Olivia Goldhill
Quartz
Originally published July 9, 2017
Empathy, in general, has an excellent reputation. But it leads us to make terrible decisions, according to Paul Bloom, psychology professor at Yale and author of Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion. In fact, he argues, we would be far more moral if we had no empathy at all.
Though it sounds counterintuitive, Bloom makes a convincing case. First, he makes a point of defining empathy as putting yourself in the shoes of other people—“feeling their pain, seeing the world through their eyes.” When we rely on empathy to make moral decisions, he says, we end up prioritizing the person whose suffering we can easily relate to over that of any number of others who seem more distant. Indeed, studies have shown that empathy does encourage irrational moral decisions that favor one individual over the masses.
“When we rely on empathy, we think that a little girl stuck down a well is more important than all of climate change, is more important than tens of thousands of people dying in a far away country,” says Bloom. “Empathy zooms us in on the attractive, on the young, on people of the same race. It zooms us in on the one rather than the many. And so it distorts our priorities.”
The article is here.
Saturday, August 5, 2017
Friday, August 4, 2017
Moral distress in physicians and nurses: Impact on professional quality of life and turnover
Austin, Cindy L.; Saylor, Robert; Finley, Phillip J.
Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, Vol 9(4), Jul 2017, 399-406.
Abstract
Objective: The purpose of this study was to investigate moral distress (MD) and turnover intent as related to professional quality of life in physicians and nurses at a tertiary care hospital.
Method: Health care providers from a variety of hospital departments anonymously completed 2 validated questionnaires (Moral Distress Scale–Revised and Professional Quality of Life Scale). Compassion fatigue (as measured by secondary traumatic stress [STS] and burnout [BRN]) and compassion satisfaction are subscales which make up one’s professional quality of life. Relationships between these constructs and clinicians’ years in health care, critical care patient load, and professional discipline were explored.
Results: The findings (n = 329) demonstrated significant correlations between STS, BRN, and MD. Scores associated with intentions to leave or stay in a position were indicative of high verses low MD. We report highest scoring situations of MD as well as when physicians and nurses demonstrate to be most at risk for STS, BRN and MD. Both physicians and nurses identified the events contributing to the highest level of MD as being compelled to provide care that seems ineffective and working with a critical care patient load >50%.
Conclusion: The results from this study of physicians and nurses suggest that the presence of MD significantly impacts turnover intent and professional quality of life. Therefore implementation of emotional wellness activities (e.g., empowerment, opportunity for open dialog regarding ethical dilemmas, policy making involvement) coupled with ongoing monitoring and routine assessment of these maladaptive characteristics is warranted.
The article is here.
Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, Vol 9(4), Jul 2017, 399-406.
Abstract
Objective: The purpose of this study was to investigate moral distress (MD) and turnover intent as related to professional quality of life in physicians and nurses at a tertiary care hospital.
Method: Health care providers from a variety of hospital departments anonymously completed 2 validated questionnaires (Moral Distress Scale–Revised and Professional Quality of Life Scale). Compassion fatigue (as measured by secondary traumatic stress [STS] and burnout [BRN]) and compassion satisfaction are subscales which make up one’s professional quality of life. Relationships between these constructs and clinicians’ years in health care, critical care patient load, and professional discipline were explored.
Results: The findings (n = 329) demonstrated significant correlations between STS, BRN, and MD. Scores associated with intentions to leave or stay in a position were indicative of high verses low MD. We report highest scoring situations of MD as well as when physicians and nurses demonstrate to be most at risk for STS, BRN and MD. Both physicians and nurses identified the events contributing to the highest level of MD as being compelled to provide care that seems ineffective and working with a critical care patient load >50%.
Conclusion: The results from this study of physicians and nurses suggest that the presence of MD significantly impacts turnover intent and professional quality of life. Therefore implementation of emotional wellness activities (e.g., empowerment, opportunity for open dialog regarding ethical dilemmas, policy making involvement) coupled with ongoing monitoring and routine assessment of these maladaptive characteristics is warranted.
The article is here.
Re: Nudges in a Post-truth World
Guest Post: Nathan Hodson
Journal of Medical Ethics Blog
Originally posted July 19, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
As Levy notes, some people are concerned that nudges present a threat to autonomy. Attempts at reconciling nudges with ethics, then, are important because nudging in healthcare is here to stay but we need to ensure it is used in ways that respect autonomy (and other moral principles).
The term “nudge” is perhaps a misnomer. To fill out the concept a bit, it commonly denotes the use of behavioural economics and behavioural psychology to the construction of choice architecture through carefully designed trials. But every choice we face, in any context, already comes with a choice architecture: there are endless contextual factors that impact the decisions we make.
When we ask whether nudging is acceptable we are asking whether an arbitrary or random choice architecture is more acceptable than a deliberate choice architecture, or whether an uninformed choice architecture is better than one informed by research.
In fact the permissibility of a nudge derives from whether it is being used in an ethically acceptable way, something that can only be explored on an individual basis. Thaler and Sunstein locate ethical acceptability in promoting the health of the person being nudged (and call this Libertarian Paternalism — i.e. sensible choices are promoted but no option is foreclosed). An alternative approach was proposed by Mitchell: nudges are justified if they maximise future liberty. Either way the nudging itself is not inherently problematic.
The article is here.
Journal of Medical Ethics Blog
Originally posted July 19, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
As Levy notes, some people are concerned that nudges present a threat to autonomy. Attempts at reconciling nudges with ethics, then, are important because nudging in healthcare is here to stay but we need to ensure it is used in ways that respect autonomy (and other moral principles).
The term “nudge” is perhaps a misnomer. To fill out the concept a bit, it commonly denotes the use of behavioural economics and behavioural psychology to the construction of choice architecture through carefully designed trials. But every choice we face, in any context, already comes with a choice architecture: there are endless contextual factors that impact the decisions we make.
When we ask whether nudging is acceptable we are asking whether an arbitrary or random choice architecture is more acceptable than a deliberate choice architecture, or whether an uninformed choice architecture is better than one informed by research.
In fact the permissibility of a nudge derives from whether it is being used in an ethically acceptable way, something that can only be explored on an individual basis. Thaler and Sunstein locate ethical acceptability in promoting the health of the person being nudged (and call this Libertarian Paternalism — i.e. sensible choices are promoted but no option is foreclosed). An alternative approach was proposed by Mitchell: nudges are justified if they maximise future liberty. Either way the nudging itself is not inherently problematic.
The article is here.
Thursday, August 3, 2017
The Trouble With Sex Robots
By Laura Bates
The New York Times
Originally posted
Here is an excerpt:
One of the authors of the Foundation for Responsible Robotics report, Noel Sharkey, a professor of artificial intelligence and robotics at the University of Sheffield, England, said there are ethical arguments within the field about sex robots with “frigid” settings.
“The idea is robots would resist your sexual advances so that you could rape them,” Professor Sharkey said. “Some people say it’s better they rape robots than rape real people. There are other people saying this would just encourage rapists more.”
Like the argument that women-only train compartments are an answer to sexual harassment and assault, the notion that sex robots could reduce rape is deeply flawed. It suggests that male violence against women is innate and inevitable, and can be only mitigated, not prevented. This is not only insulting to a vast majority of men, but it also entirely shifts responsibility for dealing with these crimes onto their victims — women, and society at large — while creating impunity for perpetrators.
Rape is not an act of sexual passion. It is a violent crime. We should no more be encouraging rapists to find a supposedly safe outlet for it than we should facilitate murderers by giving them realistic, blood-spurting dummies to stab. Since that suggestion sounds ridiculous, why does the idea of providing sexual abusers with lifelike robotic victims sound feasible to some?
The article is here.
The New York Times
Originally posted
Here is an excerpt:
One of the authors of the Foundation for Responsible Robotics report, Noel Sharkey, a professor of artificial intelligence and robotics at the University of Sheffield, England, said there are ethical arguments within the field about sex robots with “frigid” settings.
“The idea is robots would resist your sexual advances so that you could rape them,” Professor Sharkey said. “Some people say it’s better they rape robots than rape real people. There are other people saying this would just encourage rapists more.”
Like the argument that women-only train compartments are an answer to sexual harassment and assault, the notion that sex robots could reduce rape is deeply flawed. It suggests that male violence against women is innate and inevitable, and can be only mitigated, not prevented. This is not only insulting to a vast majority of men, but it also entirely shifts responsibility for dealing with these crimes onto their victims — women, and society at large — while creating impunity for perpetrators.
Rape is not an act of sexual passion. It is a violent crime. We should no more be encouraging rapists to find a supposedly safe outlet for it than we should facilitate murderers by giving them realistic, blood-spurting dummies to stab. Since that suggestion sounds ridiculous, why does the idea of providing sexual abusers with lifelike robotic victims sound feasible to some?
The article is here.
The Wellsprings of Our Morality
Daniel M.T. Fessler
What can evolution tell us about morality?
http://www.humansandnature.org
Mother Nature is amoral, yet morality is universal. The natural world lacks both any guiding hand and any moral compass. And yet all human societies have moral rules, and, with the exception of some individuals suffering from pathology, all people experience profound feelings that shape their actions in light of such rules. Where then did these constellations of rules and feelings come from?
The term “morality” jumbles rules and feelings, as well as judgments of others’ actions that result from the intersection of rules and feelings. Rules, like other features of culture, are ideas transmitted from person to person: “It is laudable to do X,” “It is a sin to do Y,” etc. Feelings are internal states evoked by events, or by thoughts of future possibilities: “I am proud that she did X,” “I am outraged that he did Y,” and so on. Praise or condemnation are social acts, often motivated by feelings, in response to other people’s behavior. All of this is commonly called “morality.”
So, what does it mean to say that morality is universal? You don’t need to be an anthropologist to recognize that, while people everywhere experience strong feelings about others’ behavior—and, as a result, reward or punish that behavior—cultures differ with regard to the beliefs on which they base such judgments. Is injustice a graver sin than disrespect for tradition? Which is more important, the autonomy of the individual or the harmony of the group? The answer is that it depends on whom you ask.
The information is here.
What can evolution tell us about morality?
http://www.humansandnature.org
Mother Nature is amoral, yet morality is universal. The natural world lacks both any guiding hand and any moral compass. And yet all human societies have moral rules, and, with the exception of some individuals suffering from pathology, all people experience profound feelings that shape their actions in light of such rules. Where then did these constellations of rules and feelings come from?
The term “morality” jumbles rules and feelings, as well as judgments of others’ actions that result from the intersection of rules and feelings. Rules, like other features of culture, are ideas transmitted from person to person: “It is laudable to do X,” “It is a sin to do Y,” etc. Feelings are internal states evoked by events, or by thoughts of future possibilities: “I am proud that she did X,” “I am outraged that he did Y,” and so on. Praise or condemnation are social acts, often motivated by feelings, in response to other people’s behavior. All of this is commonly called “morality.”
So, what does it mean to say that morality is universal? You don’t need to be an anthropologist to recognize that, while people everywhere experience strong feelings about others’ behavior—and, as a result, reward or punish that behavior—cultures differ with regard to the beliefs on which they base such judgments. Is injustice a graver sin than disrespect for tradition? Which is more important, the autonomy of the individual or the harmony of the group? The answer is that it depends on whom you ask.
The information is here.
Wednesday, August 2, 2017
Ships in the Rising Sea? Changes Over Time in Psychologists’ Ethical Beliefs and Behaviors
Rebecca A. Schwartz-Mette & David S. Shen-Miller
Ethics & Behavior
Abstract
Beliefs about the importance of ethical behavior to competent practice have prompted major shifts in psychology ethics over time. Yet few studies examine ethical beliefs and behavior after training, and most comprehensive research is now 30 years old. As such, it is unclear whether shifts in the field have resulted in general improvements in ethical practice: Are we psychologists “ships in the rising sea,” lifted by changes in ethical codes and training over time? Participants (N = 325) completed a survey of ethical beliefs and behaviors (Pope, Tabachnick, & Keith-Spiegel, 1987). Analyses examined group differences, consistency of frequency and ethicality ratings, and comparisons with past data. More than half of behaviors were rated as less ethical and occurring less frequently than in 1987, with early career psychologists generally reporting less ethically questionable behavior. Recommendations for enhancing ethics education are discussed.
The article is here.
Ethics & Behavior
Abstract
Beliefs about the importance of ethical behavior to competent practice have prompted major shifts in psychology ethics over time. Yet few studies examine ethical beliefs and behavior after training, and most comprehensive research is now 30 years old. As such, it is unclear whether shifts in the field have resulted in general improvements in ethical practice: Are we psychologists “ships in the rising sea,” lifted by changes in ethical codes and training over time? Participants (N = 325) completed a survey of ethical beliefs and behaviors (Pope, Tabachnick, & Keith-Spiegel, 1987). Analyses examined group differences, consistency of frequency and ethicality ratings, and comparisons with past data. More than half of behaviors were rated as less ethical and occurring less frequently than in 1987, with early career psychologists generally reporting less ethically questionable behavior. Recommendations for enhancing ethics education are discussed.
The article is here.
A Primatological Perspective on Evolution and Morality
Sarah F. Brosnan
What can evolution tell us about morality?
http://www.humansandnature.org
Morality is a key feature of humanity, but how did we become a moral species? And is morality a uniquely human phenomenon, or do we see its roots in other species? One of the most fun parts of my research is studying the evolutionary basis of behaviors that we think of as quintessentially human, such as morality, to try to understand where they came from and what purpose they serve. In so doing, we can not only better understand why people behave the way that they do, but we also may be able to develop interventions that promote more beneficial decision-making.
Of course, a “quintessentially human” behavior is not replicated, at least in its entirety, in another species, so how does one study the evolutionary history of such behaviors? To do so, we focus on precursor behaviors that are related to the one in question and provide insight into the evolution of the target behavior. A precursor behavior may look very different from the final instantiation; for instance, birds’ wings appear to have originated as feathers that were used for either insulation or advertisement (i.e., sexual selection) that, through a series of intermediate forms, evolved into feathered wings. The chemical definition may be even more apt; a precursor molecule is one that triggers a reaction, resulting in a chemical that is fundamentally different from the initial chemicals used in the reaction.
How is this related to morality? We would not expect to see human morality in other species, as morality implies the ability to debate ethics and develop group rules and norms, which is not possible in non-verbal species. However, complex traits like morality do not arise de novo; like wings, they evolve from existing traits. Therefore, we can look for potential precursors in other species in order to better understand the evolutionary history of morality.
The information is here.
What can evolution tell us about morality?
http://www.humansandnature.org
Morality is a key feature of humanity, but how did we become a moral species? And is morality a uniquely human phenomenon, or do we see its roots in other species? One of the most fun parts of my research is studying the evolutionary basis of behaviors that we think of as quintessentially human, such as morality, to try to understand where they came from and what purpose they serve. In so doing, we can not only better understand why people behave the way that they do, but we also may be able to develop interventions that promote more beneficial decision-making.
Of course, a “quintessentially human” behavior is not replicated, at least in its entirety, in another species, so how does one study the evolutionary history of such behaviors? To do so, we focus on precursor behaviors that are related to the one in question and provide insight into the evolution of the target behavior. A precursor behavior may look very different from the final instantiation; for instance, birds’ wings appear to have originated as feathers that were used for either insulation or advertisement (i.e., sexual selection) that, through a series of intermediate forms, evolved into feathered wings. The chemical definition may be even more apt; a precursor molecule is one that triggers a reaction, resulting in a chemical that is fundamentally different from the initial chemicals used in the reaction.
How is this related to morality? We would not expect to see human morality in other species, as morality implies the ability to debate ethics and develop group rules and norms, which is not possible in non-verbal species. However, complex traits like morality do not arise de novo; like wings, they evolve from existing traits. Therefore, we can look for potential precursors in other species in order to better understand the evolutionary history of morality.
The information is here.
Tuesday, August 1, 2017
Morality isn’t a compass — it’s a calculator
DB Krupp
The Conversation
Originally published July 9, 2017
Here is the conclusion:
Unfortunately, the beliefs that straddle moral fault lines are largely impervious to empirical critique. We simply embrace the evidence that supports our cause and deny the evidence that doesn’t. If strategic thinking motivates belief, and belief motivates reason, then we may be wasting our time trying to persuade the opposition to change their minds.
Instead, we should strive to change the costs and benefits that provoke discord in the first place. Many disagreements are the result of worlds colliding — people with different backgrounds making different assessments of the same situation. By closing the gap between their experiences and by lowering the stakes, we can bring them closer to consensus. This may mean reducing inequality, improving access to health care or increasing contact between unfamiliar groups.
We have little reason to see ourselves as unbiased sources of moral righteousness, but we probably will anyway. The least we can do is minimize that bias a bit.
The article is here.
The Conversation
Originally published July 9, 2017
Here is the conclusion:
Unfortunately, the beliefs that straddle moral fault lines are largely impervious to empirical critique. We simply embrace the evidence that supports our cause and deny the evidence that doesn’t. If strategic thinking motivates belief, and belief motivates reason, then we may be wasting our time trying to persuade the opposition to change their minds.
Instead, we should strive to change the costs and benefits that provoke discord in the first place. Many disagreements are the result of worlds colliding — people with different backgrounds making different assessments of the same situation. By closing the gap between their experiences and by lowering the stakes, we can bring them closer to consensus. This may mean reducing inequality, improving access to health care or increasing contact between unfamiliar groups.
We have little reason to see ourselves as unbiased sources of moral righteousness, but we probably will anyway. The least we can do is minimize that bias a bit.
The article is here.
Henderson psychologist charged with murder can reopen practice
David Ferrara
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Originally posted July 14, 2017
A psychologist accused of killing his wife and staging her death as a suicide can start practicing medicine again in less than four months, the Nevada Board of Psychological Examiners decided Friday.
Suspected of abusing drugs and obtaining prescription drugs from patients, Gregory “Brent” Dennis, who prosecutors say poisoned attorney Susan Winters inside their Henderson home, also must undergo up to seven years of drug treatment, the seven-member panel ruled as they signed a settlement agreement that made no mention of the murder charge.
“It’s clear that the board members do not know what Brent Dennis was arrested for,” Keith Williams, a lawyer for the Winters family, told a Las Vegas Review-Journal reporter after the meeting. “We’re confident that they did not know what they were voting on today.”
Henderson police arrested Dennis on the murder charge in February.
The article is here.
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Originally posted July 14, 2017
A psychologist accused of killing his wife and staging her death as a suicide can start practicing medicine again in less than four months, the Nevada Board of Psychological Examiners decided Friday.
Suspected of abusing drugs and obtaining prescription drugs from patients, Gregory “Brent” Dennis, who prosecutors say poisoned attorney Susan Winters inside their Henderson home, also must undergo up to seven years of drug treatment, the seven-member panel ruled as they signed a settlement agreement that made no mention of the murder charge.
“It’s clear that the board members do not know what Brent Dennis was arrested for,” Keith Williams, a lawyer for the Winters family, told a Las Vegas Review-Journal reporter after the meeting. “We’re confident that they did not know what they were voting on today.”
Henderson police arrested Dennis on the murder charge in February.
The article is here.
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