Downloading COVID-19 contact tracing apps is a moral obligation

G. Owen Schaefer and Angela Ballantyne
BMJ Blogs
Originally posted 4 May 20

Should you download an app that could notify you if you had been in contact with someone who contracted COVID-19? Such apps are already available in countries such as Israel, Singapore, and Australia, with other countries like the UK and US soon to follow. Here, we explain why you might have an ethical obligation to use a tracing app during the COVID-19 pandemic, even in the face of privacy concerns.

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Vulnerability and unequal distribution of risk

Marginalized populations are both hardest hit by pandemics and often have the greatest reason to be sceptical of supposedly benign State surveillance. COVID-19 is a jarring reminder of global inequality, structural racism, gender inequity, entrenched ableism, and many other social divisions. During the SARS outbreak, Toronto struggled to adequately respond to the distinctive vulnerabilities of people who were homeless. In America, people of colour are at greatest risk in several dimensions – less able to act on public health advice such as social distancing, more likely to contract the virus, and more likely to die from severe COVID if they do get infected. When public health advice switched to recommending (or in some cases requiring) masks, some African Americans argued it was unsafe for them to cover their faces in public. People of colour in the US are at increased risk of state surveillance and police violence, in part because they are perceived to be threatening and violent. In New York City, black and Latino patients are dying from COVID-19 at twice the rate of non-Hispanic white people.

Marginalized populations have historically been harmed by State health surveillance. For example, indigenous populations have been the victims of State data collection to inform and implement segregation, dispossession of land, forced migration, as well as removal and ‘re‐education’ of their children. Stigma and discrimination have impeded the public health response to HIV/AIDS, as many countries still have HIV-specific laws that prosecute people living with HIV for a range of offences.  Surveillance is an important tool for implementing these laws. Marginalized populations therefore have good reasons to be sceptical of health related surveillance.

When Google and Apple get privacy right, is there still something wrong?

Tamar Sharon
Medium.com
Originally posted 15 April 20

Here is an excerpt:

As the understanding that we are in this for the long run settles in, the world is increasingly turning its attention to technological solutions to address the devastating COVID-19 virus. Contact-tracing apps in particular seem to hold much promise. Using Bluetooth technology to communicate between users’ smartphones, these apps could map contacts between infected individuals and alert people who have been in proximity to an infected person. Some countries, including China, Singapore, South Korea and Israel, have deployed these early on. Health authorities in the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland, the US and other countries, are currently considering implementing such apps as a means of easing lock-down measures.

There are some bottlenecks. Do they work? The effectiveness of these applications has not been evaluated — in isolation or as part of an integrated strategy. How many people would need to use them? Not everyone has a smartphone. Even in rich countries, the most vulnerable group, aged over 80, is least likely to have one. Then there’s the question about fundamental rights and liberties, first and foremost privacy and data protection. Will contact-tracing become part of a permanent surveillance structure in the prolonged “state of exception” we are sleep-walking into?

Prompted by public discussions about this last concern, a number of European governments have indicated the need to develop such apps in a way that would be privacy preserving, while independent efforts involving technologists and scientists to deliver privacy-centric solutions have been cropping up. The Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Tracing Initiative (PEPP-IT), and in particular the Decentralised Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) protocol, which provides an outline for a decentralised system, are notable forerunners. Somewhat late in the game, the European Commission last week issued a Recommendation for a pan-European approach to the adoption of contact-tracing apps that would respect fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection.

The info is here.