Mareike Bacha-Trams, Enrico Glerean, Robin Dunbar, Juha M. Lahnakoski, and others
Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 14244
Abstract
Previous behavioural studies have shown that humans act more altruistically towards kin. Whether and how knowledge of genetic relatedness translates into differential neurocognitive evaluation of observed social interactions has remained an open question. Here, we investigated how the human brain is engaged when viewing a moral dilemma between genetic vs. non-genetic sisters. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, a movie was shown, depicting refusal of organ donation between two sisters, with subjects guided to believe the sisters were related either genetically or by adoption. Although 90% of the subjects self-reported that genetic relationship was not relevant, their brain activity told a different story. Comparing correlations of brain activity across all subject pairs between the two viewing conditions, we found significantly stronger inter-subject correlations in insula, cingulate, medial and lateral prefrontal, superior temporal, and superior parietal cortices, when the subjects believed that the sisters were genetically related. Cognitive functions previously associated with these areas include moral and emotional conflict regulation, decision making, and mentalizing, suggesting more similar engagement of such functions when observing refusal of altruism from a genetic sister. Our results show that mere knowledge of a genetic relationship between interacting persons robustly modulates social cognition of the perceiver.
The article is here.
Saturday, November 18, 2017
Friday, November 17, 2017
Going with your gut may mean harsher moral judgments
Jeff Sossamon
www.futurity.org
Originally posted November 2, 2017
Going with your intuition could make you judge others’ moral transgressions more harshly and keep you from changing your mind, even after considering all the facts, a new study suggests.
The findings show that people who strongly rely on intuition automatically condemn actions they perceive to be morally wrong, even if there is no actual harm.
In psychology, intuition, or “gut instinct,” is defined as the ability to understand something immediately, without the need for reasoning.
“It is now widely acknowledged that intuitive processing influences moral judgment,” says Sarah Ward, a doctoral candidate in social and personality psychology at the University of Missouri.
“We thought people who were more likely to trust their intuition would be more likely to condemn things that are shocking, whereas people who don’t rely on gut feelings would not condemn these same actions as strongly,” Ward says.
Ward and Laura King, professor of psychological sciences, had study participants read through a series of scenarios and judge whether the action was wrong, such as an individual giving a gift to a partner that had previously been purchased for an ex.
The article is here.
www.futurity.org
Originally posted November 2, 2017
Going with your intuition could make you judge others’ moral transgressions more harshly and keep you from changing your mind, even after considering all the facts, a new study suggests.
The findings show that people who strongly rely on intuition automatically condemn actions they perceive to be morally wrong, even if there is no actual harm.
In psychology, intuition, or “gut instinct,” is defined as the ability to understand something immediately, without the need for reasoning.
“It is now widely acknowledged that intuitive processing influences moral judgment,” says Sarah Ward, a doctoral candidate in social and personality psychology at the University of Missouri.
“We thought people who were more likely to trust their intuition would be more likely to condemn things that are shocking, whereas people who don’t rely on gut feelings would not condemn these same actions as strongly,” Ward says.
Ward and Laura King, professor of psychological sciences, had study participants read through a series of scenarios and judge whether the action was wrong, such as an individual giving a gift to a partner that had previously been purchased for an ex.
The article is here.
The Illusion of Moral Superiority
Ben M. Tappin and Ryan T. McKay
Social Psychological and Personality Science
Volume: 8 issue: 6, page(s): 623-631
Abstract
Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the average person as distinctly less so. This invites accusations of irrationality in moral judgment and perception—but direct evidence of irrationality is absent. Here, we quantify this irrationality and compare it against the irrationality in other domains of positive self-evaluation. Participants (N = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of “positive illusion,” but the underlying function remains unknown.
The article is here.
Social Psychological and Personality Science
Volume: 8 issue: 6, page(s): 623-631
Issue published: August 1, 2017
Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the average person as distinctly less so. This invites accusations of irrationality in moral judgment and perception—but direct evidence of irrationality is absent. Here, we quantify this irrationality and compare it against the irrationality in other domains of positive self-evaluation. Participants (N = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of “positive illusion,” but the underlying function remains unknown.
The article is here.
Thursday, November 16, 2017
Is There a Right Way to Nudge? The Practice and Ethics of Choice Architecture
Evan Selinger and Kyle Whyte
Sociology Compass, Vol. 5, No. 10, pp. 923-935
Abstract
What exactly is a nudge, and how do nudges differ from alternative ways of modifying people's behavior, such as fines or penalties (e.g. taxing smokers) and increasing access to information (e.g. calorie counts on restaurant menus)? We open Section 2 by defining the concept of a nudge and move on to present some examples of nudges. Though there is certainly a clear concept of what a nudge is, there is some confusion when people design and talk about nudges in practice. In Sections 3 and 4, then, we discuss policies and technologies that get called nudges mistakenly as well as borderline cases where it is unclear whether people are being nudged. Understanding mistaken nudges and borderline cases allows citizens to consider critically whether they should support “alleged” nudge policies proposed by governments, corporations, and non-profit organizations. There are also important concerns about the ethics of nudging people's behavior. In Section 5 we review some major ethical and political issues surrounding nudges, covering both public anxieties and more formal scholarly criticisms. If nudges are to be justified as an acceptable form of behavior modification in democratic societies, nudge advocates must have reasons that allay anxieties and ethical concerns. However, in Section 6, we argue that nudge advocates must confront a particularly challenging problem. A strong justification of nudging, especially for pluralistic democracies, must show that nudge designers really understand how different people re-interpret the meaning of situations after a nudge has been introduced into the situations. We call this the problem of “semantic variance.” This problem, along with the ethical issues we discussed, makes us question whether nudges are truly viable mechanisms for improving people's lives and societies. Perhaps excitement over their potential of nudges is exaggerated.
The article is here.
Sociology Compass, Vol. 5, No. 10, pp. 923-935
Abstract
What exactly is a nudge, and how do nudges differ from alternative ways of modifying people's behavior, such as fines or penalties (e.g. taxing smokers) and increasing access to information (e.g. calorie counts on restaurant menus)? We open Section 2 by defining the concept of a nudge and move on to present some examples of nudges. Though there is certainly a clear concept of what a nudge is, there is some confusion when people design and talk about nudges in practice. In Sections 3 and 4, then, we discuss policies and technologies that get called nudges mistakenly as well as borderline cases where it is unclear whether people are being nudged. Understanding mistaken nudges and borderline cases allows citizens to consider critically whether they should support “alleged” nudge policies proposed by governments, corporations, and non-profit organizations. There are also important concerns about the ethics of nudging people's behavior. In Section 5 we review some major ethical and political issues surrounding nudges, covering both public anxieties and more formal scholarly criticisms. If nudges are to be justified as an acceptable form of behavior modification in democratic societies, nudge advocates must have reasons that allay anxieties and ethical concerns. However, in Section 6, we argue that nudge advocates must confront a particularly challenging problem. A strong justification of nudging, especially for pluralistic democracies, must show that nudge designers really understand how different people re-interpret the meaning of situations after a nudge has been introduced into the situations. We call this the problem of “semantic variance.” This problem, along with the ethical issues we discussed, makes us question whether nudges are truly viable mechanisms for improving people's lives and societies. Perhaps excitement over their potential of nudges is exaggerated.
The article is here.
Moral Hard-Wiring and Moral Enhancement
Introduction
In a series of papers (Persson & Savulescu 2008; 2010; 2011a; 2012a; 2013; 2014a) and book (Persson & Savulescu 2012b), we have argued that there is an urgent need to pursue research into the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means – e.g. by pharmaceuticals, non-invasive brain stimulation, genetic modification or other means directly modifying biology. The present time brings existential threats which human moral psychology, with its cognitive and moral limitations and biases, is unfit to address. Exponentially increasing, widely accessible technological advance and rapid globalisation create threats of intentional misuse (e.g. biological or nuclear terrorism) and global collective action problems, such as the economic inequality between developed and developing countries and anthropogenic climate change, which human psychology is not set up to address. We have hypothesized that these limitations are the result of the evolutionary function of morality being to maximize the fitness of small cooperative groups competing for resources. Because these limitations of human moral psychology pose significant obstacles to coping with the current moral mega-problems, we argued that biomedical modification of human moral psychology may be necessary. We have not argued that biomedical moral enhancement would be a single “magic
bullet” but rather that it could play a role in a comprehensive approach which also features cultural and social measures.
The paper is here.
In a series of papers (Persson & Savulescu 2008; 2010; 2011a; 2012a; 2013; 2014a) and book (Persson & Savulescu 2012b), we have argued that there is an urgent need to pursue research into the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means – e.g. by pharmaceuticals, non-invasive brain stimulation, genetic modification or other means directly modifying biology. The present time brings existential threats which human moral psychology, with its cognitive and moral limitations and biases, is unfit to address. Exponentially increasing, widely accessible technological advance and rapid globalisation create threats of intentional misuse (e.g. biological or nuclear terrorism) and global collective action problems, such as the economic inequality between developed and developing countries and anthropogenic climate change, which human psychology is not set up to address. We have hypothesized that these limitations are the result of the evolutionary function of morality being to maximize the fitness of small cooperative groups competing for resources. Because these limitations of human moral psychology pose significant obstacles to coping with the current moral mega-problems, we argued that biomedical modification of human moral psychology may be necessary. We have not argued that biomedical moral enhancement would be a single “magic
bullet” but rather that it could play a role in a comprehensive approach which also features cultural and social measures.
The paper is here.
Wednesday, November 15, 2017
The U.S. Is Retreating from Religion
Allen Downey
Scientific American
Originally published on October 20, 2017
Scientific American
Originally published on October 20, 2017
Since 1990, the fraction of Americans with no religious affiliation has nearly tripled, from about 8 percent to 22 percent. Over the next 20 years, this trend will accelerate: by 2020, there will be more of these "Nones" than Catholics, and by 2035, they will outnumber Protestants.
The following figure shows changes since 1972 and these predictions, based on data from the General Social Survey (GSS):
Catholic Hospital Group Grants Euthanasia to Mentally Ill, Defying Vatican
Francis X. Rocca
The Wall Street Journal
Originally posted October 27, 2017
A chain of Catholic psychiatric hospitals in Belgium is granting euthanasia to non-terminal patients, defying the Vatican and deepening a challenge to the church’s commitment to a constant moral code.
The board of the Brothers of Charity, Belgium’s largest single provider of psychiatric care, said the decision no longer belongs to Rome.
Truly Christian values, the board argued in September, should privilege a “person’s choice of conscience” over a “strict ethic of rules.”
The policy change is highly symbolic, said Didier Pollefeyt, a theologian and vice rector of the Catholic University of Leuven.
“The Brothers of Charity have been seen as a beacon of hope and resistance” to euthanasia, he said. “Now that the most Catholic institution gives up resistance, it looks like the most normal thing in the world.”
Belgium legalized euthanasia in 2002, the first country with a majority Catholic population to do so. Belgian bishops opposed the legislation, in line with the church’s catechism, which states that causing the death of the handicapped, sick or dying to eliminate their suffering is murder.
The article is here.
The Wall Street Journal
Originally posted October 27, 2017
A chain of Catholic psychiatric hospitals in Belgium is granting euthanasia to non-terminal patients, defying the Vatican and deepening a challenge to the church’s commitment to a constant moral code.
The board of the Brothers of Charity, Belgium’s largest single provider of psychiatric care, said the decision no longer belongs to Rome.
Truly Christian values, the board argued in September, should privilege a “person’s choice of conscience” over a “strict ethic of rules.”
The policy change is highly symbolic, said Didier Pollefeyt, a theologian and vice rector of the Catholic University of Leuven.
“The Brothers of Charity have been seen as a beacon of hope and resistance” to euthanasia, he said. “Now that the most Catholic institution gives up resistance, it looks like the most normal thing in the world.”
Belgium legalized euthanasia in 2002, the first country with a majority Catholic population to do so. Belgian bishops opposed the legislation, in line with the church’s catechism, which states that causing the death of the handicapped, sick or dying to eliminate their suffering is murder.
The article is here.
Tuesday, November 14, 2017
What is consciousness, and could machines have it?
Stanislas Dehaene, Hakwan Lau, & Sid Kouider
Science 27 Oct 2017: Vol. 358, Issue 6362, pp. 486-492
Abstract
The controversial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that undoubtedly possesses it: the human brain. We suggest that the word “consciousness” conflates two different types of information-processing computations in the brain: the selection of information for global broadcasting, thus making it flexibly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitoring of those computations, leading to a subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense). We argue that despite their recent successes, current machines are still mostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain. We review the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they may inspire novel machine architectures.
The article is here.
Science 27 Oct 2017: Vol. 358, Issue 6362, pp. 486-492
Abstract
The controversial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that undoubtedly possesses it: the human brain. We suggest that the word “consciousness” conflates two different types of information-processing computations in the brain: the selection of information for global broadcasting, thus making it flexibly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitoring of those computations, leading to a subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense). We argue that despite their recent successes, current machines are still mostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain. We review the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they may inspire novel machine architectures.
The article is here.
Facial recognition may reveal things we’d rather not tell the world. Are we ready?
Amitha Kalaichandran
The Boston Globe
Originally published October 27, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
Could someone use a smartphone snapshot, for example, to diagnose another person’s child at the playground? The Face2Gene app is currently limited to clinicians; while anyone can download it from the App Store on an iPhone, it can only be used after the user’s healthcare credentials are verified. “If the technology is widespread,” says Lin, “do I see people taking photos of others for diagnosis? That would be unusual, but people take photos of others all the time, so maybe it’s possible. I would obviously worry about the invasion of privacy and misuse if that happened.”
Humans are pre-wired to discriminate against others based on physical characteristics, and programmers could easily manipulate AI programming to mimic human bias. That’s what concerns Anjan Chatterjee, a neuroscientist who specializes in neuroesthetics, the study of what our brains find pleasing. He has found that, relying on baked-in prejudices, we often quickly infer character just from seeing a person’s face. In a paper slated for publication in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, Chatterjee reports that a person’s appearance — and our interpretation of that appearance — can have broad ramifications in professional and personal settings. This conclusion has serious implications for artificial intelligence.
“We need to distinguish between classification and evaluation,” he says. “Classification would be, for instance, using it for identification purposes like fingerprint recognition. . . which was once a privacy concern but seems to have largely faded away. Using the technology for evaluation would include discerning someone’s sexual orientation or for medical diagnostics.” The latter raises serious ethical questions, he says. One day, for example, health insurance companies could use this information to adjust premiums based on a predisposition to a condition.
The article is here.
The Boston Globe
Originally published October 27, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
Could someone use a smartphone snapshot, for example, to diagnose another person’s child at the playground? The Face2Gene app is currently limited to clinicians; while anyone can download it from the App Store on an iPhone, it can only be used after the user’s healthcare credentials are verified. “If the technology is widespread,” says Lin, “do I see people taking photos of others for diagnosis? That would be unusual, but people take photos of others all the time, so maybe it’s possible. I would obviously worry about the invasion of privacy and misuse if that happened.”
Humans are pre-wired to discriminate against others based on physical characteristics, and programmers could easily manipulate AI programming to mimic human bias. That’s what concerns Anjan Chatterjee, a neuroscientist who specializes in neuroesthetics, the study of what our brains find pleasing. He has found that, relying on baked-in prejudices, we often quickly infer character just from seeing a person’s face. In a paper slated for publication in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, Chatterjee reports that a person’s appearance — and our interpretation of that appearance — can have broad ramifications in professional and personal settings. This conclusion has serious implications for artificial intelligence.
“We need to distinguish between classification and evaluation,” he says. “Classification would be, for instance, using it for identification purposes like fingerprint recognition. . . which was once a privacy concern but seems to have largely faded away. Using the technology for evaluation would include discerning someone’s sexual orientation or for medical diagnostics.” The latter raises serious ethical questions, he says. One day, for example, health insurance companies could use this information to adjust premiums based on a predisposition to a condition.
The article is here.
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