Freedom in an Age of Algocracy

John Danaher
forthcoming in Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Technology
edited by Shannon Vallor

Abstract

There is a growing sense of unease around algorithmic modes of governance ('algocracies') and their impact on freedom. Contrary to the emancipatory utopianism of digital enthusiasts, many now fear that the rise of algocracies will undermine our freedom. Nevertheless, there has been some struggle to explain exactly how this will happen. This chapter tries to address the shortcomings in the existing discussion by arguing for a broader conception/understanding of freedom as well as a broader conception/understanding of algocracy. Broadening the focus in this way enables us to see how algorithmic governance can be both emancipatory and enslaving, and provides a framework for future development and activism around the creation of this technology.

From the Conclusion:

Finally, I’ve outlined a framework for thinking about the likely impact of algocracy on freedom. Given the complexity of freedom and the complexity of algocracy, I’ve argued that there is unlikely to be a simple global assessment of the freedom-promoting or undermining power of algocracy. This is something that has to be assessed and determined on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, there are at least five interesting and relatively novel mechanisms through which algocratic systems can both promote and undermine freedom. We should pay attention to these different mechanisms, but do so in a properly contextualized manner, and not by ignoring the pre-existing mechanisms through which freedom is undermined and promoted.

The book chapter is here.

Colleges want freshmen to use mental health apps. But are they risking students’ privacy?

Deanna Paul
The New York Times
Originally posted 2 Jan 20

Here are two excepts:

TAO Connect is just one of dozens of mental health apps permeating college campuses in recent years. In addition to increasing the bandwidth of college counseling centers, the apps offer information and resources on mental health issues and wellness. But as student demand for mental health services grows, and more colleges turn to digital platforms, experts say universities must begin to consider their role as stewards of sensitive student information and the consequences of encouraging or mandating these technologies.

The rise in student wellness applications arrives as mental health problems among college students have dramatically increased. Three out of 5 U.S. college students experience overwhelming anxiety, and 2 in 5 students reported debilitating depression, according to a 2018 survey from the American College Health Association.

Even so, only about 15 percent of undergraduates seek help at a university counseling center. These apps have begun to fill students’ needs by providing ongoing access to traditional mental health services without barriers such as counselor availability or stigma.

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“If someone wants help, they don’t care how they get that help,” said Lynn E. Linde, chief knowledge and learning officer for the American Counseling Association. “They aren’t looking at whether this person is adequately credentialed and are they protecting my rights. They just want help immediately.”

Yet she worried that students may be giving up more information than they realize and about the level of coercion a school can exert by requiring students to accept terms of service they otherwise wouldn’t agree to.

“Millennials understand that with the use of their apps they’re giving up privacy rights. They don’t think to question it,” Linde said.

The info is here.

NACAC Agrees to Change Its Code of Ethics

Scott Jaschik
insidehighered.com
Originally published September 30-, 2019

When the Assembly of the National Association for College Admission Counseling has in years past debated measures to regulate the recruiting of international students or the proper rules for waiting lists and many other issues, debate has been heated. It was anything but heated this year, although the issue before the delegates was arguably more important than any of those.

Delegates voted Saturday -- 211 to 3 -- to strip provisions from the Code of Ethics and Professional Practice that may violate antitrust laws. The provisions are:

• Colleges must not offer incentives exclusive to students applying or admitted under an early decision application plan. Examples of incentives include the promise of special housing, enhanced financial aid packages, and special scholarships for early decision admits. Colleges may, however, disclose how admission rates for early decision differ from those for other admission plans."

• College choices should be informed, well-considered, and free from coercion. Students require a reasonable amount of time to identify their college choices; complete applications for admission, financial aid, and scholarships; and decide which offer of admission to accept. Once students have committed themselves to a college, other colleges must respect that choice and cease recruiting them."

• Colleges will not knowingly recruit or offer enrollment incentives to students who are already enrolled, registered, have declared their intent, or submitted contractual deposits to other institutions. May 1 is the point at which commitments to enroll become final, and colleges must respect that. The recognized exceptions are when students are admitted from a wait list, students initiate inquiries themselves, or cooperation is sought by institutions that provide transfer programs."

• Colleges must not solicit transfer applications from a previous year’s applicant or prospect pool unless the students have themselves initiated a transfer inquiry or the college has verified prior to contacting the students that they are either enrolled at a college that allows transfer recruitment from other colleges or are not currently enrolled in a college."

Before they approved the measure to strip the provisions, the delegates approved (unanimously) rules that would limit discussion, but they didn't need the rules. There was no discussion on stripping the provisions, which most NACAC members learned of only at the beginning of the month. The Justice Department has been investigating NACAC for possible violations of antitrust laws for nearly two years, but the details of that investigation have not been generally known for most of that time. The Justice Department believes that with these rules, colleges are colluding to take away student choices.

The info is here.

Middle managers may turn to unethical behavior to face unrealistic expectations

Science Daily
Originally published October 5, 2017

While unethical behavior in organizations is often portrayed as flowing down from top management, or creeping up from low-level positions, a team of researchers suggest that middle management also can play a key role in promoting wide-spread unethical behavior among their subordinates.

In a study of a large telecommunications company, researchers found that middle managers used a range of tactics to inflate their subordinates' performance and deceive top management, according to Linda Treviño, distinguished professor of organizational behavior and ethics, Smeal College of Business, Penn State. The managers may have been motivated to engage in this behavior because leadership instituted performance targets that were unrealizable, she added.

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Middle managers also used a range of tactics to coerce their subordinates to keep up the ruse, including rewards for unethical behavior and public shaming for those who were reluctant to engage in the unethical tactics.

"Interestingly, what we didn't see is managers speaking up, we didn't see them pushing back against the unrealistic goals," said Treviño. "We know a lot about what we refer to as 'voice' in an organization and people are fearful and they tend to keep quiet for the most part."

The article is here.

The target article is here.

Feds probing psychiatric hospitals for locking in patients to boost profits

Beth Mole
Ars Technica
Originally published May 24, 2017

At least three US federal agencies are now investigating Universal Health Services over allegations that its psychiatric hospitals keep patients longer than needed in order to milk insurance companies, Buzzfeed News reports.

According to several sources, the UHS' chain of psychiatric facilities—the largest in the country—will delay patients' discharge dates until the day insurance coverage runs out, regardless of the need of the patient. Because the hospitals are reimbursed per day, the practice extracts the maximum amount of money from insurance companies. It also can be devastating to patients, who are needlessly kept from returning to their jobs and families. To cover up the scheme, medical notes are sometimes altered and doctors come up with excuses, such as medication changes, sources allege. Employees say they repeatedly hear the phrase: “don’t leave days on the table.”

The Department of Health and Human Services has been investigating UHS for several years, as Buzzfeed has previously reported. UHS, a $12 billion company, gets a third of its revenue from government insurance providers. In 2013, HHS issued subpoenas to 10 UHS psychiatric hospitals.

But now it seems the Department of Defense and the FBI have also gotten involved.

The article is here.

Ethics of Coercive Treatment and Misuse of Psychiatry

Tilman Steinert
Psychiatric Services
http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201600066

Abstract

The author discusses a pragmatic approach to decisions about coercive treatment that is based on four principles from principle-based ethics: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. This approach can reconcile psychiatry’s perspective with the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities. Coercive treatment can be justified only when a patient’s capacity to consent is substantially impaired and severe danger to health or life cannot be prevented by less intrusive means. In this case, withholding treatment can violate the principle of justice. In the case of danger to others, social exclusion and loss of freedom can be seen as harming psychosocial health, which can justify coercive treatment. Considerable efforts are required to support patients’ informed decisions and avoid allowing others to make substitute decisions. Mental disorder alone without impaired capacity does not justify involuntary treatment, which can be considered a misuse of psychiatry. Involuntary detention without treatment can be justified for short periods for assessment and to offer treatment options.

The article is here.

Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason

Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu
Neuroethics
First Online: 09 July 2016
DOI: 10.1007/s12152-016-9268-5

Abstract

In this paper we reply to the most important objections to our advocacy of moral enhancement by biomedical means – moral bioenhancement – that John Harris advances in his new book How to be Good. These objections are to effect that such moral enhancement undercuts both moral reasoning and freedom. The latter objection is directed more specifically at what we have called the God Machine, a super-duper computer which predicts our decisions and prevents decisions to perpetrate morally atrocious acts. In reply, we argue first that effective moral bioenhancement presupposes moral reasoning rather than undermines it. Secondly, that the God Machine would leave us with extensive freedom and that the restrictions it imposes on it are morally justified by the prevention of harm to victims.

The online article is here.

People Feel Less Responsible For Their Actions When They're Following Orders

By Katrina Pascual
Tech Times
Originally posted February 19, 2016

Here is an excerpt:

Now, the modified experiment, conducted by University College London researchers, reflected the subjects' mental distance from their actions when obeying orders.

"We wanted to know what people actually felt about the action as they made it, and about the outcome. Time perception tells us something about the basic experiences people have when they act, not just about how they think they should have felt," said UCL professor and senior study author Patrick Haggard.

Results showed that when the subjects freely chose the action in coercive orders, there was a longer interval between the action and tone, which is produced when subjects gave their partner an electric shock by pressing a key.

The article is here.

That Time The United States Sterilized 60,000 Of Its Citizens

By Alexandra Minna Stern
The Huffington Post
Originally published January 7, 2016

Not too long ago, more than 60,000 people were sterilized in the United States based on eugenic laws. Most of these operations were performed before the 1960s in institutions for the so-called “mentally ill” or “mentally deficient.” In the early 20th century across the country, medical superintendents, legislators, and social reformers affiliated with an emerging eugenics movement joined forces to put sterilization laws on the books. Such legislation was motivated by crude theories of human heredity that posited the wholesale inheritance of traits associated with a panoply of feared conditions such as criminality, feeblemindedness, and sexual deviance. Many sterilization advocates viewed reproductive surgery as a necessary public health intervention that would protect society from deleterious genes and the social and economic costs of managing “degenerate stock.” From today’s vantage point, compulsory sterilization looks patently like reproductive coercion and unethical medical practice.

At the time, however, sterilization both was countenanced by the U.S. Supreme Court (in the 1927 Buck v. Bell case) and supported by many scientists, reformers, and lawmakers as one prong of a larger strategy to improve society by encouraging the reproduction of the “fit” and restricting the procreation of the “unfit.” In total, 32 U.S. states passed sterilization laws between 1907 and 1937, and surgeries reached their highest numbers in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Beginning in the 1970s, state legislatures began to repeal these laws, finding them antiquated and discriminatory, particularly towards people with disabilities.

The article is here.

Detox or lose your benefits

New welfare proposals are based on bad evidence and worse ethics

Ian Hamilton

The Conversation

Originally posted August 3, 2015

When is a choice not really a choice? It could be argued that the latest proposal from the government aimed at people who have problems with drugs and alcohol is not a choice but an ultimatum – accept help for your problem or lose your right to welfare benefits.

This proposal raises some very serious issues. Treating any condition is based on consent – the person should be willing to have the treatment. In this case, people have little choice and therefore they would probably be consenting to treatment to avoid losing money. This also passes on an ethical dilemma to treatment staff, who would need to decide if they are willing to participate in state-sponsored coercion.

The entire article is here.

The Ethics of Chemical Castration (Part One)

By John Danaher
Philosophical Disquisitions: Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies
Originally posted December 15, 2013

Chemical castration has been legally recognised and utilised as a form of treatment for certain types of sex offender for many years. This is in the belief that it can significantly reduce recidivism rates amongst this class of offenders. Its usage varies around the world. Nine U.S. states currently allow for it, as well as several European countries. Typically, it is presented as an “option” to sex offenders who are currently serving prison sentences. The idea being that if they voluntarily submit to chemical castration they can serve a reduced sentence.

Obviously, this practice raises a number of empirical and ethical questions. Does chemical castration actually reduce recidivism? Is it ethically right to present a convicted sex offender with a choice between continued imprisonment or release with chemical castration? Is this not unduly coercive and autonomy-undermining?

The entire article is here.

Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: Attitudes about Payments to Research Participants

Emily A. Largent, Christine Grady, Franklin G. Miller, and Alan Wertheimer, "Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: Attitudes about Payments to Research Participants," IRB: Ethics & Human Research 34, no. 1 (2012): 1-8.

Using payment to recruit research subjects is a common practice, but it raises ethical concerns that coercion or undue inducement could potentially compromise participants’ informed consent. This is the first national study to explore the attitudes of IRB members and other human subjects protection professionals concerning whether payment of research participants constitutes coercion or undue influence, and if so, why. The majority of respondents expressed concern that payment of any amount might influence a participant’s decisions or behaviors regarding research participation. Respondents expressed greater acceptance of payment as reimbursement or compensation than as an incentive to participate in research, and most agreed that subjects are coerced if the offer of payment makes them participate when they otherwise would not or when the offer of payment causes them to feel that they have no reasonable alternative but to participate (82%). Views about undue influence were similar. We conclude that human subjects protection professionals hold expansive and inconsistent views about coercion and undue influence that may interfere with the recruitment of research participants and impede valuable research.

The entire article is here.

Reviewing Autonomy

Implications of the Neurosciences and the Free Will Debate for the Principle of Respect for the Patient's Autonomy

Sabine Muller & Henrik Walter. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. New York: Apr 2010. Vol. 19, Iss. 2; pg. 205, 13 pgs

Introduction

Beauchamp and Childress have performed a great service by strengthening the principle of respect for the patient's autonomy against the paternalism that dominated medicine until at least the 1970s. Nevertheless, we think that the concept of autonomy should be elaborated further. We suggest such an elaboration built on recent developments within the neurosciences and the free will debate. The reason for this suggestion is at least twofold: First, Beauchamp and Childress neglect some important elements of autonomy. Second, neuroscience itself needs a conceptual apparatus to deal with the neural basis of autonomy for diagnostic purposes. This desideratum is actually increasing because modern therapy options can considerably influence the neural basis of autonomy itself.

Beauchamp and Childress analyze autonomous actions in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences (coercion, persuasion, and manipulation) that determine their actions. ¹ In terms of the free will debate, the absence of external controlling influences, their third criterion, corresponds to the freedom of action: to do what one wants to do without being hindered to do so. Criteria one and two are related to volition: that a choice is intentional, that is, that it has a certain goal that is properly understood by the person choosing.

According to Beauchamp and Childress, the principle of autonomy implies that patients have the right to choose between different medical therapy options taking into account risks and benefits as well as their personal situation and individual values. To enable an autonomous decision the procedure of informed consent ² has been developed. This procedure has become the gold standard in almost every part of medicine. Importantly, Beauchamp and Childress demand respect for a patient's autonomy under the premise that the patient is able to act in a sufficiently autonomous manner. ³ The crucial question in a special situation is whether this is the case.

Let us consider the example of the recent controversial discussion of Body Integrity Identity disorder: ⁴ If a patient asks a physician to amputate one of his legs although it neither hurts nor is deformed, paralyzed, or ugly (in the patient's view), and if the patient understands the consequences of the amputation and is not controlled by external influences, then one could deduce from the principle of respect for the patient's autonomy that the physician should amputate the leg. Although some commentators regard this as self-evident, we think that the case is not yet made, as it is important which internal processes have led to the wish of the patient.

We propose to add a fourth criterion for autonomous actions, namely, freedom of internal coercive influences. In the case of the patient who desires an amputation, it would have to be investigated whether his decision is based on internal coercion. Clear examples for that would be an acute episode of schizophrenia or a brain tumor. More controversial are neurotic beliefs, obsession and compulsion, severe personality disorders, or neurological dysfunctions not accessible with conventional diagnostic tools.

Although Beauchamp and Childress have not elaborated the principle of autonomy with regard to internal coercions, they clearly argue that the obligations to respect autonomy do not apply to persons who show a substantial lack of autonomy because they are immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced, or exploited, for example, infants, irrationally suicidal individuals, severely demented subjects, or drug-dependent patients. ⁵ But these kinds of patients are treated in medical ethics as exceptions and therefore as marginal cases. They are not considered to be important for the formulation of the principles.

The rest of the article can be found here.  Without access to PubMed.gov, it is not available for free.  A university library may also be helpful in reading the entire article.