Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Moral Beliefs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Moral Beliefs. Show all posts

Thursday, June 8, 2023

Do Moral Beliefs Motivate Action?

Díaz, R.
Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2023).

Abstract

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation.

Conclusion

In this paper, I showed that the use of hypothetical cases to extract conclusions regarding the (lack of) motivational power of moral beliefs faces important limitations. I argued that these limitations can be addressed using empirical research tools, and presented a series of studies doing so.

The results of the studies show that, when the stakes are high, the apparent motivational force of beliefs is in fact explained by co-occurring moral emotions. This supports Humean views of moral motivation. The results regarding low-stake situations, however, are open to both Humean and “watered-down” Anti-Humean interpretations.

In moral practice, it probably won’t matter if moral beliefs don’t motivate us much or at all. Arguably, most real-life moral choices involve countervailing motives with more than a little motivational strength, making moral beliefs irrelevant in any case. However, the situation might be different with regards to ethical theory. Accepting that moral beliefs have some motivational force (even if very low) could be enough to solve the Moral Problem (see Introduction)Footnote33 while rejecting that moral beliefs have motivational force would prompt us to reject one of the other claims involved in the puzzle. Future research should help us decide between competing interpretations of the results regarding low-stakes situations presented in this paper.

Overall, the results presented in this paper put pressure on Anti-Humean views of moral motivation, as they suggest that moral beliefs have little or no motivational force.

With regards to methodology, I showed that using empirical research tools improves upon the use of hypothetical cases of moral motivation by ruling out alternative interpretations. Note, however, that the empirical investigations presented in this paper build on extant hypothetical cases and the logical tools involved in the discussion of these cases. In this sense, the studies presented in this paper do not oppose, but rather continue extant work regarding cases. Hopefully, this paper paves the way for more empirical investigations, as well as discussions on the best ways to measure and test the relations between moral behavior, moral beliefs, and moral emotions.

Sunday, January 14, 2018

The Criminalization of Compliance

Todd Haugh
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1215 (2017).

Abstract

Corporate compliance is becoming increasingly “criminalized.” What began as a means of industry self-regulation has morphed into a multi-billion-dollar effort to avoid government intervention in business, specifically criminal and quasi-criminal investigations and prosecutions. In order to avoid application of the criminal law, companies have adopted compliance programs that are motivated by and mimic that law, using the precepts of criminal legislation, enforcement, and adjudication to advance their compliance goals. This approach to compliance is inherently flawed, however—it can never be fully effective in abating corporate wrongdoing. Criminalized compliance regimes are inherently ineffective because they impose unintended behavioral consequences on corporate employees. Employees subject to criminalized compliance have greater opportunities to rationalize their future unethical or illegal behavior. Rationalizations are a key component in the psychological process necessary for the commission of corporate crime—they allow offenders to square their self-perception as “good people” with the illegal behavior they are contemplating, thereby allowing the behavior to go forward. Criminalized compliance regimes fuel these rationalizations, and in turn, bad corporate conduct. By importing into the corporation many of the criminal law’s delegitimizing features, criminalized compliance creates space for rationalizations, facilitating the necessary precursors to the commission of white collar and corporate crime. The result is that many compliance programs, by mimicking the criminal law in hopes of reducing employee misconduct, are actually fostering it. This insight, which offers a new way of conceptualizing corporate compliance, explains the ineffectiveness of many compliance programs and also suggests how companies might go about fixing them.

The article is here.

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind

By Victor Kumar
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

Moral judgments seem to be different from other normative judgments, even apart from their characteristic subject matter. Two people might both disapprove of an action, for example, although one judges it a moral violation and the other a breach of etiquette. Philosophers have traditionally attempted to define moral judgment through reflection alone. However, psychological research on the “moral/conventional distinction” offers a promising source of empirical evidence about the distinctive nature of moral judgment.

Several authors treat the ability to draw a distinction between morality and convention as a test for the presence of moral judgments (Blair 1995; Nichols 2004a; Prinz 2007; Levy 2007). None, however, develops the implied theory of moral judgment.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Beliefs About God and Mental Health Among American Adults

Nava R. Silton, Kevin J. Flannelly, Kathleen Galek, Christopher G. Ellison
Journal of Religion and Health
October 2014, Volume 53, Issue 5, pp 1285-1296

Abstract

This study examines the association between beliefs about God and psychiatric symptoms in the context of Evolutionary Threat Assessment System Theory, using data from the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey of US Adults (N = 1,426). Three beliefs about God were tested separately in ordinary least squares regression models to predict five classes of psychiatric symptoms: general anxiety, social anxiety, paranoia, obsession, and compulsion. Belief in a punitive God was positively associated with four psychiatric symptoms, while belief in a benevolent God was negatively associated with four psychiatric symptoms, controlling for demographic characteristics, religiousness, and strength of belief in God. Belief in a deistic God and one’s overall belief in God were not significantly related to any psychiatric symptoms.

The entire article is here.

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Moral Tribes by Joshua Greene – review

By Salley Vickers
The Observer
Originally published January 11, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

What Greene and his team have added to this unnerving moral conundrum is the systematic use of multiple brain images that demonstrate that when people contemplate sacrificing the fat man there is increased activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain associated with emotion, whereas consideration of operating the switch promotes increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain associated with reasoning. People with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, who lack normal emotions, were five times more likely to approve of pushing the fat man off the bridge.

Greene began his career as a philosopher so is well placed to consider the question of ethics from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective. There have been a number of books recently that consider the biological roots of moral sense (Paul Bloom's Just Babies is the most recent example). But while Greene's research suggests, in accordance with Bloom, that the rudiments of morality are indeed innate, it also demonstrates, through such experiments as the trolley problem, that our moral responses rest on a wobbly intuitive base – a gut feeling that may not produce the best general outcome.

The entire article is here.

Friday, January 17, 2014

Which Beliefs Contribute to Virtuous Behavior?

By Christian Miller
Big Questions Online
June 15, 2012 (and still relevant today)

Which beliefs contribute to virtuous behavior? In other words, which beliefs can we form to make it more likely that we act virtuously in the future – more honestly, more compassionately, more courageously, more humbly, and the like? In this brief essay, I will propose four different answers, but I want to stress that these are not the only ones that could be given. I have included them only because these answers repeatedly show up in my own reading of research in psychology and philosophy.

First we should note that our question is asking specifically about beliefs. Beliefs are not the only mental states worth mentioning – desires and emotions are also incredibly important to virtuous behavior (but will have to wait for another essay).

The entire story is here.

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

Texas pair released after serving 21 years for 'satanic abuse'

Dan and Fran Keller, sentenced in 1991 for child sexual assault during US 'Satanic panic' era, released after district attorney conceded trial jury was probably swayed by faulty testimony

By Tom Dart
The Guardian
Originally posted December 5, 2013

Here are two excerpts:

The only physical evidence against the Kellers was the testimony of Dr. Michael Mouw, who examined the girl in the emergency room of a local hospital after the therapy session and said he found tears in her hymen that potentially indicated that she was molested.

Mouw signed an affidavit last January in which he affirms that he now realises his inexperience led him to a conclusion that "is not scientifically or medically valid, and that I was mistaken."

In an appeal filed on behalf of Fran Keller earlier this year, her lawyer, Keith Hampton, also argued that the state presented misleading evidence about the cemetery, relied on a false witness confession and the testimony of a "quack" satanic abuse "expert", and that suggestive interview techniques had encouraged the children to make "fantastical false statements".

(cut)

DeYoung said that suggestive and insistent interviewing strategies prompted children to make up stories and start to believe what they were telling the adults, and that the received wisdom was that children would not lie about such serious crimes. Media and parental pressure obliged the police to give credence even to risible allegations.

The entire story is here.

There is an interesting Geraldo Rivera special television episode, Exposing Satan's Underground from 1988, associated with this story found here on YouTube.  The entire episode is worth watching, if you are interested in the hysteria and panic of that time.  At the 1 hour and 15 minute mark, psychologists and psychiatrists report threats to their lives when treating survivors of ritualistic abuse.

Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Superhero Comics as Moral Pornography

By David Pizarro and Roy Baumeister
Superhero Comics as Moral Pornography.
In R. Rosenberg (Ed.) Our Superheroes, Ourselves. Oxford University Press.

Here is an excerpt:

Modern superhero comics (and the films they’ve inspired) are moral tales on steroids.  While they present variations on the theme of good versus evil, these stories describe individuals who commit moral deeds of global (and often cosmic) significance on a weekly basis. In this chapter we will argue that superhero comics, like other moralistic tales, are popular in part because they satisfy a basic human motivation: the motivation to divide the social world into good people and bad, and to morally praise and condemn them accordingly. In their modern superhero comic incarnation, however, these tales depict an exaggerated morality that has been stripped of its real-world subtlety. In tales of superhero versus supervillain, moral good and moral bad are always the actions of easily identifiable moral agents with unambiguous intentions and actions. And it is these very qualities that make these stories so enjoyable. Much like the appeal of the exaggerated, caricatured sexuality found in pornography, superhero comics offer the appeal of an exaggerated and caricatured morality that satisfies the natural human inclination toward moralization. In short, the modern superhero comic is a form of “moral pornography”— built to satisfy our moralistic urges, but ultimately unrealistic and, in the end, potentially misleading.

The entire chapter is here.

Friday, August 9, 2013

Is income inequality 'morally wrong'?

By John Sutter
CNN
Originally posted July 25, 2013

Here are some excerpts:

So is extreme inequality amoral?

To think this through, I called up four smart people -- Nigel Warburton, a freelance philosopher and writer, and host of the (wonderful) Philosophy Bites podcast; Arthur Brooks, president of the American Enterprise Institute and author of "Wealth and Justice"; Thomas Pogge, director of the Global Justice Program at Yale; and Kentaro Toyama, researcher at the University of California at Berkeley.

(cut)

I'll end this list back on John Rawls, the philosopher whose 1971 book, "A Theory of Justice," is a must-read (or at least a must-become-familiar-with) for people interested in this topic. One of Rawls' theories is that inequality can be justified only when it benefits everyone in society, particularly those who are most poor and vulnerable.

Monday, August 5, 2013

Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?

By Eddy Nahmias
The New York Times - Opinionator
Originally published November 13, 2011, but still relevant

Is free will an illusion?  Some leading scientists think so.  For instance, in 2002 the psychologist Daniel Wegner wrote, “It seems we are agents. It seems we cause what we do… It is sobering and ultimately accurate to call all this an illusion.” More recently, the neuroscientist Patrick Haggard declared, “We certainly don’t have free will.  Not in the sense we think.”  And in June, the neuroscientist Sam Harris claimed, “You seem to be an agent acting of your own free will. The problem, however, is that this point of view cannot be reconciled with what we know about the human brain.”

Such proclamations make the news; after all, if free will is dead, then moral and legal responsibility may be close behind.  As the legal analyst Jeffrey Rosen wrote in The New York Times Magazine, “Since all behavior is caused by our brains, wouldn’t this mean all behavior could potentially be excused? … The death of free will, or its exposure as a convenient illusion, some worry, could wreak havoc on our sense of moral and legal responsibility.”

The entire story is here.

Thanks to Verybadwizards for this information.

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

The Evolutionary Ethics of E. O. Wilson

By Whitley Kaufman
The New Atlantis
Winter/Spring 2013

In his new book The Social Conquest of Earth (2012), naturalist E. O. Wilson argues that our best chance at understanding and advancing morality will come when we “explain the origin of religion and morality as special events in the evolutionary history of humanity driven by natural selection.” This is a bold claim, yet a familiar one for Wilson, who has been advocating something like this approach to human morality ever since his landmark 1975 work Sociobiology.

In that book, Wilson provocatively argued that “scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers” and that ethics should instead be “biologicized”: questions once debated seemingly without end by philosophers will be settled by biologists using the same methods by which they have explained digestion, reproduction, and all of the other evolved drives and functions of the body.

The unification of science and morality, on Wilson’s count, would be a much-needed revolution for ethics. But it has also long been one of the desiderata of the Enlightenment project — which has been so successful in fulfilling its promise of advancing our scientific knowledge and our material wellbeing, yet seems to have made so little progress in settling debates over ethics. The consilience of the human and natural sciences that Wilson’s sociobiological project promises would carry on the scientific method’s “unrelenting application of reason” to the field of ethics, and finally begin to establish a stable, wise, and enduring ethical code for the future.

The entire story is here.