FeldmanHall O, Otto AR, Phelps EA.
J Exp Psychol Gen. 2018 Jun 7. doi: 10.1037/xge0000405.
Abstract
There is little consensus about how moral values are learned. Using a novel social learning task, we examine whether vicarious learning impacts moral values-specifically fairness preferences-during decisions to restore justice. In both laboratory and Internet-based experimental settings, we employ a dyadic justice game where participants receive unfair splits of money from another player and respond resoundingly to the fairness violations by exhibiting robust nonpunitive, compensatory behavior (baseline behavior). In a subsequent learning phase, participants are tasked with responding to fairness violations on behalf of another participant (a receiver) and are given explicit trial-by-trial feedback about the receiver's fairness preferences (e.g., whether they prefer punishment as a means of restoring justice). This allows participants to update their decisions in accordance with the receiver's feedback (learning behavior). In a final test phase, participants again directly experience fairness violations. After learning about a receiver who prefers highly punitive measures, participants significantly enhance their own endorsement of punishment during the test phase compared with baseline. Computational learning models illustrate the acquisition of these moral values is governed by a reinforcement mechanism, revealing it takes as little as being exposed to the preferences of a single individual to shift one's own desire for punishment when responding to fairness violations. Together this suggests that even in the absence of explicit social pressure, fairness preferences are highly labile.
The research is here.
Thursday, July 12, 2018
Wednesday, July 11, 2018
The Lifespan of a Lie
Ben Blum
Medium.com
Originally posted June 7, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
Somehow, neither Prescott’s letter nor the failed replication nor the numerous academic critiques have so far lessened the grip of Zimbardo’s tale on the public imagination. The appeal of the Stanford prison experiment seems to go deeper than its scientific validity, perhaps because it tells us a story about ourselves that we desperately want to believe: that we, as individuals, cannot really be held accountable for the sometimes reprehensible things we do. As troubling as it might seem to accept Zimbardo’s fallen vision of human nature, it is also profoundly liberating. It means we’re off the hook. Our actions are determined by circumstance. Our fallibility is situational. Just as the Gospel promised to absolve us of our sins if we would only believe, the SPE offered a form of redemption tailor-made for a scientific era, and we embraced it.
For psychology professors, the Stanford prison experiment is a reliable crowd-pleaser, typically presented with lots of vividly disturbing video footage. In introductory psychology lecture halls, often filled with students from other majors, the counterintuitive assertion that students’ own belief in their inherent goodness is flatly wrong offers dramatic proof of psychology’s ability to teach them new and surprising things about themselves. Some intro psych professors I spoke to felt that it helped instill the understanding that those who do bad things are not necessarily bad people. Others pointed to the importance of teaching students in our unusually individualistic culture that their actions are profoundly influenced by external factors.
(cut)
But if Zimbardo’s work was so profoundly unscientific, how can we trust the stories it claims to tell? Many other studies, such as Soloman Asch’s famous experiment demonstrating that people will ignore the evidence of their own eyes in conforming to group judgments about line lengths, illustrate the profound effect our environments can have on us. The far more methodologically sound — but still controversial — Milgram experiment demonstrates how prone we are to obedience in certain settings. What is unique, and uniquely compelling, about Zimbardo’s narrative of the Stanford prison experiment is its suggestion that all it takes to make us enthusiastic sadists is a jumpsuit, a billy club, and the green light to dominate our fellow human beings.
The article is here.
Medium.com
Originally posted June 7, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
Somehow, neither Prescott’s letter nor the failed replication nor the numerous academic critiques have so far lessened the grip of Zimbardo’s tale on the public imagination. The appeal of the Stanford prison experiment seems to go deeper than its scientific validity, perhaps because it tells us a story about ourselves that we desperately want to believe: that we, as individuals, cannot really be held accountable for the sometimes reprehensible things we do. As troubling as it might seem to accept Zimbardo’s fallen vision of human nature, it is also profoundly liberating. It means we’re off the hook. Our actions are determined by circumstance. Our fallibility is situational. Just as the Gospel promised to absolve us of our sins if we would only believe, the SPE offered a form of redemption tailor-made for a scientific era, and we embraced it.
For psychology professors, the Stanford prison experiment is a reliable crowd-pleaser, typically presented with lots of vividly disturbing video footage. In introductory psychology lecture halls, often filled with students from other majors, the counterintuitive assertion that students’ own belief in their inherent goodness is flatly wrong offers dramatic proof of psychology’s ability to teach them new and surprising things about themselves. Some intro psych professors I spoke to felt that it helped instill the understanding that those who do bad things are not necessarily bad people. Others pointed to the importance of teaching students in our unusually individualistic culture that their actions are profoundly influenced by external factors.
(cut)
But if Zimbardo’s work was so profoundly unscientific, how can we trust the stories it claims to tell? Many other studies, such as Soloman Asch’s famous experiment demonstrating that people will ignore the evidence of their own eyes in conforming to group judgments about line lengths, illustrate the profound effect our environments can have on us. The far more methodologically sound — but still controversial — Milgram experiment demonstrates how prone we are to obedience in certain settings. What is unique, and uniquely compelling, about Zimbardo’s narrative of the Stanford prison experiment is its suggestion that all it takes to make us enthusiastic sadists is a jumpsuit, a billy club, and the green light to dominate our fellow human beings.
The article is here.
Could Moral Enhancement Interventions be Medically Indicated?
Sarah Carter
Health Care Analysis
December 2017, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp 338–353
Abstract
This paper explores the position that moral enhancement interventions could be medically indicated (and so considered therapeutic) in cases where they provide a remedy for a lack of empathy, when such a deficit is considered pathological. In order to argue this claim, the question as to whether a deficit of empathy could be considered to be pathological is examined, taking into account the difficulty of defining illness and disorder generally, and especially in the case of mental health. Following this, Psychopathy and a fictionalised mental disorder (Moral Deficiency Disorder) are explored with a view to consider moral enhancement techniques as possible treatments for both conditions. At this juncture, having asserted and defended the position that moral enhancement interventions could, under certain circumstances, be considered medically indicated, this paper then goes on to briefly explore some of the consequences of this assertion. First, it is acknowledged that this broadening of diagnostic criteria in light of new interventions could fall foul of claims of medicalisation. It is then briefly noted that considering moral enhancement technologies to be akin to therapies in certain circumstances could lead to ethical and legal consequences and questions, such as those regarding regulation, access, and even consent.
The paper is here.
Health Care Analysis
December 2017, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp 338–353
Abstract
This paper explores the position that moral enhancement interventions could be medically indicated (and so considered therapeutic) in cases where they provide a remedy for a lack of empathy, when such a deficit is considered pathological. In order to argue this claim, the question as to whether a deficit of empathy could be considered to be pathological is examined, taking into account the difficulty of defining illness and disorder generally, and especially in the case of mental health. Following this, Psychopathy and a fictionalised mental disorder (Moral Deficiency Disorder) are explored with a view to consider moral enhancement techniques as possible treatments for both conditions. At this juncture, having asserted and defended the position that moral enhancement interventions could, under certain circumstances, be considered medically indicated, this paper then goes on to briefly explore some of the consequences of this assertion. First, it is acknowledged that this broadening of diagnostic criteria in light of new interventions could fall foul of claims of medicalisation. It is then briefly noted that considering moral enhancement technologies to be akin to therapies in certain circumstances could lead to ethical and legal consequences and questions, such as those regarding regulation, access, and even consent.
The paper is here.
Tuesday, July 10, 2018
The Artificial Intelligence Ethics Committee
Zara Stone
Forbes.com
Originally published June 11, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
Back to the ethics problem: Some sort of bias is sadly inevitable in programming. “We humans all have a bias,” said computer scientist Ehsan Hoque, who leads the Human-Computer Interaction Lab at Rochester University. “There’s a study where judges make more favorable decisions after a lunch break. Machines have an inherent bias (as they are built by humans) so we need to empower users in ways to make decisions.”
For instance, Walworth's way of empowering his choices is by being conscious about what AI algorithms show him. “I recommend you do things that are counterintuitive,” he said. “For instance, read a spectrum of news, everything from Fox to CNN and The New York Times to combat the algorithm that decides what you see.” Use the Cambridge Analytica election scandal as an example here. Algorithms dictated what you’d see, how you’d see it and if more of the same got shown to you, and were manipulated by Cambridge Analytica to sway voters.
The move to a consciousness of ethical AI is both a top-down and bottoms up approach. “There’s a rising field of impact investing,” explained Walworth. “Investors and shareholders are demanding something higher than the bottom line, some accountability with the way they spend and invest money.”
The article is here.
Forbes.comOriginally published June 11, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
Back to the ethics problem: Some sort of bias is sadly inevitable in programming. “We humans all have a bias,” said computer scientist Ehsan Hoque, who leads the Human-Computer Interaction Lab at Rochester University. “There’s a study where judges make more favorable decisions after a lunch break. Machines have an inherent bias (as they are built by humans) so we need to empower users in ways to make decisions.”
For instance, Walworth's way of empowering his choices is by being conscious about what AI algorithms show him. “I recommend you do things that are counterintuitive,” he said. “For instance, read a spectrum of news, everything from Fox to CNN and The New York Times to combat the algorithm that decides what you see.” Use the Cambridge Analytica election scandal as an example here. Algorithms dictated what you’d see, how you’d see it and if more of the same got shown to you, and were manipulated by Cambridge Analytica to sway voters.
The move to a consciousness of ethical AI is both a top-down and bottoms up approach. “There’s a rising field of impact investing,” explained Walworth. “Investors and shareholders are demanding something higher than the bottom line, some accountability with the way they spend and invest money.”
The article is here.
Google to disclose ethical framework on use of AI
Richard Walters
The Financial Times
Originally published June 3, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
However, Google already uses AI in other ways that have drawn criticism, leading experts in the field and consumer activists to call on it to set far more stringent ethical guidelines that go well beyond not working with the military.
Stuart Russell, a professor of AI at the University of California, Berkeley, pointed to the company’s image search feature as an example of a widely used service that perpetuates preconceptions about the world based on the data in Google’s search index. For instance, a search for “CEOs” returns almost all white faces, he said.
“Google has a particular responsibility in this area because the output of its algorithms is so pervasive in the online world,” he said. “They have to think about the output of their algorithms as a kind of ‘speech act’ that has an effect on the world, and to work out how to make that effect beneficial.”
The information is here.
The Financial TimesOriginally published June 3, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
However, Google already uses AI in other ways that have drawn criticism, leading experts in the field and consumer activists to call on it to set far more stringent ethical guidelines that go well beyond not working with the military.
Stuart Russell, a professor of AI at the University of California, Berkeley, pointed to the company’s image search feature as an example of a widely used service that perpetuates preconceptions about the world based on the data in Google’s search index. For instance, a search for “CEOs” returns almost all white faces, he said.
“Google has a particular responsibility in this area because the output of its algorithms is so pervasive in the online world,” he said. “They have to think about the output of their algorithms as a kind of ‘speech act’ that has an effect on the world, and to work out how to make that effect beneficial.”
The information is here.
Monday, July 9, 2018
Technology and culture: Differences between the APA and ACA ethical codes
Firmin, M.W., DeWitt, K., Shell, A.L. et al.
Curr Psychol (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-018-9874-y
Abstract
We conducted a section-by-section and line-by-line comparison of the ethical codes published by the American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Counseling Association (ACA). Overall, 144 differences exist between the two codes and, here we focus on two constructs where 36 significant differences exist: technology and culture. Of this number, three differences were direct conflicts between the APA and ACA ethical codes’ expectations for technology and cultural behavior. The other 33 differences were omissions in the APA code, meaning that specific elements in the ACA code were explicitly absent from the APA code altogether. Of the 36 total differences pertaining to technology and culture in the two codes, 27 differences relate to technology and APA does not address 25 of these 27 technology differences. Of the 36 total differences pertaining to technology and culture, nine differences relate to culture and APA does not address eight of these issues.
The information is here.
Curr Psychol (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-018-9874-y
Abstract
We conducted a section-by-section and line-by-line comparison of the ethical codes published by the American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Counseling Association (ACA). Overall, 144 differences exist between the two codes and, here we focus on two constructs where 36 significant differences exist: technology and culture. Of this number, three differences were direct conflicts between the APA and ACA ethical codes’ expectations for technology and cultural behavior. The other 33 differences were omissions in the APA code, meaning that specific elements in the ACA code were explicitly absent from the APA code altogether. Of the 36 total differences pertaining to technology and culture in the two codes, 27 differences relate to technology and APA does not address 25 of these 27 technology differences. Of the 36 total differences pertaining to technology and culture, nine differences relate to culture and APA does not address eight of these issues.
The information is here.
Learning from moral failure
Matthew Cashman & Fiery Cushman
In press: Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change
Introduction
Pedagogical environments are often designed to minimize the chance of people acting wrongly; surely this is a sensible approach. But could it ever be useful to design pedagogical environments to permit, or even encourage, moral failure? If so, what are the circumstances where moral failure can be beneficial? What types of moral failure are helpful for learning, and by what mechanisms? We consider the possibility that moral failure can be an especially effective tool in fostering learning. We also consider the obvious costs and potential risks of allowing or fostering moral failure. We conclude by suggesting research directions that would help to establish whether, when and how moral pedagogy might be facilitated by letting students learn from moral failure.
(cut)
Conclusion
Errors are an important source of learning, and educators often exploit this fact. Failing helps to tune our sense of balance; Newtonian mechanics sticks better when we witness the failure of our folk physics. We consider the possibility that moral failure may also prompt especially strong or distinctive forms of learning. First, and with greatest certainty, humans are designed to learn from moral failure through the feeling of guilt. Second, and more speculatively, humans may be designed to experience moral failures by “testing limits” in a way that ultimately fosters an adaptive moral character. Third—and highly speculatively—there may be ways to harness learning by moral failure in pedagogical contexts. Minimally, this might occur by imagination, observational learning, or the exploitation of spontaneous wrongful acts as “teachable moments”.
The book chapter is here.
In press: Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change
Introduction
Pedagogical environments are often designed to minimize the chance of people acting wrongly; surely this is a sensible approach. But could it ever be useful to design pedagogical environments to permit, or even encourage, moral failure? If so, what are the circumstances where moral failure can be beneficial? What types of moral failure are helpful for learning, and by what mechanisms? We consider the possibility that moral failure can be an especially effective tool in fostering learning. We also consider the obvious costs and potential risks of allowing or fostering moral failure. We conclude by suggesting research directions that would help to establish whether, when and how moral pedagogy might be facilitated by letting students learn from moral failure.
(cut)
Conclusion
Errors are an important source of learning, and educators often exploit this fact. Failing helps to tune our sense of balance; Newtonian mechanics sticks better when we witness the failure of our folk physics. We consider the possibility that moral failure may also prompt especially strong or distinctive forms of learning. First, and with greatest certainty, humans are designed to learn from moral failure through the feeling of guilt. Second, and more speculatively, humans may be designed to experience moral failures by “testing limits” in a way that ultimately fosters an adaptive moral character. Third—and highly speculatively—there may be ways to harness learning by moral failure in pedagogical contexts. Minimally, this might occur by imagination, observational learning, or the exploitation of spontaneous wrongful acts as “teachable moments”.
The book chapter is here.
Sunday, July 8, 2018
A Son’s Race to Give His Dying Father Artificial Immortality
James Vlahos
wired.com
Originally posted July 18, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
I dream of creating a Dadbot—a chatbot that emulates not a children’s toy but the very real man who is my father. And I have already begun gathering the raw material: those 91,970 words that are destined for my bookshelf.
The thought feels impossible to ignore, even as it grows beyond what is plausible or even advisable. Right around this time I come across an article online, which, if I were more superstitious, would strike me as a coded message from forces unseen. The article is about a curious project conducted by two researchers at Google. The researchers feed 26 million lines of movie dialog into a neural network and then build a chatbot that can draw from that corpus of human speech using probabilistic machine logic. The researchers then test the bot with a bunch of big philosophical questions.
“What is the purpose of living?” they ask one day.
The chatbot’s answer hits me as if it were a personal challenge.
“To live forever,” it says.
The article is here.
Yes, I saw the Black Mirror episode using a similar theme.
wired.com
Originally posted July 18, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
I dream of creating a Dadbot—a chatbot that emulates not a children’s toy but the very real man who is my father. And I have already begun gathering the raw material: those 91,970 words that are destined for my bookshelf.
The thought feels impossible to ignore, even as it grows beyond what is plausible or even advisable. Right around this time I come across an article online, which, if I were more superstitious, would strike me as a coded message from forces unseen. The article is about a curious project conducted by two researchers at Google. The researchers feed 26 million lines of movie dialog into a neural network and then build a chatbot that can draw from that corpus of human speech using probabilistic machine logic. The researchers then test the bot with a bunch of big philosophical questions.
“What is the purpose of living?” they ask one day.
The chatbot’s answer hits me as if it were a personal challenge.
“To live forever,” it says.
The article is here.
Yes, I saw the Black Mirror episode using a similar theme.
Saturday, July 7, 2018
Making better decisions in groups
Dan Bang, Chris D. Frith
Published 16 August 2017.
DOI: 10.1098/rsos.170193
Abstract
We review the literature to identify common problems of decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that the world could be in and all the possible actions that one could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness, that enter into these psychological processes. While biases increase the efficiency of information processing, they often do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to make better group decisions.
The article is here.
Published 16 August 2017.
DOI: 10.1098/rsos.170193
Abstract
We review the literature to identify common problems of decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that the world could be in and all the possible actions that one could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness, that enter into these psychological processes. While biases increase the efficiency of information processing, they often do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to make better group decisions.
The article is here.
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