Zakharin, M., & Bates, T. C. (2025).
Intelligence, 111, 101930.
Abstract
Existing research on the relationship between cognitive ability and moral foundations has yielded contradictory results. While some studies suggest that higher cognitive ability is associated with more enlightened moral intuitions, others indicate it may weaken moral foundations. To address this ambiguity, we conducted two studies (total N = 1320) using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2) with UK residents. Both Study 1 and Study 2 (preregistered) revealed negative links between cognitive ability and moral foundations. In Study 1, structural models showed negative links between general intelligence (g) and both binding (−0.24) and individualizing (−0.19) foundations. These findings replicated closely in Study 2, with similar coefficients (−0.25 and − 0.18, respectively). Higher verbal ability was specifically associated with lower purity scores. These findings suggest a negative association between cognitive ability and moral foundations, challenging existing theories relating to intelligence and moral intuitions. However, causal direction remains uncertain.
Highlights
• Tested association of intelligence and moral foundations.
• Higher ability linked to lower individualizing and binding.
• Lower Proportionality, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity.
• Lower Equality and Care.
• Verbal ability linked specifically to impurity.
• Replicated in pre-registered large study.
Here are some thoughts:
This research is significant for psychologists as it clarifies the complex relationship between intelligence and moral reasoning. The study found that higher general cognitive ability (g) is negatively associated with all six moral foundations—care, equality, proportionality, loyalty, authority, and purity—suggesting that greater analytical thinking may suppress intuitive moral responses rather than enhance them. This supports what the authors call the Morality Suppression Model , which proposes that higher cognitive ability weakens emotional-moral intuitions rather than reinforcing them. Importantly, the study replicates its findings in two large, independent samples using robust and validated tools like the Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2) and the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR), making the results highly credible.
The findings challenge common assumptions that higher intelligence leads to stronger or more "enlightened" moral values. Instead, they show that higher intelligence correlates with a general weakening of moral intuitions across both liberal (individualizing) and conservative (binding) domains. For instance, verbal reasoning was specifically linked to lower endorsement of the purity foundation, suggesting that linguistic sophistication may lead individuals to question traditional norms related to bodily sanctity or self-restraint. These insights contribute to dual-process theories of cognition by showing that reflective thinking can override intuitive moral judgments.
Moreover, the research has implications for understanding ideological differences, as it counters the tendency to view those with opposing moral views as less intelligent. It also informs educational and policy-related efforts aimed at ethical reasoning, particularly in professions requiring high-level decision-making. By demonstrating that the relationship between cognitive ability and moral foundations is consistent across genders and replicated in preregistered studies, this work offers a solid empirical basis for future exploration into how cognitive processes shape moral values.