Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy

Monday, January 9, 2023

The Psychology of Online Political Hostility: A Comprehensive, Cross-National Test of the Mismatch Hypothesis

Bor, A., & Petersen, M. (2022).
American Political Science Review, 
116(1), 1-18.
doi:10.1017/S0003055421000885

Abstract

Why are online discussions about politics more hostile than offline discussions? A popular answer argues that human psychology is tailored for face-to-face interaction and people’s behavior therefore changes for the worse in impersonal online discussions. We provide a theoretical formalization and empirical test of this explanation: the mismatch hypothesis. We argue that mismatches between human psychology and novel features of online environments could (a) change people’s behavior, (b) create adverse selection effects, and (c) bias people’s perceptions. Across eight studies, leveraging cross-national surveys and behavioral experiments (total N = 8,434), we test the mismatch hypothesis but only find evidence for limited selection effects. Instead, hostile political discussions are the result of status-driven individuals who are drawn to politics and are equally hostile both online and offline. Finally, we offer initial evidence that online discussions feel more hostile, in part, because the behavior of such individuals is more visible online than offline.

From Conclusions and General Discussion

In this manuscript, we documented that online political discussions seem more hostile than offline discussions and investigated the reasons why such hostility gap exists. In particular, we provided a comprehensive test of the mismatch hypothesis positing that the hostility gap reflects psychological changes induced by mismatches between the features of online environments and human psychology. Overall, however, we found little evidence that mismatch-induced processes underlie the hostility gap. We found that people are not more hostile online than offline; that hostile individuals do not preferentially select into online (vs. offline) political discussions; and that people do not over-perceive hostility in online messages. We did find some evidence for another selection effect: Non-hostile individuals select out from all, hostile as well as non-hostile, online political discussions. Thus, despite the use of study designs with high power, the present data do not support the claim that online environments produce radical psychological changes in people.

Our ambition with the present endeavor was to initiate research on online political hostility, as more and more political interactions occur online. To this end, we took a sweeping approach, built an overarching framework for understanding online political hostility and provided a range of initial tests. Our work highlights important fruitful avenues for future research. First, future studies should assess whether mismatches could propel hostility on specific environments, platforms or situations, even if these mismatches do not generate hostility in all online environments. Second, all our studies were conducted online and, hence, it is key for future research to assess the mismatch hypothesis using behavioral data from offline discussions. Contrasting online versus offline communications directly in a laboratory setting could yield important new insights on the similarities and differences between these environments. Third, there is mounting evidence that, at least in the USA, online discussions are sometimes hijacked by provocateurs such as employees of Russia’s infamous Internet Research Agency. While recent research implies that the amount of content generated by these actors is trivial compared to the volume of social media discussions (Bail et al. 2020), the activities of such actors may nonetheless contribute to instilling hostility online, even among people not predisposed to be hostile offline.

Sunday, January 8, 2023

On second thoughts: changes of mind in decision-making

Stone, C., Mattingley, J. B., & Rangelov, D. (2022).
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 26(5), 419–431.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.004

Abstract

The ability to change initial decisions in the face of new or potentially conflicting information is fundamental to adaptive behavior. From perceptual tasks to multiple-choice tests, research has shown that changes of mind often improve task performance by correcting initial errors. Decision makers must, however, strike a balance between improvements that might arise from changes of mind and potential energetic, temporal, and psychological costs. In this review, we provide an overview of the change-of-mind literature, focusing on key behavioral findings, computational mechanisms, and neural correlates. We propose a conceptual framework that comprises two core decision dimensions – time and evidence source – which link changes of mind across decision contexts, as a first step toward an integrated psychological account of changes of mind.

Highlights
  • Changes of mind are observed during decision-making across a range of decision contexts.
  • While changes of mind are relatively infrequent, they can serve to improve overall behavioral performance by correcting initial errors.
  • Despite often improving performance, changes of mind incur energetic and temporal costs which can bias decision makers into keeping their original responses.
  • Computational models of decision-making have demonstrated that changes of mind can result from continued evidence accumulation in the post-decisional period.
  • Brain regions involved in metacognitive monitoring and affective processing are instrumental for change-of-mind behavior.

Concluding remarks

Changes of mind have received less attention in the scientific literature than the decisions which precede them. Nevertheless, existing research reveals a wealth of compelling findings, supporting changes of mind as a topic worthy of further exploration. In this review, we have covered changes of mind from a behavioral, computational, and neural perspective, and have attempted to draw parallels between disparate lines of research. To this end, we have proposed a framework comprising core decision dimensions relevant to change-of-mind behavior which we hope will foster development of an integrated account. These dimensions conceptualize changes of mind as iterative, predominantly corrective behavioral updates in the face of newly arriving evidence.

The source of this evidence, and how it is integrated into behavior, depends upon both the decision context and stage. However, the mechanisms underlying changes of mind are not equally well understood across the entire decision space. While changes of mind for perceptual decisions involving accumulation of sensory evidence over short durations have been well characterized, much work is needed to extend these insights to the complex decisions we make in everyday life.


One conclusion, ignoring contradictory evidence can account for "confirmation bias".

Saturday, January 7, 2023

Artificial intelligence and consent: a feminist anti-colonial critique

Varon, J., & Peña, P. (2021). 
Internet Policy Review, 10(4).
https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.4.1602

Abstract

Feminist theories have extensively debated consent in sexual and political contexts. But what does it mean to consent when we are talking about our data bodies feeding artificial intelligence (AI) systems? This article builds a feminist and anti-colonial critique about how an individualistic notion of consent is being used to legitimate practices of the so-called emerging Digital Welfare States, focused on digitalisation of anti-poverty programmes. The goal is to expose how the functional role of digital consent has been enabling data extractivist practices for control and exclusion, another manifestation of colonialism embedded in cutting-edge digital technology.

Here is an excerpt:

Another important criticism of this traditional idea of consent in sexual relationships is the forced binarism of yes/no. According to Gira Grant (2016), consent is not only given but also is built from multiple factors such as the location, the moment, the emotional state, trust, and desire. In fact, for this author, the example of sex workers could demonstrate how desire and consent are different, although sometimes confused as the same. For her there are many things that sex workers do without necessarily wanting to. However, they give consent for legitimate reasons.

It is also important how we express consent. For feminists such as Fraisse (2012), there is no consent without the body. In other words, consent has a relational and communication-based (verbal and nonverbal) dimension where power relationships matter (Tinat, 2012; Fraisse, 2012). This is very relevant when we discuss “tacit consent” in sexual relationships. In another dimension of how we express consent, Fraisse (2012) distinguishes between choice (the consent that is accepted and adhered to) and coercion (the "consent" that is allowed and endured).

According to Fraisse (2012), the critical view of consent that is currently claimed by feminist theories is not consent as a symptom of contemporary individualism; it has a collective approach through the idea of “the ethics of consent”, which provides attention to the "conditions" of the practice; the practice adapted to a contextual situation, therefore rejecting universal norms that ignore the diversified conditions of domination (Fraisse, 2012).

In the same sense, Lucia Melgar (2012) asserts that, in the case of sexual consent, it is not just an individual right, but a collective right of women to say "my body is mine" and from there it claims freedom to all bodies. As Sarah Ahmed (2017, n.p.) states “for feminism: no is a political labor”. In other words, “if your position is precarious you might not be able to afford no. [...] This is why the less precarious might have a political obligation to say no on behalf of or alongside those who are more precarious”. Referring to Éric Fassin, Fraisse (2012) understands that in this feminist view, consent will not be “liberal” anymore (as a refrain of the free individual), but “radical”, because, as Fassin would call, seeing in a collective act, it could function as some sort of consensual exchange of power.

Friday, January 6, 2023

Political sectarianism in America

Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., et al. (2020).
Science, 370(6516), 533–536.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abe1715

Abstract

Political polarization, a concern in many countries, is especially acrimonious in the United States (see the first box). For decades, scholars have studied polarization as an ideological matter—how strongly Democrats and Republicans diverge vis-à-vis political ideals and policy goals. Such competition among groups in the marketplace of ideas is a hallmark of a healthy democracy. But more recently, researchers have identified a second type of polarization, one focusing less on triumphs of ideas than on dominating the abhorrent supporters of the opposing party (1). This literature has produced a proliferation of insights and constructs but few interdisciplinary efforts to integrate them. We offer such an integration, pinpointing the superordinate construct of political sectarianism and identifying its three core ingredients: othering, aversion, and moralization. We then consider the causes of political sectarianism and its consequences for U.S. society—especially the threat it poses to democracy. Finally, we propose interventions for minimizing its most corrosive aspects.

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Here, we consider three avenues for intervention that hold particular promise for ameliorating political sectarianism. The first addresses people’s faulty perceptions or intuitions. For example, correcting misperceptions of opposing partisans, such as their level of hostility toward one’s copartisans, reduces sectarianism.  Such correction efforts can encourage people to engage in cross-party interactions (SM) or to consider their own positive experiences with opposing partisans, especially a friend, family
member, or neighbor. Doing so can reduce the role of motivated partisan reasoning in the formation of policy opinions.

A related idea is to instill intellectual humility, such as by asking people to explain policy preferences at a mechanistic level—for example, why do they favor their position on a national flat tax or on carbon emissions.  According to a recent study, relative to people assigned to the more lawyerly approach of justifying their preexisting policy preferences, those asked to provide mechanistic explanations gain appreciation for the complexities involved.

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From the end of the article:

Political sectarianism cripples a nation’s ability to confront challenges. Bolstering the emphasis on political ideas rather than political adversaries is not a sufficient solution, but it is likely to be a major step in the right direction. The interventions proposed above offer some promising leads, but any serious effort will require multifaceted efforts to change leadership, media, and democratic systems in ways that are sensitive to human psychology. There are no silver bullets.


A good reminder for psychologists and those involved in the mental health field.

Thursday, January 5, 2023

The Supreme Court Needs Real Oversight

Glen Fine
The Atlantic
Originally posted 5 DEC 22

Here is an excerpt:

The lack of ethical rules that bind the Court is the first problem—and the easier one to address. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, promulgated by the federal courts’ Judicial Conference, “prescribes ethical norms for federal judges as a means to preserve the actual and apparent integrity of the federal judiciary.” The code covers judicial conduct both on and off the bench, including requirements that judges act at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. But this code applies only to lower-level federal judges, not to the Supreme Court, which has not issued ethical rules that apply to its own conduct. The Court should explicitly adopt this code or a modified one.

Chief Justice Roberts has noted that Supreme Court justices voluntarily consult the Code of Conduct and other ethical rules for guidance. He has also pointed out that the justices can seek ethical advice from a variety of sources, including the Court’s Legal Office, the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct, and their colleagues. But this is voluntary, and each justice decides independently whether and how ethical rules apply in any particular case. No one—including the chief justice—has the ability to alter a justice’s self-judgment.

Oversight of the judiciary is a more difficult issue, involving separation-of-powers concerns. I was the inspector general of the Department of Justice for 11 years and the acting inspector general of the Department of Defense for four years; I saw the importance and challenges of oversight in two of the most important government agencies. I also experienced the difficulties in conducting complex investigations of alleged misconduct, including leak investigations. But as I wrote in a Brookings Institution article this past May after the Dobbs leak, the Supreme Court does not have the internal capacity to effectively investigate such leaks, and it would benefit from a skilled internal investigator, like an inspector general, to help oversee the Court and the judiciary.

Another example of the Court’s ineffective self-policing and lack of transparency involves its recusal decisions. For example, Justice Thomas’s wife, Virginia Thomas, has argued that the 2020 presidential election was stolen, sent text messages to former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows urging him and the White House to seek to overturn the election, and expressed support for the pro-Trump January 6 rally on the Ellipse. Nevertheless, Justice Thomas has not recused himself in cases relating to the subsequent attack on the Capitol.

Notably, Thomas was the only justice to dissent from the Court’s decision not to block the release to the January 6 committee of White House records related to the attack, which included his wife’s texts. Some legal experts have argued that this is a clear instance where recusal should have occurred. Statute 28 U.S.C. 455 requires federal judges, including Supreme Court justices, to recuse themselves from a case when they know that their spouse has any interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome. In addition, the statute requires justices and judges to disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality may reasonably be questioned.

Wednesday, January 4, 2023

How social identity tunes moral cognition

Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D.,  et al.
PsyArXiv.com (2022, November 18). 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/9efsb

Abstract

In this chapter, we move beyond the treatment of intuition and reason as competing systems and outline how social contexts, and especially social identities, allow people to flexibly “tune” their cognitive reactions to moral contexts—a process we refer to as ‘moral tuning’. Collective identities—identities based on shared group memberships—significantly influence judgments and decisions of many kinds, including in the moral domain. We explain why social identities influence all aspects of moral cognition, including processes traditionally classified as intuition and reasoning. We then explain how social identities tune preferences and goals, expectations, and what outcomes care about. Finally, we propose directions for future research in moral psychology.

Social Identities Tune Preferences and Goals

Morally-relevant situations often involve conflicts between choices about which the interests of different parties are in tension. Moral transgressions typically involve an agent putting their own desires ahead of the interests, needs, or rights of others, thus causing them harm (e.g., Gray et al., 2012), whereas acts worthy of moral praise usually involve an agent sacrificing self-interest for the sake of someone else’s or the greater good. Value-computation frameworks of cooperation model how much people weigh the interests of different parties (e.g., their own versus others’) in terms of social preferences (see Van Bavel et al., 2022). Social preference parameters can, for example, capture individual differences in how much people prioritize their own outcomes over others’ (e.g., pro-selfs versus pro-socials as indexed by social value orientation; Balliet et al., 2009). These preferences, along with social norms, inform the computations that underlie decisions to engage in selfish or pro-social behavior (Hackel, Wills &Van Bavel, 2020).

We argue that social identity also influences social preferences, such that people tend to care more about outcomes incurred by in-group than out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;Van Bavel & Packer, 2021). For instance, highly identified group members appear to experience vicarious reward when they observe in-group (but not out-group) members experiencing positiveoutcomes, as indexed by activity in ventral striatum, a brain region implicated in hedonic reward (Hackel et al., 2017). Intergroup competition may exacerbate differences in concern for in-group versus out-group targets, causing people to feel empathy when in-group targets experience negative outcomes, but schadenfreude (pleasure in others’ pain) when out-group members experience these same events (Cikara et al., 2014). Shared social identities can also lead people to put collective interests ahead of their own individual interests in social dilemmas. For instance, making collective identities salient causes selfish individuals to contribute more to theirgroup than when these same people were reminded of their individual self (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). This shift in behavior was not necessarily because they were less selfish, but rather because their sense of self had shifted from the individual to the collective level.

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Conclusion

For centuries, philosophers and scientists have debated the role of emotional intuition and reason in moral judgment. Thanks to theoretical and methodological developments over the past few decades, we believe it is time to move beyond these debates. We argue that social identity can tune the intuitions and reasoning processes that underlie moral cognition (Van Bavel et al., 2015). Extensive research has found that social identities have a significant influence on social and moral judgment and decision-making (Oakes et al., 1994; Van Bavel & Packer, 2021). This approach offers an important complement to other theories of moral psychology and suggests a powerful way to shift moral judgments and decisions—by changing identities and norms, rather than hearts and minds.

Tuesday, January 3, 2023

Varieties of White working-class identity

Knowles, E., McDermott, M., & Richeson, J.
(2021, July 2).
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/mjhdy

Abstract

The present work demonstrates that, contrary to popular political narratives, working-class White Americans are far from monolithic in their class identities, social attitudes, and political preferences. Latent profile analysis (LPA) is used to distinguish three types of identity in a nationally representative sample of working-class Whites: Working Class Patriots, who valorize responsibility, embrace national identity, and disparage the poor; Class Conflict Aware, who regard social class as a structural phenomenon and ascribe elitist attitudes to higher classes; and Working Class Connected, who embrace working-class identity, sympathize with the poor, and feel disrespected because of the work they do. This identity typology appears unique to working-class Whites and is associated with distinct patterns of attitudes regarding immigration, race, and politics, such that Class Conflict Aware and Working Class Connected Whites are considerably more progressive than are Working Class Patriots. Implications for electoral politics and race relations are discussed.

Discussion

Despite often being characterized as a monolithic social and political force, members of theWhite working class display considerable diversity in their intergroup attitudes and voting behavior(Smith & Hanley, 2018; Teixeira & Rogers, 2000; Tyson & Maniam, 2016). In an ethnographic study of working-class Whites in Kentucky, Missouri, and Indiana, McDermott and colleagues(2019) identified three identity types among White working-class interviewees:  Working ClassPatriots, who identity strongly as American, emphasize responsibility, disparage the poor, and report feeling respected in their jobs; Class Conflict Aware Whites, who see the working class as locked in a conflictual relationship with socioeconomic elites; and Working Class Connected Whites, who identify strongly as members of the working class, feel compassion toward the poor, and report feeling looked down on because of the work they do. These researchers found that the three identity types were associated with different patterns of social attitudes—with Patriots tending to disparage Black people and Latino immigrants, Conflict Aware Whites displaying progressive attitudes toward these groups, and Class Connected Whites exhibiting a combination of tolerant attitudes toward immigrants and hostile attitudes toward Black people.

The present research represents a quantitative extension of these qualitative findings. In a nationally representative sample of working-class (non–college-educated) White Americans, we measured five themes emerging from previous qualitative work: American identification, the value placed on responsibility, psychological distance from the poor, the belief in stark divisions between social classes, and the tendency to feel looked down on by members of higher classes. Latent profile analysis (LPA) was then used to assess whether the White American population contains discrete types resembling the Working Class Patriot, Class Conflict Aware, and Working Class Connected groups. Indeed, the best LPA solution yielded three identity types based on our five indicators, and these types could be readily matched to those found in McDermott et al.’s (2019) qualitative work(Figure 1a). The representation of the types in our survey sample broadly matched the breakdown in the ethnographic study—with Patriots making up the majority of respondents and the remaining sample split roughly between Class Conflict Aware and Working Class Connected Whites.


Psychologists need to understand that white working class culture is not monolithic, just like other cultures.

Monday, January 2, 2023

The hidden dark side of empowering leadership

Dennerlein, T., & Kirkman, B. L. (2022).
The Journal of applied psychology, 107(12), 2220–2242. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0001013

Abstract

The majority of theory and research on empowering leadership to date has focused on how empowering leader behaviors influence employees, portraying those behaviors as almost exclusively beneficial. We depart from this predominant consensus to focus on the potential detriments of empowering leadership for employees. Drawing from the social cognitive theory of morality, we propose that empowering leadership can unintentionally increase employees' unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB), and that it does so by increasing their levels of moral disengagement. Specifically, we propose that hindrance stressors create a reversing effect, such that empowering leadership increases (vs. decreases) moral disengagement when hindrance stressors are higher (vs. lower). Ultimately, we argue for a positive or negative indirect effect of empowering leadership on UPB through moral disengagement. We find support for our predictions in both a time-lagged field study (Study 1) and a scenario-based experiment using an anagram cheating task (Study 2). We thus highlight the impact that empowering leadership can have on unethical behavior, providing answers to both why and when the dark side of empowering leadership behavior occurs.

Managerial Implications

Leaders should be more aware of contextual features in the workplace before using empowering leadership. If employees are likely to experience hindrance stressors when empowered, leaders will need to either (a) use less empowering leadership or (b) reduce effects of hindrance stressors. Regarding the latter, leaders can become sponsors to remove obstacles impeding goal achievement.  If bureaucracy is preventing empowered employees from reaching their goals, leaders can reduce red tape to allow more freedom.Leaders can also engage with other leaders to organize a concerted effort to remove hindrance stressors. As noted, Conger and Kanungo’s (1988) theoretical model includes removing factors that lead to feelings of powerlessness—many of which pertain to hindrance stressors, such as a lack of role clarity, a bureaucratic climate, or high levels of formalization—as a first step in the empowerment process distinct from behaviors leaders use to empower employees. Yet, applications of empowering leadership often overlook this critical element (Argyris, 1998), which, based on our findings, is problematic. If hindrance stressors cannot be removed, leaders could help employees develop better coping strategies in the face of the frustration they are likely to experience when their goal achievement is thwarted. Coping strategies could include employee support groups, leadership development, or stress management techniques, such as mindfulness (Sutcliffe et al., 2016).


The full citation is lengthy, but here it is:

Dennerlein, T., & Kirkman, B. L. (2022). The hidden dark side of empowering leadership: The moderating role of hindrance stressors in explaining when empowering employees can promote moral disengagement and unethical pro-organizational behavior. The Journal of applied psychology, 107(12), 2220–2242. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0001013

Sunday, January 1, 2023

The Central Role of Lifelong Learning & Humility in Clinical Psychology

Washburn, J. J., Teachman, B. A., et al. 
(2022). Clinical Psychological Science, 0(0).
https://doi.org/10.1177/21677026221101063

Abstract

Lifelong learning plays a central role in the lives of clinical psychologists. As psychological science advances and evidence-based practices develop, it is critical for clinical psychologists to not only maintain their competencies but to also evolve them. In this article, we discuss lifelong learning as a clinical, ethical, and scientific imperative in the myriad dimensions of the clinical psychologist’s professional life, arguing that experience alone is not sufficient. Attitude is also important in lifelong learning, and we call for clinical psychologists to adopt an intellectually humble stance and embrace “a beginner’s mind” when approaching new knowledge and skills. We further argue that clinical psychologists must maintain and refresh their critical-thinking skills and seek to minimize their biases, especially as they approach the challenges and opportunities of lifelong learning. We intend for this article to encourage psychologists to think differently about how they approach lifelong learning.

Here is an excerpt:

Schwartz (2008) was specifically referencing the importance of teaching graduate students to embrace what they do not know, viewing it as an opportunity instead of a threat. The same is true, perhaps even more so, for psychologists engaging in lifelong learning.

As psychologists progress in their careers, they are told repeatedly that they are experts in their field and sometimes THE expert in their own tiny subfield. Psychologists spend their days teaching others what they know and advising students how to make their own discoveries. But expertise is a double-edged sword. Of course, it serves psychologists well in that they are less likely to repeat past mistakes, but it is a disadvantage if they become too comfortable in their expert role. The Egyptian mathematician, Ptolemy, devised a system based on the notion that the sun revolved around the earth that guided astronomers for centuries until Copernicus proved him wrong. Although Newton devised the laws of physics, Einstein showed that the principles of Newtonian physics were wholly bound by context and only “right” within certain constraints. Science is inherently self-correcting, and the only thing that one can count on is that most of what people believe today will be shown to be wrong in the not-too-distant future. One of the authors (S. D. Hollon) recalls that the two things that he knew for sure coming out of graduate school was that neural tissues do not regenerate and that you cannot inherit acquired characteristics. It turns out that both are wrong. Lifelong learning and the science it is based on require psychologists to continuously challenge their expertise. Before becoming experts, psychologists often experience impostor phenomenon during education and training (Rokach & Boulazreg, 2020). Embracing the self-doubt that comes with feeling like an impostor can motivate lifelong learning, even for areas in which one feels like an expert. This means not only constantly learning about new topics but also recognizing that as psychologists tackle tough problems and their associated research questions, complex and often interdisciplinary approaches are required to develop meaningful answers. It is neither feasible nor desirable to become an expert in all domains. This means that psychologists need to routinely surround themselves with people who make them question or expand their expertise.

Here is the conclusion:

Lifelong learning should, like doctoral programs in clinical psychology, concentrate much more on thinking than training. Lifelong learning must encourage critical and independent thinking in the process of mastering relevant bodies of knowledge and the development of specific skills. Specifically, lifelong learning must reinforce the need for clinical psychologists to reflect carefully and critically on what they read, hear, and say and to think abstractly. Such abstract thinking is as relevant after one’s graduate career as before.