Why morals matter in foreign policy

Joseph Nye
aspistrategist.org.au
Originally published 10 Jan 20

Here is the conclusion:

Good moral reasoning should be three-dimensional, weighing and balancing intentions, consequences and means. A foreign policy should be judged accordingly. Moreover, a moral foreign policy must consider consequences such as maintaining an institutional order that encourages moral interests, in addition to particular newsworthy actions such as helping a dissident or a persecuted group in another country. And it’s important to include the ethical consequences of ‘nonactions’, such as President Harry S. Truman’s willingness to accept stalemate and domestic political punishment during the Korean War rather than follow General Douglas MacArthur’s recommendation to use nuclear weapons. As Sherlock Holmes famously noted, much can be learned from a dog that doesn’t bark.

It’s pointless to argue that ethics will play no role in the foreign policy debates that await this year. We should acknowledge that we always use moral reasoning to judge foreign policy, and we should learn to do it better.

The info is here.

The college admissions scandal is a morality play

Elaine Ayala
San Antonio Express-News
Originally posted March 16, 2019

The college admission cheating scandal that raced through social media and dominated news cycles this week wasn’t exactly shocking: Wealthy parents rigged the system for their underachieving children.

It’s an ancient morality play set at elite universities with an unseemly cast of characters: spoiled teens and shameless parents; corrupt test proctors and paid test takers; as well as college sports officials willing to be bribed and a ring leader who ultimately turned on all of them.

William “Rick” Singer, who went to college in San Antonio, wore a wire to cooperate with FBI investigators.

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Yet even though they were arrested, the 50 people involved managed to secure the best possible outcome under the circumstances. Unlike many caught shoplifting or possessing small amounts of marijuana and who lack the lawyers and resources to help them navigate the legal system, the accused parents and coaches quickly posted bond and were promptly released without spending much time in custody.

The info is here.

Can Morality Be Engineered In Artificial General Intelligence Systems?

Abhijeet Katte
Analytics India Magazine
Originally published May 10, 2018

Here is an excerpt:

This report Engineering Moral Agents – from Human Morality to Artificial Morality discusses challenges in engineering computational ethics and how mathematically oriented approaches to ethics are gaining traction among researchers from a wide background, including philosophy. AGI-focused research is evolving into the formalization of moral theories to act as a base for implementing moral reasoning in machines. For example, Kevin Baum from the University of Saarland talked about a project about teaching formal ethics to computer-science students wherein the group was involved in building a database of moral-dilemma examples from the literature to be used as benchmarks for implementing moral reasoning.

Another study, titled Towards Moral Autonomous Systems from a group of European researchers states that today there is a real need for a functional system of ethical reasoning as AI systems that function as part of our society are ready to be deployed.One of the suggestions include having every assisted living AI system to have  a “Why did you do that?” button which, when pressed, causes the robot to explain why it carried out the previous action.

The information is here.

A fundamental problem with Moral Enhancement

Joao Fabiano
Practical Ethics
Originally posted October 13, 2017

Moral philosophers often prefer to conceive thought experiments, dilemmas and problem cases of single individuals who make one-shot decisions with well-defined short-term consequences. Morality is complex enough that such simplifications seem justifiable or even necessary for philosophical reflection.  If we are still far from consensus on which is the best moral theory or what makes actions right or wrong – or even if such aspects should be the central problem of moral philosophy – by considering simplified toy scenarios, then introducing group or long-term effects would make matters significantly worse. However, when it comes to actually changing human moral dispositions with the use of technology (i.e., moral enhancement), ignoring the essential fact that morality deals with group behaviour with long-ranging consequences can be extremely risky. Despite those risks, attempting to provide a full account of morality in order to conduct moral enhancement would be both simply impractical as well as arguably risky. We seem to be far away from such account, yet there are pressing current moral failings, such as the inability for proper large-scale cooperation, which makes the solution to present global catastrophic risks, such as global warming or nuclear war, next to impossible. Sitting back and waiting for a complete theory of morality might be riskier than attempting to fix our moral failing using incomplete theories. We must, nevertheless, proceed with caution and an awareness of such incompleteness. Here I will present several severe risks from moral enhancement that arise from focusing on improving individual dispositions while ignoring emergent societal effects and point to tentative solutions to those risks. I deem those emergent risks fundamental problems both because they lie at the foundation of the theoretical framework guiding moral enhancement – moral philosophy – and because they seem, at the time, inescapable; my proposed solution will aim at increasing awareness of such problems instead of directly solving them.

The article is here.

How to Distinguish Between Antifa, White Supremacists, and Black Lives Matter

Conor Friedersdorf
The Atlantic
Originally published August 31, 2017

Here are two excerpts:

One can condemn the means of extralegal violence, and observe that the alt-right, Antifa, and the far-left have all engaged in it on different occasions, without asserting that all extralegal violence is equivalent––murdering someone with a car or shooting a representative is more objectionable than punching with the intent to mildly injure. What’s more, different groups can choose equally objectionable means without becoming equivalent, because assessing any group requires analyzing their ends, not just their means.

For neo-Nazis and Klansmen in Charlottesville, one means, a torch-lit parade meant to intimidate by evoking bygone days of racial terrorism, was deeply objectionable; more importantly, their end, spreading white-supremacist ideology in service of a future where racists can lord power over Jews and people of color, is abhorrent.

Antifa is more complicated.

Some of its members employ the objectionable means of initiating extralegal street violence; but its stated end of resisting fascism is laudable, while its actual end is contested. Is it really just about resisting fascists or does it have a greater, less defensible agenda? Many debates about Antifa that play out on social media would prove less divisive if the parties understood themselves to be agreeing that opposing fascism is laudable while disagreeing about Antifa’s means, or whether its end is really that limited.

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A dearth of distinctions has a lot of complicated consequences, but in aggregate, it helps to empower the worst elements in a society, because those elements are unable to attract broad support except by muddying distinctions between themselves and others whose means or ends are defensible to a broader swath of the public. So come to whatever conclusions accord with your reason and conscience. But when expressing them, consider drawing as many distinctions as possible.

The article is here.

Budgets are moral documents, and Trump’s is a moral failure

Dylan Matthews
vox.com
Originally published March 16, 2017

The budget is a moral document.

It’s not clear where that phrase originates, but it’s become a staple of fiscal policy debates in DC, and for very good reason. Budgets lay out how a fifth of the national economy is going to be allocated. They make trade-offs between cancer treatment and jet fighters, scientific research and tax cuts, national parks and border fences. These are all decisions with profound moral implications. Budgets, when implemented, can lift millions out of poverty, or consign millions more to it. They can provide universal health insurance or take coverage away from those who have it. They can fuel wars or support peacekeeping.

What President Donald Trump released on Thursday is not a full budget. It doesn’t touch on taxes, or on entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or food stamps. It concerns itself exclusively with the third of the budget that’s allocated through the annual appropriations process.

But it’s a moral document nonetheless. And the moral consequences of its implementation would be profound, and negative. The fact that it will not be implemented in full — that Congress is almost certain not to go along with many of its recommendations — in no way detracts from what it tells us about the administration’s priorities, and its ethics.

Let’s start with poverty.

The article is here.

Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality

L. Ngo, M. Kelly, C. G. Coutlee, R. M. Carter, W. Sinnott-Armstrong & S. A. Huettel
Scientific Reports 5, Article number: 17390 (2015)
doi:10.1038/srep17390

Abstract

Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others.

The article is here.

How Our Self-Control Affects the Way We See Risk

Research shows that people with low self-control tend to underplay the negative consequences of their decisions.

by Kerry A. Dolan
Stanford Business
November 25, 2015

Here is an excerpt:

Academic research has long shown that people with low self-control engage in riskier behaviors than do those with higher self-control. But what is the connection between self-control and risk? Are people with low self-control simply unable to stop themselves from risky behavior?

Not exactly. In a new study, researchers from Stanford and the University of Hong Kong found that people with low self-control look at consequences differently than those with higher self-control.

The article is here.

Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality

Fiery Cushman
Current Opinion in Psychology
Volume 6, December 2015, Pages 97–103

Highlights

• Mental state inference is a foundational element of moral judgment.
• Its influence is usually captured by contrasting intentional and accidental harm.
• The folk theory of intentional action comprises many distinct elements.
• Moral judgment shows nuanced sensitivity to these constituent elements.
• Future research will profit from attention to the constituents of intentional action.

Mental state representations are a crucial input to human moral judgment. This fact is often summarized by saying that we restrict moral condemnation to ‘intentional’ harms. This simple description is the beginning of a theory, however, not the end of one. There is rich internal structure to the folk concept of intentional action, which comprises a series of causal relations between mental states, actions and states of affairs in the world. Moral judgment shows nuanced patterns of sensitivity to all three of these elements: mental states (like beliefs and desires), the actions that a person performs, and the consequences of those actions. Deconstructing intentional action into its elemental fragments will enable future theories to reconstruct our understanding of moral judgment.

The entire article is here.

Immune from Cyber-fire? The Psychological and Physiological Effects of Cyberwar

By Michael L. Gross, Dapna Canetti, & Israel Waismel-Manor
In: Binary Bullets: The Ethics of Cyberwarfare.
Edited by Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke, and Bradley Jay Strawser.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming

Here is an excerpt:

Following an overview that describes the challenge that cyber-operations pose for the principle of noncombatant immunity, the following sections map out and analyze the harms of cyberwarfare. Consider, first, physiological harm.  Although no person has lost his life or suffered any kind of physical injury from a cyber-attack to date, the literature is replete with scenarios of death and devastation.  These come in the course of cyber-attacks on vital infrastructures that disrupt air and
rail transportation or poison water supplies. In many ways, these are similar to the consequences of conventional war. For the most part, however, modern cyberwarfare causes no physical injury. As a result, one may reasonably ask whether noncombatants enjoy protection from cyber-attacks that disrupt telecommunications, disable social media, or destroy, disclose or steal financial data and personal information. The answer hinges upon the psychological harm that victims suffer, particularly if belligerents target civilians and civilian infrastructures directly.  Extrapolating from studies of cyber-bullying, identity theft and ordinary burglary, and building upon the effects of simulated cyber-terrorism in the laboratory, we explore the psychological harms of cyberwarfare. Cyberwarfare is not benign but causes stress, anxiety and fear. Such mental suffering threatens to disrupt routine life, impair educational and workplace performance, impact significantly on the poor
and elderly, and increase public pressure on the government to act. Although most forms of psychological suffering are not as intense, prolonged or irreversible as bodily injury or loss of life, our analysis suggests that the psychological harm of cyberwar can affect well-being nonetheless.

The entire article is here.

Moral Responsibility and PAP

By Heath White
PEA Soup
A blog dedicated to philosophy, ethics, and academia
Originally posted December 19, 2013

Does moral responsibility require the ability to do otherwise?  For example, must one have been able to refrain from an evil deed if one is to be appropriately blamed for it?  The answer turns on the truth of a familiar principle:

(PAP) If S is blameworthy for doing X, S must have been able to do otherwise than X.

The traditional view is that (PAP) is true; Frankfurt argued that it was false, with a form of example which is still widely discussed.  I’m going to argue for Frankfurt’s conclusion in a way that has nothing to do with Frankfurt-style examples.  I’d be interested in feedback.

Blaming (or punishing) someone for failing to live up to a moral standard is a special case of a more general phenomenon.  There are many cases where there is some kind of requirement, someone fails to live up to it, and negative consequences are imposed as a result.  It is instructive to look at how we view “couldn’t have done otherwise” in these other cases.

The entire blog post is here.

What happens to whistleblowers?

By David Nather
Politico
Originally published June 13, 2013

Edward Snowden might want to talk to a slew of recent national security leakers who learned a lesson the hard way: whistleblowing comes at a price.

Thomas Tamm, the DOJ attorney who told the New York Times about the National Security Agency’s surveillance program in 2004, struggled to stay employed for the five years he was under federal investigation.

And he was one of the lucky ones. Thomas Drake, a former National Security Agency official who helped expose a wasteful NSA surveillance program without privacy protections, is working in an Apple store.

And Matt Diaz, the Navy lawyer who secretly sent a list of Guantanamo Bay prisoners to a New York civil rights firm, was disbarred and now does non-legal work for the Bronx public defender’s office.

Snowden is still on the run, but he is expected to be extradited to the United States, eventually, and most likely charged with a crime.

If Snowden’s life turns out like other national security whistleblowers, his life will never be the same — leaving him to grapple with huge legal bills, poor job prospects, and a notoriety that will never really go away.

The entire story is here.