The Possibility of an Ongoing Moral Catastrophe

Williams, E.G. (2015).

Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 

971–982 (2015). 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9567-7

Abstract

This article gives two arguments for believing that our society is unknowingly guilty of serious, large-scale wrongdoing. First is an inductive argument: most other societies, in history and in the world today, have been unknowingly guilty of serious wrongdoing, so ours probably is too. Second is a disjunctive argument: there are a large number of distinct ways in which our practices could turn out to be horribly wrong, so even if no particular hypothesized moral mistake strikes us as very likely, the disjunction of all such mistakes should receive significant credence. The article then discusses what our society should do in light of the likelihood that we are doing something seriously wrong: we should regard intellectual progress, of the sort that will allow us to find and correct our moral mistakes as soon as possible, as an urgent moral priority rather than as a mere luxury; and we should also consider it important to save resources and cultivate flexibility, so that when the time comes to change our policies we will be able to do so quickly and smoothly.

A pdf is here.

On the role of descriptive norms and subjectivism in moral judgment

Andrew E. Monroe, Kyle D. Dillon, Steve Guglielmo, Roy F. Baumeister
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Volume 77, July 2018, Pages 1-10.

Abstract

How do people evaluate moral actions, by referencing objective rules or by appealing to subjective, descriptive norms of behavior? Five studies examined whether and how people incorporate subjective, descriptive norms of behavior into their moral evaluations and mental state inferences of an agent's actions. We used experimental norm manipulations (Studies 1–2, 4), cultural differences in tipping norms (Study 3), and behavioral economic games (Study 5). Across studies, people increased the magnitude of their moral judgments when an agent exceeded a descriptive norm and decreased the magnitude when an agent fell below a norm (Studies 1–4). Moreover, this differentiation was partially explained via perceptions of agents' desires (Studies 1–2); it emerged only when the agent was aware of the norm (Study 4); and it generalized to explain decisions of trust for real monetary stakes (Study 5). Together, these findings indicate that moral actions are evaluated in relation to what most other people do rather than solely in relation to morally objective rules.

Highlights

• Five studies tested the impact of descriptive norms on judgments of blame and praise.

• What is usual, not just what is objectively permissible, drives moral judgments.

• Effects replicate even when holding behavior constant and varying descriptive norms.

• Agents had to be aware of a norm for it to impact perceivers' moral judgments.

• Effects generalize to explain decisions of trust for real monetary stakes.

The research is here.