Get lucky: Situationism and circumstantial moral luck

Marcela Herdova & Stephen Kearns 

(2015) Philosophical Explorations, 18:3, 362-377

DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2015.1026923

Abstract

Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of (supposed) moral luck.

From the Conclusion

Those who insist on the significance of luck to our practices of moral assessment are on somewhat of a tightrope. If we consider agents who differ only in the external results of their actions, and who are faced with normatively similar circumstances, it is difficult to maintain that there is any major difference in the degree of such agents’ moral responsibility. If we consider agents that differ rather significantly, and face normatively distinct situations, then though luck may play a role in what normative circumstances they face, there is much to base a moral assessment on that is either under the agents’ control or distinctive of each agent and their respective responses to their normative circumstances (or both). The role luck plays in our assessments of such agents, then, is arguably small enough that it is unclear that any difference in moral assessment can be properly said to be due  to this luck (at least to an extent that should worry us or that is inconsiderable tension with our usual moral thinking).

A pdf is here.

Debunking the Myth of Kitty Genovese

By Larry Getlen
The New York Post
Originally published February 16, 2014

Here is an excerpt:

But as journalist Kevin Cook details in his new book, “Kitty Genovese: The Murder, the Bystanders, the Crime that Changed America” (W.W. Nor­ton), some of the real thoughtlessness came from a police commissioner who lazily passed a falsehood to a journalist, and a media that fell so deeply in love with a story that it couldn’t be bothered to determine whether it was true.

The account of the murder at the top of this story is accurate, based on Cook’s reporting. Instead of a narrative of apathy, the media could have told instead of the people who tried to help, and of the complex circumstances — many boiling down to a lack not of compassion, but of information — that prevented some ­others from calling for aid.

One could argue that Genovese became a legend not on the day she was killed, but 10 days later, when New York City Police Commissioner Michael “Bull” Murphy had lunch with The New York Times’ new city editor — later to become the paper’s executive ­editor — Abe Rosenthal.
After Rosenthal brought up a case Murphy wished to avoid discussing, the commissioner pivoted to the Genovese case.

“Brother, that Queens story is one for the books. Thirty-eight witnesses,” Murphy said. “I’ve been in this business a long time, but this beats everything.”

The entire story is here.