Why your brain is not a computer

Matthew Cobb
theguardian.com
Originally posted 27 Feb 20

Here is an excerpt:

The processing of neural codes is generally seen as a series of linear steps – like a line of dominoes falling one after another. The brain, however, consists of highly complex neural networks that are interconnected, and which are linked to the outside world to effect action. Focusing on sets of sensory and processing neurons without linking these networks to the behaviour of the animal misses the point of all that processing.

By viewing the brain as a computer that passively responds to inputs and processes data, we forget that it is an active organ, part of a body that is intervening in the world, and which has an evolutionary past that has shaped its structure and function. This view of the brain has been outlined by the Hungarian neuroscientist György Buzsáki in his recent book The Brain from Inside Out. According to Buzsáki, the brain is not simply passively absorbing stimuli and representing them through a neural code, but rather is actively searching through alternative possibilities to test various options. His conclusion – following scientists going back to the 19th century – is that the brain does not represent information: it constructs it.

The metaphors of neuroscience – computers, coding, wiring diagrams and so on – are inevitably partial. That is the nature of metaphors, which have been intensely studied by philosophers of science and by scientists, as they seem to be so central to the way scientists think. But metaphors are also rich and allow insight and discovery. There will come a point when the understanding they allow will be outweighed by the limits they impose, but in the case of computational and representational metaphors of the brain, there is no agreement that such a moment has arrived. From a historical point of view, the very fact that this debate is taking place suggests that we may indeed be approaching the end of the computational metaphor. What is not clear, however, is what would replace it.

Scientists often get excited when they realise how their views have been shaped by the use of metaphor, and grasp that new analogies could alter how they understand their work, or even enable them to devise new experiments. Coming up with those new metaphors is challenging – most of those used in the past with regard to the brain have been related to new kinds of technology. This could imply that the appearance of new and insightful metaphors for the brain and how it functions hinges on future technological breakthroughs, on a par with hydraulic power, the telephone exchange or the computer. There is no sign of such a development; despite the latest buzzwords that zip about – blockchain, quantum supremacy (or quantum anything), nanotech and so on – it is unlikely that these fields will transform either technology or our view of what brains do.

The info is here.

Suicide attempt survivors’ recommendations for improving mental health treatment for attempt survivors.

Melanie A. Hom and others
Psychological Services. 
Advance online publication.
https://doi.org/10.1037/ser0000415

Abstract

Research indicates that connection to mental health care services and treatment engagement remain challenges among suicide attempt survivors. One way to improve suicide attempt survivors’ experiences with mental health care services is to elicit suggestions directly from attempt survivors regarding how to do so. This study aimed to identify and synthesize suicide attempt survivors’ recommendations for how to enhance mental health treatment experiences for attempt survivors. A sample of 329 suicide attempt survivors (81.5% female, 86.0% White/Caucasian, mean age = 35.07 ± 12.18 years) provided responses to an open-ended self-report survey question probing how treatment might be improved for suicide attempt survivors. Responses were analyzed utilizing both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Analyses identified four broad areas in which mental health treatment experiences might be improved for attempt survivors: (a) provider interactions (e.g., by reducing stigma of suicidality, expressing empathy, and using active listening), (b) intake and treatment planning (e.g., by providing a range of treatment options, including nonmedication treatments, and conducting a thorough assessment), (c) treatment delivery (e.g., by addressing root problems, bolstering coping skills, and using trauma-informed care), and (d) structural issues (e.g., by improving access to care and continuity of care). Findings highlight numerous avenues by which health providers might be able to facilitate more positive mental health treatment experiences for suicide attempt survivors. Research is needed to test whether implementing the recommendations offered by attempt survivors in this study might lead to enhanced treatment engagement, retention, and outcomes among suicide attempt survivors at large.

Here is an excerpt from the Discussion:

On this point, this study revealed numerous recommendations for how providers might be able to improve their interactions with attempt survivors. Suggestions in this domain aligned with prior studies on treatment experiences among suicide attempt survivors. For instance, recommendations that providers not stigmatize attempt survivors and, instead, empathize with them, actively listen to them, and humanize them, are consistent with aforementioned studies (Berglund et al., 2016; Frey et al., 2016; Shand et al., 2018; Sheehan et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2009). This study’s findings regarding the importance of a collaborative therapeutic relationship are also consistent with previous work (Shand et al., 2018). Though each of these factors has been identified as salient to treatment engagement efforts broadly (see Barrett et al., 2008, for review), several suggestions that emerged in this study were more specific to attempt survivors. For example, ensuring that patients feel comfortable openly discussing suicidal thoughts and behaviors and taking disclosures of suicidality seriously are suggestions specifically applicable to the care of at-risk individuals. These recommendations not only support research indicating that asking about suicidality is not iatrogenic (see DeCou & Schumann, 2018, for review), but they also underscore the importance of considering the unique needs of attempt survivors. Indeed, given that most participants provided a recommendation in this area, the impact of provider-related factors should not be overlooked in the provision of care to this group.

Treating “Moral” Injuries

Anna Harwood-Gross
Scientific American
Originally posted 24 March 20

Here is an excerpt:

Though PTSD symptoms such as avoidance of reminders of the traumatic event and intrusive thought patterns may also be present in moral injury, they appear to serve different purposes, with PTSD sufferers avoiding fear and moral injury sufferers avoiding shame triggers. Few comparison studies of PTSD and moral injury exist, yet there has been research that indirectly compares the two conditions by differentiating between fear-based and non-fear-based (i.e., moral injury) forms of PTSD, which have been demonstrated to have different neurobiological markers. In the context of the military, there are countless examples of potentially morally injurious events (PMIEs), which can include killing or wounding others, engaging in retribution or disproportionate violence, or failing to save the life of a comrade, child or civilian. The experience of PMIEs has been demonstrated to lead to a larger range of psychological distress symptoms, including higher levels of guilt, anger, shame, depression and social isolation, than those seen in traditional PTSD profiles.

Guilt is difficult to address in therapy and often lingers following standardized PTSD treatment (that is, if the sufferer is able to access therapy). It may, in fact, be a factor in the more than 49 percent of veterans who drop out of evidence-based PTSD treatment or in why, at times, up to 72% of sufferers, despite meaningful improvement in their symptoms, do not actually recover enough after such treatment for their PTSD diagnosis to be removed. Most often, moral injury symptoms that are present in the clinic are addressed through traditional PTSD treatments, with thoughts of guilt and shame treated similarly to other distorted cognitions. When guilt and the events it relates to are treated as “a feeling and not a fact,” as psychologist Lisa Finlay put it in a 2015 paper, there is an attempt to lessen or relieve such emotions while taking a shortcut to avoid experiencing those that are legitimate and reasonable after-wartime activities. Continuing, Finlay stated that “the idea that we might get good, as a profession, at talking people out of guilt following their involvement in traumatic incidents is frighteningly short-sighted in more ways than one.”

The info is here.

Managing mental health challenges faced by healthcare workers during COVID-19 pandemic

Greenberg N., & others
BMJ 2020; 368 :m1211

Here is an excerpt:

Moral injury

Moral injury, a term that originated in the military, can be defined as the psychological distress that results from actions, or the lack of them, which violate someone’s moral or ethical code.1 Unlike formal mental health conditions such as depression or post-traumatic stress disorder, moral injury is not a mental illness. But those who develop moral injuries are likely to experience negative thoughts about themselves or others (for example, “I am a terrible person” or “My bosses don’t care about people’s lives”) as well as intense feelings of shame, guilt, or disgust. These symptoms can contribute to the development of mental health difficulties, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and even suicidal ideation. Equally, some people who have to contend with significant challenges, moral or traumatic, experience a degree of post-traumatic growth,3 a term used to describe a bolstering of psychological resilience, esteem, outlook, and values after exposure to highly challenging situations. Whether someone develops a psychological injury or experiences psychological growth is likely to be influenced by the way that they are supported before, during, and after a challenging incident.

Moral injury has already been described in medical students, who report great difficulty coping with working in prehospital and emergency care,4 where they were exposed to trauma that they felt unprepared for. This may be similar to the unprecedented nature of the challenges healthcare staff are currently facing. In the UK, most NHS staff may have felt, with some justification, that with all its faults, the NHS gives the sickest people the greatest chance of recovery. As such, staff should and usually do feel that it is something to be proud of.

The huge current effort to ensure adequate staffing and resources may be successful, but it looks likely that during the covid-19 outbreak many healthcare workers will encounter situations where they cannot say to a grieving relative, “We did all we could” but only, “We did our best with the staff and resources available, but it wasn’t enough.” That is the seed of a moral injury. Not all staff members will be adversely affected by the challenges ahead (table 1) but no one is invulnerable, and some healthcare workers will hurt, perhaps for a long time, unless we begin now to prepare and support our staff.

The info is here.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Ethics in a Pandemic

Jessica Davis
JustSecurity.org
Originally posted 31 March 20

Here is an excerpt:

It is imperative that States and their citizens question how much freedom and privacy should be sacrificed to limit the impact of this pandemic. It is also not sufficient to ask simply “if” something is legal; we should also ask whether it should be, and under what circumstances. States should consider the ethics of surveillance and intelligence, specifically whether it is justified, done under the right authority, if it can be done with intentionality and proportionality and as a last resort, and if targets of surveillance can be separated from non-targets to avoid mass surveillance. These considerations, combined with enhanced transparency and sunset clauses on the use of intelligence and surveillance techniques, can allow States to ethically deploy these powerful tools to help stop the spread of the virus.

States are employing intelligence and surveillance techniques to contain the spread of the illness because these methods can help track and identify infected or exposed people and enforce quarantines. States have used cell phone data to track people at risk of infection or transmission and financial data to identify places frequented by at-risk people. Social media intelligence is also ripe for exploitation in terms of identifying social contacts. This intelligence, is increasingly being combined with health data, creating a unique (and informative) picture of a person’s life that is undoubtedly useful for virus containment. But how long should States have access to this type of information on their citizens, if at all? Considering natural limits to the collection of granular data on citizens is imperative, both in terms of time and access to this data.

The info is here.

Social Distancing as a Moral Dilemma

E. Litvack
U. A. News
Originally posted 31 March 20

Here is an excerpt:

Q: At this point, is social distancing a moral imperative?

This is an interesting philosophical question. A moral imperative is a command to act in a certain way, which everyone should follow, and, in order to invoke one, we need to explain what makes a particular action right or morally good.

A: In the context of the current health crisis, we can plausibly make the claim that it is a morally good state of affairs if we save the greatest number of lives possible. Not everyone would agree with that claim, but I'll leave that argument aside for now and return to it later. For now, let's assume that promoting health and saving lives is a morally good goal for society. Given that premise – if we also accept the empirical evidence, which suggests that social distancing is a means to halt the spread of the virus – it's easy to see how one would defend their judgment that it is morally wrong not to practice social distancing.

Q: How might someone argue that saving lives isn't a moral imperative?

A: Some people might argue that there is a naturalistic and evolutionary reason to let the virus take its course. It would reduce human population, which, in the long run, could be a good thing in terms of having more resources for fewer people. Notice one thing this view entails, though: The person who holds it must be willing to accept that they or their loved ones might be among those who contribute to the population reduction.

Likewise, some might argue that certain people have more value than others and therefore deserve to live while others do not. This would require a set of criteria by which to judge the value of a life, and unless someone – or some entity – creates that criteria by fiat, then to define "a valuable life" requires us to circle right back around to our original premise.

The info is here.

How Trump failed the biggest test of his life

Ed Pilkington & Tom McCarty
The Guardian
Originally posted 29 Mar 20

Here is an excerpt:

Those missing four to six weeks are likely to go down in the definitive history as a cautionary tale of the potentially devastating consequences of failed political leadership. Today, 86,012 cases have been confirmed across the US, pushing the nation to the top of the world’s coronavirus league table – above even China.

More than a quarter of those cases are in New York City, now a global center of the coronavirus pandemic, with New Orleans also raising alarm. Nationally, 1,301 people have died.

Most worryingly, the curve of cases continues to rise precipitously, with no sign of the plateau that has spared South Korea.

“The US response will be studied for generations as a textbook example of a disastrous, failed effort,” Ron Klain, who spearheaded the fight against Ebola in 2014, told a Georgetown university panel recently. “What’s happened in Washington has been a fiasco of incredible proportions.”

Jeremy Konyndyk, who led the US government’s response to international disasters at USAid from 2013 to 2017, frames the past six weeks in strikingly similar terms. He told the Guardian: “We are witnessing in the United States one of the greatest failures of basic governance and basic leadership in modern times.”

In Konyndyk’s analysis, the White House had all the information it needed by the end of January to act decisively. Instead, Trump repeatedly played down the severity of the threat, blaming China for what he called the “Chinese virus” and insisting falsely that his partial travel bans on China and Europe were all it would take to contain the crisis.

The info is here.

The Ethics of Quarantine

Ross Upshur
Virtual Mentor. 2003;5(11):393-395.


Here are two excerpts:

There are 2 independent ethical considerations to consider here: whether the concept of quarantine is justified ethically and whether it is effective. It is also important to make a clear distinction between quarantine and isolation. Quarantine refers to the separation of those exposed individuals who are not yet symptomatic for a period of time (usually the known incubation period of the suspected pathogen) to determine whether they will develop symptoms. Quarantine achieves 2 goals. First, it stops the chain of transmission because it is less possible to infect others if one is not in social circulation. Second, it allows the individuals under surveillance to be identified and directed toward appropriate care if they become symptomatic. This is more important in diseases where there is presymptomatic shedding of virus. Isolation, on the other hand, is keeping those who have symptoms from circulation in general populations.

Justification of quarantine and quarantine laws stems from a general moral obligation to prevent harm to (infection of) others if this can be done. Most democracies have public health laws that do permit quarantine. Even though quarantine is a curtailment of civil liberties, it can be broadly justified if several criteria can be met.

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Secondly, the proportionality, or least-restrictive-means, principle should be observed. This holds that public health authorities should use the least restrictive measures proportional to the goal of achieving disease control. This would indicate that quarantine be made voluntary before more restrictive means and sanctions such as mandatory orders or surveillance devices, home cameras, bracelets, or incarceration are contemplated. It is striking to note that in the Canadian SARS outbreak in the Greater Toronto area, approximately 30,000 persons were quarantined at some time. Toronto Public Health reports writing only 22 orders for mandatory detainment [3]. Even if the report is a tenfold underestimate, the remaining instances of voluntary quarantine constitute an impressive display of civic-mindedness.

Thirdly, reciprocity must be upheld. If society asks individuals to curtail their liberties for the good of others, society has a reciprocal obligation to assist them in the discharge of their obligations. That means providing individuals with adequate food and shelter and psychological support, accommodating them in their workplaces, and not discriminating against them. They should suffer no penalty on account of discharging their obligations to society.

The info is here.

Pregnant and shackled: why inmates are still giving birth cuffed and bound

Lori Teresa Yearwood
theguardian.com
Originally posted 24 Feb 20

Here is an excerpt:

To convolute matters more, the federal government does not require prisons or jails to collect data on pregnancy and childbirth among female inmates. A bill introduced in September 2018 would have required such data collection. However, no action was taken on the bill.

Even the definition of shackling varies. Some states, such as Maryland and New York, ban all restraints immediately before and after birth, though there are exceptions in extraordinary circumstances. Other states, such as Ohio, allow pregnant women to be handcuffed in the front of their bodies, as opposed to behind their bodies, which is thought to be more destabilizing.

Then there is the delineation between shackling during pregnancy, active delivery and postpartum. Individual state laws are filled with nuances. As of 2017, Rhode Island is the only state that has what is called “a private right of action”, an enforcement mechanism allowing the illegally shackled woman to sue for monetary compensation.

The one constant: the acute psychological trauma that shackling inflicts.

“Women subjected to restraint during childbirth report severe mental distress, depression, anguish, and trauma,” states a 2017 report from the American Psychological Association.

“Women who get locked up, tend on average to have suffered many more childhood traumas, says Terry Kupers, MD, a psychiatrist and the author of the book Solitary: The Inside Story of Supermax Isolation and How We Can Abolish It. He implores prison staffs “to be very careful that we do not re-traumatize them. Because re-traumatization makes conditions like post-traumatic stress disorder much worse.”

Amy Ard, executive director of Motherhood Beyond Bars, a not-for-profit in Georgia, worries that the trauma of shackling takes a toll on the self-image of new mothers. Inevitably, this question looms in the minds of the women Ard works with: if I am someone who needs to be chained, how can I expect to also see myself as someone capable of protecting my child?

The info is here.