Moral Reasoning and Emotion

Joshua May & Victor Kumar
Published in
The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology,
eds. Karen Jones, Mark Timmons, and
Aaron Zimmerman, Routledge (2018), pp. 139-156.

Abstract:

This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research but continues to guide it.

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Conclusion

We draw two main conclusions. First, on a fair and plausible characterization of reasoning and emotion, they are both integral to moral judgment. In particular, when our moral beliefs undergo changes over long periods of time, there is ample space for both reasoning and emotion to play an iterative role. Second, it’s difficult to cleave reasoning from emotional processing. When the two affect moral judgment, especially across time, their interplay can make it artificial or fruitless to impose a division, even if a distinction can still be drawn between inference and valence in information processing.

To some degree, our conclusions militate against extreme characterizations of the rationalism-sentimentalism divide. However, the debate is best construed as a question about which psychological process is more fundamental or essential to distinctively moral cognition.  The answer still affects both theoretical and practical problems, such as how to make artificial intelligence capable of moral judgment. At the moment, the more nuanced dispute is difficult to adjudicate, but it may be addressed by further research and theorizing.

The book chapter can be downloaded here.

Are You a Moral Grandstander?

Scott Barry Kaufman
Scientific American
Originally published October 28, 2019

Here are two excerpts:

Do you strongly agree with the following statements?

• When I share my moral/political beliefs, I do so to show people who disagree with me that I am better than them.

• I share my moral/political beliefs to make people who disagree with me feel bad.

• When I share my moral/political beliefs, I do so in the hopes that people different than me will feel ashamed of their beliefs.

If so, then you may be a card-carrying moral grandstander. Of course it's wonderful to have a social cause that you believe in genuinely, and which you want to share with the world to make it a better place. But moral grandstanding comes from a different place.

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Nevertheless, since we are such a social species, the human need for social status is very pervasive, and often our attempts at sharing our moral and political beliefs on public social media platforms involve a mix of genuine motives with social status motives. As one team of psychologists put it, yes, you probably are "virtue signaling" (a closely related concept to moral grandstanding), but that doesn't mean that your outrage is necessarily inauthentic. It just means that we often have a subconscious desire to signal our virtue, which when not checked, can spiral out of control and cause us to denigrate or be mean to others in order to satisfy that desire. When the need for status predominates, we may even lose touch with what we truly believe, or even what is actually the truth.

The info is here.

Drivers are blamed more than their automated cars when both make mistakes

Edmond Awad and others
Nature Human Behaviour (2019)
Published: 28 October 2019


Abstract

When an automated car harms someone, who is blamed by those who hear about it? Here we asked human participants to consider hypothetical cases in which a pedestrian was killed by a car operated under shared control of a primary and a secondary driver and to indicate how blame should be allocated. We find that when only one driver makes an error, that driver is blamed more regardless of whether that driver is a machine or a human. However, when both drivers make errors in cases of human–machine shared-control vehicles, the blame attributed to the machine is reduced. This finding portends a public under-reaction to the malfunctioning artificial intelligence components of automated cars and therefore has a direct policy implication: allowing the de facto standards for shared-control vehicles to be established in courts by the jury system could fail to properly regulate the safety of those vehicles; instead, a top-down scheme (through federal laws) may be called for.

The research is here.

This Researcher Exploited Prisoners, Children, and the Elderly. Why Does Penn Honor Him?

Albert Kligman

Alexander Kafka
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Originally published Nov 8, 2019

Here is an excerpt:

What the university sites don’t mention is how Retin-A and Renova, an anti-wrinkle variation of the retinoic acid compound, were derived from substances first experimentally applied by Kligman’s research team to the skin of inmates at Holmesburg Prison, then a large facility in Philadelphia.

From the 1950s into the 1970s, the prison served as Kligman’s “Kmart of human experimentation,” in the words of Allen M. Hornblum, an author who exhaustively documented the Penn researcher’s projects at Holmesburg in his books Acres of Skin (1998) and Sentenced to Science: One Black Man’s Story of Imprisonment in America (2007).

Colleges are questioning the morality of accepting research funds from Jeffrey Epstein, who was accused of sexually molesting young girls, and the Sacklers, makers of OxyContin.

They are searching their souls over institutional ties to slavery and Jim Crow-era exploitation.

Hornblum and others have asked for decades whether Penn should be honoring Kligman, and Hornblum and Yusef Anthony, the former inmate whose story Hornblum tells in Sentenced to Science, will ask again in a lecture at Princeton next month. The current ethical climate amplifies their question.

The university’s president, Amy Gutmann, and a Penn colleague, the bioethicist Jonathan D. Moreno, recently published a book on bioethics and health care. “They are advising the world on all of these different issues,” Hornblum says, “but they don’t know what’s going on on their own campus? They don’t know it’s wrong?”

Penn says it “regrets the manner in which this research was conducted” and emphasizes the university’s commitment to research ethics. But it has given no indication that it plans to take any action regarding the lectureship or the university’s portrayal of Kligman.

Kligman, who died in 2010, defended his work by saying that experiments on prisoners were common at the time, and he was right. But, Hornblum says, the scale and duration of the Holmesburg experiments stood out even then.

The info is here.

The unbearable wrongness of William Barr: Secularism doesn't destroy society or moral order

Phil Zuckerman
salon.com
Originally posted November 9, 2019

Here is an excerpt:

When lots of people in a given society stop being religious of their own accord, such organic secularization does not result in the evaporation of morality in society, nor national decay. For instance, the most secular countries in the world today fare much better on nearly every measure of peace, prosperity, and societal well-being — including infant mortality, life expectancy, educational attainment, economic prosperity, freedom, levels of corruption, and so forth — than the most religious countries. In fact, those countries with the highest murder rates — such as Jamaica, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, and Brazil — are extremely religious, while those countries with the lowest murder rates — such as Iceland, Canada, Slovenia, Norway, and the Netherlands — are among the most secular nations in the world. Heck, Singapore and the Czech Republic are among the least religious nations on earth, while Brazil and the Philippines are among the most God-worshipping, yet the latter’s murder rates are over ten times higher than the former’s, and the crime rate of never-been-Christian, strongly secular Japan is 80 times lower than El Salvador’s, a Catholic nation neck-deep in worship of Barr’s “Supreme Transcendent Being.”

Similar correlations hold within our own country: on almost every measure of societal well-being — from poverty rates to STD rates to DUIs — the most secular states tend to fare the best, while the most religious tend to fare the worst. For example, among the states with the highest gun violence and murder rates, many are among the most religious — e.g., Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arkansas — while among those with the lowest gun violence and murder rates, many are among the least religious states, such as New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, New York, Washington, Massachusetts, and Minnesota.

Of course, such correlations don’t prove that secularism causes these more positive outcomes experienced by less religious societies. But they do knock the knees out of Barr’s thesis that secularism is a destructive force. For if secularism resulted in moral deterioration, then highly secular societies would be decaying bastions of crime and misery, while the strongly religious would be shining beacons of liberty and harmony. But we find just the opposite reality: the nations with the best overall quality of life are among the most secular countries in the world. And while numerous factors account for the differing degrees of societal well-being — factors that have nothing to do with religion or secularism — that’s exactly the point. Societies thrive or fail because of their social policies, laws, economic opportunities, civil institutions, and government regulations — not because of their faith in God, or lack thereof.

The info is here.

The Moral Injury of Pardoning War Crimes

The Editorial Board
The New York Times
Originally posted 22 Nov 19

Here is an excerpt:

That Mr. Trump would pardon men accused or convicted of war crimes should come as little surprise, given that he campaigned on promises to torture the nation’s enemies and kill their families. Mr. Trump in May became the first modern president to pardon a person convicted of war crimes, when he pardoned Michael Behenna, a former Army lieutenant, who had been convicted of killing a prisoner in Iraq.

The president may think he’s supporting men and women in uniform. “When our soldiers have to fight for our country, I want to give them the confidence to fight,” he said in a statement issued by the White House. “We train our boys to be killing machines, then prosecute them when they kill!” he said on Twitter last month.

Whatever the reason, absolving people who commit war crimes does great harm to society in general, and the men and women who served honorably — as far more than “killing machines” — in the wars since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in particular.

A nation has to know that military action being taken in its name follows morally defensible rules — that soldiers do not, for instance, kill unarmed civilians or prisoners.

To excuse men who have so flagrantly violated those rules — to treat them as heroes, even — is to cast the idea of just war to the winds. It puts the nation and veterans at risk of moral injury, the shattering of a moral compass.

One of the loudest groups pushing for Mr. Trump’s pardons was United American Patriots, a nonprofit organization that supports numerous soldiers accused of crimes, including Mr. Lorance, Mr. Behenna and Major Golsteyn. Last month, Chief Gallagher sued two of his former lawyers and United American Patriots, alleging that his lawyers tried to delay the case to increase fund-raising for the organization.

Supporters of the pardoned men say the military justice system comes down too hard and too often on honorable soldiers fighting through the fog of war. That wouldn’t explain why United American Patriots has made a cause célèbre of Robert Bales, who pleaded guilty to slaughtering 16 Afghan civilians in their homes during a one-man nighttime rampage in 2012.

The info is here.

Corruption Is Contagious: Dishonesty begets dishonesty, rapidly spreading unethical behavior through a society

Dan Ariely & Ximena Garcia-Rada
Scientific American
September 2019

Here is an excerpt:

This is because social norms—the patterns of behavior that are accepted as normal—impact how people will behave in many situations, including those involving ethical dilemmas. In 1991 psychologists Robert B. Cialdini, Carl A. Kallgren and Raymond R. Reno drew the important distinction between descriptive norms—the perception of what most people do—and injunctive norms—the perception of what most people approve or disapprove of. We argue that both types of norms influence bribery.

Simply put, knowing that others are paying bribes to obtain preferential treatment (a descriptive norm) makes people feel that it is more acceptable to pay a bribe themselves.

Similarly, thinking that others believe that paying a bribe is acceptable (an injunctive norm) will make people feel more comfortable when accepting a bribe request. Bribery becomes normative, affecting people's moral character.

In 2009 Ariely, with behavioral researchers Francesca Gino and Shahar Ayal, published a study showing how powerful social norms can be in shaping dishonest behavior. In two lab studies, they assessed the circumstances in which exposure to others' unethical behavior would change someone's ethical decision-making. Group membership turned out to have a significant effect: When individuals observed an in-group member behaving dishonestly (a student with a T-shirt suggesting he or she was from the same school cheating in a test), they, too, behaved dishonestly. In contrast, when the person behaving dishonestly was an out-group member (a student with a T-shirt from the rival school), observers acted more honestly.

But social norms also vary from culture to culture: What is acceptable in one culture might not be acceptable in another. For example, in some societies giving gifts to clients or public officials demonstrates respect for a business relationship, whereas in other cultures it is considered bribery. Similarly, gifts for individuals in business relationships can be regarded either as lubricants of business negotiations, in the words of behavioral economists Michel André Maréchal and Christian Thöni, or as questionable business practices. And these expectations and rules about what is accepted are learned and reinforced by observation of others in the same group. Thus, in countries where individuals regularly learn that others are paying bribes to obtain preferential treatment, they determine that paying bribes is socially acceptable. Over time the line between ethical and unethical behavior becomes blurry, and dishonesty becomes the “way of doing business.”

The info is here.

Engineers need a required course in ethics

Kush Saxena

qz.com
Originally posted November 8, 2019

Here is an except:

Typically, engineers are trained to be laser-focused on solving problems in the most effective and efficient way. And those solutions often have ripple effects in society, and create externalities that must be carefully considered.

Given the pace with which we can deploy technology at scale, the decisions of just a few people can have deep and far-reaching impact.

But in spite of the fact that they build potentially society-altering technologies—such as artificial intelligence—engineers often have no training or exposure to ethics. Many don’t even consider it part of their remit.

But it is. In a world where a few lines of code can impact whether a woman lands a job in tech, or how a criminal is sentenced in court, everyone who touches technology must be qualified to make ethical decisions, however insignificant they may seem at the time.

Engineers need to understand that their work may be used in ways that they never intended and consider the broader impact it can have on the world.

How can tech leaders not only create strong ethical frameworks, but also ensure their employees act with “decency” and abide by the ideals and values they’ve set out? And how can leaders in business, government, and education better equip the tech workforce to consider the broader ethical implications of what they build?

The info is here.

Nurses Wrestling With the Moral Uncertainties of MAiD

Barbara Pesut and Sally Thorne
Impact Ethics
Originally posted October 23, 2019

Have you tried to imagine what it is like to be the healthcare provider who provides medical assistance in dying (MAiD)? What would it feel like to go into a strange home, to greet a patient and family, to start an intravenous line, to deliver the medications that rapidly cause death, and then to bring some sort of closure before leaving? Although there has been a great deal of attention paid to the regulation of MAiD, and its accessibility to the Canadian population, we have heard relatively little about the moral experiences of the healthcare providers at the forefront of providing this service. That is surprising in light of the fact that all but 6 of the 6,749 MAiD deaths in Canada that occurred between December 10, 2015 and October 31, 2018 were administered by physicians or nurse practitioners.

In a recent study we interviewed 59 nurses from across Canada, who had diverse experiences with participating in, or choosing not to participate in, the MAiD process. Canada is the first country to allow nurse practitioners to act as both MAiD assessors and providers. Canadian registered nurses also play a key role in providing care to patients and families considering, planning for, or receiving MAiD. We learned a lot about the experiences of being involved in MAiD and about the type of wrestling with moral uncertainty that the involvement can entail. Nurses worked hard to make sense of this radical new end-of-life option. Making sense required some soul searching, some important conversations, and in some cases, encounters with the procedure itself.

Encounters with MAiD were inevitably deeply impactful. Some participants described an emotional overload that was unanticipated and didn’t necessarily fade over time. Others described a deep sense of compassion and purpose—a sense of beauty. Still others described an accumulating sense of distress, a rising tide that they didn’t necessarily know how to deal with. This was particularly true for those nurses who worked alone on multiple cases because they were the sole person willing to provide MAiD. Even those who had experienced MAiD only as observers described an emotional climate within the care environment that was far-reaching.

The info is here.