment guarantees, simply entering the criminal-legal system carries profound personal health risks: violent living conditions result in traumatic injuries, housing in congregate settings predisposes to the spread of infectious diseases, and exceptions to physical comfort, health privacy, and informed decision-making occur during medical care delivery. These factors compound existing health disparities commonly found in the incarcerated population.

The First Step Act

Signed under then-president Trump, the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) was a bipartisan criminal justice reform bill designed to reduce the federal prison population while also protecting public safety. The legislation aimed to decrease entry into prison, provide rehabilitation during incarceration, improve protections for medically vulnerable individuals, and expedite release.

To achieve these goals, the FSA included prospective and retroactive sentencing reforms, most notably expanded relief from mandatory minimum sentences for drug distribution offenses that disproportionately affect Black individuals in the US. The FSA additionally called for the use of evidence-based tools, such as the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs, to facilitate release decisions.

The legislation also addressed medical scenarios commonly encountered by professionals providing care to incarcerated persons, including prohibitions on shackling pregnant patients, deescalation training for correctional officers when encountering people with psychiatric illness or cognitive deficits, easing access to compassionate release for those with advanced age or life-limiting illness, and mandatory reporting on the use of medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder. With opioid overdose being the leading cause of postrelease mortality, the latter requirement has been particularly important for those transitioning out of correctional settings.

During the recent COVID-19 pandemic, FSA amendments expanding incarcerated individuals’ access to the courts led to a marked increase in successful petitions for early release from prison. Decarcerating those individuals most medically at risk during the public health crisis reduced the spread of viral illness associated with prison overcrowding, protecting both incarcerated individuals and those working in carceral settings.

The info is here.

Americans’ Trust in Scientists, Positive Views of Science Continue to Decline

Brian Kennedy & Alec Tyson

Pew Research

Originally published 14 NOV 23

Impact of science on society

Overall, 57% of Americans say science has had a mostly positive effect on society. This share is down 8 percentage points since November 2021 and down 16 points since before the start of the coronavirus outbreak.

About a third (34%) now say the impact of science on society has been equally positive as negative. A small share (8%) think science has had a mostly negative impact on society.

Trust in scientists

When it comes to the standing of scientists, 73% of U.S. adults have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in scientists to act in the public’s best interests. But trust in scientists is 14 points lower than it was at the early stages of the pandemic.

The share expressing the strongest level of trust in scientists – saying they have a great deal of confidence in them – has fallen from 39% in 2020 to 23% today.

As trust in scientists has fallen, distrust has grown: Roughly a quarter of Americans (27%) now say they have not too much or no confidence in scientists to act in the public’s best interests, up from 12% in April 2020.

Ratings of medical scientists mirror the trend seen in ratings of scientists generally. Read Chapter 1 of the report for a detailed analysis of this data.

Differences between Republicans and Democrats in ratings of scientists and science

Declining levels of trust in scientists and medical scientists have been particularly pronounced among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents over the past several years. In fact, nearly four-in-ten Republicans (38%) now say they have not too much or no confidence at all in scientists to act in the public’s best interests. This share is up dramatically from the 14% of Republicans who held this view in April 2020. Much of this shift occurred during the first two years of the pandemic and has persisted in more recent surveys.

The info is here.

My take on why this important:

Science is a critical driver of progress. From technological advancements to medical breakthroughs, scientific discoveries have dramatically improved our lives. Without public trust in science, these advancements may slow or stall.

Science plays a vital role in addressing complex challenges. Climate change, pandemics, and other pressing issues demand evidence-based solutions. Undermining trust in science weakens our ability to respond effectively to these challenges.

Erosion of trust can have far-reaching consequences. It can fuel misinformation campaigns, hinder scientific collaboration, and ultimately undermine public health and well-being.

He was a top church official who criticized Trump. He says Christianity is in crisis

S. Detrow, G. J. Sanchez, & S. Handel

npr.org

Originally poste 8 Aug 23

Here is an excerpt:

What's the big deal? 

According to Moore, Christianity is in crisis in the United States today.

• Moore is now the editor-in-chief of the Christianity Today magazine and has written a new book, Losing Our Religion: An Altar Call For Evangelical America, which is his attempt at finding a path forward for the religion he loves.

• Moore believes part of the problem is that "almost every part of American life is tribalized and factionalized," and that has extended to the church.

• "I think if we're going to get past the blood and soil sorts of nationalism or all of the other kinds of totalizing cultural identities, it's going to require rethinking what the church is," he told NPR.

• During his time in office, Trump embraced a Christian nationalist stance — the idea that the U.S. is a Christian country and should enforce those beliefs. In the run-up to the 2024 presidential election, Republican candidates are again vying for the influential evangelical Christian vote, demonstrating its continued influence in politics.

• In Aug. 2022, church leaders confirmed the Department of Justice was investigating Southern Baptists following a sexual abuse crisis. In a statement, SBC leaders said: "Current leaders across the SBC have demonstrated a firm conviction to address those issues of the past and are implementing measures to ensure they are never repeated in the future."

• In 2017, the church voted to formally "denounce and repudiate" white nationalism at its annual meeting.

What is he saying? 

Moore spoke to All Things Considered's Scott Detrow about what he thinks the path forward is for evangelicalism in America.

On why he thinks Christianity is in crisis:

It was the result of having multiple pastors tell me, essentially, the same story about quoting the Sermon on the Mount, parenthetically, in their preaching — "turn the other cheek" — [and] to have someone come up after to say, "Where did you get those liberal talking points?" And what was alarming to me is that in most of these scenarios, when the pastor would say, "I'm literally quoting Jesus Christ," the response would not be, "I apologize." The response would be, "Yes, but that doesn't work anymore. That's weak." And when we get to the point where the teachings of Jesus himself are seen as subversive to us, then we're in a crisis.

The information is here. 

Social Media and Morality

Van Bavel, J. J., Robertson, C. et al. (2023, June 6).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ywevq

Abstract

Nearly five billion people around the world now use social media, and this number continues to grow. One of the primary goals of social media platforms is to capture and monetize human attention. One means by which individuals and groups can capture attention and drive engagement on these platforms is by sharing morally and emotionally evocative content. We review a growing body of research on the interrelationship of social media and morality–as well the consequences for individuals and society. Moral content often goes “viral” on social media, and social media makes moral behavior (such as punishment) less costly. Thus, social media often acts as an accelerant for existing moral dynamics – amplifying outrage, status seeking, and intergroup conflict, while also potentially amplifying more constructive facets of morality, such as social support, pro-sociality, and collective action. We discuss trends, heated debates, and future directions in this emerging literature.

From Discussions and Future Directions

Addressing the interplay between social media and morality 

There is a growing recognition among scholars and the public that social media has deleterious consequences for society and there is a growing appetite for greater transparency and some form of regulation of social media platforms (Rathje et al., 2023). To address the adverse consequences of social media, solutions at the system level are necessary (e.g., Chater & Loewenstein, 2022), but individual- or group-level solutions may be useful for creating behavioral change before system-level change is in place and for increasing public support for system-level solutions (Koppel et. al., 2023). In the following section, we discuss a range of solutions that address the adverse consequences of the interplay between social media and morality.

Regulation is one of the most heavily debated ways of mitigating the adverse features of social media. Regulating social media can be done both on platforms as well at the national or cross-national level, but always involves discussions about who should decide what should be allowed on which platforms (Kaye, 2019). Currently, there is relatively little editorial oversight with the content even on mainstream platforms, yet the connotations with censorship makes regulation inherently controversial. For instance, Americans believe that social media companies censor political viewpoints (Vogels et al., 2020) and believe it is hard to regulate social media because people cannot agree upon what should and should not be removed (PewResearch Center, 2019). Moreover, authoritarian states can suppress dissent through the regulation of speech on social media.

In general, people on the political left are supportive of regulating social media platforms (Kozyreva, 2023; Rasmussen, 2022), reflecting liberals’ general tendency to more supportive, and conservatives' tendency to more opposing, of regulatory policies (e.g. Grossman, 2015). In the context of content on social media, one explanation is that left-leaning people infer more harm from aggressive behaviors. In other words, they may perceive immoral behaviors on social media as more harmful for the victim, which in turn justifies regulation (Graham 2009; Crawford 2017; Walter 2019; Boch 2020). There are conflicting results, however, on whether people oppose regulating hate speech (Bilewicz et. al. 2017; Rasmussen 2023a) because they use hate to derogate minority and oppressed groups (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Federico and Sidanius, 2002) or because of principled political preferences deriving from conservatism values (Grossman 2016; Grossman 2015; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). While sensitivity to harm contributes to making people on the political left more supportive of regulating social media, it is contested whether opposition from the political right derives from group-based dominance or principled opposition.

Click the link above to get to the research.

Here is a summary from me:

• Social media can influence our moral judgments. Studies have shown that people are more likely to make moral judgments that align with the views of their social media friends and the content they consume on social media. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to pro-environmental content on social media were more likely to make moral judgments that favored environmental protection.
• Social media can lead to moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a psychological process that allows people to justify harmful or unethical behavior. Studies have shown that social media can contribute to moral disengagement by making it easier for people to distance themselves from the consequences of their actions. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to violent content on social media were more likely to engage in moral disengagement.
• Social media can promote prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is behavior that is helpful or beneficial to others. Studies have shown that social media can promote prosocial behavior by connecting people with others who share their values and by providing opportunities for people to help others. For example, one study found that people who used social media to connect with others were more likely to volunteer their time to help others.
• Social media can be used to spread misinformation and hate speech. Misinformation is false or misleading information that is spread intentionally or unintentionally. Hate speech is speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of attributes such as race, religion, or sexual orientation. Social media platforms have been used to spread misinformation and hate speech, which can have a negative impact on society.

Overall, the research on social media and morality suggests that social media can have both positive and negative effects on our moral judgments and behavior. It is important to be aware of the potential risks and benefits of social media and to use it in a way that promotes positive moral values.

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Wang, H., & Van Prooijen, J. (2022).

Applied Cognitive Psychology.

https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3996

Abstract

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.

From the General Discussion

Most studies on conspiracy beliefs provide correlational evidence through cross-sectional designs (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). The present research took full advantage of the 2020 American presidential elections through a five-wave longitudinal design, enabling three complementary contributions. First, the results provide evidence that conspiracy mentality is a relatively stable individual difference trait (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014): While the election did influence specific conspiracy beliefs (i.e., that the elections were rigged), it did not influence conspiracy mentality. Second, the results provide evidence for the notion that conspiracy beliefs are for election losers (Uscinski & Parent, 2014), as reflected in the finding that Biden voters' outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased at the individual level, while Trump voters' did not. The group-level effects on changes in outgroup conspiracy beliefs also underscored the role of intergroup conflict in conspiracy theories (van Prooijen & Song, 2021). And third, the present research examined conspiracy theories about one's own political ingroup, and found that such ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time.

The decrease over time for ingroup conspiracy beliefs occurred among both Biden and Trump voters. We speculate that, given its polarized nature and contested result, this election increased intergroup conflict between Biden and Trump voters. Such intergroup conflict may have increased feelings of ingroup loyalty within both voter groups (Druckman, 1994), therefore decreasing beliefs that members of one's own group were conspiring. Moreover, ingroup conspiracy beliefs were higher for Trump than Biden voters (particularly at the first measurement point). This difference might expand previous findings that Republicans are more susceptible to conspiracy cues than Democrats (Enders & Smallpage, 2019), by suggesting that these effects generalize to conspiracy cues coming from their own ingroup.

Conclusion

The 2020 American presidential elections yielded many conspiracy beliefs that the elections were rigged, and conspiracy beliefs generally have negative consequences for societies. One key challenge for scientists and policymakers is to establish how conspiracy theories develop over time. In this research, we conducted a longitudinal study to provide empirical insights into the temporal dynamics underlying conspiracy beliefs, in the setting of a polarized election. We conclude that specific conspiracy beliefs that the elections were rigged—but not conspiracy mentality—are malleable over time, depending on political affiliations and election results.

The research is here.

Advocates of high court reform give Roberts poor marks

Kelsey Reichmann

Courthouse News Service

Originally published 27 April 23

The final straw for ethics experts wondering if the leader of one of the nation’s most powerful bodies would uphold the institutionalist views associated with his image came on Tuesday as Chief Justice John Roberts declined to testify before Congress about ethical concerns at the Supreme Court. 

“You can't actually have checks and balances if one branch is so powerful that the other branches cannot, in fact, engage in their constitutionally mandated role to provide a check on inappropriate or illegal behavior,” Caroline Fredrickson, a distinguished visitor from practice at Georgetown Law, said in a phone interview. “Then we have a defective system.” 

Roberts cited concerns about separation of powers as the basis for declining to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the court’s ethical standards — or lack thereof. Fredrickson said it was a canard that a system based on checks and balances would not be able to do just that. 

“It sort of puts the question to the entire structure of separation of powers and checks and balances,” Fredrickson said. 

For the past several weeks, one of the associate justices has been at the heart of controversy. After blockbuster reporting revealed that Republican megadonor Harlan Crow has footed the bill for decades of luxury vacations enjoyed by Justice Clarence Thomas, the revelations brought scrutiny on the disclosure laws that bind the justices and it called into question why the justices are not bound by ethics standards like the rest of the judiciary and other branches of government.

“For it to function, it relies on the public trust, and the trust of the other institutions to abide by the court's findings,” Virginia Canter, chief ethics counsel at Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, said in a phone call. “If the court and its members are willing to live without any standards, then I think that ultimately the whole process and the institution start to unravel.” 

Many court watchers saw opportunity for action here on a call that has been made for years: the adoption of an ethics code.

“The idea that the Supreme Court would continue to operate without one, it's just ridiculous,” Gabe Roth, executive director of Fix the Court, said in a phone call. 

Along with his letter declining to testify before Congress on the court’s ethics, Roberts included a statement listing principles and practices the court “subscribes” to. The statement was signed by all nine justices. 

For ethics experts raising alarm bells on this subject, a restatement of guidelines that the justices are already supposed to follow did not meet the moment.

“It's just a random — in my view at least — conglomeration of paragraphs that rehash things you already knew, but, yeah, good for him for getting all nine justices on board with something that already exists,” Roth said. 

The info is here.

Why Americans Hate Political Division but Can’t Resist Being Divisive

Will Blakely & Kurt Gray

Moral Understanding Substack

Originally posted 21 FEB 23

No one likes polarization. According to a recent poll, 93% of Americans say it is important to reduce the country's current divides, including two-thirds who say it is very important to do so. In a recent Five-Thirty-Eight poll, out of a list of 20 issues, polarization ranked third on a list of the most important issues facing America. Which is… puzzling.

The puzzle is this: How can we be so divided if no one wants to be? Who are the hypocrites causing division and hatred while paying lip service to compromise and tolerance?

If you ask everyday Americans, they’ve got their answer. It’s the elites. Tucker Carlson, AOC, Donald Trump, and MSNBC. While these actors certainly are polarizing, it takes two to tango. We, the people, share some of the blame too. Even us, writing this newsletter, and even you, dear reader.

But this leaves us with a tricky question, why would we contribute to a divide that we can’t stand? To answer this question, we need to understand the biases and motivations that influence how we answer the question, “Who’s at fault here?” And more importantly, we need to understand the strategies that can get us out of conflict.

The Blame Game

The Blame Game comes in two flavors: either/or. Adam or Eve, Will Smith or Chris Rock, Amber Heard or Jonny Depp. When assigning blame in bad situations, our minds are dramatic. Psychology studies show that we tend to assign 100% of the blame to the person we see as the aggressor, and 0% to the side we see as the victim. So, what happens when all the people who are against polarization assign blame for polarization? You guessed it. They give 100% of the blame to the opposing party and 0% to their own. They “morally typecast” themselves as 100% the victim of polarization and the other side as 100% the perpetrator.

We call this moral “typecasting” because people’s minds firmly cast others into roles of victim and victimizer in the same way that actors get typecasted in certain roles. In the world of politics, if you’re a Democrat, you cast Republicans as victimizers, as consistently as Hollywood directors cast Kevin Hart as comic relief and Danny Trejo as a laconic villain.

But why do we rush to this all-or-nothing approach when the world is certainly more complicated? It’s because our brains love simplicity. In the realm of blame, we want one simple cause. In his recent book, “Complicit” Max Bazerman, professor at Harvard Business School, illustrated just how widespread this “monocausality bias” is. Bazerman gave a group of business executives the opportunity to allocate blame after reviewing a case of business fraud. 62 of the 78 business leaders wrote only one cause. Despite being given ample time and a myriad set of potential causes, these executives intuitively reached for their Ockham’s razor. In the same way, we all rush to blame a sputtering economy on the president, a loss on a kicker’s missed field goal, or polarization on the other side.

The info is here.

Individuals prefer to harm their own group rather than help an opposing group

Rachel Gershon and Ariel Fridman

PNAS, 119 (49) e2215633119

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.221563311

Abstract

Group-based conflict enacts a severe toll on society, yet the psychological factors governing behavior in group conflicts remain unclear. Past work finds that group members seek to maximize relative differences between their in-group and out-group (“in-group favoritism”) and are driven by a desire to benefit in-groups rather than harm out-groups (the “in-group love” hypothesis). This prior research studies how decision-makers approach trade-offs between two net-positive outcomes for their in-group. However, in the real world, group members often face trade-offs between net-negative options, entailing either losses to their group or gains for the opposition. Anecdotally, under such conditions, individuals may avoid supporting their opponents even if this harms their own group, seemingly inconsistent with “in-group love” or a harm minimizing strategy. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, these circumstances have not been investigated. In six pre-registered studies, we find consistent evidence that individuals prefer to harm their own group rather than provide even minimal support to an opposing group across polarized issues (abortion access, political party, gun rights). Strikingly, in an incentive-compatible experiment, individuals preferred to subtract more than three times as much from their own group rather than support an opposing group, despite believing that their in-group is more effective with funds. We find that identity concerns drive preferences in group decision-making, and individuals believe that supporting an opposing group is less value-compatible than harming their own group. Our results hold valuable insights for the psychology of decision-making in intergroup conflict as well as potential interventions for conflict resolution.

Significance

Understanding the principles guiding decisions in intergroup conflicts is essential to recognizing the psychological barriers to compromise and cooperation. We introduce a novel paradigm for studying group decision-making, demonstrating that individuals are so averse to supporting opposing groups that they prefer equivalent or greater harm to their own group instead. While previous models of group decision-making claim that group members are driven by a desire to benefit their in-group (“in-group love”) rather than harm their out-group, our results cannot be explained by in-group love or by a harm minimizing strategy. Instead, we propose that identity concerns drive this behavior. Our theorizing speaks to research in psychology, political theory, and negotiations by examining how group members navigate trade-offs among competing priorities.

From the Conclusion

We synthesize prior work on support-framing and propose the Identity-Support model, which can parsimoniously explain our findings across win-win and lose-lose scenarios. The model suggests that individuals act in group conflicts to promote their identity, and they do so primarily by providing support to causes they believe in (and avoid supporting causes they oppose; see also SI Appendix, Study S1). Simply put, in win-win contexts, supporting the in-group is more expressive of one’s identity as a group member than harming the opposing group, thereby leading to a preference for in-group support. In lose-lose contexts, supporting the opposing group is more negatively expressive of one’s identity as a group member than harming the in-group, resulting in a preference for in-group harm. Therefore, the principle that individuals make decisions in group conflicts to promote and protect their identity, primarily by allocating their support in ways that most align with their values, offers a single framework that predicts individual behavior in group conflicts in both win-win and lose-lose contexts.

The research is here.

The Psychology of Online Political Hostility: A Comprehensive, Cross-National Test of the Mismatch Hypothesis

Bor, A., & Petersen, M. (2022).

American Political Science Review, 

116(1), 1-18.

doi:10.1017/S0003055421000885

Abstract

Why are online discussions about politics more hostile than offline discussions? A popular answer argues that human psychology is tailored for face-to-face interaction and people’s behavior therefore changes for the worse in impersonal online discussions. We provide a theoretical formalization and empirical test of this explanation: the mismatch hypothesis. We argue that mismatches between human psychology and novel features of online environments could (a) change people’s behavior, (b) create adverse selection effects, and (c) bias people’s perceptions. Across eight studies, leveraging cross-national surveys and behavioral experiments (total N = 8,434), we test the mismatch hypothesis but only find evidence for limited selection effects. Instead, hostile political discussions are the result of status-driven individuals who are drawn to politics and are equally hostile both online and offline. Finally, we offer initial evidence that online discussions feel more hostile, in part, because the behavior of such individuals is more visible online than offline.

From Conclusions and General Discussion

In this manuscript, we documented that online political discussions seem more hostile than offline discussions and investigated the reasons why such hostility gap exists. In particular, we provided a comprehensive test of the mismatch hypothesis positing that the hostility gap reflects psychological changes induced by mismatches between the features of online environments and human psychology. Overall, however, we found little evidence that mismatch-induced processes underlie the hostility gap. We found that people are not more hostile online than offline; that hostile individuals do not preferentially select into online (vs. offline) political discussions; and that people do not over-perceive hostility in online messages. We did find some evidence for another selection effect: Non-hostile individuals select out from all, hostile as well as non-hostile, online political discussions. Thus, despite the use of study designs with high power, the present data do not support the claim that online environments produce radical psychological changes in people.

Our ambition with the present endeavor was to initiate research on online political hostility, as more and more political interactions occur online. To this end, we took a sweeping approach, built an overarching framework for understanding online political hostility and provided a range of initial tests. Our work highlights important fruitful avenues for future research. First, future studies should assess whether mismatches could propel hostility on specific environments, platforms or situations, even if these mismatches do not generate hostility in all online environments. Second, all our studies were conducted online and, hence, it is key for future research to assess the mismatch hypothesis using behavioral data from offline discussions. Contrasting online versus offline communications directly in a laboratory setting could yield important new insights on the similarities and differences between these environments. Third, there is mounting evidence that, at least in the USA, online discussions are sometimes hijacked by provocateurs such as employees of Russia’s infamous Internet Research Agency. While recent research implies that the amount of content generated by these actors is trivial compared to the volume of social media discussions (Bail et al. 2020), the activities of such actors may nonetheless contribute to instilling hostility online, even among people not predisposed to be hostile offline.

A pdf of the research is here.