Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

4 questions for Paul Bloom

By Lea Winerman
May 2017, Vol 48, No. 5
Print version: page 27

Here is an excerpt:

Why do you believe this kind of empathy is overrated?

I should be clear that I'm not against empathy in general. I think it's a great source of pleasure, for instance, and it plays some role in intimate ­relationships. But when it comes to moral judgments, empathy makes a very poor guide.

One reason is that it's biased. You naturally empathize with people who in some way are part of your circle, who look like you, who maybe share your ethnicity. So, for example, if you base your charitable giving choices on empathy, you find yourself inevitably giving to people who [are like you], and ignoring the plight of thousands, maybe millions of others.

Another problem is that empathy is innumerate. It's a spotlight—you zoom in on one person, as opposed to many. Some people think that this is one of its advantages. But real-world moral decisions involve coping with numbers. They often involve a recognition, for instance, that helping just one person can make lives worse for hundreds or thousands of others. The innumeracy of empathy often leads to paradoxical situations where we're desperate to help a single person—or even a cute puppy—while ignoring crises like climate change, because although millions of people will be affected by it, there's no identifiable victim to zoom in on.

A third problem is that empathy can be weaponized. So, unscrupulous politicians use our empathy for victims of certain crimes to motivate anger and hatred toward other, marginalized, groups. We saw a lot of that in the last election season.

The article is here.

More CEOs Are Getting Fired After an Ethical Lapse, Study Finds

Vanessa Fuhrmans
The Wall Street Journal
Originally posted May 14, 2017

Ethical breaches are causing more chief executives to lose their jobs. The upside? Researchers say the rising numbers don’t point to more corporate misbehavior: It’s that CEOs are being held to a higher level of accountability.

Among the myriad reasons corporate bosses leave their jobs, firings have been on the decline. In a study of CEO exits at the world’s 2,500 largest public companies, researchers at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s strategy consulting arm, called Strategy&, found 20% of CEO exits in the past five years were forced, down from 31% of CEO exits in the previous five years.

But CEO ousters due to ethical lapses—either their own improper conduct, or their employees’—are climbing. Such forced exits rose to 5.3% of CEO departures in the 2012-to-2016 period, up from 3.9% during the previous five years.

The article is here.

Tuesday, May 30, 2017

There’s a Right Way and a Wrong Way to Do Empathy

By Sarah Watts
The Science of Us
Originally published May 18, 2017

Here is an excerpt:

When we talk about empathy, we tend to talk about it as an unqualified good thing. Research has shown that empathy is associated with kindness and helping behaviors, while its absence, clinically referred to as psychopathy, is associated with manipulation and criminal deviance. Empathy, some scientists have concluded, allows us to function well with others and survive as a species.

But what people often don’t talk about is how even a good thing like empathy can still be emotionally draining. Empathic people who easily take on other people’s feelings can spend their days feeling overwhelmed, hurt, and heavyhearted. Empathy, in other words, can be downright stressful. So would it be fair to say that sometimes it’s unhealthy?

A paper published earlier this month in the Journal of Experimental Psychology set out to answer exactly that. According to the authors, there are “two routes” to empathy. The first is imagining how someone else might feel in a given circumstance, called “imagine-other-perspective-taking,” or IOPT. The second is actually imagining yourself in the other person’s situation, called “imagine-self-perspective-taking,” or ISPT. With IOPT, you acknowledge another person’s feelings; with ISPT, you take on that person’s feelings as your own.

The article is here.

Game Theory and Morality

Moshe Hoffman , Erez Yoeli , and Carlos David Navarrete
The Evolution of Morality
Part of the series Evolutionary Psychology pp 289-316

Here is an excerpt:

The key result for evolutionary dynamic models is that, except under extreme conditions, behavior converges to Nash equilibria. This result rests on one simple, noncontroversial assumption shared by all evolutionary dynamics: Behaviors that are relatively successful will increase in frequency. Based on this logic, game theory models have been fruitfully applied in biological contexts to explain phenomena such as animal sex ratios (Fisher, 1958), territoriality (Smith & Price, 1973), cooperation (Trivers, 1971), sexual displays (Zahavi, 1975), and parent–offspring conflict (Trivers, 1974). More recently, evolutionary dynamic models have been applied in human contexts where conscious deliberation is believed to not play an important role, such as in the adoption of religious rituals (Sosis & Alcorta, 2003 ), in the expression and experience of emotion (Frank, 1988 ; Winter, 2014), and in the use of indirect speech (Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008).

 Crucially for this chapter, because our behaviors are mediated by moral intuitions and ideologies, if our moral behaviors converge to Nash, so must the intuitions and ideologies that motivate them. The resulting intuitions and ideologies will bear the signature of their game theoretic origins, and this signature will lend clarity on the puzzling, counterintuitive, and otherwise hard-to-explain features of our moral intuitions, as exemplified by our motivating examples.

In order for game theory to be relevant to understanding our moral intuitions and ideologies, we need only the following simple assumption: Moral intuitions and ideologies that lead to higher payoffs become more frequent. This assumption can be met if moral intuitions that yield higher payoffs are held more tenaciously, are more likely to be imitated, or are genetically encoded. For example, if every time you transgress by commission you are punished, but every time you transgress by omission you are not, you will start to intuit that commission is worse than omission.

The book chapter is here.

Monday, May 29, 2017

Moral Hindsight

Nadine Fleischhut, Björn Meder, & Gerd Gigerenzer
Experimental Psychology (2017), 64, pp. 110-123.

Abstract.

How are judgments in moral dilemmas affected by uncertainty, as opposed to certainty? We tested the predictions of a consequentialist and deontological account using a hindsight paradigm. The key result is a hindsight effect in moral judgment. Participants in foresight, for whom the occurrence of negative side effects was uncertain, judged actions to be morally more permissible than participants in hindsight, who knew that negative side effects occurred. Conversely, when hindsight participants knew that no negative side effects occurred, they judged actions to be more permissible than participants in foresight. The second finding was a classical hindsight effect in probability estimates and a systematic relation between moral judgments and probability estimates. Importantly, while the hindsight effect in probability estimates was always present, a corresponding hindsight effect in moral judgments was only observed among “consequentialist” participants who indicated a cost-benefit trade-off as most important for their moral evaluation.

The article is here.

Sunday, May 28, 2017

CRISPR Makes it Clear: US Needs a Biology Strategy, FAST

Amy Webb
Wired
Originally published

Here is an excerpt:

Crispr can be used to engineer agricultural products like wheat, rice, and animals to withstand the effects of climate change. Seeds can be engineered to produce far greater yields in tiny spaces, while animals can be edited to create triple their usual muscle mass. This could dramatically change global agricultural trade and cause widespread geopolitical destabilization. Or, with advance planning, this technology could help the US forge new alliances.

How comfortable do you feel knowing that there is no group coordinating a national biology strategy in the US, and that a single for-profit company holds a critical mass of intellectual property rights to the future of genomic editing?

While I admire Zheng’s undeniable smarts and creativity, for-profit companies don’t have a mandate to balance the tension between commercial interests and what’s good for humanity; there is no mechanism to ensure that they’ll put our longer-term best interests first.

The article is here.

Saturday, May 27, 2017

Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?

Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic
Harvard Business Review
Originally published August 22, 2013

There are three popular explanations for the clear under-representation of women in management, namely: (1) they are not capable; (2) they are not interested; (3) they are both interested and capable but unable to break the glass-ceiling: an invisible career barrier, based on prejudiced stereotypes, that prevents women from accessing the ranks of power. Conservatives and chauvinists tend to endorse the first; liberals and feminists prefer the third; and those somewhere in the middle are usually drawn to the second. But what if they all missed the big picture?

In my view, the main reason for the uneven management sex ratio is our inability to discern between confidence and competence. That is, because we (people in general) commonly misinterpret displays of confidence as a sign of competence, we are fooled into believing that men are better leaders than women. In other words, when it comes to leadership, the only advantage that men have over women (e.g., from Argentina to Norway and the USA to Japan) is the fact that manifestations of hubris — often masked as charisma or charm — are commonly mistaken for leadership potential, and that these occur much more frequently in men than in women.

The article is here.

Friday, May 26, 2017

What is moral injury in veterans?

Holly Arrow and William Schumacher
The Conversation
Originally posted May 21, 2017

Here is an excerpt:

The moral conflict created by the violations of “what’s right” generates moral injury when the inability to reconcile wartime actions with a personal moral code creates lasting psychological consequences.

Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, in his work with Vietnam veterans, defined moral injury as the psychological, social and physiological results of a betrayal of “what’s right” by an authority in a high-stakes situation. In “Achilles In Vietnam,” a book that examines the psychological devastation of war, a Vietnam veteran described a situation in which his commanding officers used tear gas on a village after the veteran and his unit had their gas masks rendered ineffective due to water damage. The veteran stated, “They gassed us almost to death.” This type of “friendly fire” incident is morally wounding in a way that attacks by an enemy are not.

Psychologist Brett Litz and his colleagues expanded this to include self-betrayal and identified “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” as the cause of moral injury.

Guilt and moral injury

A research study published in 1991 identified combat-related guilt as the best predictor of suicide attempts among a sample of Vietnam veterans with PTSD. Details of the veterans’ experiences connected that guilt to morally injurious events.

The article is here.

Do the Right Thing: Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather than Equity or Efficiency Per Se, Drive Human Prosociality

Capraro, Valerio and Rand, David G.
(May 8, 2017).

Abstract

Decades of experimental research have shown that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral one-shot anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that are fundamentally incompatible with these standard social preference models. We introduce the “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labeling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses people’s behavior in the TOG. Moreover, people who take the positively framed action, be it equitable or efficient, are more prosocial in a separate Dictator Game (DG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, we propose a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right. When one option is clearly selfish and the other pro-social (e.g. equitable and/or efficient), as in the DG and PD, the economic outcomes are enough to determine what is morally right. When one option is not clearly more prosocial than the other, as in the TOG, framing resolves the ambiguity about which choice is moral. In addition to explaining our data, this account organizes prior findings that framing impacts cooperation in the standard simultaneous PD, but not in the asynchronous PD or the DG. Thus we present a new framework for understanding the basis of human prosociality.

The paper is here.