Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Normative Ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Normative Ethics. Show all posts

Saturday, April 18, 2020

Experimental Philosophical Bioethics

Brain Earp, and others
AJOB Empirical Bioethics (2020), 11:1, 30-33
DOI: 10.1080/23294515.2020.1714792

There is a rich tradition in bioethics of gathering empirical data to inform, supplement, or test the implications of normative ethical analysis. To this end, bioethicists have drawn on diverse methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion surveys to advance understanding of key issues in bioethics. In so doing, they have developed strong ties with neighboring disciplines such as anthropology, history, law, and sociology.  Collectively, these lines of research have flourished in the broader field of “empirical bioethics” for more than 30 years (Sugarman and Sulmasy 2010).

More recently, philosophers from outside the field of bioethics have similarly employed empirical
methods—drawn primarily from psychology, the cognitive sciences, economics, and related disciplines—to advance theoretical debates. This approach, which has come to be called experimental philosophy (or x-phi), relies primarily on controlled experiments to interrogate the concepts, intuitions, reasoning, implicit mental processes, and empirical assumptions about the mind that play a role in traditional philosophical arguments (Knobe et al. 2012). Within the moral domain, for example, experimental philosophy has begun to contribute to long-standing debates about the nature of moral judgment and reasoning; the sources of our moral emotions and biases; the qualities of a good person or a good life; and the psychological basis of moral theory itself (Alfano, Loeb, and Plakias 2018). We believe that experimental philosophical bioethics—or “bioxphi”—can similarly contribute to bioethical scholarship and debate.1 Here, we introduce this emerging discipline, explain how it is distinct from empirical bioethics more broadly construed, and attempt to characterize how it might advance theory and practice in this area.

The paper is here.

Thursday, November 29, 2018

Does AI Ethics Need to be More Inclusive?

Patrick Lin
Forbes.com
Originally posted October 29, 2018

Here is an excerpt:

Ethics is more than a survey of opinions

First, as the study’s authors allude to in their Nature paper and elsewhere, public attitudes don’t dictate what’s ethical or not.  People believe all kinds of crazy things—such as that slavery should be permitted—but that doesn’t mean those ethical beliefs are true or have any weight.  So, capturing responses of more people doesn’t necessarily help figure out what’s ethical or not.  Sometimes, more is just more, not better or even helpful.

This is the difference between descriptive ethics and normative ethics.  The former is more like sociology that simply seeks to describe what people believe, while the latter is more like philosophy that seeks reasons for why a belief may be justified (or not) and how things ought to be.

Dr. Edmond Awad, lead author of the Nature paper, cautioned, “What we are trying to show here is descriptive ethics: peoples’ preferences in ethical decisions.  But when it comes to normative ethics, which is how things should be done, that should be left to experts.”

Nonetheless, public attitudes are a necessary ingredient in practical policymaking, which should aim at the ethical but doesn’t always hit that mark.  If expert judgments in ethics diverge too much from public attitudes—asking more from a population than what they’re willing to agree to—that’s a problem for implementing the policy, and a resolution is needed.

The info is here.

Tuesday, October 16, 2018

Let's Talk About AI Ethics; We're On A Deadline

Tom Vander Ark
Forbes.com
Originally posted September 13, 2018

Here is an excerpt:

Creating Values-Aligned AI

“The project of creating value-aligned AI is perhaps one of the most important things we will ever do,” said the Future of Life Institute. It’s not just about useful intelligence but “the ends to which intelligence is aimed and the social/political context, rules, and policies in and through which this all happens.”

The Institute created a visual map of interdisciplinary issues to be addressed:

  • Validation: ensuring that the right system specification is provided for the core of the agent given stakeholders' goals for the system.
  • Security: applying cyber security paradigms and techniques to AI-specific challenges.
  • Control: structural methods for operators to maintain control over advanced agents.
  • Foundations: foundational mathematical or philosophical problems that have bearing on multiple facets of safety
  • Verification: techniques that help prove a system was implemented correctly given a formal specification
  • Ethics: effort to understand what we ought to do and what counts as moral or good.
  • Governance: the norms and values held by society, which are structured through various formal and informal processes of decision-making to ensure accountability, stability, broad participation, and the rule of law.

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

Does Bioethics Tell Us What to Do?

by J.S. Blumenthal-Barby, Ph.D.
bioethics.net
Originally posted February 15, 2016

Applied ethicists—including bioethicists—are in the business of making normative claims. Unlike, say, claims in meta-ethics, these are meant to guide action. Yet, when one examines the literature and discourse in applied ethics, there are three common barriers to these claims being action-guiding. First, they often lack precision and accuracy when examined under the lens of deontic logic. Second, even when accurately articulated in deontic language, they often fall into the category of claims about “permissibility,” a category that yields low utility with respect to action guidance. Third, they are often spectrum based rather than binary normative claims, which also yield low utility with respect to action guidance.

The blog post is here.

Friday, August 29, 2014

Artificial Wombs Are Coming, but the Controversy Is Already Here

By Zoltan Istvan
MotherBoard
Originally posted August 4, 2014

Of all the transhumanist technologies coming in the near future, one stands out that both fascinates and perplexes people. It's called ectogenesis: raising a fetus outside the human body in an artificial womb.

It has the possibility to change one of the most fundamental acts that most humans experience: the way people go about having children. It also has the possibility to change the way we view the female body and the field of reproductive rights.

Naturally, it's a social and political minefield.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Process Debunking and Ethics

By Shaun Nichols
Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 4 (July 2014), pp. 727-749
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Article DOI: 10.1086/675877

The rise of empirical moral psychology has been accompanied by the return of debunking arguments in ethics. This is no surprise since debunking arguments often depend on empirical premises about the beliefs under consideration. As we learn more about our moral psychology, we put ourselves in a position to develop more empirically informed debunking arguments.

In this essay, I will start by distinguishing different forms of debunking arguments, and I will adopt a particular, psychologically oriented, approach to debunking. On the type of debunking argument that I will promote, one attempts to undercut the justificatory status of a person’s belief by showing that the belief was formed by an epistemically defective psychological process. There are natural ways to develop such debunking arguments in metaethics, I’ll contend; but in normative ethics, debunking arguments face greater obstacles.

The entire article is here, behind a paywall.  Hopefully, your university library can get this for you.

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Normative & Descriptive Ethics

By JW Gray
Ethical Realism
Originally posted May 5, 2014

I believe that one source of confusion can be solved by the distinction between normative and descriptive ethics. Whenever people talk about cultural relativism or evolutionary theories of ethics, I think they have descriptive ethics in mind, but they often jump to the conclusion that whatever they are talking about has certain obvious normative implications. In particular, some people claim that morality comes from evolution and others claim that morality is relative. What they have in mind often doesn’t actually make sense, as I will discuss in detail.

The short, yet interesting article is here.

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Social media can cause problems for lawyers when it comes to ethics, professional responsibility

Bodies are trying to come up with guidelines for the legal profession when it comes to the use of social media

By Ed Silverstein
Inside Counsel
Originally published April 29, 2014

It is becoming increasingly confusing what lawyers, judges and courthouse employees can post on social media sites. For instance, can a judge “friend” someone who is an attorney on Facebook and then have the attorney appear before them in court?

Attorneys who post on sites like Facebook also have to worry about violating attorney-client confidentiality, disciplinary action, losing jobs, or engaging in the unauthorized or inadvertent practice of law, according to an article in the Touro Law Review. In addition, attorneys could “face sanctions for revealing misconduct or disparaging judges on social media sites,” the article adds.

The entire article is here.