Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Cognitive Processes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cognitive Processes. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

Are we living in the age of the brain?

Understanding the brain won’t be done simply by mapping it down to the last synapse

By Philip Ball
Prospect Magazine
Originally published December 22 2014

Here is an excerpt:

Resolution of conflicting mental signals is certainly not ignored by cognitive scientists or psychologists, but there seems often to be a disjuncture between the neuroscientific model of the brain as a problem-solving network and the actual experience of the brain as a medley, even a bedlam, of imperatives and impulses. Sigmund Freud may have been wrong in seeking to present his psychoanalytic theory as a kind of science, but he was surely right to present the mind in terms of conflict rather than unity. One thing we do know about the brain is that it is not just a very large network of neurons, but is both very diverse (there are many different types of neuron, as well as non-neuronal cells called glia) and highly modular (different parts perform different, specialized roles). Mapping this architecture is an important goal, and there are some deeply impressive techniques for doing that. But the risk is that this is like trying to understand human culture using Google Earth—or rather, cultures, for there is just a single geography but plenty of conflicts, compromises and confusion going on within it.

None of this would be disputed by neuroscientists. But it perhaps highlights the distinctions between an understanding of the brain and an understanding of the mind. The implication seems to be that it is hard to develop one while you’re working on the other.

The entire article is here.

Sunday, December 7, 2014

The self is moral

We tend to think that our memories determine our identity, but it’s moral character that really makes us who we are

By Nina Strohminger
Aeon Magazine
Originally published November 17, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

Recent studies by the philosopher Shaun Nichols at the University of Arizona and myself support the view that the identity-conferring part of a person is his moral capacities. One of our experiments pays homage to Locke’s thought experiment by asking subjects which of a slew of traits a person would most likely take with him if his soul moved to a new body. Moral traits were considered more likely to survive a body swap than any other type of trait, mental or physical. Interestingly, certain types of memories – those involving people – were deemed fairly likely to survive the trip. But generic episodic memories, such as one’s commute to work, were not. People are not so much concerned with memory as with memory’s ability to connect us to others and our capacity for social action.

(cut)

Why does our identity detector place so much emphasis on moral capacities? These aren’t our most distinctive features. Our faces, our fingertips, our quirks, our autobiographies: any of these would be a more reliable way of telling who’s who. Somewhat paradoxically, identity has less to do with what makes us diļ¬€erent from other people than with our shared humanity. 


Wednesday, November 19, 2014

Ambivalence in the Cognitive Enhancement Debate

By Neil Levy
The Neuroethics Blog
Originally posted October 14, 2014

The most hotly debated topic in neuroethics surely concerns the ethics of cognitive enhancement. Is it permissible, or advisable, for human beings already functioning within the normal range to further enhance their capacities? Some people see in the prospect of enhancing ourselves the exciting prospect of becoming more than human; others see it as threatening our humanity so that we become something less than we were.

In an insightful article, Erik Parens (2005) has argued that truthfully we are all on both sides of this debate. We are at once attracted and repulsed by the prospect that we might become something more than we already are. Parens thinks both frameworks are deeply rooted in Western culture and history; perhaps they are universal themes. We are deeply attached to a gratitude framework and to a more Promeathean framework. Hence we find ourselves torn with regard to self-transformation.

The entire blog post is here.

Thursday, October 23, 2014

The Case Against Empathy

By Derek Beres
BigThink.com
Originally posted September 29, 2014

It’s hard to imagine empathy being anything but beneficial. It has become one of the most championed mental states in the neuroscience age: the ability to feel what someone else is feeling and, if all goes well, extend a hand altruistically or compassionately.

This is the clean-cut version of empathy. I feel what you’re feeling; I get it. Thinkers call for empathy when facing international crises, such as continual turmoil in Gaza: if Israelis could just feel what it’s like to be a Palestinian mother, if the Hamas leader could just understand what a sympathetic Jewish father goes through, none of this would be happening.

Yale University professor of psychology and cognitive science Paul Bloom thinks a lot gray resides in such a black-and-white definition, and that there is more danger than good adopting such a simplistic view of empathy. He argues exactly this point in the latest issue of Boston Review.

The entire article is here.

Sunday, September 21, 2014

Moral decision-making and the brain

NEURO.tv - Episode 11
Published on Aug 16, 2014

What experiments do psychologists use to identify the brain areas involved in moral decision-making? Do moral truths exist? We discuss with Joshua D. Greene, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University and author of Moral Tribes.




Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Morality and the Religious Mind: Why Theists and Nontheists Differ

By Azim Shariff, Jared Piazza, and Stephanie R. Kramer
Science and Society

Religions have come to be intimately tied to morality and much recent research has shown that theists and nontheists differ in their moral behavior and decision making along several dimensions.  Here we discuss how these empirical trends can be explained by fundamental differences in group commitment, motivations for pro-sociality, cognitive styles, and meta-ethics. We conclude that by elucidating key areas of moral congruence.

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Is One of the Most Popular Psychology Experiments Worthless?

By Olga Khazan
The Atlantic
Originally published July 24, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

But one group of researchers thinks it might be time to retire the trolley. In an upcoming paper that will be published in Social and Personality Psychology Compass, Christopher Bauman of the University of California, Irvine, Peter McGraw of the University of Colorado, Boulder, and others argue that the dilemma is too silly and unrealistic to be applicable to real-life moral problems. Therefore, they contend, it doesn't tell us as much about the human condition as we might hope.

In a survey of undergraduates, Bauman and McGraw found that 63 percent laughed "at least a little bit" in the fat-man scenario and 33 percent did so in the track-switching scenario. And that's an issue, because "humor may alter the decision-making processes people normally use to evaluate moral situations," they note. "A large body of research shows how positivity is less motivating than negativity."

The entire article is here.

Sunday, August 31, 2014

Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong

Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science
Originally published in 2005

Abstract

Do moral heuristics operate in the moral domain? If so, do they lead to moral errors? This brief essay offers an affirmative answer to both questions. In so doing, it responds to an essay by Gerd Gigerenzer on the nature of heuristics, moral and otherwise. While focused on morality, the discussion bears on the general debate between those who emphasize cognitive errors, sometimes produced by heuristics, and those who emphasize the frequent success of heuristics in producing sensible judgments in the real world. General claims are that it is contentious to see moral problems as ones of arithmetic, and that arguments about moral heuristics will often do well to steer clear of contentious arguments about what morality requires.

(cut)

But no one should deny that in many contexts, moral and other heuristics, in the form of simple rules of thumb, lead to moral error on any plausible view of morality. Consider, for example, the idea, emphasized by Gigerenzer, that one ought to do as the majority does, a source of massive moral blunders (see Sunstein, 2003). Or consider the fast and frugal idea that one ought not to distort the truth—a heuristic that generally works well, but that also leads (in my view) to moral error when, for example, the distortion is necessary to avoid significant numbers of deaths. Or consider the act- omission distinction, which makes moral sense in many domains, but which can lead to unsupportable moral judgments as well (Baron, 2004).

The entire article is here.

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Process Debunking and Ethics

By Shaun Nichols
Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 4 (July 2014), pp. 727-749
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Article DOI: 10.1086/675877

The rise of empirical moral psychology has been accompanied by the return of debunking arguments in ethics. This is no surprise since debunking arguments often depend on empirical premises about the beliefs under consideration. As we learn more about our moral psychology, we put ourselves in a position to develop more empirically informed debunking arguments.

In this essay, I will start by distinguishing different forms of debunking arguments, and I will adopt a particular, psychologically oriented, approach to debunking. On the type of debunking argument that I will promote, one attempts to undercut the justificatory status of a person’s belief by showing that the belief was formed by an epistemically defective psychological process. There are natural ways to develop such debunking arguments in metaethics, I’ll contend; but in normative ethics, debunking arguments face greater obstacles.

The entire article is here, behind a paywall.  Hopefully, your university library can get this for you.

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths

The Significance of Psychopaths for Ethical and Legal Reasoning

William Hirstein and Katrina Sifferd
Elmhurst College

Abstract

The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition.  The first of these models, Newman‘s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair‘s amygdala model and Kiehl‘s paralimbic model represent the psychopath‘s problem as primarily emotional , including reduced tendency to experience fear in normally fearful situations, and a failure to attach the proper significance to the emotions of others. The fourth model locates the problem at a higher level: a failure of  psychopaths to notice and correct for their attentional or emotional problems using ―executive processes.  In normal humans, decisions are accomplished via these executive processes, which are responsible for planning actions, or inhibiting unwise actions, as well as allowing emotions to influence cognition in the proper way. We review the current state of knowledge of the executive capacities of psychopaths. We then evaluate psychopaths in light of the three major  philosophical theories of ethics, utilitarianism, deontological theory, and virtue ethics. Finally,we turn to the difficulty psychopath offenders pose to criminal law, because of the way psychopathy interacts with the various justifications and functions of punishment. We concludewith a brief consideration of the effects of psychopaths on contemporary social structures.

The entire article is here.

Saturday, July 26, 2014

Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior

Jonathan Baron
Synthese
January 2010, Volume 172, Issue 1, pp 7-35

Abstract

Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (which people are willing to impose on others regardless of the consequences) and protected values (PVs, values protected from trade-offs). I present evidence against the idea that voting is expressive, i.e., that voters aim to express their moral views rather than to have an effect on outcomes. I show experimentally that PVs are often moralistic. Finally, I present some data that citizens’ think of their duty in a parochial way, neglecting out-groups. I conclude that moral judgments are important determinants of citizen behavior, that these judgments are subject to biases and based on moralistic values, and that, therefore, outcomes are probably less good than they could be.

The entire article is here.

Monday, July 21, 2014

Neuroimaging study shows why antisocial youths are less able to take the perspective of others

By Max Planck Gesellshft
PsyPost.Org
Originally published on March 11, 2014

Adolescents with antisocial personality disorder inflict serious physical and psychological harm on both themselves and others. However, little is yet known about the underlying neural processes. Researchers at the University of Leiden and the Max Planck Institute for Human Development have pinpointed a possible explanation: Their brain regions responsible for social information processing and impulse control are less developed.

(cut)

Adolescents with antisocial personality disorder thus seem to have difficulties in taking into account all the relevant information in social interactions, such as other people’s intentions. The researchers hypothesize that this in turn leads to more antisocial behavior.

The entire article is here.

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

Why It’s Imperative to Teach Empathy to Boys

By Gayle Allen and Deborah Farmer Kris
Mind/Shift Blog
Originally posted June 25, 2014

When searching for toys for their kids at chain toy stores, parents typically encounter the following scenario: toy aisles are color-coded pink and blue. They shouldn’t bother looking for LEGOS, blocks, and trucks in the pink aisle, and they certainly won’t find baby dolls in the blue aisle.


While parents, researchers, and educators decry the lack of STEM toys for girls — and rightly so — what often goes unnoticed is that assigning genders to toys harms boys, as well. Too often children’s playrooms reinforce gender stereotypes that put boys at risk of failing to gain skills critical for success in life and work. The most important of these? Empathy.

Friday, April 4, 2014

Disgust and biological descriptions bias logical reasoning during legal decision-making

By Beatrice Capestany and Lasana T. Harris
Social Neuroscience
Originally posted February 27, 2014
DOI:10.1080/17470919.2014.892531

Legal decisions often require logical reasoning about the mental states of people who perform gruesome behaviors. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine how brain regions implicated in logical reasoning are modulated by emotion and social cognition during legal decision-making. Participants read vignettes describing crimes that elicit strong or weak disgust matched on punishment severity using the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines. An extraneous sentence at the end of each vignette described the perpetrator’s personality using traits or biological language, mimicking the increased use of scientific evidence presented in courts. Behavioral results indicate that crimes weak in disgust receive significantly less punishment than the guidelines recommend. Neuroimaging results indicate that brain regions active during logical reasoning respond less to crimes weak in disgust and biological descriptions of personality, demonstrating the impact of emotion and social cognition on logical reasoning mechanisms necessary for legal decision-making.

The entire article is here.

Monday, March 31, 2014

Episode 5: Ethical Decision-Making (Part 2)

In Episode 5, John continues to outline relevant factors related to ethical decision-making. The psychologist's fiduciary responsibility is emphasized.  Additionally, John outlines one ethical decision-making model as well as cognitive biases and emotional factors involved with ethical decision-making. John will make suggestions on how to improve ethical decision-making.

At the end of this podcast, the listener will be able to:


1. Describe one ethical decision-making model,

2. Identify one cognitive bias and one emotional factor that can adversely affect decision-
     making, and,
3. Outline three strategies to aid with ethical decision-making.

Click here to purchase 1 APA-approved Continuing Education credit

Find this podcast in iTunes


Listen here directly




Find the Episode 5 video on Vimeo here

Find Episode 5 slides on Slideshare here


Resources


Motivated Moral Reasoning in Psychotherapy

John Gavazzi and Sam Knapp

Nonrational Processes in Ethical Decision-making

Mark Rogerson, Michael C. Gottlieb Mitchell M. Handelsman Samuel Knapp  & Jeffrey Younggren

The Motivated Use of Moral Principles

David Pizarro, Eric Ulhmann, David Tannehbaum, and Peter H. Ditto

Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model

Thomas M. Jones

Avoiding bias in medical ethical decision-making. Lessons to be learnt from psychology research

H. Albisser Schleger, N. R. Oehninger, and S. Reiter-Theil

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Conspiracy theories: Why we believe the unbelievable

By Michael Shermer
The Los Angeles Times
Originally posted on November 26, 2013

Here is an excerpt:

Why do so many people refuse to accept this simple and obvious conclusion? The answer: psychology.

There are three psychological effects at work here, starting with "cognitive dissonance," or the discomfort felt when holding two ideas that are not in harmony. We attempt to reduce the dissonance by altering one of the ideas to be in accord with the other. In this case, the two discordant ideas are 1) JFK as one of the most powerful people on Earth who was 2) killed by Lee Harvey Oswald, a lone loser, a nobody. Camelot brought down by a curmudgeon.

That doesn't feel right. To balance the scale, conspiracy elements are stacked onto the Oswald side: the CIA, the FBI, the KGB, the Mafia, Fidel Castro, Lyndon Johnson and, in Oliver Stone's telling in his film "JFK," the military-industrial complex.

Cognitive dissonance was at work shortly after Princess Diana's death, which was the result of drunk driving, speeding and no seat belt. But princesses are not supposed to die the way thousands of regular people die each year, so the British royal family, the British intelligence services and others had to be fingered as co-conspirators.

The entire story is here.

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

The Moral Behavior of Ethicists and the Power of Reason

By Joshua Rust and Eric Schwitzgebel

Professional ethicists behave no morally better, on average, than do other professors.  At least that’s what we have found in a series of empirical studies that we will summarize below.  Our results create a prima facie challenge for a certain picture of the relationship between intellectual reasoning and moral behavior – a picture on which explicit, intellectual cognition has substantial power to change the moral opinions of the reasoner and thereby to change the reasoner’s moral behavior.  Call this picture the Power of Reason view.  One alternative view has been prominently defended by Jonathan Haidt.  We might call it the Weakness of Reason view, or more colorfully the Rational Tail view, after the headline metaphor of Haidt’s seminal 2001 article, “The emotional dog and its rational tail” (in Haidt’s later 2012 book, the emotional dog becomes an “intuitive dog”).  According to the Rational Tail view (which comes in different degrees of strength), emotion or intuition drives moral opinion and moral behavior, and explicit forms of intellectual cognition function mainly post-hoc, to justify and socially communicate conclusions that flow from emotion or intuition.  Haidt argues that our empirical results favor his view (2012, p. 89).  After all, if intellectual styles of moral reasoning don’t detectably improve the behavior even of professional ethicists who build their careers on expertise in such reasoning, how much hope could there be for the rest of us to improve by such means?  While we agree with Haidt that our results support the Rational Tail view over some rationalistic rivals, we believe that other models of moral psychology are also consistent with our findings, and some of these models reserve an important role for reasoning in shaping the reasoner’s behavior and attitudes.  Part One summarizes our empirical findings.  Part Two explores five different theoretical models, including the Rational Tail, more or less consistent with those findings.

The entire article is here.

Sunday, June 9, 2013

Studying Childhood Morality via Social Groups and Cognition

Rhodes, M. (in press). Naive theories of social groups. Child Development.

Here are some excerpts from this paper regarding the importance of studying moral development.

Yet, despite preschoolers’ general commitment to fairness, the possibility that children view people as having special moral obligations to their own group members cannot be entirely ruled out. This possibility is consistent with several theoretical accounts of morality proposed by social and cultural psychologists (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006; Dovidio, 1984; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine & Thompson, 2004), and there is recent developmental data that appear consistent with this possibility (Castelli, De Amicis, & Sherman, 2007; Rhodes & Brickman, 2011). Thus, this remains an important area for future work.

(cut)

Whereas the majority of research in this area has examined how children appeal to individual mental states to make these predictions, there has recently been increasing emphasis on understanding how children make these predictions by reference to social causes that extend beyond the individual, including social categories, norms, and morality (Hirschfeld, 1996; Olson & Dweck, 2008; Wellman & Miller, 2008). This emphasis—on considering children’s naı¨ve sociology along with their naive psychology—is particularly important given that preschool-age children often weight the causal features  speciļ¬ed by naive sociology (e.g., categories, norms) more heavily than individual mental states (e.g., traits, desires) to predict individual action (Berndt & Heller, 1986; Biernat, 1991; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Kalish, 2002; Kalish & Shiverick, 2004; Lawson & Kalish, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 2008; Taylor, 1996).

The entire paper is here.

Sunday, January 13, 2013

Intellectual property law and the psychology of creativity


By Jessica Bregant, JD, and Jennifer K. Robbennolt, JD, PhD, University of Illinois
The Monitor on Psychology - The Judicial Notebook
January 2013, Vol 44, No. 1
Print version: page 21

Creativity and the process of innovation are fertile grounds for psychological research, with applications spanning education, the arts, business and science. Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the topic of creativity in the context of patent law. The case, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., revisited a long-observed legal prohibition on patenting the "laws of nature" and illustrates one of the many ways in which law, particularly intellectual property law, can be informed and shaped by psychological principles.

(cut)

The court, in Mayo, identified the competing incentives created by the availability of patents: The rights granted by patents are intended to provide an economic incentive for innovation but may also restrict the flow of information and cross-fertilization of ideas among inventors. To balance these interests, patents are generally issued only for inventions that are novel, not obvious and useful. The court also recognized the breadth of the fields to which patent law (and, more broadly, intellectual property law) applies. Different types of creative activities may involve different aspects of creativity.

Psychologists have much to contribute to an understanding of the cognitive processes by which people engage in creative activity, how those processes are similar and different across substantively different fields, what motivates creative activity, whether and how the rules of intellectual property can encourage or stifle innovation, and what else might be done to cultivate innovation.


The entire article is here.