By Julie Bykowicz
Associate Press
Originally posted March 22, 2017
President Donald Trump's former national security adviser Michael Flynn did not sign a mandatory ethics pledge ahead of his forced resignation in February, raising questions about the White House's commitment to the lobbying and ethics rules it imposed as part of the president's promise to "drain the swamp."
Flynn "didn't have the opportunity to sign it," said Price Floyd, a spokesman for the retired Army general. "But he is going to abide by the pledge" and has not engaged in any lobbying work since leaving the White House that would have violated the pledge, Floyd said.
Trump signed an executive order on Jan. 28 prohibiting political appointees from lobbying the government in any way for five years after serving in his administration. That same order instituted a lifetime ban on outgoing officials representing foreign governments.
The article is here.
Thursday, March 23, 2017
Why we must teach morality to robots: Podcast
Daniel Glaser
The Guardian
Originally published February 27, 2017
Every week comes a new warning that robots are taking over our jobs. People have become troubled by the question of how robots will learn ethics, if they do take over our work and our planet.
As early on as the 1960s Isaac Asimov came up with the ‘Three Laws of Robotics’ outlining moral rules they should abide by. More recently there has been official guidance from the British Standards Institute advising designers how to create ethical robots, which is meant to avoid them taking over the world.
From a neuroscientist’s perspective, they should learn more from human development. We teach children morality before algebra. When they’re able to behave well in a social situation, we teach them language skills and more complex reasoning. It needs to happen this way round. Even the most sophisticated bomb-sniffing dog is taught to sit first.
If we’re interested in really making robots think more like we do, we can’t retrofit morality and ethics. We need to focus on that first, build it into their core, and then teach them to drive.
Wednesday, March 22, 2017
The Case of Dr. Oz: Ethics, Evidence, and Does Professional Self-Regulation Work?
Jon C. Tilburt, Megan Allyse, and Frederic W. Hafferty
AMA Journal of Ethics. February 2017, Volume 19, Number 2: 199-206.
Abstract
Dr. Mehmet Oz is widely known not just as a successful media personality donning the title “America’s Doctor®,” but, we suggest, also as a physician visibly out of step with his profession. A recent, unsuccessful attempt to censure Dr. Oz raises the issue of whether the medical profession can effectively self-regulate at all. It also raises concern that the medical profession’s self-regulation might be selectively activated, perhaps only when the subject of professional censure has achieved a level of public visibility. We argue here that the medical profession must look at itself with a healthy dose of self-doubt about whether it has sufficient knowledge of or handle on the less visible Dr. “Ozes” quietly operating under the profession’s presumptive endorsement.
The article is here.
AMA Journal of Ethics. February 2017, Volume 19, Number 2: 199-206.
Abstract
Dr. Mehmet Oz is widely known not just as a successful media personality donning the title “America’s Doctor®,” but, we suggest, also as a physician visibly out of step with his profession. A recent, unsuccessful attempt to censure Dr. Oz raises the issue of whether the medical profession can effectively self-regulate at all. It also raises concern that the medical profession’s self-regulation might be selectively activated, perhaps only when the subject of professional censure has achieved a level of public visibility. We argue here that the medical profession must look at itself with a healthy dose of self-doubt about whether it has sufficient knowledge of or handle on the less visible Dr. “Ozes” quietly operating under the profession’s presumptive endorsement.
The article is here.
Act versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment
Ivar R. Hannikainen, Ryan M. Miller, & Fiery A. Cushman
Ratio: Special Issue on ‘Experimental Philosophy as Applied Philosophy’
Forthcoming
Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a
novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives
tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive feature of conservative morality. Next, we find that the conservative and liberal structural approaches to moral judgment are associated with their corresponding patterns of reliance on distinct moral foundations. In addition, the structural approach uniquely predicts that conservatives will be more opposed to harm in circumstances like the wellknown trolley problem, a result which we replicate. Finally, we show that the structural approaches of conservatives and liberals are partly linked to underlying cognitive styles (intuitive versus deliberative). Collectively, these findings forge a link between two important yet previously independent lines of research in political psychology: cognitive style and moral foundations theory.
The article is here.
Ratio: Special Issue on ‘Experimental Philosophy as Applied Philosophy’
Forthcoming
Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a
novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives
tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive feature of conservative morality. Next, we find that the conservative and liberal structural approaches to moral judgment are associated with their corresponding patterns of reliance on distinct moral foundations. In addition, the structural approach uniquely predicts that conservatives will be more opposed to harm in circumstances like the wellknown trolley problem, a result which we replicate. Finally, we show that the structural approaches of conservatives and liberals are partly linked to underlying cognitive styles (intuitive versus deliberative). Collectively, these findings forge a link between two important yet previously independent lines of research in political psychology: cognitive style and moral foundations theory.
The article is here.
Tuesday, March 21, 2017
Why can 12-year-olds still get married in the United States?
Fraidy Reiss
The Washington Post
Originally published February 10, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
Unchained At Last, a nonprofit I founded to help women resist or escape forced marriage in the United States, spent the past year collecting marriage license data from 2000 to 2010, the most recent year for which most states were able to provide information. We learned that in 38 states, more than 167,000 children — almost all of them girls, some as young 12 — were married during that period, mostly to men 18 or older. Twelve states and the District of Columbia were unable to provide information on how many children had married there in that decade. Based on the correlation we identified between state population and child marriage, we estimated that the total number of children wed in America between 2000 and 2010 was nearly 248,000.
Despite these alarming numbers, and despite the documented consequences of early marriages, including negative effects on health and education and an increased likelihood of domestic violence, some state lawmakers have resisted passing legislation to end child marriage — because they wrongly fear that such measures might unlawfully stifle religious freedom or because they cling to the notion that marriage is the best solution for a teen pregnancy.
The article is here.
The Washington Post
Originally published February 10, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
Unchained At Last, a nonprofit I founded to help women resist or escape forced marriage in the United States, spent the past year collecting marriage license data from 2000 to 2010, the most recent year for which most states were able to provide information. We learned that in 38 states, more than 167,000 children — almost all of them girls, some as young 12 — were married during that period, mostly to men 18 or older. Twelve states and the District of Columbia were unable to provide information on how many children had married there in that decade. Based on the correlation we identified between state population and child marriage, we estimated that the total number of children wed in America between 2000 and 2010 was nearly 248,000.
Despite these alarming numbers, and despite the documented consequences of early marriages, including negative effects on health and education and an increased likelihood of domestic violence, some state lawmakers have resisted passing legislation to end child marriage — because they wrongly fear that such measures might unlawfully stifle religious freedom or because they cling to the notion that marriage is the best solution for a teen pregnancy.
The article is here.
Ethical concerns for telemental health therapy amidst governmental surveillance.
Samuel D. Lustgarten and Alexander J. Colbow
American Psychologist, Vol 72(2), Feb-Mar 2017, 159-170.
Abstract
Technology, infrastructure, governmental support, and interest in mental health accessibility have led to a burgeoning field of telemental health therapy (TMHT). Psychologists can now provide therapy via computers at great distances and little cost for parties involved. Growth of TMHT within the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and among psychologists surveyed by the American Psychological Association (APA) suggests optimism in this provision of services (Godleski, Darkins, & Peters, 2012; Jacobsen & Kohout, 2010). Despite these advances, psychologists using technology must keep abreast of potential limitations to privacy and confidentiality. However, no scholarly articles have appraised the ramifications of recent government surveillance disclosures (e.g., “The NSA Files”; Greenwald, 2013) and how they might affect TMHT usage within the field of psychology. This article reviews the current state of TMHT in psychology, APA’s guidelines, current governmental threats to client privacy, and other ethical ramifications that might result. Best practices for the field of psychology are proposed.
The article is here.
American Psychologist, Vol 72(2), Feb-Mar 2017, 159-170.
Abstract
Technology, infrastructure, governmental support, and interest in mental health accessibility have led to a burgeoning field of telemental health therapy (TMHT). Psychologists can now provide therapy via computers at great distances and little cost for parties involved. Growth of TMHT within the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and among psychologists surveyed by the American Psychological Association (APA) suggests optimism in this provision of services (Godleski, Darkins, & Peters, 2012; Jacobsen & Kohout, 2010). Despite these advances, psychologists using technology must keep abreast of potential limitations to privacy and confidentiality. However, no scholarly articles have appraised the ramifications of recent government surveillance disclosures (e.g., “The NSA Files”; Greenwald, 2013) and how they might affect TMHT usage within the field of psychology. This article reviews the current state of TMHT in psychology, APA’s guidelines, current governmental threats to client privacy, and other ethical ramifications that might result. Best practices for the field of psychology are proposed.
The article is here.
Monday, March 20, 2017
When Evidence Says No, But Doctors Say Yes
David Epstein
ProPublica
Originally published February 22, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
When you visit a doctor, you probably assume the treatment you receive is backed by evidence from medical research. Surely, the drug you’re prescribed or the surgery you’ll undergo wouldn’t be so common if it didn’t work, right?
For all the truly wondrous developments of modern medicine — imaging technologies that enable precision surgery, routine organ transplants, care that transforms premature infants into perfectly healthy kids, and remarkable chemotherapy treatments, to name a few — it is distressingly ordinary for patients to get treatments that research has shown are ineffective or even dangerous. Sometimes doctors simply haven’t kept up with the science. Other times doctors know the state of play perfectly well but continue to deliver these treatments because it’s profitable — or even because they’re popular and patients demand them. Some procedures are implemented based on studies that did not prove whether they really worked in the first place. Others were initially supported by evidence but then were contradicted by better evidence, and yet these procedures have remained the standards of care for years, or decades.
The article is here.
ProPublica
Originally published February 22, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
When you visit a doctor, you probably assume the treatment you receive is backed by evidence from medical research. Surely, the drug you’re prescribed or the surgery you’ll undergo wouldn’t be so common if it didn’t work, right?
For all the truly wondrous developments of modern medicine — imaging technologies that enable precision surgery, routine organ transplants, care that transforms premature infants into perfectly healthy kids, and remarkable chemotherapy treatments, to name a few — it is distressingly ordinary for patients to get treatments that research has shown are ineffective or even dangerous. Sometimes doctors simply haven’t kept up with the science. Other times doctors know the state of play perfectly well but continue to deliver these treatments because it’s profitable — or even because they’re popular and patients demand them. Some procedures are implemented based on studies that did not prove whether they really worked in the first place. Others were initially supported by evidence but then were contradicted by better evidence, and yet these procedures have remained the standards of care for years, or decades.
The article is here.
The Enforcement of Moral Boundaries Promotes Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior in Groups
Brent Simpson, Robb Willer & Ashley Harrell
Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 42844 (2017)
Abstract
The threat of free-riding makes the marshalling of cooperation from group members a fundamental challenge of social life. Where classical social science theory saw the enforcement of moral boundaries as a critical way by which group members regulate one another’s self-interest and build cooperation, moral judgments have most often been studied as processes internal to individuals. Here we investigate how the interpersonal expression of positive and negative moral judgments encourages cooperation in groups and prosocial behavior between group members. In a laboratory experiment, groups whose members could make moral judgments achieved greater cooperation than groups with no capacity to sanction, levels comparable to those of groups featuring costly material sanctions. In addition, members of moral judgment groups subsequently showed more interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and generosity than all other groups. These findings extend prior work on peer enforcement, highlighting how the enforcement of moral boundaries offers an efficient solution to cooperation problems and promotes prosocial behavior between group members.
The article is here.
Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 42844 (2017)
Abstract
The threat of free-riding makes the marshalling of cooperation from group members a fundamental challenge of social life. Where classical social science theory saw the enforcement of moral boundaries as a critical way by which group members regulate one another’s self-interest and build cooperation, moral judgments have most often been studied as processes internal to individuals. Here we investigate how the interpersonal expression of positive and negative moral judgments encourages cooperation in groups and prosocial behavior between group members. In a laboratory experiment, groups whose members could make moral judgments achieved greater cooperation than groups with no capacity to sanction, levels comparable to those of groups featuring costly material sanctions. In addition, members of moral judgment groups subsequently showed more interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and generosity than all other groups. These findings extend prior work on peer enforcement, highlighting how the enforcement of moral boundaries offers an efficient solution to cooperation problems and promotes prosocial behavior between group members.
The article is here.
Sunday, March 19, 2017
Revamping the US Federal Common Rule: Modernizing Human Participant Research Regulations
James G. Hodge Jr. and Lawrence O. Gostin
JAMA. Published online February 22, 2017
On January 19, 2017, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Department of Health and Human Services, and 15 federal agencies published a final rule to modernize the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (known as the “Common Rule”).1 Initially introduced more than a quarter century ago, the Common Rule predated modern scientific methods and findings, notably human genome research.
Research enterprises now encompass vast multicenter trials in both academia and the private sector. The volume, types, and availability of public/private data and biospecimens have increased exponentially. Federal agencies demanded more accountability, research investigators sought more flexibility, and human participants desired more control over research. Most rule changes become effective in 2018, giving institutions time for implementation.
The article is here.
JAMA. Published online February 22, 2017
On January 19, 2017, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Department of Health and Human Services, and 15 federal agencies published a final rule to modernize the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (known as the “Common Rule”).1 Initially introduced more than a quarter century ago, the Common Rule predated modern scientific methods and findings, notably human genome research.
Research enterprises now encompass vast multicenter trials in both academia and the private sector. The volume, types, and availability of public/private data and biospecimens have increased exponentially. Federal agencies demanded more accountability, research investigators sought more flexibility, and human participants desired more control over research. Most rule changes become effective in 2018, giving institutions time for implementation.
The article is here.
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