Hull, K., Warren, C., & Smith, K. (2024).
Political Psychology, 45(6), 1013–1029.
Abstract
Moral judgment is politically situational—people are more forgiving of transgressive copartisans and more likely to behave punitively and unethically toward political opponents. Such differences are widely observed, but not fully explained. If moral values are nonnegotiable first-principle beliefs about right and wrong, why do similar transgressions elicit different moral judgment in the personal and political realm? We argue this pattern arises from the same forces intuitionist frameworks of moral psychology use to explain the origins of morality: the adaptive need to suppress individual behavior to ensure ingroup success. We hypothesize ingroups serve as moral boundaries, that the relative tight constraints morality exerts over ingroup relations loosen in competitive group environments because doing so also serves ingroup interests. We find support for this hypothesis in four independent samples and also find that group antipathy—internalized dislike of the outgroup—pushes personal and political moral boundaries farther apart.
Here are some thoughts:
This research explores why moral judgments differ between personal and political contexts. The authors argue that moral flexibility in politics arises from the adaptive function of morality: to promote ingroup success. Ingroup loyalty loosens moral constraints when group competition is present. The study also reveals that disliking the opposing political group increases this effect.
This study offers psychologists a deeper understanding of moral flexibility and political behavior. It explains how group dynamics and intergroup conflict influence moral judgment, highlighting the situational nature of morality. It also links moral psychology with political science by examining how political affiliations and antipathies shape moral judgments.