The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief

Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018).

Trends in cognitive sciences, 22(3), 213–224.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004

Abstract

Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties - known as partisanship - can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help to create a shared reality across partisan divides.

A pdf is here.

Here are some thoughts:

Political beliefs are deeply intertwined with personal and social identities, influencing cognitive processes and emotional responses. For clinical psychologists, recognizing that political beliefs serve to affirm one's group membership and self-concept is crucial. This understanding helps in identifying cognitive biases that favor one's political in-group, which can affect patients' relationships and well-being. Cognitive restructuring can aid patients in achieving more balanced perspectives and reducing conflicts in politically charged situations.

Political beliefs often evoke strong emotional reactions due to their ties to identity and self-worth, leading to heightened anxiety, anger, or distress when encountering opposing views. Clinical psychologists can help patients manage these emotions by validating their feelings and teaching emotional regulation strategies such as mindfulness and distress tolerance. This can enable patients to engage more constructively in political discussions and mitigate the psychological impact of political polarization.

In therapy, addressing the influence of political identity can enhance empathy and self-awareness. Psychologists can guide patients in exploring how their political beliefs align with their core values, reducing identity-driven conflicts. Promoting open, non-judgmental communication can help patients navigate political differences in their personal and social lives, improving relationships and reducing the emotional toll of polarization. By incorporating these insights, clinical psychologists can better support their patients in understanding the role of political identity in their cognitive and emotional processes.

Predicting Radicalism After Perceived Injustice: The Role of Separatist Identity, Sacred Values, and Police Violence

Pretus, C., Sheikh, H., Hamid, N., & Atran, S. (2023).

Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 

11(2), 730–746. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11255

Abstract

Perceptions of injustice are central to fueling violent political action, though not everyone within a social movement will support violence in response to collective grievances. So who supports violence and who doesn't after perceived injustice? To address this question, we followed up on the same individuals (N = 805) before and after a court decision in Catalonia (Spain) sentencing nine separatist leaders to prison, an event that led to mass violent and nonviolent protests. We tested three hypotheses by combining classical theories of collective action and more recent extremism models and found support for all three hypotheses. Namely, individuals who exhibited steeper increases in radicalism (controlling for activism) after the court ruling were those who had previously experienced police violence (social dynamics hypothesis), those who identified as separatists (separatist identity hypothesis), and those who held Catalan 2 independence as a sacred value (sacred value hypothesis). Our findings offer a complex picture of real-world conflict settings, where the three evaluated factors seem to be intertwined. We discuss potential venues to restore inter-group relations after perceived injustice, with an assessment of how likely these strategies are to succeed based on the three adopted perspectives.

Here are some thoughts:

This study investigated what makes people who feel wronged turn to violence. Researchers studied people in Catalonia, Spain, following a court ruling that many Catalans felt was unfair. They found that people who felt more strongly about Catalan independence (separatist identity and sacred value) and had experienced police violence in the past were more likely to report increased support for violence after the court ruling.

The study suggests that these three factors may reinforce each other. For instance, experiencing police violence might strengthen someone's separatist identity and make them see independence as a more sacred value.

The researchers acknowledge limitations like not having a control group that wasn't exposed to the court ruling. They also note their findings may not apply to groups that see non-violence as a core value. Future studies could look at these factors across different cultures and social movements.

Overall, the study suggests that a sense of injustice, combined with a strong group identity and a feeling that the group's values are under attack, can make people more likely to support violence.

What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research

Nicola Belle & Paola Cantarelli

(2017)

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 77, Iss. 3, pp. 327–339

Abstract

This article uses meta-analysis to synthesize 137 experiments in 73 articles on the causes of unethical behavior. Results show that exposure to in-group members who misbehave or to others who benefit from unethical actions, greed, egocentrism, self-justification, exposure to incremental dishonesty, loss aversion, challenging performance goals, or time pressure increase unethical behavior. In contrast, monitoring of employees, moral reminders, and individuals’ willingness to maintain a positive self-view decrease unethical conduct. Findings on the effect of self-control depletion on unethical behavior are mixed. Results also present subgroup analyses and several measures of study heterogeneity and likelihood of publication bias. The implications are of interest to both scholars and practitioners. The article concludes by discussing which of the factors analyzed should gain prominence in public administration research and uncovering several unexplored causes of unethical behavior.

From the Discussion

Among the factors that our meta-analyses identified as determinants of unethical behavior, the following may be elevated to prominence for public administration research and practice. First, results from the meta-analyses on social influences suggest that being exposed to corrupted colleagues may enhance the likelihood that one engages in unethical conduct. These findings are particularly relevant because “[c]orruption in the public sector hampers the efficiency of public services, undermines confidence in public institutions and increases the cost of public transactions” (OECD 2015 ). Moreover, corruption “may distort government ’ s public resource allocations” (Liu and Mikesell 2014 , 346). 

The meta-analysis is here.

In Praise of Ignorance

Simon Cullen

Quillette 

Originally published December 25, 2016

Here is an excerpt:

The world is such a big and messy place, all anyone can do is focus on understanding a tiny slice of it. So most of us can be forgiven our ignorance about empirical questions as complex as the causes of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, the likely effects of a particular international trade deal, the costs and benefits of raising the federal minimum wage to $15, and so forth. These questions are so enormously complex, thoughtful people who devote their lives to investigating them do not always reach consensus. But what cannot be forgiven is holding passionate opinions on issues of immense practical significance when we are almost completely ignorant of the facts. It does not matter how strongly we may believe we are factually correct or that we are fighting the darkest forces of evil, when we choose to address a topic that may seriously affect the lives of other people, we incur a correspondingly serious obligation to discharge onerous epistemic duties.

If we do not bother to acquaint ourselves with the most basic facts, to expose ourselves openly to people with whom we are inclined to disagree, and especially to those who have thought the longest and hardest about these topics, then we are not entitled to any opinion. As J.S. Mill wrote in On Liberty, “He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that.” For most of us, the only defensible attitude on most issues is perfect agnosticism.

The problem is, we have little tolerance for agnosticism. A politician who admitted that she held no opinion on the TPP might expect mockery, even though it is as unreasonable to expect the average politician to know about the difficult empirical questions raised by such agreements as it is to expect the average doctor or nurse. And we should all be alive to the possibility that most politicians would not do much better than the rest of us if they had to pass Econ 101 tomorrow. It is even worse that we ordinary people suffer disapprobation when we express agnosticism towards issues about which we know nothing. This intolerance of ignorance threatens to sever both policy makers and ordinary people from reality, harming our best chance at improving our world — scientific knowledge combined with careful, open-minded moral thinking.

The article is here.

“Fury, us”: Anger as a basis for new group self-categories

Andrew G. Livingstone , Lee Shepherd , Russell Spears , Antony S. R. Manstead
Cognition & Emotion

Abstract

We tested the hypothesis that shared emotions, notably anger, influence the formation of new self-categories. We first measured participants' (N = 89) emotional reactions to a proposal to make university assessment tougher before providing feedback about the reactions of eight other co-present individuals. This feedback always contained information about the other individuals' attitudes to the proposals (four opposed and four not opposed) and in the experimental condition emotion information (of those opposed, two were angry, two were sad). Participants self-categorised more with, and preferred to work with, angry rather than sad targets, but only when participants' own anger was high. These findings support the idea that emotions are a potent determinant of self-categorisation, even in the absence of existing, available self-categories.

The entire article is here.