The psychologist and bestselling author of Thinking, Fast and Slow reveals his new research and talks about prejudice, fleeing the Nazis, and how to hold an effective meeting
By David Shariatmadari
The Guardian
Originally posted on July 18, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
What’s fascinating is that Kahneman’s work explicitly swims against the current of human thought. Not even he believes that the various flaws that bedevil decision-making can be successfully corrected. The most damaging of these is overconfidence: the kind of optimism that leads governments to believe that wars are quickly winnable and capital projects will come in on budget despite statistics predicting exactly the opposite. It is the bias he says he would most like to eliminate if he had a magic wand. But it “is built so deeply into the structure of the mind that you couldn’t change it without changing many other things”.
The entire article is here.
Wednesday, August 5, 2015
Despite allegations, suspended priest thrives as family therapist
Caitlin McCabe
Philadelphia Inquirer
Originally posted July 16, 2015
After the Roman Catholic Diocese of Camden removed Edward Igle from active ministry in 2000 over an allegation of sex abuse, he turned to his second career: family counseling.
Licensed as a therapist since the 1980s, the suspended priest runs a South Jersey practice, counseling families and children, and teaches related classes through a Philadelphia-based center, including on how to identify and clinically treat victims of sex abuse.
In 2011, church officials told New Jersey regulators about two men who claimed that Igle abused them in the 1970s. The diocese deemed both claims credible, a spokesman said, but too late under the statute of limitations to lead to prosecution.
The state has repeatedly renewed Igle's licenses.
In interviews this month, Igle, 68, denied any misconduct. He called "inaccurate" any suggestion that the first abuse allegation forced him from ministry.
"I have never sexually abused anyone in my life," he said last week at his Vineland family and marriage counseling practice, the Center for Relational Counseling.
He said that although he counsels children, he never meets alone with them. And when he teaches professionals about sex abuse, among other topics, he said he sometimes mentions that he was once accused of abuse.
The entire article is here.
Philadelphia Inquirer
Originally posted July 16, 2015
After the Roman Catholic Diocese of Camden removed Edward Igle from active ministry in 2000 over an allegation of sex abuse, he turned to his second career: family counseling.
Licensed as a therapist since the 1980s, the suspended priest runs a South Jersey practice, counseling families and children, and teaches related classes through a Philadelphia-based center, including on how to identify and clinically treat victims of sex abuse.
In 2011, church officials told New Jersey regulators about two men who claimed that Igle abused them in the 1970s. The diocese deemed both claims credible, a spokesman said, but too late under the statute of limitations to lead to prosecution.
The state has repeatedly renewed Igle's licenses.
In interviews this month, Igle, 68, denied any misconduct. He called "inaccurate" any suggestion that the first abuse allegation forced him from ministry.
"I have never sexually abused anyone in my life," he said last week at his Vineland family and marriage counseling practice, the Center for Relational Counseling.
He said that although he counsels children, he never meets alone with them. And when he teaches professionals about sex abuse, among other topics, he said he sometimes mentions that he was once accused of abuse.
The entire article is here.
Tuesday, August 4, 2015
Killer Robots: The Soldiers that Never Sleep
By Simon Parker
BBC.com
Originally published July 16, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Likewise, a fully autonomous version of the Predator drone may have to decide whether or not to fire on a house whose occupants include both enemy soldiers and civilians. How do you, as a software engineer, construct a set of rules for such a device to follow in these scenarios? Is it possible to programme a device to think for itself? For many, the simplest solution is to sidestep these questions by simply requiring any automated machine that puts human life in danger to allow a human override. This is the reason that landmines were banned by the Ottawa treaty in 1997. They were, in the most basic way imaginable, autonomous weapons that would explode whoever stepped on them.
In this context the provision of human overrides make sense. It seems obvious, for example, that pilots should have full control over a plane's autopilot system. But the 2015 Germanwings disaster, when co-pilot Andreas Lubitz deliberately crashed the plane into the French Alps, killing all 150 passengers, complicates the matter. Perhaps, in fact, no pilot should be allowed to override a computer – at least, not if it means they are able to fly a plane into a mountainside?
“There are multiple approaches to trying to develop ethical machines, and many challenges,” explains Gary Marcus, cognitive scientist at NYU and CEO and Founder of Geometric Intelligence. “We could try to pre-program everything in advance, but that’s not trivial – how for example do you program in a notion like ‘fairness’ or ‘harm’?” There is another dimension to the problem aside from ambiguous definitions. For example, any set of rules issued to an automated soldier will surely be either too abstract to be properly computable, or too specific to cover all situations.
The entire article is here.
BBC.com
Originally published July 16, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
Likewise, a fully autonomous version of the Predator drone may have to decide whether or not to fire on a house whose occupants include both enemy soldiers and civilians. How do you, as a software engineer, construct a set of rules for such a device to follow in these scenarios? Is it possible to programme a device to think for itself? For many, the simplest solution is to sidestep these questions by simply requiring any automated machine that puts human life in danger to allow a human override. This is the reason that landmines were banned by the Ottawa treaty in 1997. They were, in the most basic way imaginable, autonomous weapons that would explode whoever stepped on them.
In this context the provision of human overrides make sense. It seems obvious, for example, that pilots should have full control over a plane's autopilot system. But the 2015 Germanwings disaster, when co-pilot Andreas Lubitz deliberately crashed the plane into the French Alps, killing all 150 passengers, complicates the matter. Perhaps, in fact, no pilot should be allowed to override a computer – at least, not if it means they are able to fly a plane into a mountainside?
“There are multiple approaches to trying to develop ethical machines, and many challenges,” explains Gary Marcus, cognitive scientist at NYU and CEO and Founder of Geometric Intelligence. “We could try to pre-program everything in advance, but that’s not trivial – how for example do you program in a notion like ‘fairness’ or ‘harm’?” There is another dimension to the problem aside from ambiguous definitions. For example, any set of rules issued to an automated soldier will surely be either too abstract to be properly computable, or too specific to cover all situations.
The entire article is here.
Psychologists are known for being liberal, but why?
By Elliot Berkman
The Conversation
Originally published July 14, 2015
Is the field of social psychology biased against political conservatives? There has been intense debate about this question since an informal poll of over 1,000 attendees at a social psychology meeting in 2011 revealed the group to be overwhelmingly liberal.
Formal surveys have produced similar results, showing the ratio of liberals to conservatives in the broader field of psychology is 14-to-1.
Since then, social psychologists have tried to figure out why this imbalance exists.
The primary explanation offered is that the field has an anticonservative bias. I have no doubt that this bias exists, but it’s not strong enough to push people who lean conservative out of the field at the rate they appear to be leaving.
I believe that a less prominent explanation is more compelling: learning about social psychology can make you more liberal. I know about this possibility because it is exactly what happened to me.
The entire article is here.
The Conversation
Originally published July 14, 2015
Is the field of social psychology biased against political conservatives? There has been intense debate about this question since an informal poll of over 1,000 attendees at a social psychology meeting in 2011 revealed the group to be overwhelmingly liberal.
Formal surveys have produced similar results, showing the ratio of liberals to conservatives in the broader field of psychology is 14-to-1.
Since then, social psychologists have tried to figure out why this imbalance exists.
The primary explanation offered is that the field has an anticonservative bias. I have no doubt that this bias exists, but it’s not strong enough to push people who lean conservative out of the field at the rate they appear to be leaving.
I believe that a less prominent explanation is more compelling: learning about social psychology can make you more liberal. I know about this possibility because it is exactly what happened to me.
The entire article is here.
Monday, August 3, 2015
Empathy Is Actually a Choice
By Daryl Cameron, Michael Inzlicht and William A. Cunningham
The New York Times - Gray Matter
Originally published July 10, 2015
ONE death is a tragedy. One million is a statistic.
You’ve probably heard this saying before. It is thought to capture an unfortunate truth about empathy: While a single crying child or injured puppy tugs at our heartstrings, large numbers of suffering people, as in epidemics, earthquakes and genocides, do not inspire a comparable reaction.
Studies have repeatedly confirmed this. It’s a troubling finding because, as recent research has demonstrated, many of us believe that if more lives are at stake, we will — and should — feel more empathy (i.e., vicariously share others’ experiences) and do more to help.
Not only does empathy seem to fail when it is needed most, but it also appears to play favorites. Recent studies have shown that our empathy is dampened or constrained when it comes to people of different races, nationalities or creeds. These results suggest that empathy is a limited resource, like a fossil fuel, which we cannot extend indefinitely or to everyone.
The entire article is here.
The New York Times - Gray Matter
Originally published July 10, 2015
ONE death is a tragedy. One million is a statistic.
You’ve probably heard this saying before. It is thought to capture an unfortunate truth about empathy: While a single crying child or injured puppy tugs at our heartstrings, large numbers of suffering people, as in epidemics, earthquakes and genocides, do not inspire a comparable reaction.
Studies have repeatedly confirmed this. It’s a troubling finding because, as recent research has demonstrated, many of us believe that if more lives are at stake, we will — and should — feel more empathy (i.e., vicariously share others’ experiences) and do more to help.
Not only does empathy seem to fail when it is needed most, but it also appears to play favorites. Recent studies have shown that our empathy is dampened or constrained when it comes to people of different races, nationalities or creeds. These results suggest that empathy is a limited resource, like a fossil fuel, which we cannot extend indefinitely or to everyone.
The entire article is here.
Cheeseburger ethics
By Eric Schwitzgebel
Aeon Magazine
Originally published July 15, 2015
Here are two excerpts:
Ethicists do not appear to behave better. Never once have we found ethicists as a whole behaving better than our comparison groups of other professors, by any of our main planned measures. But neither, overall, do they seem to behave worse. (There are some mixed results for secondary measures.) For the most part, ethicists behave no differently from professors of any other sort – logicians, chemists, historians, foreign-language instructors.
(cut)
‘Furthermore,’ she continues, ‘if we demand that ethicists live according to the norms they espouse, that will put major distortive pressures on the field. An ethicist who feels obligated to live as she teaches will be motivated to avoid highly self-sacrificial conclusions, such as that the wealthy should give most of their money to charity or that we should eat only a restricted subset of foods. Disconnecting professional ethicists’ academic enquiries from their personal choices allows them to consider the arguments in a more even-handed way. If no one expects us to act in accord with our scholarly opinions, we are more likely to arrive at the moral truth.’
The entire article is here.
Aeon Magazine
Originally published July 15, 2015
Here are two excerpts:
Ethicists do not appear to behave better. Never once have we found ethicists as a whole behaving better than our comparison groups of other professors, by any of our main planned measures. But neither, overall, do they seem to behave worse. (There are some mixed results for secondary measures.) For the most part, ethicists behave no differently from professors of any other sort – logicians, chemists, historians, foreign-language instructors.
(cut)
‘Furthermore,’ she continues, ‘if we demand that ethicists live according to the norms they espouse, that will put major distortive pressures on the field. An ethicist who feels obligated to live as she teaches will be motivated to avoid highly self-sacrificial conclusions, such as that the wealthy should give most of their money to charity or that we should eat only a restricted subset of foods. Disconnecting professional ethicists’ academic enquiries from their personal choices allows them to consider the arguments in a more even-handed way. If no one expects us to act in accord with our scholarly opinions, we are more likely to arrive at the moral truth.’
The entire article is here.
Sunday, August 2, 2015
Is Consciousness an Engineering Problem?
We could build an artificial brain that believes itself to be conscious. Does that mean we have solved the hard problem?
By Michael Graziano
Aeon Magazine
Originally published July 10, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
As long as scholars think of consciousness as a magic essence floating inside the brain, it won’t be very interesting to engineers. But if it’s a crucial set of information, a kind of map that allows the brain to function correctly, then engineers may want to know about it. And that brings us back to artificial intelligence. Gone are the days of waiting for computers to get so complicated that they spontaneously become conscious. And gone are the days of dismissing consciousness as an airy-fairy essence that would bring no obvious practical benefit to a computer anyway. Suddenly it becomes an incredibly useful tool for the machine.
The entire article is here.
By Michael Graziano
Aeon Magazine
Originally published July 10, 2015
Here is an excerpt:
As long as scholars think of consciousness as a magic essence floating inside the brain, it won’t be very interesting to engineers. But if it’s a crucial set of information, a kind of map that allows the brain to function correctly, then engineers may want to know about it. And that brings us back to artificial intelligence. Gone are the days of waiting for computers to get so complicated that they spontaneously become conscious. And gone are the days of dismissing consciousness as an airy-fairy essence that would bring no obvious practical benefit to a computer anyway. Suddenly it becomes an incredibly useful tool for the machine.
The entire article is here.
Saturday, August 1, 2015
Dilemma 33: Breaking Bad (or Good)
Dr. Jesse Pinkman has been working with a 26-year-old professional for about a year, Ms. Skyler White. They have been working on managing her symptoms of depression and anxiety. The patient smokes marijuana regularly, which has been a concern for Dr. Pinkman.
Skyler arrives late to her appointment, looking frazzled. She explained her friend overdosed on heroin the prior evening. She has been in the ER for the past 12 hours. Her friend will likely survive, but she may have residual cognitive problems.
Skyler reported feeling horribly guilty because she introduced her friend to her next door neighbor, who is the drug dealer. Her friend always stops by to see Skyler first, before purchasing drugs. Skyler purchases her marijuana from the same dealer.
After processing the events of the previous evening, Skyler stated she will move away from the drug dealer. She no longer wants to be this close or indirectly cause harm to someone else. The police are actively investigating, but Skyler does not want to divulge any information. She does not want to get involved. Skyler makes an appointment for next week, and then leaves feeling somewhat better.
Dr. Pinkman becomes preoccupied about what Skyler reported. Dr. Pinkman knows the dealer’s name from previous sessions and can figure out the address of dealer, based on his patient’s address.
Dr. Pinkman is contemplating calling in an anonymous tip to the police. Dr. Pinkman is aware of the increase in heroin use in his community. He also recognizes his struggle with moral outrage and sense of injustice in this situation. Struggling with the emotions to report or not report anonymously, Dr. Pinkman calls you for a consultation.
What are the competing ethical principles in this situation?
How would you feel if you were Dr. Pinkman?
What are some of the positive and negative consequences about Dr. Pinkman making the anonymous report?
How do your own professional values and personal morals influence how you would respond to Dr. Pinkman?
How would you respond to Dr. Pinkman’s moral outrage?
Would your answers differ if the friend died?
Would your answers differ if the patient was of low socio-economic status?
Would your answers differ if Skyler were a teenager?
Skyler arrives late to her appointment, looking frazzled. She explained her friend overdosed on heroin the prior evening. She has been in the ER for the past 12 hours. Her friend will likely survive, but she may have residual cognitive problems.
Skyler reported feeling horribly guilty because she introduced her friend to her next door neighbor, who is the drug dealer. Her friend always stops by to see Skyler first, before purchasing drugs. Skyler purchases her marijuana from the same dealer.
After processing the events of the previous evening, Skyler stated she will move away from the drug dealer. She no longer wants to be this close or indirectly cause harm to someone else. The police are actively investigating, but Skyler does not want to divulge any information. She does not want to get involved. Skyler makes an appointment for next week, and then leaves feeling somewhat better.
Dr. Pinkman becomes preoccupied about what Skyler reported. Dr. Pinkman knows the dealer’s name from previous sessions and can figure out the address of dealer, based on his patient’s address.
Dr. Pinkman is contemplating calling in an anonymous tip to the police. Dr. Pinkman is aware of the increase in heroin use in his community. He also recognizes his struggle with moral outrage and sense of injustice in this situation. Struggling with the emotions to report or not report anonymously, Dr. Pinkman calls you for a consultation.
What are the competing ethical principles in this situation?
How would you feel if you were Dr. Pinkman?
What are some of the positive and negative consequences about Dr. Pinkman making the anonymous report?
How do your own professional values and personal morals influence how you would respond to Dr. Pinkman?
How would you respond to Dr. Pinkman’s moral outrage?
Would your answers differ if the friend died?
Would your answers differ if the patient was of low socio-economic status?
Would your answers differ if Skyler were a teenager?
Friday, July 31, 2015
Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Kurt Gray , Liane Young , Adam Waytz
Psychological Inquiry
Vol. 23, Iss. 2, 2012
Abstract
Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.
The entire article is here.
Psychological Inquiry
Vol. 23, Iss. 2, 2012
Abstract
Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.
The entire article is here.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)