Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Psychology and Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Psychology and Law. Show all posts

Thursday, April 30, 2015

Most Prisoners Are Mentally Ill

By Olga Khazan
The Atlantic
Originally posted April 7, 2015

Here is an excerpt:

The numbers are even more stark when parsed by gender: 55 percent of male inmates in state prisons are mentally ill, but 73 percent of female inmates are. Meanwhile, the think-tank writes, "only one in three state prisoners and one in six jail inmates who suffer from mental-health problems report having received mental-health treatment since admission."

An increasingly popular program might help thin the ranks of these sick, untreated inmates. What are known as "mental-health courts" have sprung up in a number of states as an alternative to incarceration. A shoplifter who has, say, schizophrenia might be screened and found eligible for mental-health court, and then be sentenced to judicially supervised treatment. These types of courts have expanded rapidly since 2000, and there are now hundreds around the country.

The entire article is here.

Sunday, March 1, 2015

Montco woman, Temple professor not a licensed psychologist

By Jo Ciavaglia
Bucks County Courier Times
Originally posted February 4, 2015

Susan Schecter-Cornbluth swore under oath that she was a practicing clinical psychologist in Pennsylvania, as well as licensed to practice family and marriage therapy in New Jersey.

But Solebury police say that the 41-year-old Montgomery County woman, who also teaches psychology at Temple University, lied.

They said Schecter-Cornbluth, of Ambler, committed perjury in December 2013 when she testified as an “expert witness” in a Bucks County family court hearing that she was a “licensed clinical psychologist” in New Jersey.

The entire article is here.

Friday, January 30, 2015

Does Moral Responsibility Come in Degrees?

By Justin Caouette
Flickers of Freedom Blog
Originally published January 14, 2015

Here are two excerpts:

I think Mele is right to say that moral responsibility is commonly regarded as a matter of degree, but I’m not so sure that such an assumption is warranted. And, if the assumption is warranted, I think it’s worthwhile to get clear on why this is so.  Investigating this so-called degree feature might help to shed light on the nature of moral responsibility itself. Further, if one holds that moral responsibility does come in degrees it might limit what one can say about the nature of moral responsibility and this conclusion could be fruitful as well for those trying to uncover the the root of the differences between competing views.

(cut)

So, the purpose of posting on this topic is simply to get a sense of how can we make sense of moral responsibility as coming in degrees. Must we assume that blameworthiness and moral responsibility is the same thing to make sense of this? And, what does it even mean to say that moral responsibility comes in degrees?

The entire blog post, and some great responses, are here.

Editor's Note: These types of articles are particularly relevant for forensic psychology, and helping to understand how psychologists help describe mitigating factors.

Moral responsibility is also easily applied to psychotherapy.

Friday, January 16, 2015

My brain made me do it, but does that matter?

By Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
The Conversation
Originally published December 12, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

Despite some rhetoric, almost nobody really believes that the fact that your brain made you do it is by itself enough to excuse you from moral responsibility. On the other side, almost everybody agrees that some brain states, such as seizures, do remove moral responsibility. The real issues lie in the middle.

What about mental illnesses? Addictions? Compulsions? Brainwashing? Hypnosis? Tumors? Coercion? Alien hand syndrome? Multiple personality disorder? These cases are all tricky, so philosophers disagree about which people in these conditions are responsible — and why. Nonetheless, these difficult cases do not show that there is no difference between seizures and normal desires, just as twilight does not show that there is no difference between night and day. It is hard to draw a line, but that does not mean that there is no line.

The entire article is here.

Thursday, January 15, 2015

Decarceration of u.s. Jails and prisons: where will persons with serious mental illness go?

By H.R. Lamb and L.E. Weinberger
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law. 2014;42(4):489-94.

Abstract

Decarceration (decreasing the number of persons incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons) has begun. It is estimated that more than 350,000 persons with serious mental illness (SMI) are among those incarcerated in the United States and that many thousands of them will probably be among those released. Currently, the prison population in general is being reduced as a consequence of concerns about overcrowding and of policies and programs such as reclassification of drug possession, which would affect many persons with mental illness. Court-ordered diversion and changes in sentencing guidelines are also serving to reduce prison populations. In recent years, the mental health system did not have to manage as large a number of persons with SMI, especially those who were among the most difficult and expensive to treat, because many of them were incarcerated in jails and prisons. Now, with decarceration and the release of many such persons, the mental health system may be expected to assume more responsibility for them and should be prepared and funded to meet their needs. This population of persons with SMI needs structure and treatment that, depending upon their individual needs, may include 24-hour supportive housing, ACT and FACT teams, assisted outpatient treatment, psychiatric medication, and psychiatric hospitalization.

The article is here.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

Framed by forensics

Junky, out-of-date science fuels jury errors and tragic miscarriages of justice. How can we throw it out of court?

By Douglas Starr
Aeon Magazine
Originally published

Here is an excerpt:

Rivera’s case represents a tragic miscarriage of justice. Seen another way, it’s also the result of bad science and anti-scientific thinking – from the police’s coercive interview of a vulnerable person, to the jury’s acceptance of a false confession over physical evidence, including DNA.

Unfortunately, Rivera’s case is not unique. Hundreds of innocent people have been convicted by bad science, permitting an equal number of perpetrators to go free. It’s impossible to know how often this happens, but the growing number of DNA-related exonerations points to false convictions as the collateral damage of our legal system. Part of the problem involves faulty forensics: contrary to what we might see in the CSI drama shows on TV, few forensic labs are state-of-the-art, and they don’t always use scientific techniques. According to the US National Academy of Sciences, none of the traditional forensic techniques, such as hair comparison, bite-mark analysis or ballistics analysis, qualifies as rigorous, reproducible science. But it’s not just forensics: bad science is marbled throughout our legal system, from the way police interrogate suspects to the decisions judges make on whether to admit certain evidence in court.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, December 31, 2014

The Tarasoff Rule: The Implications of Interstate Variation and Gaps in Professional Training

By Rebecca Johnson, Govind Persad, and Dominic Sisti
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 42:4:469-477 (December 2014)

Abstract

Recent events have revived questions about the circumstances that ought to trigger therapists' duty to warn or protect. There is extensive interstate variation in duty to warn or protect statutes enacted and rulings made in the wake of the California Tarasoff ruling. These duties may be codified in legislative statutes, established in common law through court rulings, or remain unspecified. Furthermore, the duty to warn or protect is not only variable between states but also has been dynamic across time. In this article, we review the implications of this variability and dynamism, focusing on three sets of questions: first, what legal and ethics-related challenges do therapists in each of the three broad categories of states (states that mandate therapists to warn or protect, states that permit therapists to breach confidentiality for warnings but have no mandate, and states that give no guidance) face in handling threats of violence? Second, what training do therapists and other professionals involved in handling violent threats receive, and is this training adequate for the task that these professionals are charged with? Third, how have recent court cases changed the scope of the duty? We conclude by pointing to gaps in the empirical and conceptual scholarship surrounding the duty to warn or protect.

The entire article can be found here.

Making sense of a court's two cents

By David DeMatteo, JD, PhD, Jaymes Fairfax-Columbo, BA, and Daniel A. Krauss, JD, PhD
The Monitor on Psychology
December 2014, Vol 45, No. 11
Print version: page 24

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently decided two cases that address whether parties can use expert witnesses to help juries assess lay witness testimony. In one case, Commonwealth v. Walker (2014), the court lifted a ban on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. In the other case, Commonwealth v. Alicia (2014), the court held that expert testimony regarding false confessions was inadmissible.

Although the two outcomes diverged, robust research suggests that eyewitness identification and false confessions pose significant problems for the legal system (Wells et al., 1998; Kassin et al., 2010). So, how did the court justify its differing opinions? And what lessons can be learned from these discrepant decisions concerning how social science can influence legal decisions?

The entire article is here.

Sunday, December 28, 2014

Psychologists and psychiatrists serving as expert witnesses in court: what do they know about eyewitness memory?

Annika Melindera & Svein Magnussena
Psychology, Crime & Law
Volume 21, Issue 1, 2015, pp 53-61

Abstract

Expert witnesses have various tasks that frequently include issues of memory. We tested if expert witnesses outperform other practitioners on memory issues of high relevance to clinical practice. We surveyed psychiatrists and psychologists who reported serving as expert witnesses in court (n = 117) about their knowledge and beliefs about human memory. The results were compared to a sample of psychiatrists and psychologists who had never served as expert witnesses (n = 819). Contrary to our expectations, the professionals serving as expert witnesses did not outperform the practitioners who never served. A substantial minority of the respondents harbored scientifically unproven ideas of human memory on issues such as the memory of small children, repression of adult traumatic memories, and recovered traumatic childhood memories. We conclude that the expert witnesses are at risk of offering bad recommendations to the court in trials where reliability of eyewitness memory is at stake.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, December 24, 2014

Don't Execute Schizophrenic Killers

By Sally L. Satel
Bloomberg View
Originally posted December 1, 2014

Is someone who was diagnosed with schizophrenia years before committing murder sane enough to be sentenced to death?

The government thinks so in the case of Scott L. Panetti, 56, who will die on Wednesday by lethal injection in Texas unless Governor Rick Perry stays the execution.

(cut)

This is unjust. It is wrong to execute, even to punish, people who are so floridly psychotic when they commit their crimes that they are incapable of correcting the errors by logic or evidence.

Yet Texas, like many other states, considers a defendant sane as long as he knows, factually, that murder is wrong. Indeed, Panetti’s jury, which was instructed to apply this narrow standard, may have been legally correct to reject his insanity defense because he may have known that the murders were technically wrong.

The entire article is here.

Thursday, December 18, 2014

Prosecutor questions ethics of Jodi Arias witness

By Megan Cassidy
The Arizona Republic via USA Today
Originally published November 26, 2014

Prosecutor Juan Martinez on Tuesday continued his steady drum of implications and accusations against a defense expert for Jodi Arias in an attempt to discredit favorable testimony for the convicted killer.

Psychologist L.C. Miccio-Fonseca examined the sexual relationship between Arias and victim Travis Alexander, Arias' sometimes lover.

The entire article is here.

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

The Shrinking World of Ideas

By Arthur Krystal
The Chronicle Review
Originally posted November 21, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

For instance, psychologists and legal scholars, spurred by brain research and sophisticated brain-scanning techniques, have begun to reconsider ideas about volition. If all behavior has an electrochemical component, then in what sense—psychological, legal, moral—is a person responsible for his actions? Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen in a famous 2004 paper contend that neuroscience has put a new spin on free will and culpability: It "can help us see that all behavior is mechanical, that all behavior is produced by chains of physical events that ultimately reach back to forces beyond the agent’s control." Their hope is that the courts will ultimately discard blame-based punishment in favor of more "consequentialist approaches."

All this emphasis on the biological basis of human behavior is not to everyone’s liking. The British philosopher Roger Scruton, for one, takes exception to the notion that neuroscience can explain us to ourselves. He rejects the thought that the structure of the brain also structures the person, since an important distinction exists between an event in the brain and the behavior that follows. And, by the same token, the firing of neurons does not in a strictly causal sense account for identity, since a "person" is not identical to his or her physiological components.

The entire article is here.

Monday, November 24, 2014

Psychologist paying $550,000 settlement in toddler’s death

By Tom Jackman
The Washington Post
Originally published November 8, 2014

The mother of a 15-month-old boy who died while on a visit to his father in Manassas in 2012 will be paid a $550,000 wrongful death settlement from the psychologist who testified that it was safe to leave the boy with his father, Joaquin Rams.

The settlement was entered in Fairfax Circuit Court on Oct. 17, the same day that Prince William County prosecutors, who are seeking to prove that Rams killed his son, revealed that Virginia’s chief medical examiner had changed the official ruling on the cause of death from drowning to “undetermined.”

The entire article is here.

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Can a Jury Believe What It Sees?

Videotaped Confessions Can Be Misleading

By Jennifer L. Mnookin
The New York Times
Originally published July 13, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

The short answer is that, according to recent research, interrogation recording may in fact be too vivid and persuasive. Even seemingly neutral recordings still require interpretation. As advertisers and Hollywood directors know well, camera angles, close-ups, lenses and dozens of other techniques shape our perception of what we see without our being aware of it.

In a series of experiments led by the psychologist G. Daniel Lassiter of Ohio University, mock juries were shown exactly the same interrogation, but some saw only the defendant, while others had a wider-angle view that included the interrogator. When the interrogator isn’t shown on camera, jurors are significantly less likely to find an interrogation coercive, and more likely to believe in the truth and accuracy of the confession that they hear — even when the interrogator explicitly threatens the defendant.

The entire article is here.

Monday, May 26, 2014

Episode 9: Psychologist as Collaborative Coach

In this episode, John interviews Lori Gephart, a psychologist from the Greater Pittsburgh area on her work as a collaborative coach.  Collaborative coaching is yet another area of practice for specially trained psychologists. Lori talks about her role as a collaborative coach in the divorce process. Skills related to collaborative coaching include helping clients identify shared interests and engage in interest-based resolution.  The collaborative coach also assists with improving communication, facilitating teamwork, providing information on marital transition, and referring for psychotherapy when needed. Lori also outlines information about training, networking, and becoming more involved in the collaborative coaching arena.

At the end of the podcast, the listener will be able to:

1. Define the role of a Collaborative Coach.
2. Identify the role of the Child Specialist.
3. Explain the additional training needed to be a collaborative coach


Or listen directly on this site


Resources

Lori Gephart's Homepage                           Follow Lori on Twitter @NHPAwellness

Sunday, January 26, 2014

Not All Multiple Relationships are Created Equal

By Ofer Zur
Independent Practitioner, 34/1, 15-22. 2014.

Introduction

Most mental health professionals have attended risk management and ethics workshops where one of the central messages was the dire warning that multiple relationships are generally unethical, inherently harmful, mostly prohibited, and should be avoided.  While the term "unethical" is thrown about liberally when it comes to multiple relationships, the fact is that none of the major professional organizations' codes of ethics prohibit all forms of dual or multiple relationships.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Are Forensic Evaluations “Health Care” and Are They Regulated by HIPAA?

By Bruce Borkosky,  Jon M. Pellett, and Mark S. Thomas
Psychological Injury and Law
June 2013

Abstract

Forensic mental health providers (FMHPs) typically do not release records to the examinee. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) federal regulations might change this position, given that they have created a basic right of access to health care records. This legislation has led to a disagreement regarding whether HIPAA regulates forensic evaluations. The primary argument (and the majority of scholarly citations) has been that such evaluations do not constitute “health care.” Specifically, in this position, the nature and purpose of forensic evaluations are not considered related to treatment (amelioration of psychopathology) of the patient. In addition, it asserts that HIPAA applies solely to treatment services; thus, forensic evaluations are inapplicable to HIPAA. We describe the evidence for and against this argument, the strengths and limitations of the evidence, and recent court decisions related to it. The weakest part of the “HIPAA does not regulate forensics” argument is that HIPAA has no exclusion criteria based on type of services. It only creates an inclusion criteria for providers; once “covered,” all services provided by that provider are thence forward “covered.” Authoritative evidence for patient access can be found in the HIPAA regulations themselves, the US Department of Health and Human Services’ commentaries, additional statements and disciplinary cases, the research literature, other agency opinion, and legal opinion. It appears that the evidence strongly suggests that, for those forensic mental health practitioners who are covered entities, HIPAA does apply to forensic evaluations. The implication is that FMHPs potentially face various federal, state, and civil sanctions for refusing to permit patient access to records.

The article is here.

Saturday, August 10, 2013

Psychopathic criminals have empathy switch

Psychopaths do not lack empathy, rather they can switch it on at will, according to new research.

By Melissa Hogenboom
Science reporter, BBC News
Originally published July 24, 2013

Placed in a brain scanner, psychopathic criminals watched videos of one person hurting another and were asked to empathise with the individual in pain.

Only when asked to imagine how the pain receiver felt did the area of the brain related to pain light up.

Scientists, reporting in Brain, say their research explains how psychopaths can be both callous and charming.

The team proposes that with the right training, it could be possible to help psychopaths activate their "empathy switch", which could bring them a step closer to rehabilitation.

The entire story is here.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Suspect in Colorado Killings Enters Insanity Plea

By Jack Healy
The New York Times
Originally posted on June 4, 2013

James E. Holmes, the former neuroscience student charged with killing 12 people inside a Colorado movie theater last July, changed his plea on Tuesday to not guilty by reason of insanity.

It was an expected shift in Mr. Holmes’s defense, formalized during a court hearing in this Denver suburb. As the judge read a lengthy document describing the legal consequences and psychiatric examinations that would follow the plea, Mr. Holmes, shackled and dressed in a red jail uniform, appeared to follow along on a copy, gazing down as one of his lawyers flipped the pages.

The entire story is here.

Thursday, May 23, 2013

New Mental-Health Manual Likely to Impact HR

Making accommodations for employees with mental disabilities has never been easy, and it's about to get more difficult with the release of the American Psychiatric Association's new manual of mental disorders.

By James J. McDonald, Jr.
Human Resource Executive Online
Originally published May 22, 2013

In psychiatry, unlike other branches of medicine, there is no laboratory test that can confirm the existence of a particular mental disorder. Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals rely on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, known as "DSM-5" to diagnose patients. The American Psychiatric Association has just released a new fifth edition of the manual and human resources executives should take note. It contains new diagnostic categories not listed in its predecessor and loosens the criteria for some diagnoses which will likely result in more people qualifying for these diagnoses. DSM-5 is likely to impact HR by expanding the number of employees who will qualify as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act and be entitled to reasonable accommodation.

(cut)

New Diagnoses

DSM-5 adds several new diagnoses that employers are likely to find vexing. One is "Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder," which describes persons whose communication skills are impaired but who do not qualify for an autism diagnosis. It applies to persons with "persistent difficulties in the social use of verbal and nonverbal communications" that limit social relationships or occupational performance. While typically diagnosed in childhood it can continue into adulthood. Employees previously thought to be merely shy or socially awkward may qualify for this new diagnosis.

Another new diagnosis is "Binge Eating Disorder," a condition characterized primarily by eating a large amount of food in a short time at least once per week for three months. DSM-5 notes that while most overweight persons do not engage in recurrent binge-eating, Binge Eating Disorder is "reliably associated with overweight and obesity."  Thus, this diagnosis makes it more likely that obesity (at least when precipitated by binge-eating) might finally qualify as a disability under the ADA.