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Showing posts with label moral flexibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label moral flexibility. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 30, 2025

Politics makes bastards of us all: Why moral judgment is politically situational

Hull, K., Warren, C., & Smith, K. (2024).
Political Psychology, 45(6), 1013–1029.

Abstract

Moral judgment is politically situational—people are more forgiving of transgressive copartisans and more likely to behave punitively and unethically toward political opponents. Such differences are widely observed, but not fully explained. If moral values are nonnegotiable first-principle beliefs about right and wrong, why do similar transgressions elicit different moral judgment in the personal and political realm? We argue this pattern arises from the same forces intuitionist frameworks of moral psychology use to explain the origins of morality: the adaptive need to suppress individual behavior to ensure ingroup success. We hypothesize ingroups serve as moral boundaries, that the relative tight constraints morality exerts over ingroup relations loosen in competitive group environments because doing so also serves ingroup interests. We find support for this hypothesis in four independent samples and also find that group antipathy—internalized dislike of the outgroup—pushes personal and political moral boundaries farther apart.


Here are some thoughts:

This research explores why moral judgments differ between personal and political contexts. The authors argue that moral flexibility in politics arises from the adaptive function of morality: to promote ingroup success.  Ingroup loyalty loosens moral constraints when group competition is present.  The study also reveals that disliking the opposing political group increases this effect.    

This study offers psychologists a deeper understanding of moral flexibility and political behavior. It explains how group dynamics and intergroup conflict influence moral judgment, highlighting the situational nature of morality.  It also links moral psychology with political science by examining how political affiliations and antipathies shape moral judgments.   

Monday, April 14, 2025

Moral Judgment and Decision Making

Bartels, D.  et al.(n.d.).
In The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of
Judgment and Decision Making.

Abstract

This chapter focuses on moral flexibility, a term that the authors use that people are strongly motivated to adhere to and affirm their moral beliefs in their judgments and choices, they really want to get it right, they really want to do the right thing, but context strongly influences which moral beliefs are brought to bear in a given situation. It reviews contemporary research on moral judgment and decision making, and suggests ways that the major themes in the literature relate to the notion of moral flexibility. The chapter explains what makes moral judgment and decision making unique. It also reviews three major research themes and their explananda: morally prohibited value trade-offs in decision making; rules, reason, and emotion in trade-offs; and judgments of moral blame and punishment. The chapter also comments on methodological desiderata and presents understudied areas of inquiry.

Here are some thoughts:

This chapter explores the psychology of moral judgment and decision-making. The authors argue that people are motivated to adhere to moral beliefs, but context strongly influences which beliefs are applied in a given situation, resulting in moral flexibility.  The chapter reviews three major research themes: moral value tradeoffs, the role of rules, reason, and emotion in moral tradeoffs, and judgments of moral blame and punishment.  The authors discuss normative ethical theories, including consequentialism (utilitarianism), deontology, and virtue ethics.  They also examine the influence of protected values and sacred values on moral decision-making, highlighting the conflict between rule-based and consequentialist decision strategies.  Furthermore, the chapter investigates the interplay of emotion, reason, automaticity, and cognitive control in moral judgment, discussing dual-process models, moral grammar, and the reconciliation of rules and emotions.  The authors explore factors influencing moral blame and punishment, including the role of intentions, outcomes, and character evaluations.  The chapter concludes by emphasizing the complexity of moral decision-making and the importance of considering contextual influences.