Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Neuroenhancement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Neuroenhancement. Show all posts

Friday, December 9, 2016

Moral neuroenhancement

Earp, B. D., Douglas, T., & Savulescu, J. (forthcoming). Moral neuroenhancement. In S. Johnson & K. Rommelfanger (eds.),  Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics.  New York: Routledge.

Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce the notion of moral neuroenhancement, offering a novel definition as well as spelling out three conditions under which we expect that such neuroenhancement would be most likely to be permissible (or even desirable). Furthermore, we draw a distinction between first-order moral capacities, which we suggest are less promising targets for neurointervention, and second-order moral capacities, which we suggest are more promising. We conclude by discussing concerns that moral neuroenhancement might restrict freedom or otherwise misfire, and argue that these concerns are not as damning as they may seem at first.

The book chapter is here.

Thursday, November 17, 2016

Can Psychedelics Make Us More Moral?

Derek Beres
Big Think
Originally published August 22, 2016

Here is an excerpt:

Could a moral drug enhancement instill empathy in such a person? If so, should it be used? Earp is not ignorant of the ethics of such a drug. Looked at from a broader social perspective instead of an individualist mindset is one important factor. If there’s a possibility that a psychopath could harm members of a society, would such a drug be beneficial, especially if the person desires it? What if they don’t?

Psychopathy is a small but very real instance. What about extending this idea of moral neuroenhancement to people with depression? Anger management issues? Excessive anxiety? This does not imply that a person needs a daily dose. Research has shown that psilocybin has an effect even after one episode...

The article is here.

Monday, April 20, 2015

Moral bioenhancement: a neuroscientific perspective

By Molly Crockett
J Med Ethics 2014;40:370-371
doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-101096

Here is an excerpt:

The science of moral bioenhancement is in its infancy. Laboratory studies of human morality usually employ highly simplified models aimed at measuring just one facet of a cognitive process that is relevant for morality. These studies have certainly deepened our understanding of the nature of moral behaviour, but it is important to avoid overstating the conclusions of any single study. De Grazia cites several purported examples of ‘non-traditional means of moral enhancement’, including one of my own studies. According to De Grazia, we showed that ‘selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (can be used) as a means to being less inclined to assault people’. In fact, our findings are a bit more subtle and nuanced than implied in the target article, as is often the case in neuroscientific studies of complex human behaviour.

The entire article is here.

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

The ethics of deep brain stimulation

Unterrainer M, Oduncu FS
Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy [2015]

Abstract

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an invasive technique designed to stimulate certain deep brain regions for therapeutic purposes and is currently used mainly in patients with neurodegenerative disorders, such as Parkinson's disease. However, DBS is also used increasingly for other experimental applications, such as the treatment of psychiatric disorders (e.g. severe depression), weight reduction. Apart from its therapeutic potential, DBS can cause severe adverse effects, some that might also have a significant impact on the patient's personality and autonomy by the external stimulation of DBS which effects lie beyond the individual's control and free will. The article's purpose is to outline the procedures of DBS currently used in therapeutic and experimental applications and to discuss the ethical concerns regarding this procedure. It will address the clinical benefit-risk-ratio, the particular ethics of research in this field, and the ethical issues raised by affecting a patient's or an individual's personality and autonomous behaviour. Moreover, a potential ethical guideline, the Ulysses contract is discussed for the field of clinical application as well as the question of responsibility.

The entire article is here.

Sunday, February 1, 2015

When is diminishment a form of enhancement?

Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics

By Brian Earp, Anders Sandberg, Guy Kahane, & Julian Savulescu
Front. Syst. Neurosci., 04 February 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00012

The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like. Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements should be considered permissible for individuals with no particular “medical” disadvantage along any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual's overall well-being: more is not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of “diminishment as enhancement” and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing.

The entire article is here.

Saturday, January 31, 2015

Ethics and the Enhanced Soldier of the Near Future

By Dave Shunk
Military Review
January-February 2015

Here are two excerpts:

The soldier of the future likely will be enhanced through neuroscience, biotechnology, nanotechnology, genetics, and drugs. According to Patrick Lin, writing in The Atlantic about the ethics of enhancing soldiers, “Soldier enhancements, through biological or technological augmentation of human capabilities, reduce warfighter risk by providing tactical advantages over the enemy.” Lin describes efforts to develop a “super-soldier” who can perform more like
a machine.

(cut)

New ethical challenges are arising from the technological developments in stem cells, genetics,
neurosciences, robotics, and information technology.  Lawrence Hinman of the Center for Ethics in
Science and Technology, University of San Diego, reports that “these developments have created ethical vacuums, situations in which our technology has outstripped our ethical framework.” This statement, although made in 2008, remains true. In fact, current military references to enhanced soldiers are very limited.

The entire article is here.

Sunday, November 30, 2014

Brain stimulation for ‘enhancement’ in children: An ethical analysis

By Hannah Maslen, Brian D Earp, Roi Cohen-Kadosh and Julian Savulescu
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Revised on November 6, 2014

Abstract

Davis (2014) called for "extreme caution" in the use of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) to treat neurological disorders in children, due to gaps in scientific knowledge. We are sympathetic to his position. However, we must also address the ethical implications of applying this technology to minors. Compensatory trade-offs associated with NIBS present a challenge to its use in children, insofar as these trade-offs have the effect of limiting the child's future options. The distinction between treatment and enhancement has some normative force here. As the intervention moves away from being a treatment toward being an enhancement—and thus toward a more uncertain weighing of the benefits, risks, and costs—considerations of the child’s best interests (as judged by the parents) diminish, and the need to protect the child's (future) autonomy looms larger. NIBS for enhancement involving trade-offs should therefore be delayed, if possible, until the child reaches a state of maturity and can make an informed, personal decision. NIBS for treatment, by contrast, is permissible insofar as it can be shown to be at least as safe and effective as currently approved treatments, which are (themselves) justified on a best interests standard.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

Ambivalence in the Cognitive Enhancement Debate

By Neil Levy
The Neuroethics Blog
Originally posted October 14, 2014

The most hotly debated topic in neuroethics surely concerns the ethics of cognitive enhancement. Is it permissible, or advisable, for human beings already functioning within the normal range to further enhance their capacities? Some people see in the prospect of enhancing ourselves the exciting prospect of becoming more than human; others see it as threatening our humanity so that we become something less than we were.

In an insightful article, Erik Parens (2005) has argued that truthfully we are all on both sides of this debate. We are at once attracted and repulsed by the prospect that we might become something more than we already are. Parens thinks both frameworks are deeply rooted in Western culture and history; perhaps they are universal themes. We are deeply attached to a gratitude framework and to a more Promeathean framework. Hence we find ourselves torn with regard to self-transformation.

The entire blog post is here.

Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Could Deep-Brain Stimulation Fortify Soldiers’ Minds?

By S. Matthew Liao
Scientific American Blog
Originally posted September 4, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

Brain implants that reduce or eliminate our sense of morality are morally undesirable and are not really enhancements as such. Efforts should therefore be made to ensure that the kind of brain implants we develop do not have these unwanted side effects. In the short term, the brain implants we develop may well be imperfect in just such a way. If so, this would be a good reason to ban such devices in the short term. The interesting theoretical issue is what happens when we have perfected the technology and have brain implants that would enable a soldier to kill at the right time, for the right reasons, and in a proportionate manner? Would we still have ethical problems with soldiers using such a technology

The entire blog post is here.

Saturday, August 9, 2014

The New Normal: How the definition of disease impacts enhancement

By Ray Purcell
The Neuroethics Blog
Originally posted July 24, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

Why does the definition of disease matter? Enhancement is typically defined relative to normal abilities. Anjan Chatterjee of the University of Pennsylvania suggested that “Therapy is treating disease, whereas enhancement is improving “normal” abilities. Most people would probably agree that therapy is desirable. By contrast, enhancing normal abilities gives pause to many.” However, many neuroethicists have wrestled with clearly defining enhancement. The director of Emory’s Center for Ethics, Paul Root Wolpe argued (2002) that the enhancement debate centers on the ability of substances or therapeutics to directly affect the brain in ways that are not necessary to restore health and, certainly, to date the cognitive enhancement debate has focused primarily on pharmaceuticals, many of which are approved to treat disorders but can have effects on healthy individuals as well. Perhaps the best examples of this are methylphenidate (Ritalin) and modafinil (Provigil) which are prescribed for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy respectively, but are increasingly being used by students and professionals to boost cognitive performance at school and in the workplace. 

Sunday, July 6, 2014

Empirical neuroenchantment: from reading minds to thinking critically

Sabrina S. Ali, Michael Lifshitz, and Amir Raz
Front. Hum. Neurosci., 27 May 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00357

While most experts agree on the limitations of neuroimaging, the unversed public—and indeed many a scholar—often valorizes brain imaging without heeding its shortcomings. Here we test the boundaries of this phenomenon, which we term neuroenchantment. How much are individuals ready to believe when encountering improbable information through the guise of neuroscience? We introduced participants to a crudely-built mock brain scanner, explaining that the machine would measure neural activity, analyze the data, and then infer the content of complex thoughts. Using a classic magic trick, we crafted an illusion whereby the imaging technology seemed to decipher the internal thoughts of participants. We found that most students—even undergraduates with advanced standing in neuroscience and psychology, who have been taught the shortcomings of neuroimaging—deemed such unlikely technology highly plausible. Our findings highlight the influence neuro-hype wields over critical thinking.

The entire article is here.

Thursday, June 5, 2014

Creating a 'morality pill' more a question of ethics than science

By Katie Collins
Wired
Originally posted May 16, 2014

Is there any way that we could create a drug that would make us moral? This is the question Molly Crockett, neuroscientist at Oxford University, posed to the crowd at a Brain Boosters event organised as part of the NERRI Project in London this week.

Crockett was tackling the subject of neuro-enhancement -- the idea that we could potentially use science to make our brains in some way better. Much of the discussion at the event revolved around intelligence, but Crockett instead chose to tackle the subject of personality -- and more specifically, morality.

The entire article is here.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Autonomy and the Unintended Legal Consequences of Emerging Neurotherapies

By Jennifer A. Chandler
Social Science Research Network
Published April 8, 2011

One of the ethical issues that has been raised recently regarding emerging neurotherapies, is that people will be coerced explicitly or implicitly in the workplace or in schools to take cognitive enhancing drugs.

This article builds on this discussion by showing how the law may pressure people to adopt emerging neurotherapies. It focuses on a range of private law doctrines that, unlike the criminal law, do not come up very often in neuroethical discussions. Three doctrines - the doctrine of mitigation, the standard of care in negligence, and child custody determinations in family law – are addressed to show how the law may pressure people to consent to treatment by offering a choice between accepting medical treatment and suffering a legal disadvantage. The doctrines considered in this article apply indirect pressure to submit to treatment, unlike court-ordered medical treatment, which applies direct pressure and is not addressed here.

The outcome of this discussion is to show that there is a greater range of social pressures that may encourage the uptake of novel neurotherapies than one might initially think. Once treatments that were developed and offered with therapeutic benefits in mind become available, their existence gives rise to unintended legal consequences. This certainly does not mean we should cease developing new therapies that may be of tremendous benefit to patients, but it does raise some questions for physicians and for legal policy-makers. How should physicians, who are required by medical ethical principles to obtain valid consent to treatment, react to a patient’s reluctant consent that is driven by legal pressure? From the legal policy perspective, are our legal doctrines satisfactory or should they be changed because, for example, they unduly promote the collective interest over individual freedom to reject medical treatment or because they channel us toward economically efficient treatments to the detriment of more costly but potentially superior approaches of dealing with behavioural problems?


The entire article is here.

Sunday, June 23, 2013

Could intranasal oxytocin be used to enhance relationships?

Research imperatives, clinical policy, and ethical considerations

By O. A. Wudarczyk, B. D. Earp, A. J. Guastella & J. Savulescu

Abstract

Purpose of review. 
Well-functioning romantic relationships are important for long-term health and well-being, but they are often difficult to sustain. This difficulty arises (in part) because of an underlying tension between our psychobiological natures, culture/environment, and modern love and relationship goals. One possible solution to this predicament is to intervene at the level of psychobiology, enhancing partners’ interpersonal connection through neurochemical modulation. This article focuses on a single, promising biobehavioral sub-system for such intervention: the attachment system, based largely upon the expression of the neuropeptide oxytocin. Could the exogenous administration of oxytocin—under the right conditions—be used to facilitate relational or marital well-being?

Recent findings.
If so, it would require considerable forethought. Recent research complicates the popular image of oxytocin as a universal social enhancer or ‘love hormone’ and shows that it may exert a variety of different effects, at different dosages, on different people, under different circumstances. Accordingly, we discuss what is known about oxytocin, including its“good” and “bad” effects on human behavior and on higher-order functional processes.

Summary.
Building upon animal-model, human preclinical, and clinical findings, we outline a proposal for the use of oxytocin in the therapeutic neuroenhancement of contemporary romantic relationships. Highlighting key targets for future research along the way, we then conclude by discussing some of the clinical and ethical considerations that would pertain to the implementation of this knowledge in applied settings.

Key Points

* Intranasal oxytocin may hold promise for the therapeutic neuroenhancement of modern relationships. Oxytocin has “good” and “bad” effects, however, that may be different for different individuals and couples depending upon a range of personal, interpersonal, and contextual factors.

* Large-scale clinical trials with adequate sample sizes, and that include both males and females, are needed to fill in a range of “gaps” in existing knowledge. Chronic administrations and ecologically valid study designs should be top research priorities.

* The imminent prospect of neurochemical modulation of interpersonal relationships should inspire the development of general ethical guidelines for the responsible use of such technology. These guidelines should emphasize autonomy, consent, and personal and interpersonal well-being.

* As is the case with any new area of biomedical research, practical, moral, and clinical-policy considerations must be addressed in tandem with any progress made on scientific and theoretical fronts.