Cummins, D. D., & Cummins, R. C. (2012).
Frontiers in psychology, 3, 328.
Abstract
According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid, affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision time is increased in order to resolve the conflict. Violations of deontological principles proscribing the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm are presumed to elicit negative affect which biases judgments early in the decision-making process. This model was tested in three experiments. Moral dilemmas were classified using (a) decision time and consensus as measures of system conflict and (b) the aforementioned deontological criteria. In Experiment 1, decision time was either unlimited or reduced. The dilemmas asked whether it was appropriate to take a morally questionable action to produce a “greater good” outcome. Limiting decision time reduced the proportion of utilitarian (“yes”) decisions, but contrary to the model’s predictions, (a) vignettes that involved more deontological violations logged faster decision times, and (b) violation of deontological principles was not predictive of decisional conflict profiles. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that time pressure simply makes people more like to say “no.” Participants made a first decision under time constraints and a second decision under no time constraints. One group was asked whether it was appropriate to take the morally questionable action while a second group was asked whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the action. The results replicated that of Experiment 1 regardless of whether “yes” or “no” constituted a utilitarian decision. In Experiment 3, participants rated the pleasantness of positive visual stimuli prior to making a decision. Contrary to the model’s predictions, the number of deontological decisions increased in the positive affect rating group compared to a group that engaged in a cognitive task or a control group that engaged in neither task. These results are consistent with the view that early moral judgments are influenced by affect. But they are inconsistent with the view that (a) violation of deontological principles are predictive of differences in early, affect-based judgment or that (b) engaging in tasks that are inconsistent with the negative emotional responses elicited by such violations diminishes their impact.
Here are some thoughts:
This research investigates the role of emotion and cognitive processes in moral decision-making, testing a dual-process model that posits moral judgments arise from a conflict between rapid, affect-driven (System 1) and slower, deliberative (System 2) processes. Across three experiments, participants were presented with moral dilemmas involving utilitarian outcomes (sacrificing few to save many) and deontological violations (using personal force to intentionally harm), with decision times manipulated to assess how these factors influence judgment. The findings challenge the assumption that deontological decisions are always driven by fast emotional responses: while limiting decision time generally reduced utilitarian judgments, exposure to pleasant emotional stimuli unexpectedly increased deontological responses, suggesting that emotional context, not just negative affect from deontological violations, plays a significant role. Additionally, decisional conflict—marked by low consensus and long decision times—was not fully predicted by deontological criteria, indicating other factors influence moral judgment. Overall, the study supports a dual-process framework but highlights the complexity of emotion's role, showing that both utilitarian and deontological judgments can be influenced by affective states and intuitive heuristics rather than purely deliberative reasoning.
