Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Self-perception. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Self-perception. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 5, 2024

You could lie to a health chatbot – but it might change how you perceive yourself

Dominic Wilkinson
The Conversation
Originally posted 8 FEB 24

Here is an excerpt:

The ethics of lying

There are different ways that we can think about the ethics of lying.

Lying can be bad because it causes harm to other people. Lies can be deeply hurtful to another person. They can cause someone to act on false information, or to be falsely reassured.

Sometimes, lies can harm because they undermine someone else’s trust in people more generally. But those reasons will often not apply to the chatbot.

Lies can wrong another person, even if they do not cause harm. If we willingly deceive another person, we potentially fail to respect their rational agency, or use them as a means to an end. But it is not clear that we can deceive or wrong a chatbot, since they don’t have a mind or ability to reason.

Lying can be bad for us because it undermines our credibility. Communication with other people is important. But when we knowingly make false utterances, we diminish the value, in other people’s eyes, of our testimony.

For the person who repeatedly expresses falsehoods, everything that they say then falls into question. This is part of the reason we care about lying and our social image. But unless our interactions with the chatbot are recorded and communicated (for example, to humans), our chatbot lies aren’t going to have that effect.

Lying is also bad for us because it can lead to others being untruthful to us in turn. (Why should people be honest with us if we won’t be honest with them?)

But again, that is unlikely to be a consequence of lying to a chatbot. On the contrary, this type of effect could be partly an incentive to lie to a chatbot, since people may be conscious of the reported tendency of ChatGPT and similar agents to confabulate.


Here is my summary:

The article discusses the potential consequences of lying to a health chatbot, even though it might seem tempting. It highlights a situation where someone frustrated with a wait for surgery considers exaggerating their symptoms to a chatbot screening them.

While lying might offer short-term benefits like quicker attention, the author argues it could have unintended consequences:

Impact on healthcare:
  • Inaccurate information can hinder proper diagnosis and treatment.
  • It contributes to an already strained healthcare system.
Self-perception:
  • Repeatedly lying, even to a machine, can erode honesty and integrity.
  • It reinforces unhealthy avoidance of seeking professional help.
The article encourages readers to be truthful with chatbots for better healthcare outcomes and self-awareness. It acknowledges the frustration with healthcare systems but emphasizes the importance of transparency for both individual and collective well-being.

Sunday, March 13, 2022

Do Obligations Follow the Mind or Body?

Protzko, J., Tobia, K., Strohminger, N.,
& Schooler, J.  (2022, February 7). 
Retrieved from psyarxiv.com/m5a6g

Abstract

Do you persist as the same person over time because you keep the same mind or because you keep the same body? Philosophers have long investigated this question of personal identity with thought experiments. Cognitive scientists have joined this tradition by assessing lay intuitions about those cases. Much of this work has focused on judgments of identity continuity. But identity also has practical significance: obligations are tagged to one’s identity over time. Understanding how someone persists as the same person over time could provide insight into how and why moral and legal obligations persist. In this paper, we investigate judgments of obligations in hypothetical cases where a person’s mind and body diverge (e.g., brain transplant cases). We find a striking pattern of results: In assigning obligations in these identity test cases, people are divided among three groups: “body-followers”, “mind-followers”, and “splitters”—people who say that the obligation is split between the mind and the body. Across studies, responses are predicted by a variety of factors, including mind/body dualism, essentialism, education, and professional training. When we give this task to professional lawyers, accountants, and bankers, we find they are more inclined to rely on bodily continuity in tracking obligations. These findings reveal not only the heterogeneity of intuitions about identity, but how these intuitions relate to the legal standing of an individual’s obligations.

From the General Discussion

Whether one is a mind-follower, body-follower, or splitter was predicted by several psychological traits, suggesting that participants’ decisions were not arbitrary. Furthermore, the use of comprehension checks did not moderate the results, so the variety of assigning obligations were not due to participants not understanding the scenarios. We found physical essentialism and mind/body dualism predict body-following; while the best educated participants are more likely mind-followers and the least educated are more likely splitters. The professional experts were more likely to be body-followers.

Essentialism predicted the belief that obligations track the body. This may seem mysterious, until we consider that much of essentialism has to do with tracking a physical (if invisible) properties. Here is a sample item from the Beliefs in Essentialism Scale: Trying on a sweater that Hitler wore, even if it was washed thoroughly beforehand, would make me very uncomfortable (Horne & Cimpian, 2019). If someone believes that essences are physically real in this way, it makes sense that they would also believe that obligations and identity go with the body. 

Consideration of specific items in the Mind/body Dualism Scale (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) similarly offer insight into its relationship with the continuity of obligation in this study. Items like Human action can only be understood in terms of our souls and minds and not just in terms of our brains, indicate that for mind/body dualists, a person is not reducible to their brain. Accordingly, for mind/body dualists, though the brain may change, something else remains in the body that maintains both identity and obligations.

Tuesday, November 23, 2021

The Moral Identity Picture Scale (MIPS): Measuring the Full Scope of Moral Identity

Amelia Goranson, Connor O’Fallon, & Kurt Gray
Research Paper, in press

Abstract

Morality is core to people’s identity. Existing moral identity scales measure good/moral vs. bad/immoral, but the Theory of Dyadic Morality highlights two-dimensions of morality: valence (good/moral vs. bad/immoral) and agency (high/agent vs. low/recipient). The Moral Identity Picture Scale (MIPS) measures this full space through 16 vivid pictures. Participants receive scores for each of four moral roles: hero, villain, victim, and beneficiary. The MIPS can also provide summary scores for good, evil, agent, and patient, and possesses test-retest reliability and convergent/divergent validity. Self-identified heroes are more empathic and higher in locus of control, villains are less agreeable and higher in narcissism, victims are higher in depression and lower in self-efficacy, and beneficiaries are lower in Machiavellianism. Although people generally see themselves as heroes, comparisons across known-groups reveals relative differences: Duke MBA students self-identify more as villains, UNC social work students self identify more as heroes, and workplace bullying victims self-identify more as victims. Data also reveals that the beneficiary role is ill-defined, collapsing the two-dimensional space of moral identity into a triangle anchored by hero, villain, and victim.

From the Discussion

We hope that, in providing this new measure of moral identity, future work can examine a broader sense of the moral world—beyond simple identifications of good vs. evil—using our expanded measure that captures not only valence but also role as a moral agent or patient. This measure expands upon previous measures related to moral identity (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Barriga et al., 2001; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004), replicating prior work that we divide the moral world up into good and evil, but demonstrating that the moral identification space includes another component as well: moral agency and moral patiency. Most past work has examined this “agent” side of moral identity—heroes and villains—but we can gain a fuller and more nuanced view of the moral world if we also examine their counterparts—moral patients/recipients. The MIPS provides us with the ability to examine moral identity across these 2 dimensions of valence (positive vs. negative) and agency (agent vs. patient). 

Saturday, May 29, 2021

Comparisons Inform Me Who I Am: A General Comparative-Processing Model of Self-Perception

Morina N.
Perspectives on Psychological Science. 
February 2021. 
doi:10.1177/1745691620966788
 
Abstract

People’s self-concept contributes to their sense of identity over time. Yet self-perception is motivated and serves survival and thus does not reflect stable inner states or accurate biographical accounts. Research indicates that different types of comparison standards act as reference frames in evaluating attributes that constitute the self. However, the role of comparisons in self-perception has been underestimated, arguably because of lack of a guiding framework that takes into account relevant aspects of comparison processes and their interdependence. I propose a general comparative model of self-perception that consists of a basic comparison process involving the individual’s prior mental representation of the target dimension, the construal of the comparison standard, and the comparison outcome representing the posterior representation of the target dimension. The generated dimensional construal is then appraised with respect to one’s motives and controllability and goes on to shape emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Contextual and personal factors influence the comparison process. This model may be informative in better understanding comparison processes in people’s everyday lives and their role in shaping self-perception and in designing interventions to assist people overcome undesirable consequences of comparative behavior.

Concluding Remarks

Comparisons inform people about their current selves and their progress toward end goals. Comparative evaluations are omnipresent in everyday life, appear both unintentionally and intentionally, and are context sensitive. The current framework defines comparison as a dynamic process consisting of several subcomponents. The segmentation of the subcomponent processes into activation of comparison, basic comparison process, valuation, as well as emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses is not rigid; however, the taxonomy should prove conceptually useful because it breaks down the comparison process into testable constituent subprocesses. A better understanding of comparative behavior processes will enhance the knowledge of self-perception and help identify effective strategies that promote more adaptive comparisons.

Tuesday, December 22, 2020

Examining the asymmetry in judgments of racism in self and others

Angela C. Bell, Melissa Burkley, & 
Jarrod Bock (2019)
The Journal of Social Psychology, 159:5, 611-627.
DOI: 10.1080/00224545.2018.1538930

Abstract

Across three experiments, participants were provided with a list of racist behaviors that purportedly were enacted from a fellow student but in fact were based on the participants’ own behaviors. People consistently evaluated themselves as less racist than this comparison other, even though this other’s racist behaviors were identical to their own. Studies 2a and 2b demonstrate this effect is quite robust and even occurs under social pressure and social consensus conditions in which participants were free to express their racial biases. Thus, it appears that people are less likely to base their racist trait ratings on behavioral evidence when evaluating themselves compared to when they are evaluating another. Taken together, this work provides evidence for the consistency and robustness of self-enhanced social comparisons as applied to the trait domain of racism. Further, this work sheds insight into why people deny they are racist when they act racist.

General discussion

The present work provides evidence for the consistency and robustness of the biased self-enhanced evaluations of racism. Across three experiments, participants received a list of racist behaviors that purportedly were enacted from a fellow student but in fact were based on the participants’ own behaviors. People consistently evaluated themselves as less racist than this comparison other, even though this other’s racist behaviors were identical to their own. Studies2a and 2b demonstrate this effect is quite robust and even occurs under conditions in which participants feel free to express their racial biases. Taken together, this work suggests that people are less likely to base their racist trait ratings on behavioral evidence when evaluating themselves compared to when they are evaluating another. By doing so, people are able to maintain the self-perception that they are not racist even in the face of contradictory behavioral evidence (i.e., people are less racist than themselves).

(I emphasized this last sentence.)

Tuesday, September 19, 2017

The strategic moral self: Self-presentation shapes moral dilemma judgments

Sarah C. Roma and Paul Conway
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Volume 74, January 2018, Pages 24–37

Abstract

Research has focused on the cognitive and affective processes underpinning dilemma judgments where causing harm maximizes outcomes. Yet, recent work indicates that lay perceivers infer the processes behind others' judgments, raising two new questions: whether decision-makers accurately anticipate the inferences perceivers draw from their judgments (i.e., meta-insight), and, whether decision-makers strategically modify judgments to present themselves favorably. Across seven studies, a) people correctly anticipated how their dilemma judgments would influence perceivers' ratings of their warmth and competence, though self-ratings differed (Studies 1–3), b) people strategically shifted public (but not private) dilemma judgments to present themselves as warm or competent depending on which traits the situation favored (Studies 4–6), and, c) self-presentation strategies augmented perceptions of the weaker trait implied by their judgment (Study 7). These results suggest that moral dilemma judgments arise out of more than just basic cognitive and affective processes; complex social considerations causally contribute to dilemma decision-making.

The article is here.

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

Talking in Euphemisms Can Chip Away at Your Sense of Morality

Laura Niemi, Alek Chakroff, and Liane Young
The Science of Us
Originally published April 7, 2017

Here is an excerpt:

Taken together, the results suggest that unethical behavior becomes easier when we perceive our own actions in indirect terms, which makes things that we would otherwise balk at seem a bit more palatable. In other words, deploying indirect speech doesn’t just help us evade blame from others — it also helps us to convince ourselves that unethical acts aren’t so bad after all.

That’s not to say that this is a conscious process. A speaker who shrouds his harmful intentions in indirect speech may understand that this will help him hold on to his standing in the public eye, or maintain his reputation among those closest to him — a useful tactic when those intentions are likely to be condemned or fall outside the bounds of socially acceptable behavior. But that same speaker may be unaware of just how much their indirect speech is easing their own psyche, too.

The article is here.

Tuesday, December 13, 2016

Of Tooth and Claw: Predator Self-Identifications Mediate Gender Differences in Interpersonal Arrogance

Robinson, M.D., Bair, J.L., Liu, T. et al. Sex Roles (2016).
Sex Roles, pp 1-15.
doi:10.1007/s11199-016-0706-y

Abstract

Men often score higher than women do on traits or tendencies marked by hostile dominance. The purpose of the present research was to contribute to an understanding of these gender differences. Four studies (total N = 494 U.S. undergraduates) administered a modified animal preference test in which participants could choose to be predator or prey animals, but not labeled as such. Men were consistently more interested in being predator animals than women were, displaying a sort of hostile dominance in their projective preferences. Predator self-identifications, in turn, mediated gender differences in outcomes related to hostile dominance. Studies 1 and 2 provided initial evidence for this model in the context of variations in interpersonal arrogance, and Studies 3 and 4 extended the model to nonverbal displays and daily life prosociality, respectively. The findings indicate that gender differences in hostile dominance are paralleled by gender differences in preferring to think about the self in predator-like terms. Accordingly, the findings provide new insights into aggressive forms of masculine behavior.

Friday, March 28, 2014

Human brains 'hard-wired' to link what we see with what we do

University of London
Originally posted March 13, 2014

Summary

Your brain's ability to instantly link what you see with what you do is down to a dedicated information 'highway,' suggests new research. For the first time, researchers have found evidence of a specialized mechanism for spatial self-awareness that combines visual cues with body motion. The newly-discovered system could explain why some schizophrenia patients feel like their actions are controlled by someone else.

The entire story is here.

Saturday, April 21, 2012

Turning Good Intentions into Good Behavior: Self-perception, Self-care, and Social Influences

Samuel Knapp, EdD, ABPP
Director of Professional Affairs

John D. Gavazzi, PsyD, ABPP
Chair, PPA Ethics Committee

Originally published in The Pennsylvania Psychologist


            Most of us want to fulfill our ethical mandate to help our clients as best as we can. However, non-rational factors, such as faulty thinking habits, situational pressures, or fatigue can overpower our good intentions and lead to less-than-optimal ethical behaviors. We are not just referring to flagrant misconduct that would leave us vulnerable to a licensing board complaint or lawsuit. Instead, this less-than-optimal behavior is more subtle, such as delivering acceptable (but not top quality) professional services.
Traditional approaches to improve ethical conduct and clinical skills involve attending didactic lectures. As helpful as these lectures may be, behavioral change is more likely to occur when we take a more active role in exploring how important variables such as self-perception, self-care, and social factors influence clinical performance (Tjeltveit & Gottlieb, 2010). Reducing our blind spots, increasing our self-knowledge, and enhancing our awareness of work pressures and organizational cultures are worthwhile processes to explore in order to investigate our basic ethical obligations (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011).
Professional narcissism,” or an “overestimation of one’s abilities” (Younggren, 2007, p. 515) represents one such blind spot. For example, Davis et al. (2006) asked physicians to perform a standardized patient procedure, and then estimate their competence at that procedure. Most physicians rated themselves higher than justified, including a few who performed incompetently but nonetheless rated themselves very high. While a modest amount of overconfidence may be harmless (or perhaps even healthy), we need to guard against the tendency to see ourselves as much better than we really are. We can avoid professional narcissism through activities that promote self-reflection, such as keeping a journal geared toward clinical experiences and contemplating ethical nuances of practice. We can also establish routines to ensure regular feedback about our behavior, such as asking patients questions at the end of sessions. We can ask how the session went or how we could have been more helpful. Some psychologists have adopted a productive philosophy of admitting mistakes, apologizing for them (when appropriate), learning from them, and then moving on (show self-compassion). “People can learn to see mistakes not as terrible personal failings to be denied or justified, but as inevitable aspects of life that help us grow” (Tavris & Aronson, 2007, p. 235).
Medical residents who are fatigued make more errors as their fatigue increases (Harvard Work Group, 2004). Similarly, we are less able to focus on our professional obligations and we can become more prone to errors when we are fatigued. Highly competent psychologists engage in positive self-care activities, such as regular exercise, good sleep hygiene, healthy eating, and other activities that promote health and wellness. Part of self-care means accepting our limitations in terms of time, energy, and resources. Healthy psychologists acknowledge that they cannot help everyone and cannot master every facet in the psychology domain.
Some practices, agencies, or organizations may not value ethical behavior, even though they may have an ethics policy, an ethics code, mandatory ethics education, or other formal structures designed to promote ethics. However, the “hidden culture” of the organization often has more influence then formal guidelines when framing ethical dilemmas and determining ethical behavior. “Formal systems are the weakest link in an organization’s ethical infrastructure” (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011, p. 118). That is, the interactions and comments that occur among members of the organization create the day-to-day ethical tone of an organization. The informal ethical culture of an organization courses through the stories that employees tell, the euphemisms that they use to describe issues, or the socialization rituals that employees undergo. In many cases, the cultural influences on practitioners remain unseen, especially to those who remain frame-dependent.
 Here are some strategies, activities, or routines that some psychologists have used to reduce the gap between good intentions and good behavior.

Self-Directed Activities to Enhance Ethical Practice

Encourage self-reflection (to reduce or to avoid professional narcissism)

Keep a journal or a diary to focus on therapy and possible ethical issues in daily practice, engage in therapy, try to be more open-minded, listen to feelings.
Routinely ask patients for feedback at the end of each session (what did I do that was helpful today? Not helpful?). Routinely gather outcome data. Re-read therapy notes to become aware of any unproductive emotions or countertransference.
Think in terms of ethical issues when facing clinical problems.
            Have a productive philosophy concerning mistakes: Admit them, apologize (if helpful), learn from them, and move on (show self-compassion).
                       
Attend to environmental influences

Encourage friends or colleagues to tell me when they think I am doing something wrong.
Develop schedules – although not too rigidly—and think about time management.
Attend to environmental circumstances that might influence me to engage in less than optimal ethical behavior.
Be aware of temptations to minimize the worth or individuality of clients or other people (e.g., interpret troublesome behaviors as barriers, not manifestations of evil).

Establish Healthy Routines

Make checklists or schedule healthy activities.
Make learning a habit. Attend CE programs (especially programs on ethics), read journals, get advanced training or certification in an area of psychology.
Keep the APA Ethics Code or the Pennsylvania licensing law and regulations close by.
Get in the habit of using an ethical decision-making model.
Belong to and participate in a professional association  (or present at a CE program, join a listserv, start a blog, or participate in student groups, committees).
Uphold ideals without being sanctimonious.
                                   
Prevent problems ahead of time

Practice self-care: e.g., pay attention to exercise, sleep hygiene, and diet.
Maintain a good work-life balance.
Reduce dysfunctional emotions through meditation, mindfulness exercises, therapy, or recreational activities unrelated to school or work.
Manage time and tasks carefully (breaking big tasks into smaller ones).
Accept my limitations in terms of time, energy, and resources. (I can’t help
            everyone; I can’t do everything). Balance compassion and altruism with my own needs.[1]
Show concern for others, including your fellow psychologists (help them out if
            I can); commit random acts of kindness; express appreciation (say “thank you”).

References
Bazerman, M., & Tenbrunsel, A. (2011). Blind spots. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Davis, D., Mazmanian, P. E., Fordis, M., Van Harrison, R., Thorpe, K. E., & Perrier, L. (2006). Accuracy of physician self-assessment compared with observed measures of competence: A systematic review. Journal of the American Medical Association, 296, 1137-1139.
Harvard Work Hours Health and Safety Group. (2004). New England Journal of Medicine, 351, 1838-1848.
Ross, W. D. (1998). What makes right act right? In J. Rachaels (Ed.). Ethical theory (pp. 265-285). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1930).
Tavris, C., & Aronson, E. (2007). Mistakes were made. Orlando, FL: Harcourt.
Tjeltveit, A., & Gottlieb, M. (2010). Avoiding the road to ethical disaster: Overcoming vulnerabilities and developing resilience. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 47, 98-110.
Younggren, J. (2007). Competence as a process of self-appraisal. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 38, 515-516.


[1] W.D. Ross (1998) says that supererogatory obligations should not distract us from our primary obligations to family, close friends, and ourselves.