By Heath White
PEA Soup
A blog dedicated to philosophy, ethics, and academia
Originally posted December 19, 2013
Does moral responsibility require the ability to do otherwise? For example, must one have been able to refrain from an evil deed if one is to be appropriately blamed for it? The answer turns on the truth of a familiar principle:
(PAP) If S is blameworthy for doing X, S must have been able to do otherwise than X.
The traditional view is that (PAP) is true; Frankfurt argued that it was false, with a form of example which is still widely discussed. I’m going to argue for Frankfurt’s conclusion in a way that has nothing to do with Frankfurt-style examples. I’d be interested in feedback.
Blaming (or punishing) someone for failing to live up to a moral standard is a special case of a more general phenomenon. There are many cases where there is some kind of requirement, someone fails to live up to it, and negative consequences are imposed as a result. It is instructive to look at how we view “couldn’t have done otherwise” in these other cases.
The entire blog post is here.
Sunday, January 5, 2014
Saturday, January 4, 2014
Free Will, Responsibility, and Psychology
Greg Caruso and Bruce Waller Discussion
Philosophy TV
Originally posted December 16, 2013
Most people believe that we can and should be held morally responsible for our actions. Caruso and Waller both hold that this belief is not only false, but harmful. They recommend that we abandon the notion of moral responsibility. But they disagree about free will: Waller thinks that we can preserve a scientifically and philosophically respectable notion of free will without moral responsibility; Caruso thinks that free will and moral responsibility should both be rejected. They begin their discussion with an overview of the traditional problem of free will (1:09). Next, they discuss Waller’s view of free will (9:14) and debate whether the notion of free will ought to be given up (23:51). Then they lay out their reasons to be skeptical about moral responsibility (41:04) and consider some of the concerns that have been expressed by defenders of moral responsibility (54:05).
The original information is here.
Philosophy TV
Originally posted December 16, 2013
Most people believe that we can and should be held morally responsible for our actions. Caruso and Waller both hold that this belief is not only false, but harmful. They recommend that we abandon the notion of moral responsibility. But they disagree about free will: Waller thinks that we can preserve a scientifically and philosophically respectable notion of free will without moral responsibility; Caruso thinks that free will and moral responsibility should both be rejected. They begin their discussion with an overview of the traditional problem of free will (1:09). Next, they discuss Waller’s view of free will (9:14) and debate whether the notion of free will ought to be given up (23:51). Then they lay out their reasons to be skeptical about moral responsibility (41:04) and consider some of the concerns that have been expressed by defenders of moral responsibility (54:05).
The original information is here.
Nanoethics as a Discipline?
By Adam Keiper
The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society
Originally published in 2007, but still relevant today
Here is an excerpt:
The growing interest among academics and activists in the implications of nanotechnology is surely, in some ways, to be welcomed. Serious scholarship and responsible advocacy can serve to enlighten and invigorate policy disputes and thereby play an important role in democratic self-rule. After all, as anyone who follows nanotech policy debates even from a distance can tell you, those debates are awash in spin and misinformation. Environmental groups exaggerate the known dangers of nanoparticles. Firms involved in nanotech investment vie with one another in hyping their projections of how many trillions of dollars the “nanotechnology market,” defined as expansively as possible, will be worth in a few years’ time. Some analysts are ludicrously credulous, while others are just plain confused — like the panelist at a conference in Washington in April 2006 who fretted about Pentagon-funded research on nanosatellites. (Nanosatellites are just small satellites; they have even less to do with nanotechnology than Apple’s “iPod nano” does.) Commentators who are ill-informed or disingenuous or just “shooting from the lip” may, in time, cede the sound bites and the airwaves to the growing ranks of better-informed and more responsible scholars — or at least that’s the theory.
Indeed, that theory seems itself to be the core of nanoethics at the moment. A recurring theme in much of the social-science writing about nanotechnology is the importance of social-science writing about nanotechnology. When you sift through the growing piles of scholarship about media coverage of nanotechnology, about the public understanding of and attitudes toward nanotechnology, about whether there are multiple “publics” who need to be “engaged” in nanotech policy, one sentiment in particular becomes clear — social scientists’ sense of self-importance.
The entire article is here.
The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society
Originally published in 2007, but still relevant today
Here is an excerpt:
The growing interest among academics and activists in the implications of nanotechnology is surely, in some ways, to be welcomed. Serious scholarship and responsible advocacy can serve to enlighten and invigorate policy disputes and thereby play an important role in democratic self-rule. After all, as anyone who follows nanotech policy debates even from a distance can tell you, those debates are awash in spin and misinformation. Environmental groups exaggerate the known dangers of nanoparticles. Firms involved in nanotech investment vie with one another in hyping their projections of how many trillions of dollars the “nanotechnology market,” defined as expansively as possible, will be worth in a few years’ time. Some analysts are ludicrously credulous, while others are just plain confused — like the panelist at a conference in Washington in April 2006 who fretted about Pentagon-funded research on nanosatellites. (Nanosatellites are just small satellites; they have even less to do with nanotechnology than Apple’s “iPod nano” does.) Commentators who are ill-informed or disingenuous or just “shooting from the lip” may, in time, cede the sound bites and the airwaves to the growing ranks of better-informed and more responsible scholars — or at least that’s the theory.
Indeed, that theory seems itself to be the core of nanoethics at the moment. A recurring theme in much of the social-science writing about nanotechnology is the importance of social-science writing about nanotechnology. When you sift through the growing piles of scholarship about media coverage of nanotechnology, about the public understanding of and attitudes toward nanotechnology, about whether there are multiple “publics” who need to be “engaged” in nanotech policy, one sentiment in particular becomes clear — social scientists’ sense of self-importance.
The entire article is here.
Friday, January 3, 2014
Ideology Is Heritable Yet Societies Can Change Their Views Quickly
By Jonathan Haidt
Social Evolution Forum
Originally published December 16, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
From my perspective as a social psychologist, who studies morality from an evolutionary perspective, rapid attitude change is not hard to explain. I am impressed by the consistent data on heritability, showing that some very important parts of our moral and political views are innate. But innate does not mean hard-wired or unmalleable; it means “structured in advance of experience, and experience can edit and alter that first draft.” (That’s a paraphrase from Gary Marcus). So even if one is born predisposed to questioning authority and seeking out diversity, life experiences can still alter one’s habitual reactions. Becoming a parent, especially of girls, seems to make people more conservative (they perceive more threats in the world).
The entire article is here.
Social Evolution Forum
Originally published December 16, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
From my perspective as a social psychologist, who studies morality from an evolutionary perspective, rapid attitude change is not hard to explain. I am impressed by the consistent data on heritability, showing that some very important parts of our moral and political views are innate. But innate does not mean hard-wired or unmalleable; it means “structured in advance of experience, and experience can edit and alter that first draft.” (That’s a paraphrase from Gary Marcus). So even if one is born predisposed to questioning authority and seeking out diversity, life experiences can still alter one’s habitual reactions. Becoming a parent, especially of girls, seems to make people more conservative (they perceive more threats in the world).
The entire article is here.
What is a mind and what is it good for?
By Damon Young
New Philosopher Magazine
Originally published December 18, 2013
“Philosophy,” wrote John Keats, “will clip an Angel’s wings. “This is the caricature: philosophers are brutal bastards, who cut beautiful things with logical clippers.
But philosophy is rarely malicious. Philosophy is often driven by something like love. From a comradely familiarity, to gentle romance, to manic lust, philosophers care about ideas. The ancient Greek word literally means this: “the love of wisdom”. It is a longing, not just for beautiful ideas, but for faithful ones: ideas that are true in some way.
This is why Alfred North White-head called philosophy the “critic of abstractions”: it seeks to test their fidelity.
The entire article is here.
New Philosopher Magazine
Originally published December 18, 2013
“Philosophy,” wrote John Keats, “will clip an Angel’s wings. “This is the caricature: philosophers are brutal bastards, who cut beautiful things with logical clippers.
But philosophy is rarely malicious. Philosophy is often driven by something like love. From a comradely familiarity, to gentle romance, to manic lust, philosophers care about ideas. The ancient Greek word literally means this: “the love of wisdom”. It is a longing, not just for beautiful ideas, but for faithful ones: ideas that are true in some way.
This is why Alfred North White-head called philosophy the “critic of abstractions”: it seeks to test their fidelity.
The entire article is here.
Thursday, January 2, 2014
New iPad app will teach empathy
By Greg Toppo
USA Today
Originally posted December 15, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
Goleman's best-selling 1995 book Emotional Intelligence popularized the idea that a child's ability to control his or her impulses, delay gratification, persist in the face of setbacks and generally be a more empathetic person could be bigger factors in his or her success than raw intelligence. More recently, educators — including the influential KIPP charter schools — have focused much of their college-completion efforts on kids' ability to show "grit" in everyday life.
The entire article is here.
USA Today
Originally posted December 15, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
Goleman's best-selling 1995 book Emotional Intelligence popularized the idea that a child's ability to control his or her impulses, delay gratification, persist in the face of setbacks and generally be a more empathetic person could be bigger factors in his or her success than raw intelligence. More recently, educators — including the influential KIPP charter schools — have focused much of their college-completion efforts on kids' ability to show "grit" in everyday life.
The entire article is here.
Privilege Discomfort: Why You Need to Get the F&#k Over It
By Noor Al-Sibai
Femisphere
Here is an excerpt:
As alarming (and fascinating) as this situation has been to watch at my otherwise polite and 96% white liberal arts university, it sparked in me a conundrum that I’ve struggled with myself and watched other people struggle with: Why do people become so defensive when confronted with the possibility of their own prejudice? What is it about the suggestion that we benefit from systems of inequality that causes so many people (particularly, in my experience, men and white people) to claim that they’re not “all like that”?
In my attempts to get to the root of the conundrum, I decided to use myself and other “well-meaning” white people that I know. Many of us consider ourselves liberal, even radical. We all have or have had black friends. Most of us probably voted for Barack Obama, and a lot of us are fans of rap and hip-hop. To all of us, my past self included, the assertion that we could be racist and that we definitely benefit from our white privilege is offensive at worst, dissonant at best. Cue the endless whines of “I don’t see race!” or, my overused favorite, “We’re not all like that!”
The entire blog post is here.
Femisphere
Here is an excerpt:
As alarming (and fascinating) as this situation has been to watch at my otherwise polite and 96% white liberal arts university, it sparked in me a conundrum that I’ve struggled with myself and watched other people struggle with: Why do people become so defensive when confronted with the possibility of their own prejudice? What is it about the suggestion that we benefit from systems of inequality that causes so many people (particularly, in my experience, men and white people) to claim that they’re not “all like that”?
In my attempts to get to the root of the conundrum, I decided to use myself and other “well-meaning” white people that I know. Many of us consider ourselves liberal, even radical. We all have or have had black friends. Most of us probably voted for Barack Obama, and a lot of us are fans of rap and hip-hop. To all of us, my past self included, the assertion that we could be racist and that we definitely benefit from our white privilege is offensive at worst, dissonant at best. Cue the endless whines of “I don’t see race!” or, my overused favorite, “We’re not all like that!”
The entire blog post is here.
Wednesday, January 1, 2014
The Essential Moral Self
Strohminger, N. and Nichols, S. (in press).
The Essential Moral Self. Cognition.
Abstract
It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits—more than any other mental faculty— are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits.
(cut)
Discussion
The studies described here illustrate several points about lay theories of personal identity. The first, most basic, point is that not all parts of the mind are equally constitutive of the self, challenging a straightforward view of psychological continuity. Identity does not simply depend on the magnitude of retained mental content; indeed, certain cognitive processes contribute less to identity than purely physical traits.
Across five experiments, we find strong and unequivocal support for the essential moral self hypothesis. Moral traits are considered more important to personal identity than any other part of the mind.
The entire article is here.
The Essential Moral Self. Cognition.
Abstract
It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits—more than any other mental faculty— are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits.
(cut)
Discussion
The studies described here illustrate several points about lay theories of personal identity. The first, most basic, point is that not all parts of the mind are equally constitutive of the self, challenging a straightforward view of psychological continuity. Identity does not simply depend on the magnitude of retained mental content; indeed, certain cognitive processes contribute less to identity than purely physical traits.
Across five experiments, we find strong and unequivocal support for the essential moral self hypothesis. Moral traits are considered more important to personal identity than any other part of the mind.
The entire article is here.
Patients who refuse their physicians’ advice
By Alex Lickerman
www.kevinmd.com Blog
Originally published December 17, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
While no medical intervention is 100% safe, the flu shot (for those not allergic to eggs) is pretty close. Yet every season, I never fail to have some of my patients refuse it. The most common reason I hear is, “I’ve never had the flu.” To this, I invariably say something like, “Just because you haven’t had a heart attack yet doesn’t mean you shouldn’t exercise.” I’d say roughly about half of my patients change their minds and decide to get the flu shot after I talk with them about it.
Over the years I’ve had numerous patients refuse my advice. It always bothers me — not because I like to think I’m right and my ego gets bruised, but because I genuinely believe my advice is in the best interest of my patients and I want them to do well. But over the years I’ve come to see that there are really two basic reasons patients refuse my advice, and that my response to them should be different.
The entire blog post is here.
www.kevinmd.com Blog
Originally published December 17, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
While no medical intervention is 100% safe, the flu shot (for those not allergic to eggs) is pretty close. Yet every season, I never fail to have some of my patients refuse it. The most common reason I hear is, “I’ve never had the flu.” To this, I invariably say something like, “Just because you haven’t had a heart attack yet doesn’t mean you shouldn’t exercise.” I’d say roughly about half of my patients change their minds and decide to get the flu shot after I talk with them about it.
Over the years I’ve had numerous patients refuse my advice. It always bothers me — not because I like to think I’m right and my ego gets bruised, but because I genuinely believe my advice is in the best interest of my patients and I want them to do well. But over the years I’ve come to see that there are really two basic reasons patients refuse my advice, and that my response to them should be different.
The entire blog post is here.
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