Jim Gottstein
Alaska Dispatch News
Originally posted January 12, 2016
The glaring failures surrounding Esteban Santiago, resulting in the tragic killing of five people and wounding of eight others in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, prompts me to make some points about our misguided mental health system.
First, psychiatrists have no ability to predict who is going to be violent. In a Jan. 3, 2013, Washington Post article, "Predicting violence is a work in progress," after reviewing the research, writer David Brown, reported:
• "There is no instrument that is specifically useful or validated for identifying potential school shooters or mass murderers."
• "The best-known attempt to measure violence in mental patients found that mental illness by itself didn't predict an above-average risk of being violent."
• "(S)tudies have shown psychiatrists' accuracy in identifying patients who would become violent was slightly better than chance."
• "(T)he presence of a mental disorder (is) only a small contributor to risk, outweighed by other factors such as age, previous violent acts, alcohol use, impulsivity, gang membership and lack of family support."
The article is here.
Monday, February 6, 2017
Working for an Algorithm Might Be an Improvement
By Elaine Ou
Bloomberg
Originally posted January 13, 2017
Here are two excerpts:
Bridgewater isn’t alone. Offices around the country are deploying tools to continuously monitor and assess employee activity. Complaints about the dehumanizing nature of working for algorithmic bosses such as Uber and Amazon have inspired comparisons to “Taylorism,” a scientific management theory remembered primarily for its use of stopwatches and specialized slide rules (like the one pictured below).
(cut)
Scientific management doesn’t have to be a dehumanizing experience. Dalio says that Bridgewater's management systems are designed to improve decision-making, conflict resolution, and personal development. This doesn’t necessarily mean removing managers from the equation; it simply recognizes that humans are unique and fallible, and ideally enables them to develop unbiased solutions. Dalio says that Bridgewater employees have a turnover rate of less than 6 percent after the first two years of attrition. Assuming his employees haven’t been turned into cyborgs, he's probably doing something right.
The article is here.
Bloomberg
Originally posted January 13, 2017
Here are two excerpts:
Bridgewater isn’t alone. Offices around the country are deploying tools to continuously monitor and assess employee activity. Complaints about the dehumanizing nature of working for algorithmic bosses such as Uber and Amazon have inspired comparisons to “Taylorism,” a scientific management theory remembered primarily for its use of stopwatches and specialized slide rules (like the one pictured below).
(cut)
Scientific management doesn’t have to be a dehumanizing experience. Dalio says that Bridgewater's management systems are designed to improve decision-making, conflict resolution, and personal development. This doesn’t necessarily mean removing managers from the equation; it simply recognizes that humans are unique and fallible, and ideally enables them to develop unbiased solutions. Dalio says that Bridgewater employees have a turnover rate of less than 6 percent after the first two years of attrition. Assuming his employees haven’t been turned into cyborgs, he's probably doing something right.
The article is here.
Sunday, February 5, 2017
Group-focused morality is associated with limited conflict detection and resolution capacity: Neuroanatomical evidence
Nash, Kyle, Baumgartner, Thomas, & Knoch, Daria
Biological Psychology
Volume 123, February 2017, Pages 235–240
Abstract
Group-focused moral foundations (GMFs) − moral values that help protect the group’s welfare − sharply divide conservatives from liberals and religiously devout from non-believers. However, there is little evidence about what drives this divide. Moral foundations theory and the model of motivated social cognition both associate group-focused moral foundations with differences in conflict detection and resolution capacity, but in opposing directions. Individual differences in conflict detection and resolution implicate specific neuroanatomical differences. Examining neuroanatomy thus affords an objective and non-biased opportunity to contrast these influential theories. Here, we report that increased adherence to group-focused moral foundations was strongly associated (whole-brain corrected) with reduced gray matter volume in key regions of the conflict detection and resolution system (anterior cingulate cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex). Because reduced gray matter is reliably associated with reduced neural and cognitive capacity, these findings support the idea outlined in the model of motivated social cognition that belief in group-focused moral values is associated with reduced conflict detection and resolution capacity.
The article is here.
Biological Psychology
Volume 123, February 2017, Pages 235–240
Abstract
Group-focused moral foundations (GMFs) − moral values that help protect the group’s welfare − sharply divide conservatives from liberals and religiously devout from non-believers. However, there is little evidence about what drives this divide. Moral foundations theory and the model of motivated social cognition both associate group-focused moral foundations with differences in conflict detection and resolution capacity, but in opposing directions. Individual differences in conflict detection and resolution implicate specific neuroanatomical differences. Examining neuroanatomy thus affords an objective and non-biased opportunity to contrast these influential theories. Here, we report that increased adherence to group-focused moral foundations was strongly associated (whole-brain corrected) with reduced gray matter volume in key regions of the conflict detection and resolution system (anterior cingulate cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex). Because reduced gray matter is reliably associated with reduced neural and cognitive capacity, these findings support the idea outlined in the model of motivated social cognition that belief in group-focused moral values is associated with reduced conflict detection and resolution capacity.
The article is here.
Saturday, February 4, 2017
The Real Problem With Hypocrisy
By Jillian Jordan, Roseanna Sommers, and David Rand
The New York Times - Gray Matters
Originally posted January 13, 2017
What, exactly, is the problem with hypocrisy? When someone condemns the behavior of others, why do we find it so objectionable if we learn he engages in the same behavior himself?
The answer may seem self-evident. Not practicing what you preach; lacking the willpower to live up to your own ideals; behaving in ways you obviously know are wrong — these are clear moral failings.
Perhaps. But new research of ours, forthcoming in the journal Psychological Science (and in collaboration with our colleague Paul Bloom), suggests a different explanation. We contend that the reason people dislike hypocrites is that their outspoken moralizing falsely signals their own virtue. People object, in other words, to the misleading implication — not to a failure of will or a weakness of character.
The article is here.
The New York Times - Gray Matters
Originally posted January 13, 2017
What, exactly, is the problem with hypocrisy? When someone condemns the behavior of others, why do we find it so objectionable if we learn he engages in the same behavior himself?
The answer may seem self-evident. Not practicing what you preach; lacking the willpower to live up to your own ideals; behaving in ways you obviously know are wrong — these are clear moral failings.
Perhaps. But new research of ours, forthcoming in the journal Psychological Science (and in collaboration with our colleague Paul Bloom), suggests a different explanation. We contend that the reason people dislike hypocrites is that their outspoken moralizing falsely signals their own virtue. People object, in other words, to the misleading implication — not to a failure of will or a weakness of character.
The article is here.
Friday, February 3, 2017
Beyond Conflicts of Interest: Disclosing Medical Biases
David M. Shaw
JAMA. 2014;312(7):697-698.
doi:10.1001/jama.2014.8035
The editors of medical and scientific journals always ask authors of papers to declare any financial conflicts of interest (COIs) related to their research. There has recently been a shift away from allowing authors to decide what constitutes a financial COI toward asking them to disclose any potential perceived COI; some journal editors even ask authors to disclose any and all financial interests that they have. But there has also been a shift away from this focus on financial COIs toward a wider conception of COI that includes other types of bias. Since 2010, all journals associated with the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) have asked authors to complete a unified COI form that requires disclosure of the following:
1. Associations with commercial entities that provided support for the work reported in the submitted
manuscript (the timeframe for disclosure in this section of the form is the life span of the work being reported).
2. Associations with commercial entities that could be viewed as having an interest in the general area of the submitted manuscript (in the three years before submission of the manuscript).
3. Non-financial associations that may be relevant or seen as relevant to the submitted manuscript.
The article is here.
JAMA. 2014;312(7):697-698.
doi:10.1001/jama.2014.8035
The editors of medical and scientific journals always ask authors of papers to declare any financial conflicts of interest (COIs) related to their research. There has recently been a shift away from allowing authors to decide what constitutes a financial COI toward asking them to disclose any potential perceived COI; some journal editors even ask authors to disclose any and all financial interests that they have. But there has also been a shift away from this focus on financial COIs toward a wider conception of COI that includes other types of bias. Since 2010, all journals associated with the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) have asked authors to complete a unified COI form that requires disclosure of the following:
1. Associations with commercial entities that provided support for the work reported in the submitted
manuscript (the timeframe for disclosure in this section of the form is the life span of the work being reported).
2. Associations with commercial entities that could be viewed as having an interest in the general area of the submitted manuscript (in the three years before submission of the manuscript).
3. Non-financial associations that may be relevant or seen as relevant to the submitted manuscript.
The article is here.
Thursday, February 2, 2017
Will artificial intelligence help to crack biology?
The Economist
Originally published January 7, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
Another important biological hurdle that AI can help people surmount is complexity. Experimental science progresses by holding steady one variable at a time, an approach that is not always easy when dealing with networks of genes, proteins or other molecules. AI can handle this more easily than human beings.
At BERG Health, the firm’s AI system starts by analysing tissue samples, genomics and other clinical data relevant to a particular disease. It then tries to model from this information the network of protein interactions that underlie that disease. At that point human researchers intervene to test the model’s predictions in a real biological system. One of the potential drugs BERG Health has discovered this way—for topical squamous-cell carcinoma, a form of skin cancer—passed early trials for safety and efficacy, and now awaits full-scale testing. The company says it has others in development.
For all the grand aspirations of the AI folk, though, there are reasons for caution. Dr Mead warns: “I don’t think we are in a state to model even a single cell. The model we have is incomplete.” Actually, that incompleteness applies even to models of single proteins, meaning that science is not yet good at predicting whether a particular modification will make a molecule intended to interact with a given protein a better drug or not. Most known protein structures have been worked out from crystallised versions of the molecule, held tight by networks of chemical bonds. In reality, proteins are flexible, but that is much harder to deal with.
The article is here.
Originally published January 7, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
Another important biological hurdle that AI can help people surmount is complexity. Experimental science progresses by holding steady one variable at a time, an approach that is not always easy when dealing with networks of genes, proteins or other molecules. AI can handle this more easily than human beings.
At BERG Health, the firm’s AI system starts by analysing tissue samples, genomics and other clinical data relevant to a particular disease. It then tries to model from this information the network of protein interactions that underlie that disease. At that point human researchers intervene to test the model’s predictions in a real biological system. One of the potential drugs BERG Health has discovered this way—for topical squamous-cell carcinoma, a form of skin cancer—passed early trials for safety and efficacy, and now awaits full-scale testing. The company says it has others in development.
For all the grand aspirations of the AI folk, though, there are reasons for caution. Dr Mead warns: “I don’t think we are in a state to model even a single cell. The model we have is incomplete.” Actually, that incompleteness applies even to models of single proteins, meaning that science is not yet good at predicting whether a particular modification will make a molecule intended to interact with a given protein a better drug or not. Most known protein structures have been worked out from crystallised versions of the molecule, held tight by networks of chemical bonds. In reality, proteins are flexible, but that is much harder to deal with.
The article is here.
New fertility procedure may lead to 'embryo farming', warn researchers
Ian Sample
The Guardian
Originally posted January 11, 2017
A new lab procedure that could allow fertility clinics to make sperm and eggs from people’s skin may lead to “embryo farming” on a massive scale and drive parents to have only “ideal” future children, researchers warn.
Legal and medical specialists in the US say that while the procedure – known as in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) – has only been demonstrated in mice so far, the field is progressing so fast that the dramatic impact it could have on society must be planned for now.
“We try not to take a position on these issues except to point out that before too long we may well be facing them, and we might do well to start the conversation now,” said Eli Adashi, professor of medical science at Brown University in Rhode Island.
The creation of sperm and eggs from other tissues has become possible through a flurry of recent advances in which scientists have learned first to reprogram adult cells into a younger, more versatile state, and then to grow them into functioning sex cells. In October, scientists in Japan announced for the first time the birth of baby mice from eggs made with their parent’s skin.
The article is here.
The Guardian
Originally posted January 11, 2017
A new lab procedure that could allow fertility clinics to make sperm and eggs from people’s skin may lead to “embryo farming” on a massive scale and drive parents to have only “ideal” future children, researchers warn.
Legal and medical specialists in the US say that while the procedure – known as in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) – has only been demonstrated in mice so far, the field is progressing so fast that the dramatic impact it could have on society must be planned for now.
“We try not to take a position on these issues except to point out that before too long we may well be facing them, and we might do well to start the conversation now,” said Eli Adashi, professor of medical science at Brown University in Rhode Island.
The creation of sperm and eggs from other tissues has become possible through a flurry of recent advances in which scientists have learned first to reprogram adult cells into a younger, more versatile state, and then to grow them into functioning sex cells. In October, scientists in Japan announced for the first time the birth of baby mice from eggs made with their parent’s skin.
The article is here.
Wednesday, February 1, 2017
New American Psychiatric Association Policy Prohibits Participation in Euthanasia of Non-Terminally Ill
Mark Moran
Psychiatric News
Published online: January 03, 2017
A psychiatrist should not prescribe or administer any intervention to a non-terminally ill person to cause death, according to a position statement passed by the APA Assembly at its meeting in Washington, D.C., this past November. The statement was approved one month later by the APA Board of Trustees by unanimous consent.
The precise wording of the Position Statement on Medical Euthanasia is as follows: “The American Psychiatric Association, in concert with the American Medical Association’s position on medical euthanasia, holds that a psychiatrist should not prescribe or administer any intervention to a non-terminally ill person for the purpose of causing death.”
(Policies and position statements approved by the Assembly are not official APA policy until they are approved by the Board. For a complete report on Board actions at its meeting this past December, see the next issue of Psychiatric News.)
In an interview with Psychiatric News, Mark S. Komrad M.D., an Assembly representative from the Southern Psychiatric Association who cosponsored the position statement in the Assembly, said it was crafted in response to reports from Belgium, the Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe that physician involvement in “assisted suicide” had evolved from assisting terminally ill patients to die to actively helping non-terminally ill patients—including mentally ill individuals—die. Annette Hanson, M.D., was co-sponsor of the statement in the Assembly.
The article is here.
Psychiatric News
Published online: January 03, 2017
A psychiatrist should not prescribe or administer any intervention to a non-terminally ill person to cause death, according to a position statement passed by the APA Assembly at its meeting in Washington, D.C., this past November. The statement was approved one month later by the APA Board of Trustees by unanimous consent.
The precise wording of the Position Statement on Medical Euthanasia is as follows: “The American Psychiatric Association, in concert with the American Medical Association’s position on medical euthanasia, holds that a psychiatrist should not prescribe or administer any intervention to a non-terminally ill person for the purpose of causing death.”
(Policies and position statements approved by the Assembly are not official APA policy until they are approved by the Board. For a complete report on Board actions at its meeting this past December, see the next issue of Psychiatric News.)
In an interview with Psychiatric News, Mark S. Komrad M.D., an Assembly representative from the Southern Psychiatric Association who cosponsored the position statement in the Assembly, said it was crafted in response to reports from Belgium, the Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe that physician involvement in “assisted suicide” had evolved from assisting terminally ill patients to die to actively helping non-terminally ill patients—including mentally ill individuals—die. Annette Hanson, M.D., was co-sponsor of the statement in the Assembly.
The article is here.
Why It’s So Hard to Train Someone to Make an Ethical Decision
Eugene Soltes
Harvard Business Review
Originally posted January 11, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
The second factor distinguishing training exercises from real-life decision making is that training inevitably exposes different points of views and judgments. Although many organizations outwardly express a desire for a diversity of opinions, in practice those differing viewpoints are often stifled by the desire to agree or appease others. Even at the most senior levels of the organization, independent directors struggle to dissent. For instance, Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO of Tyco who grew the firm from obscurity into a global conglomerate but later faced criminal charges for embezzlement, recalled the challenge of board members genuinely disagreeing and pushing back on him as CEO when the firm was performing well. “When the CEO is in the room, directors — even independent directors — tend to want to try to please him,” Kozlowski explained. “The board would give me anything I wanted. Anything.”
Finally, unlike in training, when a single decision might be given an hour of careful analysis, most actual decisions are made quickly and rely on intuition rather than careful, reflective reasoning. This can be especially problematic for moral decisions, which often rely on routine and intuitions that produce mindless judgements that don’t match up with how we’d desire to respond if we considered the decision with more time.
The article is here.
Editor's note: While I agree that it can be difficult to teach someone to make an ethical decision, maybe we can develop alternative ways to teach ethical decision-making. Ethics education requires attention to how personal values blend with work responsibilities, emotional reactions to ethical dilemmas, and biases and heuristics related to decision-making skills in general, and ethics in particular. If an individual feels pressure to make a decision, then there are typically ways to slow down the process. Finally, ethics education can include quality enhancement strategies, including redundant protections and consultation, that can bolster the opportunity for better outcomes.
Harvard Business Review
Originally posted January 11, 2017
Here is an excerpt:
The second factor distinguishing training exercises from real-life decision making is that training inevitably exposes different points of views and judgments. Although many organizations outwardly express a desire for a diversity of opinions, in practice those differing viewpoints are often stifled by the desire to agree or appease others. Even at the most senior levels of the organization, independent directors struggle to dissent. For instance, Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO of Tyco who grew the firm from obscurity into a global conglomerate but later faced criminal charges for embezzlement, recalled the challenge of board members genuinely disagreeing and pushing back on him as CEO when the firm was performing well. “When the CEO is in the room, directors — even independent directors — tend to want to try to please him,” Kozlowski explained. “The board would give me anything I wanted. Anything.”
Finally, unlike in training, when a single decision might be given an hour of careful analysis, most actual decisions are made quickly and rely on intuition rather than careful, reflective reasoning. This can be especially problematic for moral decisions, which often rely on routine and intuitions that produce mindless judgements that don’t match up with how we’d desire to respond if we considered the decision with more time.
The article is here.
Editor's note: While I agree that it can be difficult to teach someone to make an ethical decision, maybe we can develop alternative ways to teach ethical decision-making. Ethics education requires attention to how personal values blend with work responsibilities, emotional reactions to ethical dilemmas, and biases and heuristics related to decision-making skills in general, and ethics in particular. If an individual feels pressure to make a decision, then there are typically ways to slow down the process. Finally, ethics education can include quality enhancement strategies, including redundant protections and consultation, that can bolster the opportunity for better outcomes.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)