Overconfidently conspiratorial: Conspiracy believers are dispositionally overconfident and massively overestimate how much others agree with them

Pennycook, G., Binnendyk, J., & Rand, D. G. 

(2022, December 5). PsyArXiv

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/d5fz2

Abstract

There is a pressing need to understand belief in false conspiracies. Past work has focused on the needs and motivations of conspiracy believers, as well as the role of overreliance on intuition. Here, we propose an alternative driver of belief in conspiracies: overconfidence. Across eight studies with 4,181 U.S. adults, conspiracy believers not only relied more intuition, but also overestimated their performance on numeracy and perception tests (i.e. were overconfident in their own abilities). This relationship with overconfidence was robust to controlling for analytic thinking, need for uniqueness, and narcissism, and was strongest for the most fringe conspiracies. We also found that conspiracy believers – particularly overconfident ones – massively overestimated (>4x) how much others agree with them: Although conspiracy beliefs were in the majority in only 12% of 150 conspiracies across three studies, conspiracy believers thought themselves to be in the majority 93% of the time.

Here is my summary:

The research found that people who believe in conspiracy theories are more likely to be overconfident in their own abilities and to overestimate how much others agree with them. This was true even when controlling for other factors, such as analytic thinking, need for uniqueness, and narcissism.

The researchers conducted a series of studies to test their hypothesis. In one study, they found that people who believed in conspiracy theories were more likely to overestimate their performance on numeracy and perception tests. In another study, they found that people who believed in conspiracy theories were more likely to overestimate how much others agreed with them about a variety of topics, including climate change and the 2016 US presidential election.

The researchers suggest that overconfidence may play a role in the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs. When people are overconfident, they are more likely to dismiss evidence that contradicts their beliefs and to seek out information that confirms their beliefs. This can lead to a "filter bubble" effect, where people are only exposed to information that reinforces their existing beliefs.

The researchers also suggest that overconfidence may lead people to overestimate how much others agree with them about their conspiracy beliefs. This can make them feel more confident in their beliefs and less likely to question them.

The findings of this research have implications for understanding and addressing the spread of conspiracy theories. It is important to be aware of the role that overconfidence may play in the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs. This knowledge can be used to develop more effective interventions to prevent people from falling for conspiracy theories and to help people who already believe in conspiracy theories to critically evaluate their beliefs.

When Did Medicine Become a Battleground for Everything?

Tara Haelle

Medscape.com

Originally posted 18 July 23

Like hundreds of other medical experts, Leana Wen, MD, an emergency physician and former Baltimore health commissioner, was an early and avid supporter of COVID vaccines and their ability to prevent severe disease, hospitalization, and death from SARS-CoV-2 infections.

When 51-year-old Scott Eli Harris, of Aubrey, Texas, heard of Wen's stance in July 2021, the self-described "5th generation US Army veteran and a sniper" sent Wen an electronic invective laden with racist language and very specific threats to shoot her.

Harris pled guilty to transmitting threats via interstate commerce last February and began serving 6 months in federal prison last fall, but his threats wouldn't be the last for Wen. Just 2 days after Harris was sentenced, charges were unsealed against another man in Massachusetts, who threatened that Wen would "end up in pieces" if she continued "pushing" her thoughts publicly.'

Wen has plenty of company. In an August 2022 survey of emergency doctors conducted by the American College of Emergency Physicians, 85% of respondents said violence against them is increasing. One in four doctors said they're being assaulted by patients and their family and friends multiple times a week, compared to just 8% of doctors who said as much in 2018. Sixty-four percent of emergency physicians reported receiving verbal assaults and threats of violence; 40% reported being hit or slapped, and 26% were kicked.

This uptick of violence and threats against physicians didn't come out of nowhere; violence against healthcare workers has been gradually increasing over the past decade. Healthcare providers can attest to the hostility that particular topics have sparked for years: vaccines in pediatrics, abortion in ob-gyn, and gender-affirming care in endocrinology.

But the pandemic fueled the fire. While there have always been hot-button issues in medicine, the ire they arouse today is more intense than ever before. The proliferation of misinformation (often via social media) and the politicization of public health and medicine are at the center of the problem.

"The People Attacking Are Themselves Victims'

The misinformation problem first came to a head in one area of public health: vaccines. The pandemic accelerated antagonism in medicine ― thanks, in part, to decades of anti- antivaccine activism.

The anti-vaccine movement, which has ebbed and flowed in the US and across the globe since the first vaccine, experienced a new wave in the early 2000s with the combination of concerns about thimerosal in vaccines and a now disproven link between autism and the MMR vaccine. But that movement grew. It picked up steam when activists gained political clout after a 2014 measles outbreak at Disneyland led California schools to tighten up policies regarding vaccinations for kids who enrolled. These stronger public school vaccination laws ran up against religious freedom arguments from anti-vaccine advocates.

The info is here.

Conspirituality: How New Age conspiracy theories threaten public health

D. Beres, M. Remski, & J. Walker

bigthink.com

Originally posted 17 June 23

Here is an excerpt:

Disaster capitalism and disaster spirituality rely, respectively, on an endless supply of items to commodify and minds to recruit. While both roar into high gear in times of widespread precarity and vulnerability, in disaster spirituality there is arguably more at stake on the supply side. Hedge fund managers can buy up distressed properties in post-Katrina New Orleans to gentrify and flip. They have cash on hand to pull from when opportunity strikes, whereas most spiritual figures have to use other means for acquisitions and recruitment during times of distress.

Most of the influencers operating in today’s conspirituality landscape stand outside of mainstream economies and institutional support. They’ve been developing fringe religious ideas and making money however they can, usually up against high customer turnover.

For the mega-rich disaster capitalist, a hurricane or civil war is a windfall. But for the skint disaster spiritualist, a public catastrophe like 9/11 or COVID-19 is a life raft. Many have no choice but to climb aboard and ride. Additionally, if your spiritual group has been claiming for years to have the answers to life’s most desperate problems, the disaster is an irresistible dare, a chance to make good on divine promises. If the spiritual group has been selling health ideologies or products they guarantee will ensure perfect health, how can they turn away from the opportunity presented by a pandemic?

The information is here.

Here is my summary with some extras:

The article argues that conspirituality is a growing problem that is threatening public health. Conspiritualists push the false beliefs that vaccines are harmful, that the COVID-19 pandemic is a hoax, and that natural immunity is the best way to protect oneself from disease. These beliefs can lead people to make decisions that put their health and the health of others at risk.

The article also argues that conspirituality is often spread through social media platforms, which can make it difficult to verify the accuracy of information. This can lead people to believe false or misleading information, which can have serious consequences for their health.  However, some individuals can make a profit from the spread of disinformation.

The article concludes by calling for more research on conspirituality and its impact on public health. It also calls for public health professionals to be more aware of conspirituality and to develop strategies to address it.

• Conspirituality is a term that combines "conspiracy" and "spirituality." It refers to the belief that certain anti-science ideas (such as alternative medicine, non-scientific interventions, and spiritual healing) are being suppressed by a powerful elite. Conspiritualists often believe that this elite is responsible for a wide range of problems, including the COVID-19 pandemic.

• The term "conspirituality" was coined by sociologists Charlotte Ward and David Voas in 2011. They argued that conspirituality is a unique form of conspiracy theory that is characterized by blending 1) New Age beliefs (religious and spiritual ideas) of a paradigm shift in consciousness (in which we will all be awakened to a new reality); and, 2) traditional conspiracy theories (in which an elite, powerful, and covert group of individuals are either controlling or trying to control the social and political order.)

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Wang, H., & Van Prooijen, J. (2022).

Applied Cognitive Psychology.

https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3996

Abstract

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.

From the General Discussion

Most studies on conspiracy beliefs provide correlational evidence through cross-sectional designs (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). The present research took full advantage of the 2020 American presidential elections through a five-wave longitudinal design, enabling three complementary contributions. First, the results provide evidence that conspiracy mentality is a relatively stable individual difference trait (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014): While the election did influence specific conspiracy beliefs (i.e., that the elections were rigged), it did not influence conspiracy mentality. Second, the results provide evidence for the notion that conspiracy beliefs are for election losers (Uscinski & Parent, 2014), as reflected in the finding that Biden voters' outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased at the individual level, while Trump voters' did not. The group-level effects on changes in outgroup conspiracy beliefs also underscored the role of intergroup conflict in conspiracy theories (van Prooijen & Song, 2021). And third, the present research examined conspiracy theories about one's own political ingroup, and found that such ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time.

The decrease over time for ingroup conspiracy beliefs occurred among both Biden and Trump voters. We speculate that, given its polarized nature and contested result, this election increased intergroup conflict between Biden and Trump voters. Such intergroup conflict may have increased feelings of ingroup loyalty within both voter groups (Druckman, 1994), therefore decreasing beliefs that members of one's own group were conspiring. Moreover, ingroup conspiracy beliefs were higher for Trump than Biden voters (particularly at the first measurement point). This difference might expand previous findings that Republicans are more susceptible to conspiracy cues than Democrats (Enders & Smallpage, 2019), by suggesting that these effects generalize to conspiracy cues coming from their own ingroup.

Conclusion

The 2020 American presidential elections yielded many conspiracy beliefs that the elections were rigged, and conspiracy beliefs generally have negative consequences for societies. One key challenge for scientists and policymakers is to establish how conspiracy theories develop over time. In this research, we conducted a longitudinal study to provide empirical insights into the temporal dynamics underlying conspiracy beliefs, in the setting of a polarized election. We conclude that specific conspiracy beliefs that the elections were rigged—but not conspiracy mentality—are malleable over time, depending on political affiliations and election results.

The research is here.

The Psychological Origins of Conspiracy Theory Beliefs: Big Events with Small Causes Amplify Conspiratorial Thinking

Vonasch, A., Dore, N., & Felicite, J.

(2022, January 20). 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/3j9xg

Abstract

Three studies supported a new model of conspiracy theory belief: People are most likely to believe conspiracy theories that explain big, socially important events with smaller, intuitively unappealing official explanations. Two experiments (N = 577) used vignettes about fictional conspiracy theories and measured online participants’ beliefs in the official causes of the events and the corresponding conspiracy theories. We experimentally manipulated the size of the event and its official cause. Larger events and small official causes decreased belief in the official cause and this mediated increased belief in the conspiracy theory, even after controlling for individual differences in paranoia and distrust. Study 3 established external validity and generalizability by coding the 78 most popular conspiracy theories on Reddit. Nearly all (96.7%) popular conspiracy theories explain big, socially important events with smaller, intuitively unappealing official explanations. By contrast, events not producing conspiracy theories often have bigger explanations.

General Discussion

Three studies supported the HOSE (heuristic of sufficient explanation) of conspiracy theory belief. Nearly all popular conspiracy theories sampled were about major events with small official causes deemed too small to sufficiently explain the event. Two experiments involving invented conspiracy theories supported the proposed causal mechanism. People were less likely to believe the official explanation was true because it was relatively small and the event was relatively big. People’s beliefs in the conspiracy theory were mediated by their disbelief in the official explanation. Thus, one reason people believe conspiracy theories is because they offer a bigger explanation for a seemingly implausibly large effect of a small cause.

HOSE helps explain why certain conspiracy theories become popular but others do not. Like evolutionarily fit genes are especially likely to spread to subsequent generations, ideas (memes) with certain qualities are most likely to spread and thus become popular (Dawkins, 1976). HOSE explains that conspiracy theories spread widely because people are strongly motivated to learn an explanation for important events (Douglas, et al., 2017; 2019), and are usually unsatisfied with counterintuitively small explanations that seem insufficient to explain things. Conspiracy theories are typically inspired by events that people perceive to be larger than their causes could plausibly produce. Some conspiracy theories may be inevitable because small causes do sometimes counterintuitively cause big events: via the exponential spread of a microscopic virus or the interconnected, chaotic nature of events like the flap of a butterfly’s wings changing weather across the world (Gleick, 2008). Therefore, itmay be impossible to prevent all conspiracy theories from developing.

The research is here.

Why do narcissists find conspiracy theories so appealing?

A. Cichocka, M. Marchlewska, & M. Biddlestone

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 47, October 2022, 101386

Abstract

Narcissism—a conviction about one's superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one's social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation.

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Gullibility

Although narcissists are typically overconfident in their abilities, judgments, and intelligence, they tend to be naive and less likely to engage in cognitive reflection. For example, Hart and colleagues found that those scoring high in narcissistic rivalry/antagonism (but not admiration/agentic extraversion) were more gullible, that is insensitive to cues of untrustworthiness and vulnerable to being manipulated. Furthermore, studies consistently show that both grandiose (especially its antagonistic, but less consistently agentic extroversive, component) and vulnerable (its antagonistic and neurotic components) narcissism are associated with a predisposition towards odd and unusual beliefs. Conspiracy theories can be one example of such beliefs. There is also evidence that gullibility strengthens the association between narcissism and conspiracy beliefs. In a study by Ahadzadeh and colleagues, the link between narcissism and endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories was especially pronounced among those who were not skeptical towards social media posts in the first place. Taken together, this research suggests that narcissistic antagonism and neuroticism might predict higher gullibility, further related to conspiracy beliefs.

Parallel effects of collective narcissism

Multiple studies indicate that conspiracy theories might not only be appealing to those high in individual narcissism, but also in collective narcissism—a belief that one's group is exceptional and deserves special treatment. Collective narcissism predicts beliefs in conspiracy theories about outgroups, for instance accusing them of involvement in high-profile events (such as the 2019 Smolensk air disaster). Collective narcissism has also been linked to beliefs in anti-science conspiracy theories (e.g., about vaccines, COVID-19, or climate change). These associations are typically explained by the exaggerated intergroup threat sensitivity of collective narcissists, analogous to the paranoia and threat sensitivity of individual narcissists. A conviction that one's group is unique and entitled to special treatment might also increase the need to deny or deflect from national failings by pointing a finger towards malevolent forces undermining the ingroup. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that a motivation to restore personal control strengthens the association between collective narcissism and outgroup conspiracy beliefs, echoing the role of control and dominance motives in individual narcissism. Finally, given studies linking collective narcissism to bullshit receptivity and low cognitive reflection, it is at least plausible that gullibility also plays a role. Thus, collective and individual narcissism could be linked to conspiracy beliefs via similar psychological processes. At the same time, while the effects of individual narcissism might be relatively stable across contexts, any effects of collective narcissism might depend on whether certain identities are important or salient to participants. More work is needed to examine these possibilities.

The info is here.

Some important information for mental health clinicians.

Their own worst enemy? Collective narcissists are willing to conspire against their in-group

M. Biddlestone, A. Cichocka, 

M. Główczewski, & A. Cislak

The British Psychological Society

Accepted: 11 April 2022

Abstract

Collective narcissism – a belief in in-group greatness that is not appreciated by others – is associated with using one's group for personal benefits. Across one pilot and four studies, we demonstrated that collective narcissism predicts readiness to conspire against in-group members (rmeta-analysis = .24). In Study 1, conducted in Poland (N = 361), collective narcissism measured in the context of national identity predicted readiness to engage in secret surveillance against one's own country's citizens. In Study 2 (N = 174; pre-registered), collective narcissism in UK workplace teams predicted intentions to engage in conspiracies against co-workers. In Study 3 (N = 471; pre-registered), US national narcissism predicted intentions to conspire against fellow citizens. Furthermore, conspiracy intentions accounted for the relationship between collective narcissism and beliefs in conspiracy theories about the in-group. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 1064; pre-registered), we corroborated the link between Polish national narcissism and conspiracy intentions against fellow citizens, further showing that these intentions were only directed towards group members that were perceived as moderately or strongly typical of the national in-group (but not when perceived in-group typicality was low). In-group identification was either negatively related (Studies 1 and 2) or unrelated (Studies 3 and 4) to conspiracy intentions (rmeta-analysis = .04). We discuss implications for research on conspiracy theories and populism.

Practitioner points

• Analysts should monitor cases of public endorsement of collective narcissism, which is a belief that one’s in-group (e.g. nation, organisation, or political party) is exceptional but underappreciated by others.
• As we show, collective narcissism is associated with a willingness to conspire against fellow in-group members and with support for in-group surveillance policies.
• Thus, groups cherishing such a defensive form of in-group identity are threatened from the inside, thereby warranting education aimed at identifying and avoiding potential exploitation from otherwise trusted members within their own groups.

From the General Discussion

Importantly,  given  the  correlational  nature  of  our  studies,  causality  was  not  established.  It  is  then  also possible that in-group conspiracy beliefs affected conspiracy intentions. For example, intentions to engage in conspiracies within one's group might be a response to a conviction that malevolent forces operate within one's society. Such beliefs and intentions might in fact form a positive feedback loop, which fuels a culture of intragroup suspicion and paranoia, making conspiracy narratives about the in- group more believable and further frustrating personal needs (see also Douglas et al., 2017). This also implies that the conspiracies those high in collective narcissism appear willing to engage in are unlikely to satisfy the frustrated personal needs they purport to serve.

A pdf is here.

Lizard people, deadly orgies and JFK: How QAnon hijacked Hollywood to spread conspiracies

Anita Chabria

The Los Angeles Times

Originally posted 7 DEC 21

Here is an excerpt:

Bloom, the extremist researcher, said the familiarity of recycled Hollywood plots may be part of what eases followers into QAnon’s depths: Although the claims are outlandish, they tickle at recollections, whether from fiction or reality.

That sense of recognition gives them a level of believability, said Bloom — an “I’ve heard that before” effect. Part of the QAnon logic, she said, is that films and television shows that contain the conspiratorial story lines are viewed by believers as kernels of truth dropped by the elites — a sort of taunting acknowledgment of their misdeeds.

“Part of the idea is that Hollywood has been doing this for ages and ages, and they have been hiding in plain sight by putting it in film,” Bloom said.

That idea of using art to hide life is sometimes reinforced by actual events, she said. She uses the example of the 1999 Stanley Kubrick film “Eyes Wide Shut,” about a New York doctor, played by Tom Cruise, who stumbles into a deadly orgy attended by society’s power players. Some QAnon adherents believe that there is a cabal of influential pedophiles who murder children during ritualistic events to harvest a hormone that provides eternal youth and that the film was a nod to that activity.

She points to the Jeffrey Epstein case, and the current trial of his confidante, Ghislaine Maxwell, as factual instances of high-profile sex-trafficking allegations that seem pulled from those story lines, and have now been folded into the QAnon narratives.

“That’s one of the reasons some of the more outlandish things resonate, is because it sort of seems plausible,” Bloom said.

She also points out that the fear of sacrifices fits with the antisemitic trajectory of QAnon — it ties into centuries-old conspiracies about “blood libel” — the false belief of Jewish people killing Christians for their blood — which in turn can be tied to myths of European vampires.

The info is here.

Maybe a free thinker but not a critical one: High conspiracy belief is associated with low critical thinking ability

Lantian, A., Bagneux, V., Delouvée, S., 

& Gauvrit, N. (2020, February 7). 

Applied Cognitive Psychology

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8qhx4

Abstract

Critical thinking is of paramount importance in our society. People regularly assume that critical thinking is a way to reduce conspiracy belief, although the relationship between critical thinking and conspiracy belief has never been tested. We conducted two studies (Study 1, N = 86; Study 2, N = 252), in which we found that critical thinking ability—measured by an open-ended test emphasizing several areas of critical thinking ability in the context of argumentation—is negatively associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Additionally, we did not find a significant relationship between self-reported (subjective) critical thinking ability and conspiracy belief. Our results support the idea that conspiracy believers have less developed critical thinking ability and stimulate discussion about the possibility of reducing conspiracy beliefs via the development of critical thinking.

From the General Discussion

The presumed role of critical thinking in belief in conspiracy theories is continuously discussed by researchers, journalists, and by lay people on social networks. One example is the capacity to exercise critical thinking ability to distinguish bogus conspiracy theories from genuine conspiracy theories (Bale, 2007), leading us to question when critical thinking ability could be used to support this adaptive function. Sometimes, it is not unreasonable to think that a form of rationality would help to facilitate the detection of dangerous coalitions (van Prooijen & Van Vugt, 2018). In that respect, Stojanov and Halberstadt (2019) recently introduced a distinction between irrational versus rational suspicion. Although the former focuses on the general tendency to believe in any conspiracy theories, the later focus on higher sensitivity to deception or corruption, which is defined as“healthy skepticism.” These two aspects of suspicion can now be handled simultaneously thanks to a new scale developed by Stojanov and Halberstadt (2019). In our study, we found that critical thinking ability was associated with lower unfounded belief in conspiracy theories, but this does not answer the question as to whether critical thinking ability can be helpful for the detection of true conspiracies. Future studies could use this new measurement to address this specific question.

The research is here.

Are Conspiracy Theories Harmless?

Douglas, K. M.

The Spanish Journal of Psychology

(2021). 24, e13, 1-7.

Abstract

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the consequences of conspiracy theories and the COVID–19 pandemic raised this interest to another level. In this article, I will outline what we know about the consequences of conspiracy theories for individuals, groups, and society, arguing that they are certainly not harmless. In particular, research suggests that conspiracy theories are associated with political apathy, support for non-normative political action, climate denial, vaccine refusal, prejudice, crime, violence, disengagement in the workplace, and reluctance to adhere to COVID–19 recommendations. In this article, I will also discuss the challenges of dealing with the negative consequences of conspiracy theories, which present some opportunities for future research.

Conclusions

Conspiracy theories are associated with a range of negative consequences for political engagement, political behavior, climate engagement, trust in science, vaccine uptake, civic behavior, work-related behavior, inter-group relations, and more recently the COVID-19 response.  A significant challenge for researchers is to learn how to deal with conspiracy theories and their associated effects.

The research is here.

The Antiscience Movement Is Escalating, Going Global and Killing Thousands

Peter J. Hotez

Scientific American

Originally posted 29 MAR 21

Antiscience has emerged as a dominant and highly lethal force, and one that threatens global security, as much as do terrorism and nuclear proliferation. We must mount a counteroffensive and build new infrastructure to combat antiscience, just as we have for these other more widely recognized and established threats.

Antiscience is the rejection of mainstream scientific views and methods or their replacement with unproven or deliberately misleading theories, often for nefarious and political gains. It targets prominent scientists and attempts to discredit them. The destructive potential of antiscience was fully realized in the U.S.S.R. under Joseph Stalin. Millions of Russian peasants died from starvation and famine during the 1930s and 1940s because Stalin embraced the pseudoscientific views of Trofim Lysenko that promoted catastrophic wheat and other harvest failures. Soviet scientists who did not share Lysenko’s “vernalization” theories lost their positions or, like the plant geneticist, Nikolai Vavilov, starved to death in a gulag.

Now antiscience is causing mass deaths once again in this COVID-19 pandemic. Beginning in the spring of 2020, the Trump White House launched a coordinated disinformation campaign that dismissed the severity of the epidemic in the United States, attributed COVID deaths to other causes, claimed hospital admissions were due to a catch-up in elective surgeries, and asserted that ultimately that the epidemic would spontaneously evaporate. It also promoted hydroxychloroquine as a spectacular cure, while downplaying the importance of masks. Other authoritarian or populist regimes in Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, Philippines and Tanzania adopted some or all of these elements.   

As both a vaccine scientist and a parent of an adult daughter with autism and intellectual disabilities, I have years of experience going up against the antivaccine lobby, which claims vaccines cause autism or other chronic conditions. This prepared me to quickly recognize the outrageous claims made by members of the Trump White House staff, and to connect the dots to label them as antiscience disinformation. Despite my best efforts to sound the alarm and call it out, the antiscience disinformation created mass havoc in the red states. 

The info is here.

Paranoia and Belief Updating During a Crisis

Suthaharan, P., Reed, E.,  et al. 

(2020, September 4). 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/mtces

Abstract

The 2019 coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has made the world seem unpredictable. During such crises we can experience concerns that others might be against us, culminating perhaps in paranoid conspiracy theories. Here, we investigate paranoia and belief updating in an online sample (N=1,010) in the United States of America (U.S.A). We demonstrate the pandemic increased individuals’ self-rated paranoia and rendered their task-based belief updating more erratic. Local lockdown and reopening policies, as well as culture more broadly, markedly influenced participants’ belief-updating: an early and sustained lockdown rendered people’s belief updating less capricious. Masks are clearly an effective public health measure against COVID-19. However, state-mandated mask wearing increased paranoia and induced more erratic behaviour. Remarkably, this was most evident in those states where adherence to mask wearing rules was poor but where rule following is typically more common. This paranoia may explain the lack of compliance with this simple and effective countermeasure. Computational analyses of participant behaviour suggested that people with higher paranoia expected the task to be more unstable, but at the same time predicted more rewards. In a follow-up study we found people who were more paranoid endorsed conspiracies about mask-wearing and potential vaccines – again, mask attitude and conspiratorial beliefs were associated with erratic task behaviour and changed priors. Future public health responses to the pandemic might leverage these observations, mollifying paranoia and increasing adherence by tempering people’s expectations of other’s behaviour, and the environment more broadly, and reinforcing compliance.

Why Facts Are Not Enough: Understanding and Managing the Motivated Rejection of Science

Hornsey MJ. 

Current Directions in Psychological Science

2020;29(6):583-591. 

doi:10.1177/0963721420969364

Abstract

Efforts to change the attitudes of creationists, antivaccination advocates, and climate skeptics by simply providing evidence have had limited success. Motivated reasoning helps make sense of this communication challenge: If people are motivated to hold a scientifically unorthodox belief, they selectively interpret evidence to reinforce their preferred position. In the current article, I summarize research on six psychological roots from which science-skeptical attitudes grow: (a) ideologies, (b) vested interests, (c) conspiracist worldviews, (d) fears and phobias, (e) personal-identity expression, and (f) social-identity needs. The case is made that effective science communication relies on understanding and attending to these underlying motivations.

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Conclusion

This article outlines six reasons people are motivated to hold views that are inconsistent with scientific consensus. This perspective helps explain why education and explication of data sometimes has a limited impact on science skeptics, but I am not arguing that education and facts are pointless. Quite the opposite: The provision of clear, objective information is the first and best line of defense against misinformation, mythmaking, and ignorance. However, for polarizing scientific issues—for example, climate change, vaccination, evolution, and in-vitro meat—it is clear that facts alone will not do the job. Successful communication around these issues will require sensitive understandings of the psychological motivations people have for rejecting science and the flexibility to devise communication frames that align with or circumvent these motivations.

Conspiracy Theorists May Really Just Be Lonely

Matthew Hutson

Scientific American

Originally posted 1 May 17

Conspiracy theorists are often portrayed as nutjobs, but some may just be lonely, recent studies suggest. Separate research has shown that social exclusion creates a feeling of meaninglessness and that the search for meaning leads people to perceive patterns in randomness. A new study in the March issue of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology connects the dots, reporting that ostracism enhances superstition and belief in conspiracies.

In one experiment, people wrote about a recent unpleasant interaction with friends, then rated their feelings of exclusion, their search for purpose in life, their belief in two conspiracies (that the government uses subliminal messages and that drug companies withhold cures), and their faith in paranormal activity in the Bermuda Triangle. The more excluded people felt, the greater their desire for meaning and the more likely they were to harbor suspicions.

In a second experiment, college students were made to feel excluded or included by their peers, then read two scenarios suggestive of conspiracies (price-fixing, office sabotage) and one about a made-up good-luck ritual (stomping one's feet before a meeting). Those who were excluded reported greater connection between behaviors and outcomes in the stories compared with those who were included.

The info is here.

Collective narcissism predicts the belief and dissemination of conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Sternisko, A., Cichocka, A., Cislak, A.,
& Van Bavel, J. J. (2020, May 21).
PsyArXiv
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/4c6av

Abstract

While COVID-19 was quietly spreading across the globe, conspiracy theories were finding loud voices on the internet. What contributes to the spread of these theories? In two national surveys (NTotal = 950) conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom, we identified national narcissism – a belief in the greatness of one’s nation that others do not appreciate – as a risk factor for the spread of conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that national narcissism was strongly associated with the proneness to believe and disseminate conspiracy theories related to COVID-19, accounting for up to 22% of the variance. Further, we found preliminary evidence that belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and national narcissism was linked to health-related behaviors and attitudes towards public policies to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Our study expands previous work by illustrating the importance of identity processes in the spread of conspiracy theories during pandemics.

Conclusion

Ultimately, we hope that our studies are not only relevant for researchers but also for practitioners.Yet, little is known about how to increase or decrease the link between collective narcissism and conspiracy theories. Therefore, we urge future research to examine if focusing on the protection of the national image influences the spread of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, and the implications of these associations for public-health communication. For instance, underscoring that the national in-group is in some way disadvantaged in fighting the pandemic might increase the need to assert the image of the group and further fuel conspiracy theories.  Conversely, public-health messages might benefit from stressing that the adherence to health guidelines and policies also helps protect the nation’s image. Exploring such and other interventions could help limit the current ‘infodemic'.

Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational

TomasStåhl and Jan-Willem van Prooijen
Personality and Individual Differences
Volume 122, 1 February 2018, Pages 155-163

Abstract

Why does belief in the paranormal, conspiracy theories, and various other phenomena that are not backed up by evidence remain widespread in modern society? In the present research we adopt an individual difference approach, as we seek to identify psychological precursors of skepticism toward unfounded beliefs. We propose that part of the reason why unfounded beliefs are so widespread is because skepticism requires both sufficient analytic skills, and the motivation to form beliefs on rational grounds. In Study 1 we show that analytic thinking is associated with a lower inclination to believe various conspiracy theories, and paranormal phenomena, but only among individuals who strongly value epistemic rationality. We replicate this effect on paranormal belief, but not conspiracy beliefs, in Study 2. We also provide evidence suggesting that general cognitive ability, rather than analytic cognitive style, is the underlying facet of analytic thinking that is responsible for these effects.

The article is here.

To think critically, you have to be both analytical and motivated

John Timmer
ARS Techica
Originally published November 15, 2017

Here is an excerpt:

One of the proposed solutions to this issue is to incorporate more critical thinking into our education system. But critical thinking is more than just a skill set; you have to recognize when to apply it, do so effectively, and then know how to respond to the results. Understanding what makes a person effective at analyzing fake news and conspiracy theories has to take all of this into account. A small step toward that understanding comes from a recently released paper, which looks at how analytical thinking and motivated skepticism interact to make someone an effective critical thinker.

Valuing rationality

The work comes courtesy of the University of Illinois at Chicago's Tomas Ståhl and Jan-Willem van Prooijen at VU Amsterdam. This isn't the first time we've heard from Ståhl; last year, he published a paper on what he termed "moralizing epistemic rationality." In it, he looked at people's thoughts on the place critical thinking should occupy in their lives. The research identified two classes of individuals: those who valued their own engagement with critical thinking, and those who viewed it as a moral imperative that everyone engage in this sort of analysis.

The information is here.

The target article is here.

The spreading of misinformation online

M. Del Vicarioa , A. Bessib , F. Zolloa , F. Petronic , A. Scalaa, G. Caldarellia, H. E. Stanley, and W. Quattrociocchia
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

The wide availability of user-provided content in online social media facilitates the aggregation of people around common interests, worldviews, and narratives. However, the World Wide Web (WWW) also allows for the rapid dissemination of unsubstantiated rumors and conspiracy theories that often elicit rapid, large, but naive social responses such as the recent case of Jade Helm 15––where a simple military exercise turned out to be perceived as the beginning of a new civil war in the United States. In this work, we address the determinants governing misinformation spreading through a thorough quantitative analysis. In particular, we focus on how Facebook users consume information related to two distinct narratives: scientific and conspiracy news. We find that, although consumers of scientific and conspiracy stories present similar consumption patterns with respect to content, cascade dynamics differ. Selective exposure to content is the primary driver of content diffusion and generates the formation of homogeneous clusters, i.e., “echo chambers.” Indeed, homogeneity appears to be the primary driver for the diffusion of contents and each echo chamber has its own cascade dynamics. Finally, we introduce a data-driven percolation model mimicking rumor spreading and we show that homogeneity and polarization are the main determinants for predicting cascades’ size.

The article is here.

Political Extremism Predicts Belief in Conspiracy Theories

By Jan-Willem van Prooijen, André P. M. Krouwel, & Thomas V. Pollet
Social Psychological and Personality Science, January 12, 2015

Abstract

Historical records suggest that the political extremes—at both the “left” and the “right”—substantially endorsed conspiracy beliefs about other-minded groups. The present contribution empirically tests whether extreme political ideologies, at either side of the political spectrum, are positively associated with an increased tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Four studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands revealed a quadratic relationship between strength of political ideology and conspiracy beliefs about various political issues. Moreover, participants’ belief in simple political solutions to societal problems mediated conspiracy beliefs among both left- and right-wing extremists. Finally, the effects described here were not attributable to general attitude extremity. Our conclusion is that political extremism and conspiracy beliefs are strongly associated due to a highly structured thinking style that is aimed at making sense of societal events.

The entire article is here.

Conspiracy theories: Why we believe the unbelievable

By Michael Shermer
The Los Angeles Times
Originally posted on November 26, 2013

Here is an excerpt:

Why do so many people refuse to accept this simple and obvious conclusion? The answer: psychology.

There are three psychological effects at work here, starting with "cognitive dissonance," or the discomfort felt when holding two ideas that are not in harmony. We attempt to reduce the dissonance by altering one of the ideas to be in accord with the other. In this case, the two discordant ideas are 1) JFK as one of the most powerful people on Earth who was 2) killed by Lee Harvey Oswald, a lone loser, a nobody. Camelot brought down by a curmudgeon.

That doesn't feel right. To balance the scale, conspiracy elements are stacked onto the Oswald side: the CIA, the FBI, the KGB, the Mafia, Fidel Castro, Lyndon Johnson and, in Oliver Stone's telling in his film "JFK," the military-industrial complex.

Cognitive dissonance was at work shortly after Princess Diana's death, which was the result of drunk driving, speeding and no seat belt. But princesses are not supposed to die the way thousands of regular people die each year, so the British royal family, the British intelligence services and others had to be fingered as co-conspirators.

The entire story is here.